Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/64

BC–57

Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 24th March, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Present Also Present
America, United States of America, United States of
President Wilson Admiral Benson
Hon. R. Lansing Capt. Schofield
Secretary-General Mr. James B. Scott
. . . . . . . Dr. I. Bowman
Secretaries Dr. Haskins
Mr. A. H. Frazier Dr. Lord
Mr. L. Harrison Mr. Dickson
British Empire British Empire
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George Sir Eyre Crowe
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour Mr. C. J. B. Hurst
Secretary-General Colonel F. H. Kisch
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey Dr. Pierce Higgins
Secretary France
Mr. E. Phipps M. Tardieu
France M. Cambon
M. Clemenceau M. Fromageot
M. Pichon M. de Lasteyrie
Secretary-General Peace Conference M. Hermitte
M. Dutasta Marshal Foch
Secretaries General Weygand
M. Berthelot General le Rond
M. Arnavon Italy
M. de Bearn Admiral Thaon di Revel
Italy Admiral Grassi
H. E. M. Orlando Captain R. N. Ruspoli
H. E. Baron Sonnino Marquis della Torretta
Secretary-General M. Brambilla
Count Aldrovandi Japan
Secretary M. Yamakawa
M. Bertele Capt. S. Yamamoto
Japan
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. Marquis Saionji
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Joint Secretariat

America, United States of Lieut. Burden.
British Empire Major A. M. Caccia.
France Captain A. Portier.
Italy Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan M. Kawai.
Interpreter:—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

(1) (See Annexure “A”.) Transport of General Haller’s Troops to Poland Through Dantzig

(2) M. Clemenceau called on M. Fromageot to give a summary of the report of the Committee on Submarine Cables. Disposal of Enemy-Owned Submarine Cables:

(a) Report of Committee on Enemy-Owned Submarine Cables M. Fromageot said that at a meeting of the Supreme War Council held at the Quai d’Orsay, on Friday, March 7th, 1919,1 the following resolution was accepted:—

“(1) Is it right under the rules or principles of International law to treat as capture or prize submarine telegraph cables of an enemy cut or taken possession of by naval operations?

(2) Is it right under the rules or principles of International law for a Government whose naval forces have cut or taken possession of a submarine telegraph cable of an enemy to retain such cable by way of reparation?

(3) In the event that the cut or captured cable of an enemy is landed on the territory of another nation, what right and authority does such nation possess under contracts or permits granted to the enemy to cancel the same or to control the use of the cable?”

To these questions the Committee had submitted the following replies:—

On the first and second questions.

(1)
The Committee is unanimous in thinking that military necessity is a justification for the cutting of enemy cables.
(2)
On the question as to whether the enemy cables can or cannot be the subject of capture or prize the Delegates of the British Empire, France and Japan think that the capture and confiscation of enemy cables are legally justified by the general principle of the right of capture of enemy property at sea. The delegates of the United States and of Italy consider, on the other hand, that in the present state of international law this opinion is not well founded, the property in enemy cables cannot be assimilated to property subject to capture at sea.
(3)
In these circumstances the Committee is unanimous in considering that in the absence of a special rule, recognising the right of confiscation of enemy submarine cables, the treaty of peace must decide the disposal of these cables.

On the third question.

The Committee is unanimous in considering that the answer depends upon the terms of the contracts entered into between the owner [Page 461] of the cable and the third Power on whose territory such cable is landed, and that, in all cases, these contracts are, as regards the belligerents who have cut or seized the cable, a res inter alios acta.

(b) British Views in Regard to Disposal of Enemy Cables Mr. Balfour said that as far as he had been able to make himself acquainted with the report of the Committee, he did not think it gave as much assistance as had been hoped for. The question would, therefore, have to be discussed in full conference. In the first place, he thought that two points should be sharply distinguished, namely: a first question, which was relevant to peace with Germany, and a second question, which would have to be left to be settled after peace had been concluded. The latter question was this: “Ought world-arrangements to be made for the regulation of submarine cables?” It might well be that the movement to internationalise waterways, great rivers, straits, certain railways, etc., would have to be extended to cables, which were of the utmost value for commercial purposes. That question, however, could well be postponed.

The other question to be decided was this: “Had Germany any right over cables which had been cut and diverted? Had Germany any right to complain and, if so, what principle should be asserted?” In his opinion Germany had no right to complain of the action which had been taken; and the Allied and Associated Governments had a right to appropriate cables in exactly the same manner as ships captured at sea. That view, he admitted, had not received unanimous acceptance: it had been accepted by the French, Japanese and British members, and rejected by the American and Italian representatives. Consequently, a difference of opinion existed, and it was difficult for a man who was not a lawyer to argue where lawyers disagreed. He maintained, however, that the question had been settled during the Spanish-American War, when the United States Courts had decreed that belligerents had no claims in regard to cables cut during the War. He did not think that the Germans could, with reason, complain if the Allies seized the cables which, though constructed by private enterprise, had been heavily subventioned by the enemy Governments and used by them for strategic and warlike purposes, until destroyed. Therefore, in his opinion, if the right to appropriate any property at all were admitted, the right to appropriate cables undoubtedly existed. He did not wish to make any pronouncement in regard to the regulation of cables throughout the world. That world-problem could not be discussed during the present conferences, and the consideration of that question would have to be postponed to a more favourable occasion. That was all he wished to say on the subject for the moment and he would like to hear the case argued on the other side before saying anything more.

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(c) French Views in Regard to Disposal of Enemy Cables Admiral de Bon said that at the Meeting of the Supreme War Council held on March 6th, 1919, when the question of the disposal of German cables first came under discussion,2 he had expressed the view that submarine cables undoubtedly formed instruments of war, since they were used for the transmission of enemy messages and, since ships had been lost in cutting enemy submarine cables, the latter must be considered to be war material and fair prize, resulting from war operations. At that meeting, the view appeared to have been accepted by all parties that Germany could have no pretentions in regard to the future disposal of her submarine cables. Furthermore, when the matter came to be referred to the Judicial Commission, the conclusion reached was that International Law contained nothing which would upset the views expressed by the Military Authorities. In regard to the principle involved, two points of view had been expressed by the legal experts, which clearly proved that the problem could not be solved on purely legal grounds. The British, French and Japanese experts held that the Allied and Associated Governments had full right to appropriate the cables in question, while the American and Italian experts held the opposite view without having any established principles on which to base their conclusions. In other words, the views expressed were not based on International Law. In this connection he wished, however, to point out that the views expressed by the American Members of the Committee were not shared by other American experts, such as Mr. Grafton Wilson and Admiral Stockton.

He agreed with Mr. Balfour that the question to be answered was this: “Could the Allied and Associated Governments appropriate cables without giving Germany just cause of complaint?” He thought the Conference was entitled to accept the recommendations made by their Military experts since the legal experts had been unable to produce any ruling against such procedure. In other words, the Allied and Associated Governments should decide to keep the cables in question. In regard to the regulation of cables throughout the world, he agreed that the question should form the subject of future study, since it did not appertain to the immediate problem under consideration.

(d) American Views in Regard to Disposal of Enemy Cables Mr. Lansing said that he had listened with interest to the arguments advanced in favour of retaining possession of the cables seized by France and Great Britain during the war, and he quite agreed with Mr. Balfour that the matter of internationalising cables should be taken up as soon as possible so that there should be no monopoly of cables. In the case under consideration, he thought the report submitted by the Committee was excellent in that it did not attempt to solve what had not been solved. The Committee had arrived at the unanimous [Page 463] conclusion that no law existed, which could be applied to the cases referred to it. The Committee had, it was true, unanimously admitted the right to cut cables as a war measure; but he (Mr. Lansing) denied the fact that the cutting of cables as a war measure gave the right of possession. In his opinion there was a very great difference between the capture of ships at sea and the seizure of cables. Cables were attached to a submarine region, which was not in the sovereignty of any nation. The cutting of a cable was merely an expedient of war; and, in his opinion, it was wrong that such a cable should continue in the possession of the nation, who cut it, after hostilities were over. Furthermore, cables could not be considered as belonging wholly to one country since they crossed other territorial waters and terminated in other countries. Consequently, to divert such cables to other uses and to deprive their use to former owners would constitute a dangerous precedent. The basis of capture on the high seas was that the ship could be brought within the jurisdiction of the captor, where it could be reduced to possession. This could not be done with submarine cables. Cables were the result of private enterprise and represented investments of money by individuals or companies. If it were argued that the keeping of cables deprived individuals of all ownership, no individuals would hereafter invest money in cables, to the great detriment of mankind. Admiral de Bon had given expression to the opinion held by certain naval authorities; but he would invite attention to the fact that there was not unanimity on the subject among naval experts. To sum up, in his opinion, since no basis in law existed for the guidance of the Conference, he thought it would be most impolitic to take over as spoils of war cables useful to all the world and to convert them into the State property of the captors. Such action would be contrary to American opinion as it involved acceptance of the principle that the conqueror could deal with the conquered as he wished.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether Mr. Lansing wished to suggest that cables were less useful to mankind because removed from the property of Germans.

Mr. Lansing replied that his contention was that it would make more of a monopoly.

Mr. Balfour said that he himself was no lover of monopolies, but he thought the word was somewhat out of place in connection with the question under investigation. As far as the connection between the United States of America and Europe was concerned, he would admit that the majority, but not all the cables passed through Great Britain. He believed 13 cables passed through Great Britain; but all of them were owned or controlled by American capital. He quite agreed that a cable landing in a country would be subject to the laws [Page 464] of that country, and in war-time it was only natural that restrictions would be put on the use of such cables, as national interests might require. As a result, cases had occurred when Great Britain had been obliged to take over the control of all the 13 cables just mentioned. But in addition to the 13 American cables to Europe, which passed through Great Britain, there were 3 other cables which went through France and did not touch British soil. Consequently, he thought the word monopoly was somewhat excessive.

In regard to the question of sparing private property amid the horrors of war, he would invite attention to the fact that the United States of America had itself, during the war, put in a claim for acquiring 600 miles of German cables and the British Government had given its consent. He was ignorant, however, whether the United States had used those 600 miles of cable or not. But, at any rate, the American Government had not driven to its extreme logical conclusion the principle which Mr. Lansing had laid down, the justice of which he himself fully recognised. He thought that the case had been very fairly presented on both sides. He quite felt that the question of international communications would have to be dealt with sooner or later; but all were agreed that it could not form part of the problem under consideration.

(e) Mr. Lansing’s Proposal to Refer Question to Prize Court Mr. Lansing enquired whether the Conference thought it would be advisable to submit to a Prize Court the question of the right to the appropriation of the cables in question.

Mr. Balfour said he would wish, in the first place, to consult with his experts. He feared, however, that a Prize Court would refuse to give any judgment as no actual precedent existed.

(f) President Wilson’s Views on Appropriation of Enemy Cables President Wilson said he had experienced great difficulty in coming to a conclusion. In the first place he would have hesitated to discuss the question from a legal point of view, but as no legal point of view existed he felt warranted in expressing an opinion. It was true that the problem to be solved contained two parts, namely:— (1) Was Germany to be deprived of the ownership of the cables, and (2) what was to be done with them in regard to their use as indispensable means of communication? Up to now the Conference had only considered the question from the point of view of depriving the Germans of the ownership of the cables as a result of the war; but it should not be overlooked that the question also affected the whole commercial world. For that reason he was unable to agree with Admiral de Bon that the cables could be appropriated solely on the ground that they formed instrumentalities of war; for it was evident, that cables were also indispensable instruments of commerce, and indispensable to the pacific intercourse of nations. He thought, therefore, the cables must [Page 465] be regarded as property from the point of view of habitual use, that is to say, from a peace point of view. As a consequence, it would be impossible to contemplate embarrassing their use as means for reestablishing the ordinary courses and processes of trade, to which the commercial world had become accustomed in times of peace. Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Governments expected Germany to pay heavy sums as reparation, and she could only do that by establishing favourable international balances to herself; otherwise she would be compelled to pay in her own currencies, which would be of little value to the Allies. It followed, therefore, that the question of the ownership of the cables must also be looked at from the German trade point of view. Four cables existed with one end in Germany itself, namely: the Emden-Vigo, Emden-Brest, Emden-Teneriffe, and Emden-Azores lines. These formed means of communication between Germany and the rest of the commercial world, and, in his opinion, it would be agreed that it made a great difference whether they were administered by one instrument or various.

Reference had been made to the decision reached by the United States Courts in the Spanish-American war, when it had been decided that damages could not be claimed for what had been done to cables during the period of hostilities. That decision related merely to the responsibility of the Government towards the owners of enemy property. Similarly, in his opinion, the cables now under consideration were really enemy private property, unless it could be established that the Government was the only owner. Consequently, the question of the disposal of the cables was one which could only be dealt with in connection with the disposal of other enemy property, since all countries had during the war taken temporary possession of enemy alien property within its borders. He thought the question would have to be considered from that point of view. Those familiar with International Conferences on the Rights of Nations maintained that the United States of America had never willingly assented to the principle of the capture of private property at sea. He would, therefore, hesitate to agree to the appropriation of the cables in question, even if cables could be considered to be private property, captured at sea. Hence he shared the views of the American representatives on the Committee. In his opinion, no analogy could be drawn between cables, which consisted of fixed lines uniting two shores, and ships, which were built to move from place to place and which could be converted into possession when carried into the harbours of the captors. He begged the Conference to proceed very slowly in deciding to do something, the basis of which had never been discussed in time of peace when a careful and unbiased decision could have been reached. In his opinion, it would be extremely unwise to establish a principle of law as a war measure.

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(g) Diversion of Enemy Cables Cut Mr. Balfour said he wished to make one observation of a practical character without adding anything more to the theory of the principles involved. The Conference had discussed the question of restoring these cables to Germany in order that she might resume her economic existence. That was an error because the belligerents besides cutting the cables had also diverted them. The point, therefore, was that though would be possible to relay the cables at the expense of the Allies, it would not be possible to hand over the cables as they were before the war. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the necessities of war and the pressure of events had compelled France and Great Britain to divert these cables. Therefore, nothing could be done except to relay them in order to revert to the statu[s] quo ante bellum.

President Wilson enquired whether a list of the cables which had so been diverted could be given.

(Mr. Balfour then read a list of the cables which had been diverted.)

President Wilson enquired whether by diversion was merely meant that the cable had been cut, and the cut end being attached to a new cable which went in the new direction required.

Mr. Balfour explained that for the purpose of diverting the cables whole sections had been taken up and placed in an altogether different position.

M. Clemenceau said he found some difficulty in arriving at a definite conclusion. He had at first thought that the suggestion made by Mr. Lansing to refer the question to a Prize Court would have found acceptance. But he was now given to understand that the Prize Courts both of Great Britain and France would be compelled to rule that the question fell outside their jurisdiction because no precedent existed.

In his opinion a distinction would have to be made between the question of right, which could only be settled by law, and the question of fact. He had been much struck by the statement made by Mr. Balfour that the cables having been rightly diverted as an act of war, could not be restored to their former position, and the act of war constituted an accomplished fact. The question of right could however be referred to a legal committee.

(h) Japan’s Views in Regard to Disposal of Cables Baron Makino said that the cables mentioned in today’s programme comprised two links in which Japan was interested. The Japanese view, as expressed by her experts, coincided with the opinions expressed by Great Britain and France. In regard to the two cables seized by Japan, the one belonged entirely to the German Government; the other was private, but had been heavily subsidized by the German Government out of all proportion to its importance. Both cables had been employed to promote Germany’s “Welt Politik” as well [Page 467] as her economic domination. He did not wish to discuss the legal aspect of the case; but from the point of view of preventing military domination and economic abuses Japan was opposed to the return of the cables to Germany, since they might again be used for the same purposes. In conclusion he would add that the two cables in question had also been taken up and diverted for war purposes, and in that respect the situation in Japan was the same as that of Great Britain and France.

President Wilson asked Baron Makino to name the two lines he had referred to.

Baron Makino replied that the two lines in question were:—

(1) Chifu-Tsingtau-Shanghai.
(2) { Yap-Shanghai.
Yap-Menado.

(i) Italy’s Views in Regard to Disposal of Enemy Cables M. Orlando said that there were evidently two questions involved; the question of law and the question of fact. In regard to the legal aspect of the case he had always maintained that law was not a mystical science and, consequently, any one possessed with an atom of common sense had a right to express an opinion. From a common sense point of view he thought the Conference could not talk of applying to cables the Clauses of International law applicable to ships, since the two cases were quite different: the law applicable to ships was inapplicable to cables.

Next in regard to the possibility of appropriating a particular thing. If the thing were private property, even enemy property, it could not, in accordance with the rules of international law, be appropriated. In his opinion the two principles which he had just expressed must be accepted, namely: the impossibility of applying the rules relating to the capture of ships to the seizure of cables and, secondly, the illegality of appropriating private enemy property. He would add, however, with equal frankness, that the question of fact put forward by M. Balfour had made a great impression on him because, whilst international law could not be applied, the dictum that “what is done is done” could be accepted. In regard to the diversion of the cables it would be necessary to decide whether such action was permissible under the rules of war. That question had been unanimously decided in the affirmative, that is to say, a permissible act of war had been accomplished. Secondly, it was evident that the cables in question could not be restored to Germany, and either an indemnity would have to be paid to Germany or something would have to be done to put the cables back in the position in which they were before the war. In his opinion, to do this would be to admit that what had been done had not been right. He regretted that the fact relating to the [Page 468] diversion of the cables had not been raised before the question had been referred to the special commission, because, in his opinion, that fact altered the whole situation. On the legal aspect of the case he was in complete agreement, with the views expressed by the American and Italian representatives, but if the facts were as stated by Mr. Balfour, that is to say, if the Allied and Associated Governments were faced with an accomplished act which had been carried out in strict accordance with the admitted rules of war, then the thing had been done, and there was really no question for discussion.

(j) M. Tardieu’s Proposal M. Tardieu thought that the Conference was faced with a question of fact which could not be undone, and a question of law relating to the disposal of private enemy property. Under these conditions he suggested that all the German Government’s cables should be appropriated, and the private cables should be kept, their value being entered on the list of reparations, the German Government being charged with the duty of indemnifying private owners.

President Wilson said that the principle he was seeking to go on was this. He was interested in seeing that there should be an entirely just Peace, rather than that advantages should be gained by any Country from a material point of view. The decisions embodied in the Peace Treaty should be such that they could hereafter be accepted as precedents. Thus, while he understood that the right to cut cables had been established by law, he was doubtful whether the same right existed to divert cables to other termini, that is to say, to appropriate private property to public uses. On that question he would be glad to have an expert ruling.

Mr. Balfour said that he did not pretend to have sufficient authority to deal with the question of law. Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson said that the right to cut cables in time of war had been established. In his opinion, that right had only been established because the United States of America had done it, that was apparently the only justification.

President Wilson explained that the question had been referred for decision to a Commission.

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that so far as his opinion went the United States of America had cut a cable, the British Government had complained, the question had then been taken to a Court and tried by the regular machinery, which had justified the action taken by the American Government by ruling that private owners had no right to compensation in the case. President Wilson now made a distinction between destroying private property and appropriating private property. In his opinion, if the destruction of private property were admissible its appropriation, after diversion, could not be denied.

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President Wilson explained that, in his opinion, it was permissible to destroy certain property for purposes of war but it was not permissible to use the same continuously for purposes of Peace.

(k) Mr. Balfour’s Proposal in Regard to Disposal of Enemy Cables Mr. Balfour suggested that the German Government should be informed that so much of their property in cables still remained under the sea and so much had been diverted. The Government could be permitted to resume possession of the part lying in its old bed which could be put in order. He thought that would be a solution of the problem.

Mr. Lansing pointed out that Great Britain had so far never recognised the fact that the cutting of a cable gave the right to its appropriation.

Mr. Balfour said that he had just been reminded that an important distinction existed between the case of the Spanish American cable, to which reference had previously been made, and the present case. The Spanish American cable had been a neutral cable, whereas the present cable was an enemy cable.

Mr. Lansing agreed. He pointed out, however, that the cable in question had been used by the Spanish, and Great Britain had then declared that she would not allow its use unless both belligerents were granted equal rights to usage.

(l) M. Orlando’s Proposal to Refer Question to a Commission M. Orlando thought the observations just made still further confirmed the view he had previously taken. To be quite frank, he thought the whole question turned on whether by diverting the cables anything had been done contrary to the laws of war. If an Army were to occupy enemy territory, it was entitled to damage communications, railway lines, tunnels, and bridges. No indemnity would be due for such damage, because the destruction of the enemy railway lines constituted a regular act of war. But it was not permitted to remove the rails as an act of war. In his opinion, exactly the same argument applied to cables. In the present case, however, the property in question had not been destroyed; it had been diverted. Consequently, though he, himself, was not a great believer in Commissions, he thought the whole question was so very complicated that it could only be settled on grounds of equity. On that account, it should be referred to a special Commission.

(m) Mr. Balfour’s Resolution Mr. Balfour said that he had a suggestion to make which he thought would meet the general views. He wished to propose the following resolution:—

“The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which have been cut out from such cables, or which without having been cut are now in use by any of those Powers.”

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Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that since drafting his resolution, his attention had been drawn to the fact that certain of the cables taken by the Japanese and Italian Governments were purely Government cables. That question had been overlooked in his draft resolution. He thought that point should be considered by the Drafting Committee in preparing the necessary clause.

Admiral Thaon di Revel explained that no enemy Government cables had been appropriated by the Italian Government. In the North Adriatic there was one cable which had been cut. In the Lower Adriatic there were two cables, one between San Giovanni di Medua and Taranto and the other between Otranto and Corfu. Both had been cut, and the latter had been diverted by the British Government.

Baron Making enquired whether the resolution as drafted might not be interpreted to mean that all cables might be returned to Germany.

M. Clemenceau explained that the whole question had merely been referred to the Drafting Committee and would be reconsidered when the Report of that Committee was received.

(It was agreed to refer the following resolution to the Drafting Committee for early submission of a draft clause for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace:—

The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which have been cut out from such cables, or which without having been cut are now in use by any of those Powers.)

(3) Dr. Lord said that the proposal laid before the Supreme War Council (see Annexure “B”), was designed to render more effective the work of the Commission at Teschen. That Commission had been established with the object of putting an end to the fighting between the Poles and the Czechs, and to regulate other contentious questions. The Commission, accordingly, had taken up its duties in February last and had endeavoured to work along the lines of their mandate; but without success, because the powers accorded were not sufficient to enable effective action to be taken. The great difficulty was due to the fact that the role allotted to the Commission was only that of adviser and counsellor, to make suggestions to the Czech and Polish Governments. In every case, the questions to be settled had to be referred to the Governments at Warsaw or Prague with the result that great delays invariably ensued. The most important question related to the supply of coal to Poland and the Commission had not so far succeeded in getting a single ton of coal to Poland, because it was unable to put through its wishes. It was now proposed that the four Great Powers, represented on the Inter-Allied [Page 471] Teschen Commission, should request the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to accept the principle that, within the limits of the original mandate, the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission should become effective the moment they were promulgated, without requiring the assent of the Governments of Prague and Warsaw. It was understood, however, that the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments would reserve the liberty of presenting their objections to the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission or of appealing to the Conference, but in any case the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission would be binding until revoked by that Commission or countermanded by the Conference. Proposal of the United States Delegation Relative to the Inter-Allied Commission at Teschen

President Wilson enquired whether the Teschen Commission thought that these proposals would be effective.

Dr. Lord explained that he did not speak on behalf of the Teschen Commission as a whole. The proposals he had put forward had the support of the American Representatives of that Commission who were now in Paris; but he believed that the proposals represented roughly the views of the whole of the Teschen Commission.

Mr. Balfour said that he could answer President Wilson’s question as far as the British Government was concerned. Colonel Coulson, the British Representative on the Teschen Commission had made a proposal substantially identical to that put forward by Dr. Lord.

M. Cambon explained that a copy of Dr. Lord’s proposals had been forwarded to him and in consequence he had, that morning, called together the Commission on Czecho-Slovak questions. The American Representative on that Commission had, however, expressed his inability to throw any light on the question and in consequence the meeting had been adjourned to a later date.

Dr. Lord explained that the proposal put forward by the United States Delegation did not come officially from the Teschen Commission. It had been put forward by himself and Dr. Bowman, but he believed it agreed with the views of the Commission.

M. Cambon, continuing, said he personally had no objections to offer to the proposal made, but the question had not been examined by his Commission. He was, however, quite prepared to accept the proposal on behalf both of the Commission on Czecho-Slovak questions and of the Polish Commission.

Baron Sonnino enquired whether the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments would accept the proposal.

Dr. Lord explained that the resolution had merely been submitted in order that the principle might be accepted by the Supreme War Council, whose duty it would then be to obtain the acceptance of the proposals therein contained by the Governments of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland.

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(It was agreed:—

1. That the four Great Powers represented on the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission request the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to accept the principle that within the limits of the original mandate of this Conference (February 3, 1919)3 the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission are to become effective the moment they are promulgated, without requiring the assent of the Governments of Prague and Warsaw.

It is understood that the said Governments may reserve the liberty of presenting their objections to the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission or of appealing to the Conference, but in any case, the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission will be binding until revoked by that Commission or countermanded by the Conference. The Inter-Allied Teschen Commission is requested to report its proceedings to the General Secretariat of the Peace Conference for review by the Paris Commission on Polish Affairs.

2. To telegraph to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia an identic note to give effect to the preceding.)

(For text of telegram to be sent see Annexure “B”; paragraph IV.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Annexure “A”

Annex to Procès-Verbal

Transport of General Haller’s Troops to Poland

In the course of a meeting which took place at 3 p.m. on Monday, March 24th., 1919, in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay between M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Orlando, and Marshal Foch with M. Mantoux as Interpreter, the following Conclusions were reached on the subject of the transport of General Haller’s Army to Dantzig:—

1.
The negotiations shall be taken up at Spa, under Clause 34 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918.
2.
Marshal Foch shall demand that under Clause 16 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, the Germans shall permit the free passage of General Haller’s Army as part of the Allied Army, through Dantzig to Poland, for the purpose of maintaining order in that country. They must also undertake to give every facility for the temporary accommodation of the troops passing through the port. Any refusal to accede to this demand will be interpreted as a breach of the Armistice by Germany.
3.
In the event of a refusal by the Germans to accede to this demand, Marshal Foch shall confer with the Supreme War Council as to the action to be taken.
4.
This decision shall be notified by the Secretary-General to the Warsaw Commission.

Annexure “B”

Proposal for Rendering Effective the Work of the Teschen Commission

I. The Interallied Teschen Commission was created on February 3, 1919, in a communication signed by the following: Woodrow Wilson; D. Lloyd George; V. E. Orlando; G. Clemenceau; Roman Dmowski; E. Benes.

The mandate of the Conference included the following instructions:

(1)
To proceed to an inquiry upon the basis of which the Peace Conference could form a decision definitively fixing the respective frontiers of the Czechs, and the Poles in the contested zone.
(2)
To supervise the exploitation of the mines of the Karwin-Ostrawa district so as to avoid any infraction of the rights of private property, and to supervise the police measures which the situation might require.
(3)
To secure to the Poles that part of the output of those mines which might be equitably claimed by them to meet their wants.
(4)
To prevent conflict between the Czechs and the Poles by ensuring the application of the following rules:
(a)
No measure implying annexation of all or of a part of the Principality of Teschen either to the territory of Poland or of Czechoslovakia taken by interested parties shall have binding force.
(b)
Political elections and military conscription are to be suspended in the district of Teschen pending the decision of the Peace Conference.
(c)
The local administration is to continue the function in accordance with the conditions of the pact of November 5, 1918,4 and the rights of minorities are to be strictly respected.
(d)
The Czechs are to put at the disposal of the Poles all their available resources in war materials and to grant them every facility in the transportation of arms and ammunition.
(e)
The Czech Government is to release immediately, with their arms and baggage, the Polish prisoners taken during the recent conflict.
(f)
A line of military occupation is to be established giving to the Czechs the mines and railway line north of Teschen and to the Poles the town of Teschen and the railroad line south of the town of Jablunken.

[Page 474]

II. The Interallied Teschen Commission reached Teschen on February 13th. In the administration of its mandate it has been confronted with the following difficulties:

(1)
It has had to report both to the Interallied Commission at Warsaw and to the Peace Conference at Paris.
(2)
In dealing with the local authorities it has been obliged to secure the assent of the Governments at Prague and Warsaw to each of its proposals.
(3)
The Czech local authorities long showed themselves unwilling to carry out the terms of the agreement as to the withdrawal of their troops to the line of demarcation.
(4)
The Czech local authorities have failed to deliver the stipulated quantity of coal to the Poles.

III. To overcome the difficulties noted above, it is recommended that the Conference adopt the following resolutions:

(1) Resolved:

That the four Great Powers represented on the Interallied Teschen Commission request the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to accept the principle that within the limits of the original mandate of this Conference (February 3, 1919) the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission are to become effective the moment they are promulgated, without requiring the assent of the Governments of Prague and Warsaw.

It is understood that the said Governments may reserve the liberty of presenting their objections to the Interallied Teschen Commission or of appealing to the Conference, but in any case the decision of the Interallied Teschen Commission will be binding until revoked by that Commission or countermanded by the Conference. The Interallied Teschen Commission is requested to report its proceedings to the general secretariat of the Peace Conference for review by the Paris Commission on Polish Affairs.

(2) Resolved:

To telegraph to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia an identic note, to give effect to the preceding.

IV. To make the foregoing resolutions effective, the following telegrams are proposed.

(1) To the Interallied Teschen Commission:

Recognizing the importance of quick and effective decisions in the administration of the powers entrusted to the Interallied Teschen Commission, the Conference has sent an identic note to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia requesting them to instruct the local authorities of the Duchy of Teschen that they are to accept the decision of the Interallied Teschen Commission without waiting for the assent of their respective Governments.

The local authorities will keep their respective Governments fully informed of the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission and should either of the Governments concerned protest the decisions of the Commission, due attention should be given to such protestation.

[Page 475]

The two Governments may reserve the right to appeal to the Peace Conference should they be unwilling to accept any decision of the Interallied Teschen Commission, but, in each instance, pending a final decision, the local authorities shall follow the mandate of the Interallied Teschen Commission. A resolution of the Conference requires your Commission to report its proceedings to the general secretariat of the Peace Conference for review by the Commission on Polish Affairs.

(2) Identic note to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia.

In order to ensure the administration of the Teschen agreement of February 3rd in a more effective manner, the Peace Conference requests your Government to consent to the following arrangement. It proposes that the principle should be established that the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission are in each case to become effective as soon as they are announced, without requiring the local authorities to await the agreement of the Governments of Poland or of Czecho-Slovakia.

Should your Government desire to do so, it may reserve the liberty of presenting any objections to these decisions either to the Conference at Paris or to the Interallied Teschen Commission, but it is proposed that, pending a reply, the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission should be binding. An identic note to this effect is being sent to the Government of Poland (Czecho-Slovakia). Should your Government accept this principle it is requested that immediate notification be sent to all the local authorities and to the Conference at Paris.

  1. See BC–46 (SWC–13), p. 254.
  2. See BC–45 (SWC–12), p. 226.
  3. See annexure B, infra.
  4. For text, see Commission polonaise des travaux préparatoires au Congrès de la Paix, Mémoire concernant la délimitation des frontières entre les états polonais et tchéco-slovaque en Silésie de Cieszyn, Orawa et Spisz, annexe B4, pp. 27–31. (Paris Peace Conf. 186.3114/5).