Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/63

BC–56

Minutes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 22nd March, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Present Also Present
America, United States of America, United States of
President Wilson Dr. I. Bowman
Hon. R. Lansing Dr. Lord
Secretary British Empire
Mr. A. H. Frazier Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
British Empire Colonel F. H. Kisch, D. S. O.
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P. Mr. H. J. Paton
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P. France
Secretaries M. Cambon
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B. M. Tardieu
Mr. Norman General Le Rond
France M. Hermitte
M. Clemenceau Lt. de Percin
M. Pichon M. Degrand
Secretaries Italy
M. Dutasta Marquis della Torretta
M. Berthelot Japan
M. Arnavon M. Kuriyama
M. de Bearn
Italy
H. E., M. Orlando
H. E., Baron Sonnino
Secretaries
Count Aldroyandi
M. Bertele
Japan
Baron Makino
Marquis Saionji
M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of Lieut. Burden.
British Empire Captain B. Abraham.
France Captain A. Porter.
Italy Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan M. Saburi.
Interpreter:—Professor P. J. Mantoux.
[Page 449]

1. M. Clemenceau opened the Meeting by asking M. Jules Cambon to address the Council. Polish Frontiers: Western Frontier of East Prussia

M. Cambon said that he proposed to read the note prepared for the Council by the Committee on Polish Affairs in accordance with the instruction received to re-examine the proposals concerning the western frontier of East Prussia in the light of the exchange of views in the Council on the 19th March.1

Mr. Lloyd George expressed the opinion that as this note had been communicated to all the representatives, it would be unnecessary to read it.

M. Clemenceau said that the conclusion of the note was that the Committee on Polish Affairs, after reconsidering the problem, maintained its previous proposals.

(For text see Annexure “A”.)

Mr. Lloyd George said that as he had taken an active part in the discussion of the first Report of the Polish Committee and as he had raised objections to the inclusion within Poland of two million Germans, he felt he must add a few comments on this second Report. He was still somewhat alarmed by the effect the Report would produce. He was not as convinced as at the previous meeting that this effect could be avoided. He did not wish to criticise the Polish Committee which had worked in a perfect spirit of impartiality and which had had to solve serious difficulties. Poland had to be given a corridor to the sea with every guarantee of security. The Committee had come to the conclusion that this could not be done without subjecting to Poland a large German population. He feared that this demand, added to many others which would have to be made from Germany, would produce deplorable results on German public opinion. The Allies should not run the risk of driving the country to such desperation that no Government would dare to sign the terms. At the present time the Government at Weimar was not very stable and all the currents of German life went on their way without taking much notice of its existence. It was tolerated, however, as there was nothing put in its place. The Conference must avoid presenting such a Treaty that no Government would dare sign it, or such as would cause the immediate collapse of any government that undertook the responsibility of accepting it. These observations were not levelled at the Committee on Polish Affairs, but the recommendations of that Committee were a considerable element in the difficulty just mentioned. He was inclined to accept, provisionally, the solution proposed by the Committee and to do likewise with all similar proposals by other Committees, with the clear understanding that the Supreme [Page 450] Council reserved the right of revision when it came to consider the total effect of all these proposals.

M. Cambon said that he had only a word to add. He agreed that the Germans in general and the Prussians in particular would be extremely sensitive in regard to the destruction of the cherished enterprise of Prussia pursued for so many years. They had hoped to link Eastern and Western Prussia along the coast of the Baltic. The Committee, however, had been charged with the constitution of a Polish State with some chance of survival. The Committee had considered that to do this, wide access to the sea was necessary.

President Wilson said that he thought the procedure proposed by Mr. Lloyd George was wise, and he was prepared to accept it. He did not, however, quite see how the Public would be made to understand that the Council had provisionally accepted frontiers for Poland.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that when the matter of communications to the Press had been discussed, it had been decided that no information should be given regarding territorial questions. It would, therefore, be enough to inform the Press that an agreement had been reached, without any details.

President Wilson said that the Public might be informed that the Committee’s Report had been received and reserved for further examination together with the whole group of territorial questions. He would suggest the following formula:—

“The new Report of the Commission on Polish Affairs was received and discussed and reserved for final examination in connection with subsequent boundary determinations affecting Germany.”

(This text was adopted.)

2. M. Clemenceau caused to be read to the Council four telegrams lately received relating to the rupture of negotiations.

(See Annexure “B” (a), (b), (c) and (d).)

Failure of Negotiations Between the Polish Commission and Germany Relating to Disembarkation at Dantzig Mr. Balfour said that two questions arose. The first, which was the more important, was to determine whether the demands addressed by the Allies to the Germans were in conformity with the clauses of the Armistice. For his part he thought they were and that the Germans were attempting to evade their execution. If the Council shared his opinion he thought that the application of the terms of the Armistice should be vigorously pursued through the instrumentality of Marshal Foch at Spa. The second question raised by the Germans was whether it was more convenient to land troops at Königsberg or at Libau. This was a question of convenience which might be examined.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that disembarkation might be carried out at all three ports.

[Page 451]

Mr. Lansing enquired whether the whole correspondence relating to disembarkation was now available.

President Wilson observed that M. Noulens’ note to the Germans was not yet before the Council. According to the terms of General von Hammerstein’s telegrams it would seem that M. Noulens had asked for free passage for Polish troops and not for Allied troops. If so, the request would not be in agreement with the terms of the Armistice. Polish soldiers could, if need be, be represented as Allied troops if they had been enlisted in the French or American armies, but, if the Germans were required to give passage to Polish troops as such, the Allies might be putting themselves ostensively in the wrong. This point, therefore, should be made clear, and once our rights had been established, the Council might enquire whether it was more expedient to disembark at Königsberg or at Libau than at Dantzig, in order to avoid crossing German territory.

Baron Sonnino observed that this would entail crossing Bolshevik territory.

President Wilson said that if the Polish troops were disembarked at Königsberg it was not quite clear how they would avoid crossing German territory. It must be remembered that this question was closely related in the minds of the Germans to the ultimate fate of Dantzig. An impression would be produced on the population of Dantzig that the Poles had come to take possession of the town. This impression might perhaps only last for a few days during the passage of the troops, but it might be strong enough to provoke disorder. It had been declared that the decisions of the Conference must not be prejudged by military operations. A bad example should therefore not be set. It was therefore very desirable to know exactly in what terms M. Noulens had addressed the Germans.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that it would be advantageous to use all three routes. This would doubtless hasten the realisation of our plans and facilitate the importation of food into the country. The idea of disembarking at Dantzig should, however, not be abandoned, as this would look like a surrender of our position.

He also wished to draw attention to the wording of Clause 34 of the Armistice:—

“To secure the execution of the present Convention under the most favourable conditions the principle of a Permanent International Commission of Armistice is accepted. This Commission shall operate under the supreme authority of the Chief Command of the Naval and Military Forces of the Allies.”

Consequently, it appeared to him that the Germans were within their rights in demanding that the negotiations should be conducted at Spa and not at Posen.

[Page 452]

M. Clemenceau agreed.

Mr. Balfour observed that the Germans suggested the disembarkation of Polish troops at Königsberg or Libau. As regards Konigsberg, Marshal Foch might be asked to furnish a report, but as to Libau, he wished to point out that this port was in Courland, in a zone claimed by the Lithuanians. Lithuanians and Poles were not on the best of terms.

President Wilson remarked that the same difficulty arose in respect to Memel.

M. Clemenceau proposed as a result of the discussion that Marshal Foch be requested to furnish the Council with all documents not at present before it; to prepare a report on the subject of a possible disembarkation at Konigsberg, and to meet the heads of Governments at a private meeting, on Monday, 24th March, at 3 p.m.

(This proposal was accepted.)

3. Following on proposals by President Wilson and Mr. Balfour, it was decided that the Secretary General should draw up a list of all questions ready for immediate discussion, giving priority to such as concerned Preliminaries of Peace with Germany. Agenda for Next Meeting

It was further decided that the two following questions should be considered at the next Meeting of the Council on Monday, 24th March, 1919, at 4 p.m.:—

(1)
Submarine Cables.
(2)
Teschen.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Paris, 22nd March, 1919.

Annexure “A”

To the Council of Ten

From the Commission on Polish Affairs.

The Polish Commission has been instructed to reconsider its recommendation in regard to the western frontier of East Prussia2 in the light of the Conversation at the Council of Ten on March 19th.3

That conversation started primarily from the objection that the number of Germans whom it was proposed to include within the new Polish State was excessive, and it was suggested that this objection was particularly applicable to the region between the Vistula and the proposed western frontier of East Prussia.

[Page 453]

The recommendations of the Polish Commission were based primarily on the ethnographical distribution of the two peoples concerned, but it was recognised that in any particular region other considerations might be so strong as to override purely ethnographic facts. This applied to the region to which attention was drawn at the Conversation of the 19th March, in as much as the Commission were of the opinion that it was their duty to assign to Poland, throughout its length, the Danzig-Mlawa-Warsaw railway:

(a)
In order that Poland might have secure access to the sea.
(b)
Since the economic value of the railway would lie only in the fact of its serving as a means of communication between different parts of Poland.
(c)
Since this is by far the shortest line of rail between the port of Poland and the capital of Poland.

These considerations were held to outweigh the fact that this involved the annexation of two areas (Kreis Rosenberg and that part of Kreis Marienwerder which lies east of the Vistula) which were not only predominantly German, but had been part of Ducal or East Prussia for many centuries. The total population for these two areas according to the undoubtedly biased census figures of 1910 are 73,000 Germans and 7,000 Poles. It should be observed that all other areas assigned to Poland east of the Vistula are historically Polish territory, with the exception of a small district in the extreme south where there is a Polish Protestant population.

As regards the 73,000 Germans of Kreis Rosenberg and Marienwerder, it should be observed that although their claim for special consideration is undoubtedly strengthened by their historic connection with East Prussia, the intricate and abnormal character of the historic frontier of East Prussia makes it almost impossible to follow that frontier. The Prussian Government itself has recognised this by excluding these districts from East Prussia, and incorporating them with West Prussia to which geographically they belong. Further, to assign the whole of this area to East Prussia is impossible, as it would give the Germans complete command of the Vistula, and the historical principle in this area must therefore in any case be overridden by considerations other than that of the Danzig-Mlawa railway.

Taking the above facts and arguments into consideration, the Commission remain of the opinion that the importance to Poland of retaining complete control over the Danzig-Mlawa-Warsaw railway overrides the historical and ethnographical arguments in favour of Germany in this area.

With regard to the general question of the number of Germans included in Poland, it should be noted that the statistics in the third and fourth columns of Appendix I (B) of the Report of the Commission [Page 454] have reference only to the strip of former German territory which it is proposed to include within the new Polish State.

Until the eastern frontier of Poland has been defined, it is impossible to forecast precisely the total population of the new State, but the figure will probably approximate 25,000,000. The total German population in this area, including that assigned to Poland under the recommendations of the Report of the Commission, will amount to not more than 3,000,000; thus the Germans will at most constitute about ⅛ of the total population, not allowing for the considerable emigration of Germans which is certain to ensue; and for which easy facilities are being arranged under the treaty clauses.

The Commission have made a careful scrutiny of the ethnographic distribution in the territories bordering on the proposed new frontiers.

In five localities only (leaving the Danzig corridor out of consideration) has any appreciable departure been made from the ethnographic line, and the total number of Germans involved is not more than 200,000. The economic and other reasons which led the Commission to take the decisions in question have already been explained in Part III (a) to (e) of their report, and the sufficiency of these reasons has not been questioned.

One general fact therefore becomes clear—that the large number of Germans assigned to Poland is primarily the result of the nature of the intimate racial distribution in this part of Europe, and not of any neglect on the part of the Commission to consider ethnographical facts. Before Poland was partitioned there were large German minorities permanently settled on Polish territory. Since the partition, and more especially since the creation of the German Empire, the immense energy of one of the most efficient of modern states has been directed towards the Germanization of this area by all possible means, and the most extreme measures have been taken to maintain and to increase the proportion of Germans to Poles. The German minority in the area assigned to Poland is not gathered together in the western boundaries of Polish territory, but is widely distributed over the whole area and intimately mixed with the Polish population. However unfortunate may be the inclusion of the German minority in the Polish State, no adjustment or modification of the boundary can avoid this result.

The general conclusion is that the cession of the Mlawa railway is a comparatively small factor in causing the large number of Germans to be assigned to the Polish State, and the Commission respectively submit that their original proposals offer the best possible solution to the problem which they were called upon to solve.

[Page 455]

Annexure “B”
A

General Von Hammerstein to General Nudant

WAKO 12.784

The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw, in the course of a meeting which took place on the 6th March at the station of Kreuz (German Posnania) under the Presidency of Ambassador Noulens, insisted on the disembarkation of Polish troops at Dantzig. With reference to my note 11,805 of February 27th, 1919, I recall the fact that the disembarkation of large numbers of Polish troops at Dantzig would undoubtedly cause fresh bloodshed. It would be considered by the excited Polish minorities in West Prussia as a signal for a rising preconcerted by the Entente. Allied officers who are probably to accompany the transports would be unable to oppose it. Moreover, the transport of food from Dantzig in the direction of Poland would be seriously hampered by the simultaneous transport of troops.

I lay special stress on the serious danger which would threaten the German front against the Russian Bolsheviks, the communications of which with its rear would thus be hindered.

If the Allies think it necessary now to bring Polish troops to Poland by the Baltic Sea, it is proposed to send them in the first place by way of Libau where they would not touch German territory at all, and whence they can be sent against the Russian Bolsheviks with the greatest possible speed. In the second place would come the East Prussian ports of Memel and Pillau (Koenigsberg).

According to declarations of undoubted authenticity, the object seriously sought by the Allied Governments is to avoid the outbreak of fresh hostilities between the Germans and the Poles in the East. If it is desired to attain this object, Dantzig should not be chosen as a port of disembarkation for Polish troops.

For this reason I am instructed by the German Government once more urgently to draw attention to the consequences which would ensue.

(Signed)
Von Hammerstein

B

General Von Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission, to General Nudant, President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission

I forward as an enclosure an extract from the report received by telegraph on the sitting of the International Commission at Kreuz [Page 456] on March 7th. This paper clearly shows that Ambassador Noulens really intends to prepare for a disembarkation of Poles at Dantzig.

I am instructed to make the following observations on this subject:

(1) I ask to be informed whether the Inter-Allied Commission, set up solely to fix the line of demarcation of German Posnania, is competent in principle to settle a question of such serious importance. On the German side nothing is known on this subject.

(2) I observe that Article 16 of the Armistice Treaty does not give the Allies the right to land Polish troops at Dantzig. The Allies are only “to have the right of free passage by Dantzig, in order to be able to revictual the population of the regions evacuated by the Germans on the east of Germany and in order to maintain order”.

The disembarkation of Polish troops is not therefore provided for by the Conventions. As it is certain that it would have the effect of disturbing public order it must even be considered that it is contrary to Article 16.

The Allies would thus be acting against their own intentions, which they have constantly proclaimed, of maintaining order and preventing hostilities.

(3) The declaration of Ambassador Noulens, according to which no protest has ever yet been made against the choice of Dantzig as a port of disembarkation, is incorrect (see 11.805 of February 27th and 12.784 of March 7th4). The principal reason why this question has not been cleared up is that no such demand has ever been made officially on the part of the Allies.

(4) The admission of Polish officers and officials and other Polish employés to Dantzig and moreover to German territory can only be allowed if the Entente undertakes to guarantee that the people in question will abstain from all agitation and from all political activity and will strictly observe German instructions and conditions as long as they remain in German territory. The text of the Armistice Treaty confers no right to lay down conditions, still less such far-reaching conditions as those set forth in the enclosure, by which Germany alone will be bound.

(5) It has already been stated in the note of March 7th, No. 12.784, that Germany is ready to undertake Polish transport. The conditions can be treated in detail by word of mouth, as soon as the Allied and Associated Governments have officially expressed their desire to examine the question more closely. But I point out now, after an exhaustive study of the state of communications, that, even from the technical point of view it would be far better to use the ports lying further east. I am in a position to give more precise information on the possibility of working transport from these points in the direction of Poland.

[Page 457]

C

Copy of a Telegram From Marshal Foch to General Nudant

(Communicated to General von Hammerstein by General Nudant under No. 716 G)

By letters 11.805 of February 27th.
12.784 of March 7th.
12.944 of March 8th.

General Hammerstein has asked in the name of the German Government that the disembarkation of Polish troops may take place, not at Dantzig, but at Koenigsberg, Memel or Libau.

Now, the President of the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw telegraphs that the German Government, taking this application as a pretext, claims the right to refuse to allow the passage of officers instructed to make preparatory arrangements for transport by way of Dantzig.

Please remind the German Commission:

(a)
That the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw has received from the Allied Governments full powers to settle the conditions of the application of Article 16 of the Armistice of the 11th November, and that consequently it is for the Commission alone to lay down these conditions.
(b)
Consequently that the above-mentioned application calls for no reply and the German Government could in no case make use of this application to postpone the solution of the question.

I am informing M. Noulens of the above measures.

(Signed)
Weygand

D

General Von Hammerstein to General Nudant, Respecting the Disembarkation of Polish Troops in Germany

(Continuation of 698 G. and 716 G.)

I have the honour in the name of the German Government to make the following declaration confirming my verbal declaration at the Plenary Session of the 19th March:—

1. On handing over Note 716 G. of the 18th March 1919* General Nudant declared that the Inter-Allied Commission at Posen was empowered to settle the question of the disembarkation of Polish Troops at Danzig. The German Government, however, maintains its right, according to Article 34, of the Convention of the 11th [Page 458] November 1918, to treat this question, which is governed by the aforesaid Convention, at Spa.

2. Note 716 G. of the 19th March cannot be said to be a final declaration as regards the question of the disembarkation of Polish Troops. It only concerns my letter of the 7th March No. 12.784. The point of view of the German Government is, however, contained in the note of the 8th March No. 12.9444. The German Government is waiting to see the effect of the opinions contained in this Note before further steps are taken.

3. The German Government attaches special importance to the fact that, by the offer made in the Note No. 12.944 of the 8th March, para: 5., it declared itself ready to take measures which go beyond its obligations. It must therefore maintain its view that these measures should be taken under the conditions which itself imposes. It is ready to discuss this point.

The German Government can in no way lend itself to the passage of enemy troops through a country where nationalities are mixed, in a case where the right is so plainly on its side. Neither is it possible to suppose that the Allied Governments wish to act contrary to the assurances which they have repeatedly given and in accordance to which they have no other intention in the East than to maintain order, and avoid further bloodshed. The German Government can declare that quiet prevails in the region in question. Unhappily it cannot but fear that the appearance of Polish Troops would mean an attempt at the violent and flagrant oppression of the Germans who are undoubtedly in a majority in West Prussia.

4. In these conditions, the German Government cannot be expected to yield to the demand that it should allow Allied Officers, and among them Polish Officers, to move about in the region to the East of the Vistula, without restriction as regards their journeys, and without supervision. No paragraph of the Convention obliges the German Government to consent to this. In view of its experience with Mr. Paderewski and Colonel Wade in a similar case,5 it has now to be doubly prudent. The Government however is disposed, in this instance also, to do all it possibly can. It will willingly examine, in each particular case, whether it can allow these journeys for special objects, without threatening public order, and in what conditions.

(Signed)
Von Hammerstein

Forwarded by General Nudant under No. 6.039 (as continuation of 758. of 20th March.)

  1. See BC–53, p. 414.
  2. Contained in Report No. 1 of the Commission on Polish Affairs.
  3. BC–53, p. 414.
  4. For the latter, see part A of this annexure, supra.
  5. Notification of Tel: 1576/0 of 18th March. [Footnote in the original.]
  6. Forwarded under No. 5.492 of 7th March. [Footnote in the original.]
  7. Note forwarded under No. 5.596 of 9th March. [Footnote in the original.]
  8. See vol. ii, pp. 422424.