Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/63
BC–56
Minutes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai
d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 22nd March, 1919, at 11 a.m.
Paris, March 22, 1919, 11 a.m.
| Present |
Also Present |
| America, United States of |
America, United States of |
| President Wilson |
Dr. I. Bowman |
| Hon. R. Lansing |
Dr. Lord |
| Secretary |
British Empire |
| Mr. A. H. Frazier |
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G. |
| British Empire |
Colonel F. H. Kisch, D. S. O. |
| The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P. |
Mr. H. J. Paton |
| The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P. |
France |
| Secretaries |
M. Cambon |
| Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B. |
M. Tardieu |
| Mr. Norman |
General Le Rond |
| France |
M. Hermitte |
| M. Clemenceau |
Lt. de Percin |
| M. Pichon |
M. Degrand |
| Secretaries |
Italy |
| M. Dutasta |
Marquis della Torretta |
| M. Berthelot |
Japan |
| M. Arnavon |
M. Kuriyama |
| M. de Bearn |
|
| Italy |
|
| H. E., M. Orlando |
|
| H. E., Baron Sonnino |
|
| Secretaries |
|
| Count Aldroyandi |
|
| M. Bertele |
|
| Japan |
|
| Baron Makino |
|
| Marquis Saionji |
|
| M. Matsui |
|
| Secretary |
|
| M. Kawai |
|
Joint Secretariat
| America, United States of |
Lieut. Burden. |
| British Empire |
Captain B. Abraham. |
| France |
Captain A. Porter. |
| Italy |
Lieut. Zanchi. |
| Japan |
M. Saburi. |
| Interpreter:—Professor P. J.
Mantoux. |
[Page 449]
1. M. Clemenceau opened the Meeting by asking
M. Jules Cambon to address the Council. Polish
Frontiers: Western Frontier of East Prussia
M. Cambon said that he proposed to read the
note prepared for the Council by the Committee on Polish Affairs in
accordance with the instruction received to re-examine the proposals
concerning the western frontier of East Prussia in the light of the
exchange of views in the Council on the 19th March.1
Mr. Lloyd George expressed the opinion that as
this note had been communicated to all the representatives, it would be
unnecessary to read it.
M. Clemenceau said that the conclusion of the
note was that the Committee on Polish Affairs, after reconsidering the
problem, maintained its previous proposals.
(For text see Annexure “A”.)
Mr. Lloyd George said that as he had taken an
active part in the discussion of the first Report of the Polish
Committee and as he had raised objections to the inclusion within Poland
of two million Germans, he felt he must add a few comments on this
second Report. He was still somewhat alarmed by the effect the Report
would produce. He was not as convinced as at the previous meeting that
this effect could be avoided. He did not wish to criticise the Polish
Committee which had worked in a perfect spirit of impartiality and which
had had to solve serious difficulties. Poland had to be given a corridor
to the sea with every guarantee of security. The Committee had come to
the conclusion that this could not be done without subjecting to Poland
a large German population. He feared that this demand, added to many
others which would have to be made from Germany, would produce
deplorable results on German public opinion. The Allies should not run
the risk of driving the country to such desperation that no Government
would dare to sign the terms. At the present time the Government at
Weimar was not very stable and all the currents of German life went on
their way without taking much notice of its existence. It was tolerated,
however, as there was nothing put in its place. The Conference must
avoid presenting such a Treaty that no Government would dare sign it, or
such as would cause the immediate collapse of any government that
undertook the responsibility of accepting it. These observations were
not levelled at the Committee on Polish Affairs, but the recommendations
of that Committee were a considerable element in the difficulty just
mentioned. He was inclined to accept, provisionally, the solution
proposed by the Committee and to do likewise with all similar proposals
by other Committees, with the clear understanding that the Supreme
[Page 450]
Council reserved the right of
revision when it came to consider the total effect of all these
proposals.
M. Cambon said that he had only a word to add.
He agreed that the Germans in general and the Prussians in particular
would be extremely sensitive in regard to the destruction of the
cherished enterprise of Prussia pursued for so many years. They had
hoped to link Eastern and Western Prussia along the coast of the Baltic.
The Committee, however, had been charged with the constitution of a
Polish State with some chance of survival. The Committee had considered
that to do this, wide access to the sea was necessary.
President Wilson said that he thought the
procedure proposed by Mr. Lloyd George was wise, and he was prepared to
accept it. He did not, however, quite see how the Public would be made
to understand that the Council had provisionally accepted frontiers for
Poland.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that when the
matter of communications to the Press had been discussed, it had been
decided that no information should be given regarding territorial
questions. It would, therefore, be enough to inform the Press that an
agreement had been reached, without any details.
President Wilson said that the Public might be
informed that the Committee’s Report had been received and reserved for
further examination together with the whole group of territorial
questions. He would suggest the following formula:—
“The new Report of the Commission on Polish Affairs was received
and discussed and reserved for final examination in connection
with subsequent boundary determinations affecting Germany.”
(This text was adopted.)
2. M. Clemenceau caused to be read to the
Council four telegrams lately received relating to the rupture of
negotiations.
(See Annexure “B” (a), (b),
(c) and (d).)
Failure of Negotiations Between the Polish Commission
and Germany Relating to Disembarkation at Dantzig
Mr. Balfour said that two questions arose. The
first, which was the more important, was to determine whether the
demands addressed by the Allies to the Germans were in conformity with
the clauses of the Armistice. For his part he thought they were and that
the Germans were attempting to evade their execution. If the Council
shared his opinion he thought that the application of the terms of the
Armistice should be vigorously pursued through the instrumentality of
Marshal Foch at Spa. The second question raised by the Germans was
whether it was more convenient to land troops at Königsberg or at Libau.
This was a question of convenience which might be examined.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that
disembarkation might be carried out at all three ports.
[Page 451]
Mr. Lansing enquired whether the whole
correspondence relating to disembarkation was now available.
President Wilson observed that M. Noulens’ note
to the Germans was not yet before the Council. According to the terms of
General von Hammerstein’s telegrams it would seem that M. Noulens had
asked for free passage for Polish troops and not for Allied troops. If
so, the request would not be in agreement with the terms of the
Armistice. Polish soldiers could, if need be, be represented as Allied
troops if they had been enlisted in the French or American armies, but,
if the Germans were required to give passage to Polish troops as such,
the Allies might be putting themselves ostensively in the wrong. This
point, therefore, should be made clear, and once our rights had been
established, the Council might enquire whether it was more expedient to
disembark at Königsberg or at Libau than at Dantzig, in order to avoid
crossing German territory.
Baron Sonnino observed that this would entail
crossing Bolshevik territory.
President Wilson said that if the Polish troops
were disembarked at Königsberg it was not quite clear how they would
avoid crossing German territory. It must be remembered that this
question was closely related in the minds of the Germans to the ultimate
fate of Dantzig. An impression would be produced on the population of
Dantzig that the Poles had come to take possession of the town. This
impression might perhaps only last for a few days during the passage of
the troops, but it might be strong enough to provoke disorder. It had
been declared that the decisions of the Conference must not be prejudged
by military operations. A bad example should therefore not be set. It
was therefore very desirable to know exactly in what terms M. Noulens
had addressed the Germans.
Mr. Lloyd George thought that it would be
advantageous to use all three routes. This would doubtless hasten the
realisation of our plans and facilitate the importation of food into the
country. The idea of disembarking at Dantzig should, however, not be
abandoned, as this would look like a surrender of our position.
He also wished to draw attention to the wording of Clause 34 of the
Armistice:—
“To secure the execution of the present Convention under the most
favourable conditions the principle of a Permanent International
Commission of Armistice is accepted. This Commission shall
operate under the supreme authority of the Chief Command of the
Naval and Military Forces of the Allies.”
Consequently, it appeared to him that the Germans were
within their rights in demanding that the negotiations should be
conducted at Spa and not at Posen.
[Page 452]
M. Clemenceau agreed.
Mr. Balfour observed that the Germans suggested
the disembarkation of Polish troops at Königsberg or Libau. As regards
Konigsberg, Marshal Foch might be asked to furnish a report, but as to
Libau, he wished to point out that this port was in Courland, in a zone
claimed by the Lithuanians. Lithuanians and Poles were not on the best
of terms.
President Wilson remarked that the same
difficulty arose in respect to Memel.
M. Clemenceau proposed as a result of the
discussion that Marshal Foch be requested to furnish the Council with
all documents not at present before it; to prepare a report on the
subject of a possible disembarkation at Konigsberg, and to meet the
heads of Governments at a private meeting, on Monday, 24th March, at 3
p.m.
(This proposal was accepted.)
3. Following on proposals by President Wilson and Mr. Balfour, it was
decided that the Secretary General should draw up a list of all
questions ready for immediate discussion, giving priority to such as
concerned Preliminaries of Peace with Germany. Agenda
for Next Meeting
It was further decided that the two following questions should be
considered at the next Meeting of the Council on Monday, 24th March,
1919, at 4 p.m.:—
- (1)
- Submarine Cables.
- (2)
- Teschen.
(The Meeting then adjourned.)
Paris, 22nd March, 1919.
Annexure “A”
To the Council of Ten
From the Commission on Polish Affairs.
The Polish Commission has been instructed to reconsider its
recommendation in regard to the western frontier of East
Prussia2 in the light of the
Conversation at the Council of Ten on March 19th.3
That conversation started primarily from the objection that the
number of Germans whom it was proposed to include within the new
Polish State was excessive, and it was suggested that this objection
was particularly applicable to the region between the Vistula and
the proposed western frontier of East Prussia.
[Page 453]
The recommendations of the Polish Commission were based primarily on
the ethnographical distribution of the two peoples concerned, but it
was recognised that in any particular region other considerations
might be so strong as to override purely ethnographic facts. This
applied to the region to which attention was drawn at the
Conversation of the 19th March, in as much as the Commission were of
the opinion that it was their duty to assign to Poland, throughout
its length, the Danzig-Mlawa-Warsaw railway:
- (a)
- In order that Poland might have secure access to the
sea.
- (b)
- Since the economic value of the railway would lie only in
the fact of its serving as a means of communication between
different parts of Poland.
- (c)
- Since this is by far the shortest line of rail between the
port of Poland and the capital of Poland.
These considerations were held to outweigh the fact that this
involved the annexation of two areas (Kreis Rosenberg and that part
of Kreis Marienwerder which lies east of the Vistula) which were not
only predominantly German, but had been part of Ducal or East
Prussia for many centuries. The total population for these two areas
according to the undoubtedly biased census figures of 1910 are
73,000 Germans and 7,000 Poles. It should be observed that all other
areas assigned to Poland east of the Vistula are historically Polish
territory, with the exception of a small district in the extreme
south where there is a Polish Protestant population.
As regards the 73,000 Germans of Kreis Rosenberg and Marienwerder, it
should be observed that although their claim for special
consideration is undoubtedly strengthened by their historic
connection with East Prussia, the intricate and abnormal character
of the historic frontier of East Prussia makes it almost impossible
to follow that frontier. The Prussian Government itself has
recognised this by excluding these districts from East Prussia, and
incorporating them with West Prussia to which geographically they
belong. Further, to assign the whole of this area to East Prussia is
impossible, as it would give the Germans complete command of the
Vistula, and the historical principle in this area must therefore in
any case be overridden by considerations other than that of the
Danzig-Mlawa railway.
Taking the above facts and arguments into consideration, the
Commission remain of the opinion that the importance to Poland of
retaining complete control over the Danzig-Mlawa-Warsaw railway
overrides the historical and ethnographical arguments in favour of
Germany in this area.
With regard to the general question of the number of Germans included
in Poland, it should be noted that the statistics in the third and
fourth columns of Appendix I (B) of the Report of the Commission
[Page 454]
have reference only to the
strip of former German territory which it is proposed to include
within the new Polish State.
Until the eastern frontier of Poland has been defined, it is
impossible to forecast precisely the total population of the new
State, but the figure will probably approximate 25,000,000. The
total German population in this area, including that assigned to
Poland under the recommendations of the Report of the Commission,
will amount to not more than 3,000,000; thus the Germans will at
most constitute about ⅛ of the total population, not allowing for
the considerable emigration of Germans which is certain to ensue;
and for which easy facilities are being arranged under the treaty
clauses.
The Commission have made a careful scrutiny of the ethnographic
distribution in the territories bordering on the proposed new
frontiers.
In five localities only (leaving the Danzig corridor out of
consideration) has any appreciable departure been made from the
ethnographic line, and the total number of Germans involved is not
more than 200,000. The economic and other reasons which led the
Commission to take the decisions in question have already been
explained in Part III (a) to (e) of their report, and the sufficiency of
these reasons has not been questioned.
One general fact therefore becomes clear—that the large number of
Germans assigned to Poland is primarily the result of the nature of
the intimate racial distribution in this part of Europe, and not of
any neglect on the part of the Commission to consider ethnographical
facts. Before Poland was partitioned there were large German
minorities permanently settled on Polish territory. Since the
partition, and more especially since the creation of the German
Empire, the immense energy of one of the most efficient of modern
states has been directed towards the Germanization of this area by
all possible means, and the most extreme measures have been taken to
maintain and to increase the proportion of Germans to Poles. The
German minority in the area assigned to Poland is not gathered
together in the western boundaries of Polish territory, but is
widely distributed over the whole area and intimately mixed with the
Polish population. However unfortunate may be the inclusion of the
German minority in the Polish State, no adjustment or modification
of the boundary can avoid this result.
The general conclusion is that the cession of the Mlawa railway is a
comparatively small factor in causing the large number of Germans to
be assigned to the Polish State, and the Commission respectively
submit that their original proposals offer the best possible
solution to the problem which they were called upon to solve.
[Page 455]
Annexure “B”
A
Armistice
Commission,
Spa, March 7th,
1919.
General Von Hammerstein to General
Nudant
WAKO 12.784
The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw, in the course of a meeting
which took place on the 6th March at the station of Kreuz (German
Posnania) under the Presidency of Ambassador Noulens, insisted on
the disembarkation of Polish troops at Dantzig. With reference to my
note 11,805 of February 27th, 1919, I recall the fact that the
disembarkation of large numbers of Polish troops at Dantzig would
undoubtedly cause fresh bloodshed. It would be considered by the
excited Polish minorities in West Prussia as a signal for a rising
preconcerted by the Entente. Allied officers who are probably to
accompany the transports would be unable to oppose it. Moreover, the
transport of food from Dantzig in the direction of Poland would be
seriously hampered by the simultaneous transport of troops.
I lay special stress on the serious danger which would threaten the
German front against the Russian Bolsheviks, the communications of
which with its rear would thus be hindered.
If the Allies think it necessary now to bring Polish troops to Poland
by the Baltic Sea, it is proposed to send them in the first place by
way of Libau where they would not touch German territory at all, and
whence they can be sent against the Russian Bolsheviks with the
greatest possible speed. In the second place would come the East
Prussian ports of Memel and Pillau (Koenigsberg).
According to declarations of undoubted authenticity, the object
seriously sought by the Allied Governments is to avoid the outbreak
of fresh hostilities between the Germans and the Poles in the East.
If it is desired to attain this object, Dantzig should not be chosen
as a port of disembarkation for Polish troops.
For this reason I am instructed by the German Government once more
urgently to draw attention to the consequences which would
ensue.
B
General Von Hammerstein, President
of the German Armistice Commission, to General Nudant, President
of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission
I forward as an enclosure an extract from the report received by
telegraph on the sitting of the International Commission at Kreuz
[Page 456]
on March 7th. This
paper clearly shows that Ambassador Noulens really intends to
prepare for a disembarkation of Poles at Dantzig.
I am instructed to make the following observations on this
subject:
(1) I ask to be informed whether the Inter-Allied Commission, set up
solely to fix the line of demarcation of German Posnania, is
competent in principle to settle a question of such serious
importance. On the German side nothing is known on this subject.
(2) I observe that Article 16 of the Armistice Treaty does not give
the Allies the right to land Polish troops at Dantzig. The Allies
are only “to have the right of free passage by Dantzig, in order to
be able to revictual the population of the regions evacuated by the
Germans on the east of Germany and in order to maintain order”.
The disembarkation of Polish troops is not therefore provided for by
the Conventions. As it is certain that it would have the effect of
disturbing public order it must even be considered that it is
contrary to Article 16.
The Allies would thus be acting against their own intentions, which
they have constantly proclaimed, of maintaining order and preventing
hostilities.
(3) The declaration of Ambassador Noulens, according to which no
protest has ever yet been made against the choice of Dantzig as a
port of disembarkation, is incorrect (see 11.805 of February 27th
and 12.784 of March 7th4). The principal reason why this question has
not been cleared up is that no such demand has ever been made
officially on the part of the Allies.
(4) The admission of Polish officers and officials and other Polish
employés to Dantzig and moreover to German territory can only be
allowed if the Entente undertakes to guarantee that the people in
question will abstain from all agitation and from all political
activity and will strictly observe German instructions and
conditions as long as they remain in German territory. The text of
the Armistice Treaty confers no right to lay down conditions, still
less such far-reaching conditions as those set forth in the
enclosure, by which Germany alone will be bound.
(5) It has already been stated in the note of March 7th, No. 12.784,
that Germany is ready to undertake Polish transport. The conditions
can be treated in detail by word of mouth, as soon as the Allied and
Associated Governments have officially expressed their desire to
examine the question more closely. But I point out now, after an
exhaustive study of the state of communications, that, even from the
technical point of view it would be far better to use the ports
lying further east. I am in a position to give more precise
information on the possibility of working transport from these
points in the direction of Poland.
[Page 457]
C
No. 1.576/0 of
March
18th.
Copy of a Telegram From Marshal Foch
to General Nudant
(Communicated to General von Hammerstein by General
Nudant under No. 716 G)
| By letters |
11.805 of February 27th. |
|
12.784 of March 7th. |
|
12.944 of March 8th. |
General Hammerstein has asked in the name of the German Government
that the disembarkation of Polish troops may take place, not at
Dantzig, but at Koenigsberg, Memel or Libau.
Now, the President of the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw
telegraphs that the German Government, taking this application as a
pretext, claims the right to refuse to allow the passage of officers
instructed to make preparatory arrangements for transport by way of
Dantzig.
Please remind the German Commission:
- (a)
- That the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw has received
from the Allied Governments full powers to settle the
conditions of the application of Article 16 of the Armistice
of the 11th November, and that consequently it is for the
Commission alone to lay down these conditions.
- (b)
- Consequently that the above-mentioned application calls
for no reply and the German Government could in no case make
use of this application to postpone the solution of the
question.
I am informing M. Noulens of the above measures.
D
General Von Hammerstein to General
Nudant, Respecting the Disembarkation of Polish Troops in
Germany
(Continuation of 698 G. and 716 G.)
I have the honour in the name of the German Government to make the
following declaration confirming my verbal declaration at the
Plenary Session of the 19th March:—
1. On handing over Note 716 G. of the 18th March 1919* General Nudant declared that
the Inter-Allied Commission at Posen was empowered to settle the
question of the disembarkation of Polish Troops at Danzig. The
German Government, however, maintains its right, according to
Article 34, of the Convention of the 11th
[Page 458]
November 1918, to treat this question, which
is governed by the aforesaid Convention, at Spa.
2. Note 716 G. of the 19th March cannot be said to be a final
declaration as regards the question of the disembarkation of Polish
Troops. It only concerns my letter of the 7th March No. 12.784.† The point of view of the
German Government is, however, contained in the note of the 8th
March No. 12.9444.‡ The
German Government is waiting to see the effect of the opinions
contained in this Note before further steps are taken.
3. The German Government attaches special importance to the fact
that, by the offer made in the Note No. 12.944 of the 8th March,
para: 5., it declared itself ready to take measures which go beyond
its obligations. It must therefore maintain its view that these
measures should be taken under the conditions which itself imposes.
It is ready to discuss this point.
The German Government can in no way lend itself to the passage of
enemy troops through a country where nationalities are mixed, in a
case where the right is so plainly on its side. Neither is it
possible to suppose that the Allied Governments wish to act contrary
to the assurances which they have repeatedly given and in accordance
to which they have no other intention in the East than to maintain
order, and avoid further bloodshed. The German Government can
declare that quiet prevails in the region in question. Unhappily it
cannot but fear that the appearance of Polish Troops would mean an
attempt at the violent and flagrant oppression of the Germans who
are undoubtedly in a majority in West Prussia.
4. In these conditions, the German Government cannot be expected to
yield to the demand that it should allow Allied Officers, and among
them Polish Officers, to move about in the region to the East of the
Vistula, without restriction as regards their journeys, and without
supervision. No paragraph of the Convention obliges the German
Government to consent to this. In view of its experience with Mr.
Paderewski and Colonel Wade in a similar case,5 it has
now to be doubly prudent. The Government however is disposed, in
this instance also, to do all it possibly can. It will willingly
examine, in each particular case, whether it can allow these
journeys for special objects, without threatening public order, and
in what conditions.
Forwarded by General Nudant under No. 6.039 (as continuation of
758. of 20th March.)
