Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IV

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/52

BC–45 SWC–12

Minutes of the 17th Session, Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, Thursday, March 6, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 6, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing.	General J. J. Pershing.
Hon. E. M. House.	General Tasker H. Bliss.
Secretaries	General Andrew [McAndrew?].
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	Major-General M. N. Patrick.
Mr. L. Harrison.	British Empire
British Empire	General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V. O.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	Major-General W. Thwaites, C. B.
Secretaries	Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Brigadier-General H. W. Studd, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.
Mr. H. Norman	Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
France	Paymaster Commander H. Miller, D. S. O.
M. Clemenceau.	France
M. Pichon.	M. Klotz.
Secretaries	M. Tardieu.
M. Dutasta.	Marshal Foch.
M. Berthelot.	General Belin.
M. Arnavon.	General Degoutte.
M. de Bearn.	General Weygand.
Italy	General Duval.
H. E. Baron Sonnino.	Admiral de Bon.
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi.	Comdt. de V. Levavasseur.
Secretaries	Lieut. de V. Odend’hal.
Count Aldrovandi.	Italy
M. Bertele.	Admiral Grassi.
Japan	General Cavallero.
H. E. Baron Makino.	Japan
H. E. M. Matsui.	Admiral Takeshita.
	General Nara.
	Colonel Nagai.
	Captain Fujioka.
	Captain Nomura.
	Captain Yamamoto.

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. Burden.
British Empire	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
France	Captain A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan	M. Saburi.
Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Clemenceau having declared the meeting open, said that a draft resolution containing instructions to Commissions and Committees, whose reports were due on March 8th and March 15th, had been handed in by the American Delegation. He asked the American Delegation to explain the exact scope of the resolution.

American Proposal in Regard to Drafting by Committees and Commissions os Recommendations Concerning Preliminary Peace Terms Mr. House explained that the resolution had been drafted with a view that all proposed Preliminary Peace terms submitted by Commissions and Committees should be framed in such legal form that no re-drafting would become necessary.

(The following resolution was duly approved:—

“Each Commission and Committee established by the Conference should attach to its report a draft of a clause or clauses embodying its recommendations for insertion in the preliminary Peace Treaty provided its report is approved. In preparing such clauses, the members of the Commissions and Committees should consult their legal advisers.”

2. Mr. Lloyd George said that he had just received a message, telephoned from Spa, to the effect that negotiations relating to the supply of food and stores to Germany, and the surrender of merchant ships by Germany, had been broken off.¹ The Germans had refused to surrender any ships without a firm guarantee that food supplies would be furnished up to the time of the next harvest. This condition the Allied Delegates felt unable to accept. They were returning tonight to Paris and would be able to report the facts of the case to the Conference tomorrow. A Reports Armistice Commission for Supplies

Marshal Foch said that he had so far received no communication on the subject from Spa.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the question to the meeting to be held on the following afternoon, March 7th, 1919.)

3. Marshal Foch said that in accordance with the decision reached by the Supreme War Council at the meeting held on 3rd March, 1919, he had again assembled the Military, Aerial and Naval Advisers in order to co-ordinate their work. The revised texts of the Military, Aerial and Naval Clauses, which had that day been circulated, gave the conclusions reached by the Military, Aerial and Naval experts. No attempt had been made to define the duration of the terms to be imposed on Germany. Military Conditions of Peace With Germany: (a) Revised Drafted Regulations

(For full text of draft regulations concerning a definitive Military status of Germany, see Appendix “A”.)

Mr. Balfour said that the difference between the revised text, now submitted, and the one considered on Monday was that the Military, Naval and Air Departments, each of whom had originally given different periods of time for the duration of the terms to be imposed on Germany had now come to an agreement. That agreement had, however, only been reached by omitting all reference to any period of time. With that exception, he understood, all the clauses remained as previously submitted.

M. Clemenceau pointed out that that was not quite the case. He would call on Marshal Foch or General Degoutte to explain wherein the differences between the two texts lay.

General Degoutte said that no essential differences existed between the first text and the final text, now submitted. The Military, Naval and Aerial Advisors had merely met to arrive at an agreement on special points, and to give effect to the conclusions reached, it had merely been found necessary to make slight alterations in certain sentences. He would point out, however, that the Military Advisers had from the beginning been in complete agreement as regards the principles advocated.

As regards the minor amendments now introduced in the text he would invite attention to the following:—

(a) In Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 1, for “The total effectives of the German land army”, the following words had been substituted, namely:— “The total effectives of the land army of the States both present and future constituting Germany”.

(b) In Chapter 1, Article 6, Paragraph 1, instead of:— “the Staff Officers of the Ministry of War, and of the administrations directly attached to it, shall be included in the total effectives given in Article 2 and shall not exceed 300 officers”, the following words had been substituted: “The Staff Officers of the Ministries of War and of the German States and of the administrations directly attached to it shall be included in the total effectives given in Article 2 and shall not exceed 300 officers”.

(c) In Chapter 1, Article 7, Paragraph 2; for “In consequence, the War Academy, and the different schools of officers, students, etc.”, the amended paragraph read: “In consequence the War Academies or similar institutions of the German States and the different schools of officers, students, etc.”

(d) In Chapter 2, Article 8A, an attempt had been made to define more precisely the works to be disarmed or dismantled by Germany. The paragraph which in the original text read as follows:— “All fortified works, fortresses, and land forts at a distance of less than 50 kilometres from the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled,” had been amended to read:— “All fortified works, fortresses, and land forts which are situated in German territory west of the line traced 50 kilometres east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled.”

(e) Finally, on the suggestion of the American representatives, Chapter 5 had been amended to read as follows:—

Article 1 (a). All the provisions of this Convention shall be applicable throughout all the territories constituting Germany as she shall be on the signing of the Treaty of Peace or as she may be constituted at any time thereafter.

(b) Germany undertakes to respect all the clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who have signed the Convention with her.

(c) The execution of these clauses will continue in the future to be supervised by such means and by such organs as the League of Nations may see fit to employ or create.

M. Clemenceau remarked that from what had been said the two texts were substantially identical. He thought, therefore, that the draft regulations could now be taken up and discussed one by one.

(b) Regarding Limitation of Effectives Mr. Lloyd George said that before the text came under discussion, he wished to ask a few questions. Moreover, he thought that the text itself should not be discussed before so large a Meeting

The British Delegates could not see their way to accept the terms as they appeared at the present moment without large modifications; but those were questions which the Delegates themselves could alone discuss, as they alone would be responsible for the final decisions taken. On the other hand, in the draft resolution certain fundamental questions had been raised regarding which he would like to have explanations or enlightenment. He would, therefore, like to put certain questions to Marshal Foch before the text itself came under discussion.

He would ask Marshal Foch to explain how he proposed that the Germans should raise their army. The maximum army proposed had been fixed at 200,000 men. How were those men to be raised?

Marshal Foch replied that the 200,000 men could be raised by annual recruitment, which could be either voluntary or by drawing lots or by any other system. He would point out, however, that the men so recruited would only serve for a period of one year.

Mr. Lloyd George said that in accordance with that scheme, the total length of service being restricted to one year, 200,000 men would be recruited and trained annually, so that in ten years 2,000,000 men would have been trained, in 15 years 3,000,000 men and in 20 years 4,000,000 men. Was that really Marshal Foch’s proposal?

Marshal Foch replied that it was evident that by renewing the personnel annually, soldiers of a sort would be produced. But in an Army it was not the common soldier that constituted the quality of an Army, but the “cadres”. In accordance with the proposal made by the military advisers a large number of soldiers would undoubtedly come under training, but there would be no corresponding staffs; that was the weak point of the system that was to be imposed on Germany. On the other hand, even a small standing army represented ready-made cadres for the training of a vast force. He would quote the words of Marshal Bugeaud, who, early in the nineteenth century, had stated that it would be better to have an army of sheep commanded by a lion than a number of lions commanded by an ass. By that he meant that it was the staff that was of importance and not the common soldiers; and the system which the military advisers had proposed to impose on Germany prevented the Germans from constituting staffs which would, after a period of years, enable them to gather and drive the large flocks of sheep which would still be found in Germany.

Mr. Lloyd George said that, with all due respect to Marshal Foch, he did not think the reply given met the real difficulty. Marshal Foch had said that the Germans would have no officers to lead the large Army of men available. Trained officers were, however, already plentiful in Germany, and would be for the next twenty-five years. He himself knew many distinguished officers who had fought both in the war of 1870 and again in the present war, and yet an interval of 46 years had elapsed between those two dates. In Germany at the present moment scores of officers and non-commissioned officers existed who had fought in this war and would be ready to come forward, thirsting for revenge, at the first opportunity. He would ask: Why should the Allies present Germany a scheme which would enable her to raise four or five million men in the next twenty years? Both England and America had had some experience of what that meant. Before 1914 Great Britain only had an army of some 200,000 men. Had she had an army of 2,000,000 men, besides the officers and non-commissioned officers whom Germany now had, results would have been very different. Outside the small regular army Great Britain had merely possessed a few territorial officers, that is to say, civilians who did a little training every Saturday evening. Nevertheless, three months after the declaration of war these men were fighting in the trenches and had given a very good account of themselves. On the other hand, under the proposed scheme, Germany would have an Army of three to four million trained men led not by donkeys, but by officers who had had considerable war experience. Surely that could not be called disarmament. He himself would be very sorry to leave France after the signing of peace with that threat facing her across the Rhine.

Mr. Lansing remarked that in order to avoid any confusion Mr. Lloyd George should recognise that two or three million trained soldiers already existed in Germany. Consequently, the whole question was really one of disarmament, that is to say, the Germans must be made to surrender their surplus arms and armaments.

Marshal Foch pointed out that in reality the Allies had to deal both with the present situation and with a future situation in Germany. No doubt to-day Germany had millions of men, besides officers and non-commissioned officers who had been trained and could be brought to the colours very rapidly. Consequently, for some time to come Germany would have at her disposal all the elements of a well-organised army. That could not be prevented. Mr. Lloyd George had said that the trained officers and non-commissioned officers would remain available for 25 years and more. In his opinion, that would certainly not be the case. The men now demobilised would in three or four years’ time be of little value, owing to the interruption of their training. Germany owed her great strength before the war to the large body of 120,000 professional non-commissioned officers, who formed the backbone of the army. Under the proposed scheme that backbone would be broken. If Germany were now to be allowed to raise a permanent standing army consisting of even 40,000 or 50,000 men, that would mean practically 40,000 or 50,000 possible non-commissioned officers available for training large armies. No doubt “cadres” at present existed, but these would daily lose their value if demobilised as proposed. Mr. Lloyd George had spoken about the organisation of the British Army. That army had certainly not been a large one, but it had contained a comparatively large number of permanent officers and non-commissioned officers, serving in the Colonies and at home, who became available for training new armies. On the other hand, if the cadres were split up, and if the officers and non-commissioned officers were prevented from training after being demobilised, that would be the best method of dissipating an existing army.

(c) Mr. Lloyd George’s Proposition Regarding Limitation of Effectives Mr. Lloyd George said lie would not dare to enter into a military argument with Marshal Foch; but he would point out that what had enabled Great Britain to train the new armies had been the old non-commissioned officers and the old officers, who had returned to the colours on the outbreak of the war, and a similar state of affairs would exist in Germany for many years to come. He would enquire, therefore, why a present of this great force should be made to Germany. He thought history would be repeating itself, and the Allies would be doing exactly the same thing as Napoleon had done after the Battle of Jena. The annual renewal of the whole army as suggested merely meant in the course of years the creation of an enormous army. That was a mistake which should not be repeated.

The British point of view, however, was the following: Germany should not be permitted to maintain a bigger army than Great Britain possessed. Great Britain had no idea of having an army of 4,000,000. Consequently, the regulations should lay down that Germany should not maintain a bigger army than Britain. It was useless to say that the Germans would not have the “cadres”, for, with millions of trained ex-officers and ex-non-commissioned officers burning with a desire to avenge their defeats, cadres would undoubtedly be raised somehow or other. He would therefore ask permission to make a suggestion, namely that an opportunity should be given to him to put a new proposal before the meeting. He suggested therefore, that the debate on the military terms should be adjourned to enable him on the morrow or the next day to submit an alternative proposal limiting the German army much more effectively than in the draft regulations now under consideration.

Marshal Foch asked permission to invite the attention of the Conference to the fact that the regulations presented to the Conference had been unanimously accepted after consulting all the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, Marshal Haig, General Pershing, General Diaz, as well as other specially chosen military experts. The regulations did not therefore reflect merely his own personal views, but the agreement reached by all the Allied Military experts.

Mr. Lloyd George said he fully realised that fact. On the other hand, the question was not wholly a military one; it was also a political one and, therefore, the Heads of Governments were entitled to express their view on the question.

M. Clemenceau agreed, and said that it would be the duty of the Heads of Governments finally to decide the whole question. He suggested that the further consideration of the question should be adjourned until the next meeting of the Conference, and he proposed that the Naval Clauses should at once be taken under consideration.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the draft regulations concerning the definitive military status of Germany until the next meeting of the Conference, to be held on Friday afternoon at 15 o’clock.

It was understood that the British representatives would then submit an alternative proposal relating to the limitation of effectives.)

4. M. Leygues said that before the Naval Conditions for Peace with Germany came to be discussed clause by clause, he wished to be permitted at once to raise a question which the French Government considered to be exceedingly controversial. The Naval Clauses for Terms of Peace with Germany contained a condition which should never have been entered, and regarding which he had made certain important reservations. He referred to the proposal that the ships which would definitely be surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America should be broken up or destroyed in the shortest possible time. In his opinion, it would be sufficient to tell Germany that she must surrender so many ships, but it was unnecessary and inexpedient to state what was to be done with those same ships. That was a question which only concerned the Allies, and a decision could be reached separately and at a later date. Naval Conditions for Peace With Germany: (a) Proposed Destruction of German Ships

His proposal therefore was that this question should not come under discussion on that date. If this were done the work of the Conference would be greatly simplified, and he thought the remaining Naval Clauses could be disposed of that afternoon.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed as far as that afternoon was concerned, but he would press for a final decision on the question to be reached as early as possible. In his opinion, the sooner the question was settled, the better it would be for the Allies. He did not despair about coming to an agreement, but the question was a very important one, at all events as regards the future peace of the world. He was quite willing, however, that the question should be reserved for a few days. The Admirals would have time in the interval to look into the matter again, and to decide whether the ships should be broken up, sunk, or distributed among the Allies.

M. Clemenceau enquired whether, in Mr. Lloyd George’s opinion, any reference should be made in the Peace Treaty with Germany, to the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by her.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he would rather not discuss that point for the moment. He would not say that he disagreed, but he would reserve his decision.

(It was agreed to reserve for the moment the question relating to the disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany.)

M. Clemenceau then called on Admiral Wemyss to read through the Naval Conditions, clause by clause.

Admiral Wemyss then read the Naval Conditions for the Terms of Peace with Germany, clause by clause. (For full text, see Annexure “B”.)

Chapter I. Clause 1 (a) Mr. Lloyd George said that he wished to raise exactly the same question here as he had done in the case of the military terms. He was not prepared to agree to 15,000 men being trained every year.

Admiral Wemyss pointed out that Clause XI (i) qualified Clause I (a). It was therein stated that the personnel for the German Navy would be recruited on a long service system.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he wished nevertheless to suggest that the whole question should be reserved until to-morrow afternoon, so that the question of personnel could be considered together, both as regards the Army and the Navy.

(This was agreed to.)

Clause 1 (b). Note Admiral Benson explained that the reason for the reservation he had made to this clause was that no period of time had been given for the Imitation of the strength of the German Fleet.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether it had not been intended to leave all such questions to the Conference to decide.

Admiral Benson said that M. Sonnino had made a suggestion that the Naval experts should advise the Supreme War Council on that question. And, since no reference had been made to it in the draft regulations, he wished to place his views on record. If the Conference wished to erase his note from the document, now that he had had an opportunity of making his statement, he was ready to agree.

Mr. Balfour said he quite saw the force of what Admiral Benson had said. He wished to suggest that the duration of the terms, both naval and military, should be reserved until the terms themselves had been finally agreed. As soon as the conditions had been fixed, it would be possible to settle a reasonable period for the execution of the Naval conditions, and also to decide what action should be taken after that period had elapsed. The matter could then either be referred to the League of Nations to impose further limitations, or Germany could be granted complete freedom of action. In his opinion, that was the only business way to settle the matter.

(It was agreed to reserve all questions relating to the duration of the Naval conditions for Peace with Germany.)

Clause 2 (a)
“2 (b) (Clauses 2 (a) and 2 (b) were accepted subject to a decision being reached on the question of the duration of the Naval Conditions. See Clause 1 (b).)

Clause 3 (a) M. Leygues said that the reservations which he had made earlier in the meeting relating to the destruction of the ships to be surrendered by Germany, applied to each of these clauses, which should therefore be reserved.

Admiral Wemyss thought that the conference should straight-way approve the principle that the ships were to be definitely taken away from Germany. The question as to what should be done with them should alone be reserved for the moment.

(Clause 3 (a) was accepted, the question of the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

(Clauses 3 (b) and 3 (c) were accepted.)

Clause 3 (b)
“3 (c)
Clause 4 (Clause 4 was accepted: the question of the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

Clause 5 Mr. Balfour drew attention to the following paragraph, namely: “With the above reservations the German Government may remove from these ships before they are sunk such material as has a commercial value”, and he enquired why the Allies should give to the Germans material of commercial value.

(It was agreed to delete the paragraph in question.)

(Clause 5 as amended was accepted: the question of the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

Clause 6 (Clause 6 was accepted.)

Clause 7 M. Leygues expressed the view that this Clause also should be reserved for further consideration. It was inexpedient to prejudge what should be done with the materials resulting from the breaking up of German vessels of war, especially as it might eventually be decided that they should not be destroyed.

(It was agreed, for the present, to reserve Clause 7.)

Clause 8 Mr. Balfour said he could not altogether understand the meaning of paragraph (b). Supposing a light cruiser, for instance, went down, a new light cruiser would be built, and, in his opinion, it would be absurd to say that it could only be replaced by something designed purely for coast defence. He thought Clause 8 (b) should be re-drafted.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said the second question related to paragraph 8 (d). According to that paragraph the birthday of a ship counted from “the first year in which credit would be taken in the Budget for the construction of the ship, which was to be replaced”. That pre-supposed that Parliamentary arrangements in Germany would be the same as those, for instance, in Great Britain. If Germany, however, had a law which did not impose an annual Budget, the Naval Condition in question could be evaded. He thought, therefore, a more rigid date was required.

M. Leygues suggested that the date on which the ship was placed on the stocks should be taken.

(It was agreed to re-draft Clause 8 (d).)

(Clause 8 was approved subject to paragraphs 8 (b) and 8 (d) being re-drafted.)

Clause 9 M. Clemenceau said that this Clause would have to be reserved until the constitution of the League of Nations had been decided.

(This was agreed to.)

Clause 10 Mr. Balfour said that presumably the question of the disposal of the arms, ammunition and naval war material to be surrendered by Germany should be reserved.

M. Leygues agreed.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Balfour said that he noticed a note to the effect that Admiral Benson did not agree to the final paragraph relating to preventing the manufacture in Germany of naval ordnance, ammunition, mines, torpedoes or their parts, or naval war material of any description. He should have thought that condition was in agreement with the views of the American Delegates.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed the hope that the American delegates would see their way to withdraw their objection. If Germany were able to manufacture for foreign countries, a very serious situation would be produced. Germany would be able to say that she did not want any ships, that she was merely manufacturing for other countries, and, then, when war came, she would do exactly what England had done and requisition all these ships for her own use. Unless a condition of this nature were inserted the whole of the attempt to disarm Germany would be futile. The question under reference was not a League of Nations business; it was an essential part of the programme of the disarmament of Germany. He sincerely hoped the American delegates would allow this Clause to remain.

Mr. Lansing agreed to withdraw his reservation.

(Clause 10, as amended, was accepted, the Note by Admiral Benson being deleted: the question of the disposal of the arms, ammunition and naval war material, including mines and torpedoes to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

Mr. Lloyd George said that in accordance with the statement he had previously made, the whole of this Clause should be reserved until the question of the personnel for the German Navy had been further considered.

Clause 11 (It was agreed to reserve Clause 11 for further Consideration.)

Clause 12
“13 (These Clauses were approved.)

Part II. Clause 1 Mr. Lloyd George said he noticed a suggestion that the disposal of the islands would be decided by the Final Treaty of Peace. That was a question of great importance to Great Britain, and, in his opinion whatever happened to the islands of Heligoland and Dune, he was anxious they should not be left in the hands of the Germans.

Admiral Wemyss said that he did not mind what happened to the islands, as long as they did not revert to Germany.

(It was agreed to reserve this Clause for further consideration.)

Clause 2 (This clause was accepted.)

Clause 3 Mr. Lansing said that his Naval advisers held the view that this Clause was more an Army than a Naval question. Naval armaments were being limited; why then should Germany not be allowed to defend her own coasts? In his opinion, it would be very difficult to prevent a nation from doing that, and he thought the Conference was going beyond reason. In his opinion, Germany should be permitted to defend herself.

Mr. Balfour held that the fortifications referred to in the Clause under consideration were not for defensive purposes; they were in reality Naval Bases to be used for offensive purposes, that is to say, centres from which offensive naval operations could be undertaken. He thought it would be admitted that the coast could best be defended by guns disseminated about the coast. In the Military Conditions for Peace with Germany, provision had been made for the destruction of all fortifications situated 50 kilometres East of the Rhine, and when that Condition came up for consideration he intended to ask why a similar’ condition should not be imposed as regards the Eastern frontier.

To sum up, if the fortifications in question were of value only for defensive purposes, he would at once accept the American view. But under present conditions of Naval warfare, fortified bases merely became jumping-off places for offensive operations.

Mr. House enquired why the clause should not be limited to defensive bases only.

Mr. Lansing held that once the enemy vessels had been reduced to the smaller number proposed, Germany was entitled to keep any bases she might have for the protection of her Navy.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that there was a good deal of force in the contention of the American delegates that Germany should not be deprived of such defences. It would be unwise to give the impression that the Allies had been merciless and had displayed a spirit of revenge. On the other hand, in his opinion, the fortifications should be given such a character that they could not be used as bases for attacking other countries. But as regards bona-fide trading ports, Germany should be allowed to defend them to the best of her ability. He proposed, therefore, that the Clause should be referred back to the Admirals to be so drafted as to distinguish between fortifications maintained for offensive and those maintained for defensive purposes.

Marshal Foch insisted on the application of the principle contained in this clause. Otherwise, the fortifications of Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven, for instance, would not be destroyed.

(It was agreed to refer this Clause back to the Admirals for further examination with a view to separating the defensive from the offensive fortifications.)

Clause 4 Mr. Balfour said he did not know what principles had guided Admiral Benson in making his reservations. The importance of the Kiel Canal question was, however, very great. If Germany were permitted to continue to hold the Canal under the present conditions, the strength of the German Fleet would be doubled, the Baltic would be a German lake, the freedom of Sweden and Denmark, Finland, Latvia and Esthonia, and even of Russia, would be jeopardised, if the last ever again became a maritime power. Consequently, from an international point of view, the question was of extreme importance. The use of the Canal for purely strategic reasons must be restricted as had been done in the case of the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal, where the provisions now suggested were already in operation.

Mr. Lansing said he was not unmindful of the arguments in favour of the provisions contained in the clause under consideration, The strategic advantage to Germany of the Kiel Canal was great; it could double the power of Germany to transfer ships from the Baltic to the North Sea. But he did not see why the same purpose could not be accomplished by destroying the fortifications of the Kiel Canal and at the same time preventing their reconstruction. Furthermore, he failed to see why all commercial ships of other countries passing through the Kiel Canal should be given special privileges. The same privileges might be asked in the case of the Cape Cod Canal, in the United States of America. He could see little justice in allowing the proposed clause to remain, in view of the fact that the German Fleet was to be reduced to very small figures, combined with the destruction of the fortifications in the Kiel Canal.

Mr. Lloyd George said he failed to see any injustice to Germany in saying that she must allow ships of all nations to pass through the Kiel Canal, which was no more than was done in the case of the Panama and Suez Canals. Far from being a disadvantage or injustice to Germany, the traffic so created would be of great benefit to her ports.

M. Tardieu remarked that equal rights to all nations could not be interpreted as an injustice.

Mr. House proposed that the question should be referred to the International Ports, Waterways & Railways Commission.

(It was agreed that the question of the Kiel Canal should be referred to the International Ports, Waterways & Railways Commission.)

Clause 5 Mr. Lansing suggested that the word “final” should be omitted from Clause 5 (i) and (ii). He did not know what it meant, as qualifying the words Treaty of Peace.

Mr. Balfour thought that if the word “final” were omitted, the Clause would have no meaning. The document under consideration was a Treaty of Peace, and consequently should not contain clauses becoming inoperative at the moment of signature.

Admiral Wemyss pointed out that the document under reference had been termed a “Convention”. The use of the word “Treaty” had purposely been avoided.

Mr. Lansing said that as far as phraseology was concerned, the question of using an adjective to qualify the term “Peace Treaty” should be reserved until the question of the number of Peace Treaties to be signed with Germany had been decided.

(It was agreed that the qualifying adjective to be employed in connection with the term “Treaty of Peace” should throughout the draft Naval conditions for peace with Germany be reserved.)

Mr. Lansing drew attention to paragraph 4 of Clause 5 and enquired how that Clause would be applied. Who would select the one government to represent all the independent or semi-independent states into which Germany might be divided?

(Clause 5 was agreed to, subject to the above reservation.)

Clause 6 Mr. Lansing enquired whether the German cables therein enumerated were to be taken over as an indemnity due by Germany or on other grounds.

Admiral Wemyss said that the capture of enemy submarine cables was a legitimate application of the use of sea-power, and could be secured by the use of no other agency. Submarine cables must be considered as instruments of warfare and therefore subject to such action as might be taken in the case of naval, military, and aerial armaments. The cables in question had been cut on the outbreak of war. Large portions of them had since been diverted, taken up, or relaid, for use in situ by the British and French Governments. Their possession and use by the enemy would have enabled him to affect to a large extent the effects of the economic blockade.

Admiral Benson pointed out that only a certain number of these had been captured during the war. He did not agree that they were subject to capture and permanent retention in the same way as ships of war. At all events, that question had never been decided in international law. He would be willing, as no precedent existed, that the question should be referred to a Prize Court.

Admiral de Bon said that as far as the French Government was concerned, the question was perfectly clear. Submarine cables were undoubtedly considered to be instruments of war, since they were used for the transmission of enemy messages. Their value was evidenced by the care Germany had taken to maintain her cable lines via Spain. As a naval war operation, ships had run considerable risks in attempting to cut the enemy submarine cables, and, in fact, one French boat had been sunk whilst employed on that duty. Consequently, as far as France was concerned, there was no doubt that submarine cables were considered to be war material, and fair prize, resulting from war operations. Such cables belonged to France just as much as telegraph wires captured on the battle-field. From the military point of view, the Allies acted within their rights in seizing these cables and in utilising them, and would be justified in keeping them. He fully realised, however, that the question had never been discussed from an international point of view, and if the Meeting insisted, a judicial Commission should be appointed to consider the whole question.

Mr. Lansing held the view that the question involved was one not only of international law, but also of policy. Had anyone the right to take enemy property lying on the highways open to all nations? He agreed that the cables could have been taken out of the ocean, and destroyed, but they could not be kept in situ and confiscated. They could be taken as an indemnity by agreement, but not as a capture of war. In his opinion, the very fact that the naval authorities had found it necessary to include these clauses showed that they were not sure of their ground.

Admiral Wemyss replied that as far as the naval experts themselves were concerned, they had no doubts as to what should be done, but he agreed that no international law appeared to cover the question.

Admiral de Bon pointed out that in many places the French had removed the cables and relaid them elsewhere, so that they had done the very thing which Mr. Lansing considered a sign of capture. He agreed, however, that the question could be referred to a judicial body on the condition that the naval authorities were called in to give their views, and that the naval point of view was not overlooked.

M. Sonnino thought that in referring the question to a legal commission a distinction should be made between cables which had been seized and those which had not been seized.

Mr. Lansing agreed to the question being referred in the first instance to a judicial committee, but he felt compelled to point out that in his opinion a very large question of policy was also involved.

M. Tardieu agreed that the question of the capture 01 the cables should be settled by the Law committee. But there was a further question to be settled, namely, whether these cables should be restored to the German owners or not.

Mr. Lansing remarked that that was the very question of policy he had himself referred to.

Baron Makino said that some of the cable-lines in question were at the present moment held by the Japanese Government. They had been taken over because they were being used for the purposes of naval warfare. The Japanese delegates had agreed to the clause under consideration for the reason that they thought the cables in question were not to be returned to the Germans. But as regards their future disposal, the Japanese had their own views, which he did not think it necessary to express that day. The meeting should therefore agree that the cables must be taken from Germany. But as regards their future disposal the question should be reserved.

Mr. Balfour expressed the view that the whole question could be summed up in two very concise propositions.

• Firstly, was it in accordance with the spirit of international law that all submarine cables captured should, or should not, be taken from Germany? That was a purely legal question. If answered in the affirmative, namely, that Germany should be deprived of all or of some of the cables, then . . . . . .
• Secondly, what should be done with them? That was a question of high policy and not of law. It was a question analogous to the one dealing with the disposal of the money or ships to be taken from Germany, and it should be referred to some other commission. Finally, he thought the further discussion of the whole question should be reserved until the two questions he had propounded had been reported on.

Mr. Lansing agreed, but he would also like to refer, in connection with question 1, whether any international right existed to seize the cables in question either as prizes of war or as indemnities.

Mr. Balfour proposed that Mr. Lansing should be asked to draft the terms of reference. He thought that a committee would have to be created to report on the question with one representative for each country.

(It was agreed that terms of reference for a Commission to consider the question of the submarine cables referred to in Clause 6 should be drafted and submitted by Mr. Lansing at the next Meeting to be held on Friday afternoon, March 7th.)

(It was also agreed that a Committee should be appointed to consider the question of international law, to consist of one representative of each of the Great Powers, whose names would be handed in on the following afternoon.)

Appendix to Part II Mr. Lloyd George enquired why this question should be brought into the naval convention. It was purely a question of reparation, and, in his opinion, should be referred to the Allied Commission on Reparation without note or comment.

(It was agreed to refer the question of the reparation for Allied shipping losses to the Allied Commission on Reparation.)

Part III. Clause 1 Mr. Lansing said that Admiral Benson had made certain reservations in connection with the appointment of Commissions for the execution of the naval terms, as there was no indication of the length of time these Commissions would have to act.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not quite know what Mr. Lansing had in his mind, but if he would submit counter-proposals, the question would be made quite clear.

(It was agreed that Mr. Lansing should draft and submit an alternative reading of Part III, Clause 1.)

Clause 2 (Clause 2 was accepted without discussion.)

Admiral Wemyss then read the following statement:—

“The Admirals understand that the German Colonies are not to be returned to Germany, and, on that hypothesis, have not included the subject in the Naval conditions.”

The Naval clauses for the Conditions of Peace with Germany were approved, subject to the following reservations:—

I. That the following questions be reserved for further consideration:—

Part I. Clauses 3 (a), 4, 5, 7 & 10 The manner of disposal of ships to be surrendered by Germany, and of the material arising from the vessels broken up, and of other Naval war material.

Part I. Clauses 1 (a) and 11 The strength of the personnel of the German Navy.

Part I. Clause 1 (b) The duration of the Naval Conditions of Peace with Germany.

Part I. Clause 9 Prohibition of the construction of submarines.

Part II. Clause 1 Final disposal of Heligoland and Dune.

Part I. Clauses. Part II. Clause 5 Use of the word “final” before “Peace Treaty” throughout the Naval conditions.

Part III. Clause 1 Commission for the execution of the Naval Terms of Peace with Germany.

II. That the following question be referred back to the Allied Naval Commission for re-drafting:—Construction of Vessels of war by Germany. Part I. Clauses 8 (b) and 8 (d)

III. That the following question be referred to the Inter-Allied Naval Commission:—To separate the coast fortifications maintained by Germany for offensive purposes from those maintained for defensive purposes. Part II. Clause 3

IV. That the following questions be referred to Special Committees:—

Part II. Clause 4 Kiel Canal to be referred to the International Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission.

Part II. Clause 6 The German submarine cables to be referred to a special judicial committee to be created.

Appendix to Part II. Reparation for Allied shipping losses to be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission on Reparation.

(The Meeting then adjourned until Friday, March 7th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

Paris, 7th March, 1919.

Appendix “A” to IC–155 [BC-45]

Draft Regulations Concerning a Definitive Military Status of Germany

Chapter 1.—Limitation of Effectives

Article 1.

The total effectives of the Land Army of all the States both present and future, constituting Germany, fixed so that Germany can ensure order and police control within her territory, does not exceed 200,000 men (not including Officers.)

The non-commissioned officers and men in excess of this figure shall return to civil life.

Article 2.

The total effectives of Officers shall not exceed 9,000, including the staffs of Commanders of fortresses, garrisons, etc.

Article 3.

The German Army shall consist of not more than 15 divisions of infantry and 5 divisions of cavalry.

Article 4.

These divisions may be formed with not more than 5 Army Corps Staffs and 1 Army Staff.

The formation of forces differently grouped and of other organisations of command is forbidden.

Article 5.

The composition of the divisions and that of Army or Army Corps Staffs is given in Table No. 1.

The number of small units of infantry, artillery, engineers, and of technical services and troops, provided for the divisions, as well as the effective[s] allowed for these small units, technical services of troops, must not be exceeded.

Article 6.

As the German Army can have no other duty than the maintenance of internal order, and, in cases of necessity, the police control of the frontiers, the High Command of the Army is confined to functions of an administrative character. The Staff of Officers of the Ministries of War of all the German States and of the Administrations directly attached to it, shall be included in the total effectives given to Article 2, and shall not exceed 300 officers.

No organisation shall exist intended to prepare troops for employment in any warlike operations, and in particular, the German Great General Staff or similar formations shall be dissolved and cannot be reconstituted in any other form.

Article 7.

Only the number of military schools strictly indispensable to the recruitment of the officers of the units to be maintained, shall continue to exist.

In consequence, the War Academies or similar institutions of the German States and the different schools of officers, officer-students, cadets, non-commissioned officers, and non-commissioned officer students, shall be suppressed; the only schools authorised shall be those intended for the recruitment of the officers of each arm in the proportion of one school for each arm.

The number of students admitted to attend the lectures in these schools shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled up in the cadres of officers, students and cadres being included in the effectives mentioned in Article 1.

Manoeuvres of cadres and troops of a strength exceeding that of a regiment are suppressed.

Article 8.

All the measures prescribed in the present chapter must be carried out within two months at the most.

Chapter 2.—Limitation of Armaments

Article 1.

The Units forming the German Army shall have an armament the total amount of which shall not exceed that stated in Table No. 2.

Article 2.

The German Army may have besides, at its disposal, to provide for eventual replacements, an amount of material equal to l/25th part for small arms and to l/50th part for cannons of the quantity provided for in the preceding Article.

Article 3.

The German Army may have at its disposal stocks of munitions the amount of which shall not exceed that fixed by Table No. 3.

Article 4.

These stocks of munitions shall be stored at points fixed by the German Government of which it shall inform the Allied and Associated Powers.

Apart from these depots it shall be forbidden to form stocks, depôts or reserves of munitions.

Article 5.

Production or use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, any liquid, any material and any similar device capable of use in war are forbidden.

Article 6.

The manufacture of armoured cars or of any similar machines which can be used for military objects is forbidden.

Article 7.

The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material shall be permitted only in a very limited number of factories, the exact names of which shall be communicated to the Allied and Associated Powers with a statement of the amount of material ordered.

No other establishment having for its object the design, preparation, manufacture or storage of munitions or any war material whatever shall exist.

In particular, the arsenals shall be suppressed, unless they are used as depots for the authorised stocks of munitions. The personnel of the suppressed arsenals shall be dismissed.

Article 8.

(a) All fortified works, fortresses and land forts, which are situated in German territory west of a line traced 50 kilometres east of the Rhine, shall be disarmed and dismantled.

The construction of any new fortifications, of whatever importance or nature, within this zone is forbidden.

(b) The status quo is and shall be preserved as regards fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany.

(c) The armament of the fortified works, fortresses and land or coast forts which Germany is allowed to retain shall never exceed, as regards the number and calibre of guns, those existing at the date of the signature of the present Convention, which number and calibres shall at once be communicated by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Powers.

The stocks of ammunition for these guns shall be maintained at the following uniform rates, 3,000 rounds apiece for those the calibre of which is 10.5 cm. and under: 1,000 rounds apiece for those of higher calibre.

Article 9.

No military force or establishment shall exist on the left bank of the Rhine and till further orders police control shall be ensured by Allied troops.

Article 10.

All German arms, munitions and war material existing in Germany, including those mentioned in Articles 5, 6 and 7, in excess of the quantities allowed by the present regulations shall be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers at points to be fixed in German territory, with a view to their being destroyed or rendered useless.

The same shall be done in the case of special machinery intended for the manufacture of war material in excess of that recognised as necessary for the manufacture authorised.

War material of all sorts, even if not in working order, or origin other than German, shall be sequestrated; the Allied and Associated Powers shall decide as to its disposal.

Article 11.

Germany is forbidden to manufacture war material for other countries.

The German State or States or German private individuals shall not receive by purchase, exchange or cession of any sort war material coming from abroad.

Article 12.

The measures prescribed by Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 of the present chapter shall be carried out within one month.

The measures prescribed by Articles 7 and 8 of the present chapter shall be carried out within 3 months.

Chapter 3.—Limiting Clauses Concerning German Military Laws

Article 1.

Clauses of the following article shall form an integral part of the German Military Laws.

These laws moreover shall not include any provision in contradiction of the clauses contained in the different chapters of the regulations. They shall on the contrary prescribe the abrogation of all previous legislative, financial, or administrative measures which may be in contradiction with these clauses.

These laws shall be enforced in all German territory and promulgated within three months.

Article 2.

The total number of 200,000 men, given in Article 1 of Chapter 1, includes:

(a) The number of these enlisted or re-enlisted (non-commissioned officers included) which shall not exceed 20,000;

(b) The number of those called up in each class of recruitment.

Beyond this number of men, no military force shall be raised in Germany either in the form of a militia or any other form.

Article 3.

The total number of these called up in each class of recruitment who shall receive any military instruction shall be less than 180.000 men.

The men of the contingent embodied shall, after their service be definitely freed from all military obligation.

Men not embodied shall not be obliged to fulfill any military obligation.

The total length of the service of those called up must not exceed 1 year and their service must be continuous.

Article 4.

Officers who have previously belonged to any military formations and who are not included in the units the maintenance of which is authorised, shall not participate in any military exercise, whether theoretical or practical, and shall not be liable to any military obligation.

Officers kept in the Army shall serve at least till the age of 45 years.

Officers newly commissioned shall sign an engagement to serve on the active list for at least 25 years.

No officer shall leave the army without being pronounced unfit on grounds of health. If, by an exception, he is authorised to do so, his place shall not be filled before he has reached the age of 45 years or the period of service of 25 years provided for is ended.

The proportion of officers thus pronounced unfit on grounds of health shall not exceed in any one year 5% of the total effectives of officers provided for in Article 2 of Chapter 1.

Article 5.

Those who have re-enlisted (non-Commissioned officers and men) shall be obliged to serve for at least 15 years. Before the end of that time they shall only leave the army under the conditions fixed for Officers.

Article 6.

No measure of mobilisation shall be provided for.

In no case shall troops, services, or staffs include supplementary cadres.

No census or classification of horses shall be made for the requirements of the Army.

Article 7.

The following units may have a depot of their own:

• A regiment of Infantry,
• A regiment of Cavalry,
• A regiment of Field Artillery,
• A battalion of Heavy Artillery,
• A brigade of Horse Artillery,
• A battalion of Pioneers.

The effectives of the depôts of the German Army included in the total figure given in Article 1 of Chapter 1.

Article 8.

The administrative services the staff of which are neither officers, non-commissioned officers or men, shall have their effectives reduced for each category, to the fifth part of those provided for in the Budget of 1913. They are not included in the effectives indicated in Articles 1 and 2 of Chapter 1.

Article 9.

Public servants such as Gendarmes, Custom House Officials, Forest and Coast Guards, and Local and Municipal Police Officials, shall never be assembled to take part in any military training.

Article 10.

Societies of retired soldiers, rifle, sporting or touring clubs and, in general, associations whether incorporated or not, whatever may be the age of their members, shall not concern themselves in any military question. They shall, in particular, be forbidden to instruct or exercise, or to allow to be instructed or exercised, their members in the vocation of war or use of weapons of war. The same rule applies to Schools or Universities not provided for in Article 7 of Chapter 1.

These Societies, Associations or Schools shall have no connection with the Ministry of War or any other Military Authority. They shall have no military instructors.

Chapter 4.—Control

Article 1.

The provisions of all Articles of Chapter 1 and of Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 10 of Chapter 2 will be carried out under the control of a special Commission, delegated for that purpose by the Allied and Associated Powers. That Commission will work until the provisions of the Articles mentioned above are carried out by Germany within the prescribed period; if, for any reason, any one of those provisions be not carried out within the allotted period, the delegates of that Commission will immediately bring those facts to the knowledge of their respective Governments, who will give them new instructions.

This Commission shall be established at the seat of the Central German Government, but will be able to send Sub-Commissions or delegates to any other part of German territory.

Article 2.

The German Government undertakes to facilitate so far as possible the exercise of this control, especially from the point of view of military and financial measures, and to communicate to the Commission in its entirety the War Budget.

It undertakes also to communicate to the said Commission all orders given by it for the carrying out of the provisions of the present regulations and to furnish, moreover, on questions which may be put to it, all information which may be asked.

Article 3.

The destruction and putting out of action provided for in Chapter 2 will be carried out by orders of the German authorities, under the supervision of the delegates of the said Commission.

Article 4.

The Allied and Associated Powers reserve to themselves the right of exercising their control over importations of raw material, which might be used for the production of war material.

Chapter 5

Article 1.

(a) All the provisions of this Convention shall be applicable throughout all the territories constituting Germany as she shall be on the signing of the Treaty of Peace or as she may be constituted at any time thereafter.

(b) Germany undertakes to respect all the clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who have signed this Convention with her.

(c) The execution of these Clauses will continue in the future to be supervised by such means and by such organs as the League of Nations may see fit to employ or to create.

Table No. 1

State and Establishment of the Army and Army Corps Staffs of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions

(These tabular statements do not form a fixed establishment to be imposed on Germany, but the figures contained in them (number of Units and strengths) represent maximum figures which should not in any case be exceeded.)

i. army and army corps staffs

Units	Maximum number authorised	Maximum strengths of each unit
		Officers	Men
Army Staff	1	85	400
Army Corps Staff	5	60	500

ii. establishment of an infantry division

Constituent Unit		Max. No. of such unit in a single division	Maximum strength of each unit
			Officers	Rank & File N. C. O.’s & Men
Staff of an Infantry Div		1	25	70
Staff of Divisional Infy		1	4	30
Staff of Divisional Arty		1	4	30
Regiment of Infantry		3	70	2300
Each Regiment comprises:
	3 Battalions of Infantry.
Each Battalion comprises:
	3 Companies of Infantry & 1 Machine Gun Company.
Trench Mortar Company		3	6	150
Divisional Squadron		1	6	150
Field Artillery Regiment		1	85	1300
Each Regiment comprises:
	3 Groups of Artillery.
Each Group comprises:
	3 Batteries.
Foot Battln (3 Batteries)		1	32b	600
Pioneer Battalin		1	12	400
This Battalion comprises:
	2 Companies of Pioneers.
	1 Pontoon Detachment.
	1 Searchlight Section.
Liaison Detachment		1	12	300
This Detachment comprises:
	1 Telegraph Detachment.
	1 Microphone Section.
	1 Carrier Pigeon Section.
Divisional Medical Service		1	20	400
Parks & Convoys			14	800

iii. establishment of a cavalry division

Staff of a Cavalry Division		1	15	50
Cavalry Regiment		6	40	800
Each Regiment comprises:
	4 Squadrons.
Horse Arty Group (3 Batteries)		1	20	400

iv. horse establishment

	Saddle	Draught		Saddle	Draught	Total
Infantry Div	977	2531	15 Infantry Div	14655	37965
Cavalry Div	8333	456	5 Cavalry Divisions	26665	2280	81565

Table No. 2

Tabular Statement of Armament Establishment for a Maximum of 15 Infantry Divisions, 5 Cavalry Divisions and 5 Army Corps Staffs

	Infantry Division	For 15 Infantry Divisions	Cavalry Division	For 5 Cavalry Divisions	5 Army Corps Staffs	Total of columns 2 4 and 5
Material	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rifles	12,000	180,000			This establishment must be drawn from the increased armaments of the divisional infantry.	180,000
Carbines			6,000	30,000		30,000
Heavy machine guns.	108	1,620	12	60		1,680
Light machine guns.	162	2,430				2,430
Ordinary trench mortars.	9	135				135
Light trench mortars.	27	405				405
77 mm. guns.	24	360	12	60		420
105 mm. Howitzers.	12	180				180
150 mm. ”	8	120
105 mm. Heavy guns.	4	60				60

Table No. 3

Maximum Stocks Authorised

Maximum number of arms authorised				Establishment per unit		Maximum Totals
Rifles			130,000	}	400 rounds	84,000,000
Carbines			30,000
Heavy machine-guns			1,680	}	8000 rounds	32,880,000
Light machine-guns			2,430
Ordinary Trench Mortars			135		400 rounds	54,000
Light Trench Mortars			405		800 rounds	324,000
Field Artillery	{	77 mm. Guns	420		1,000 rounds	420,000
		105 mm. Guns	180		800 rounds	144,000
Heavy Artillery	{	150 mm Howitzer	120		600 rounds	72,000
		Heavy 105 mm. Gun	60		600 rounds	36,000

Conditions To Be Imposed on the German Government in Regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics

Article I.

The effectives of the German Air Service in material and personnel shall be reduced to the following figures:—

(1) Material.

(a) Aeroplanes.

The military forces of Germany having to be limited to the necessary minimum to allow her to maintain order in the interior, must not comprise any military aeroplanes.

(b) Hydroplanes.

Germany can for a period not longer than 1st October, 1919, maintain a total of 100 hydroplanes or water gliders for the purpose of seeking out submarine mines, with the necessary equipment, but without armaments, munitions or bombs.

(c) Motors.

In addition to the motors mounted on hydroplanes, and water gliders mentioned above, one motor may be allowed for each hydroplane or water glider.

(d) Dirigibles.

No dirigible balloons shall be kept.

(2) Personnel.

(a) Land Aviation.

Land aviation being suppressed, no personnel is allowed under this heading.

(b) Naval Aviation.

A total number of 1,000 men for the whole of the cadres, navigating and non-navigating personnel of all formations and establishments.

(c) The whole personnel, excepting a total of 1,000 men mentioned in Paragraph I (2) (b) figuring at present on the control lists of the German land and sea forces will be demobilised or sent to other arms or services, (but the effectives provided for in the Military and Naval Statute must not be exceeded).

Article II.

No aviation ground and no shed for dirigibles must be maintained or established:—

(1) to the East of the Rhine, at a distance of less than 150 Kilometres from that river.

(2) to the West of the Eastern German frontier at a distance of less than 150 kilometres from that frontier.

(3) to the North of the Southern German frontier at a distance of less than 150 kilometres from the frontier of Italy or of Czechoslovakia.

All grounds now existing which do not satisfy these conditions are to be immediately placed out of use. The sheds are to be dismantled and the earth is to be ploughed up.

Article III.

Germany will allow to all Allied aircraft free passage through the air, free transit and right to land on her territory until complete evacuation of German territory by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article IV.

The manufacture of parts of aeroplanes, hydroplanes, water gliders, dirigibles and motors shall be forbidden in the whole of German territory until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace.

Article V.

The material now existing in the German land and sea forces or in process of manufacture, in excess of the figures given under Article I shall be handed over to the Allies. In that material must be comprised in particular:—

• complete aeroplanes and hydroplanes, as well as those in process of manufacture, repair, or of being put together;
• dirigible balloons able to take the air in process of manufacture, repair or being put together;
• machinery for the manufacture of hydrogen;
• dirigible sheds and every kind of shelter for balloons or dirigibles.

Pending their delivery dirigible balloons are to be maintained blown out with hydrogen at Germany’s expense and the apparatus for the manufacture of the hydrogen, as well as shelters for dirigibles may, at the discretion of the Allied and Associated Powers, be left to Germany until the moment when the dirigibles are handed over.

• Motors.
• Cells.
• Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb throwers, torpedo throwers, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).
• Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded and unloaded, stocks of explosives or material for their manufacture).
• Instruments for use on aeroplanes.
• Wireless apparatus; photographic or cinematograph apparatus.
• Detached parts connected with any of the preceding categories.

Article VI.

Any movement of material mentioned in Article V shall be forbidden without special authorisation by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article VII.

The terms of the various articles of the present Convention shall be carried out under the control of a Special Commission delegated for that purpose by the Allied and Associated Powers.

This Commission shall work at the seat of the Central German Government, but shall be able to send a sub-Commission or delegates to any other part of German territory.

This Commission will have every power to settle directly and without appeal any disputes which may arise in regard to the execution of the present Convention.

The German Government will immediately hand over to it:—

(1) A numerical list of the personnel belonging to all the German Air Services and of the existing material as well as that in process of manufacture or on order.

(2) A complete list, with their position, of all establishments working for aviation, and of all landing grounds and sheds.

The German Government will immediately place at the disposal of this Commission all documents relating to the German Air Service.

The German Government will give to all the delegates of this Commission every facility to carry out their mission, and in particular:—

• to effect over the whole extent of German territory a census of the material mentioned under Article V;
• to inspect, whenever called upon, aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and arms, munitions and explosive factories, aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depôts.
• to take any photographs and sketches.

The German Government will immediately hand over to this Commission all the information and documents set forth in Articles V and VII, and all the material mentioned in these Articles shall be handed over as rapidly as possible, and before the 1st October, 1919, at latest.

Article VIII.

Directly Germany has fulfilled the conditions stipulated in the present convention, the Commission instituted under Article VII shall be suppressed.

Article IX.

The rules relative to the organisation of a commercial air service in Germany after the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, and to its being granted international circulation shall be determined by the said Treaty of Peace.

Note—The Officer Air Delegates request that the Commission instituted by Article VII as regards Aviation shall form part of the Commission instituted with the same objects by the Military Convention, and should operate according to the same principles and within the same time limits.

Appendix B to IC–155 [BC–45]

Naval Conditions for Peace With Germany

In pursuance of the instructions of the Supreme War Council, the proposed Naval Clauses are resubmitted in three Parts, I., II. and III., as set out in the attached schedule.

2. With regard to the reservations noted at the foot of some of the purely Naval subjects, the Admirals desire to point out that they are in complete accord on the main issue, viz., the extent to which the German Fleet should be reduced.

3. The Admirals understand that the German colonies are not to be returned to Germany, and on that hypothesis have not included the subject in the Naval Conditions.

4. As it is important from the Naval point of view that full reparation should be exacted for the shipping losses of the Allies and the United States of America, the Admirals have appended to Part II. a draft containing their views, in order that these may be embodied in the Reparation clauses of the Convention.

Signed by	For
Admiral Benson	United States of America
Admiral Wemyss	British Empire
Vice-Admiral de Bon	France
Rear-Admiral Grassi	Italy
Vice-Admiral Takeshita	Japan.

Paris, 5 March, 1919

[Enclosure]

Naval Conditions for Peace With Germany

Schedule of Clauses

Part I. Purely Naval Subjects.

1. Strength of German Fleet.

2. Disposal of Surplus.

3. Submarines.

4. Surface vessels-of-war now interned.

5. Further reduction of surface vessels-of-war.

6. Vessels-of-war under construction.

7. Materials arising from vessels broken up.

8. Future construction of vessels-of-war.

9. Prohibition of submarine construction.

10. Naval war material.

11. German Naval Law.

12. Merchant cruisers and Fleet auxiliaries.

13. Minesweeping.

Appendix. Nominal list of Merchant Cruisers and Auxiliaries.

Part II. Subjects intimately connected with Naval matters on which the Admirals deem it essential to present their views and recommendations.

1. Heligoland.

2. Routes into the Baltic.

3. Coast fortifications.

4. Kiel Canal.

5. Wireless telegraphy.

6. Submarine cables.

Appendix. Reparation for Shipping Losses.

Part III. Execution of Terms.

1. Appointment of Commissions.

2. Conventions.

Naval Clauses for Terms of Peace With Germany

Part I

Clause 1. Strength of German Fleet.

(a) Personnel.

The total personnel for Naval purposes, including the manning of the Fleet, coast defences, signal stations, administration and other land services, shall not exceed 15,000 (officers and men of all grades and corps included), of whom not more than ten per cent shall be officers and warrant officers.

(b) Seagoing Fleet.

The strength of the seagoing fleet shall not exceed:—

6	battleships of the “Deutschland” or “Lothringen” type;
6	light-cruisers;
12	destroyers	}	for coastwatching and fishery duties;
12	torpedo boats

or an equivalent number of vessels built in accordance with Clause 8.

Until the completion of the minesweeping prescribed by Clause 13, Germany will keep in commission the number of minesweeping vessels fixed by the Allies and the United States.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.

Clause 2. Disposal of Surplus.

(a) Personnel.

Officers and men belonging to the German Navy in excess of the numbers authorised by Clause 1 shall be demobilised within a period of two months from the signature of the present Convention.

(b) Vessels-of-war.

Vessels-of-war over and above the seagoing fleet authorised by Clause 1 shall be disposed of as required by Clauses 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12, or, if not specially provided for in these clauses, shall be placed in reserve or utilised for commercial purposes.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.

Clause 3. Submarines.

(a) All German submarines, without exception, submarine salvage vessels, and docks for submarines (including the tubular dock), are to be surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America. Those which can proceed under their own power, or which can be towed, shall be taken by the Germans into Allied ports, to be there destroyed^* or broken up.

Germany shall inform the neutral Powers concerned that she authorises the delivery to the Allies and the United States of America of all German submarines in neutral ports.

(b) The German submarines which cannot be delivered in Allied ports, as well as those which are in course of construction, shall be completely broken up by the Germans, under the supervision of Allied and United States Commissioners.

The breaking-up of these submarines shall be completed within a maximum period of three months after the signature of the present Convention.

(c) The Naval Commission appointed by the Allies and the United States of America to supervise the execution of the terms of the Armistice has decided as to which submarines are to proceed or are to be towed to Allied ports and which are to be broken up by the Germans. The decisions of this Commission shall be strictly carried out.

Clause 4. Surface Vessels-of-War Now Interned.

All German surface vessels-of-war now interned in Allied ports, in conformity with the terms of the Armistice, or interned in neutral ports, cease to belong to Germany; they are definitely surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America for the purpose of being broken up or destroyed^* in the shortest possible time.

Germany shall inform the neutral Powers concerned that she authorises the delivery to the Allies and the United States of America of the German surface vessels-of-war in neutral ports.

Clause 5. Further Reduction of Surface Vessels of War.

The German vessels-of-war named below shall be sunk^* under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America within two months after the signature of the present convention.

Commissions of the Allies and the United States shall fix the localities where these vessels shall be sunk.

The vessels are to have their guns on board. In other respects they are to remain disarmed as ordered by Article XXIII. of the Armistice Convention dated 11 November, 1918.

With the above reservations the German Government may remove from these ships before they are sunk such material as has a commercial value.

The vessels are:—

Battleships

• Oldenburg
• Thüringen
• Ostfriesland
• Helgoland
• Posen
• Westfalen
• Rheinland
• Nassau

Light-Cruisers

• Stettin
• Danzig
• München
• Lübeck
• Strassburg
• Augsburg
• Kolberg
• Stuttgart

Forty-two modern destroyers.

Fifty modern torpedo boats.

Clause 6. Vessels-of-War Under Construction.

All German surface vessels-of-war now under construction shall be broken up under the supervision of Allied and United States Commissioners.

Clause 7. Materials Arising From Vessels Broken Up.

The materials arising from the breaking-up of German vessels-of-war, whether surface vessels or submarines, may be used, but solely for industrial or commercial purposes, and on no account for warlike purposes.

Germany shall not sell or dispose of these materials to other Countries.

Clause 8. Construction of Vessels-of-War.

No vessels-of-war shall be constructed in Germany nor acquired by Germany except as follows:

(a) New vessels shall only be built to replace units of the seagoing fleet authorised by Clause 1.

(b) They shall be designed purely for coast defence and coast watching purposes.

(c)

(c) New vessels shall not exceed the following displacement:—

Armoured ships	10,000	tons
Light-cruisers	6,000	”
Destroyers	800	”
Torpedo boats	200	”

(d) Except in the case of the loss of a ship, units of the different classes shall only be replaced at the end of—

• 20 years in the case of battleships and cruisers:
• 15 years in the case of destroyers and torpedo boats.

This number of years expresses the duration of the life of the ship and shall count from the first year in which credit is taken in the Budget for the construction of the ship which is to be replaced to the year in which credit is taken in the Budget for the construction of the new ship.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.

Clause 9. Prohibition of Construction of Submarines.

No submarines for any purpose whatever, commercial or otherwise, shall be built in Germany or acquired by Germany, until such time as the League of Nations may order otherwise.

Clause 10. Naval War Materiel.

The allowance of arms, ammunition, and all important items of naval war materiel for the German Navy will be fixed by a Commission of the Allies and the United States of America on the basis of the seagoing fleet and personnel authorised by Clause 1. The reserve of naval ordnance, arms, ammunition, and war materiel shall be in proportion to the number and types of the units of the seagoing fleet.

All arms, ammunition, and naval war materiel, including mines and torpedoes, belonging to Germany and now in possession of the German authorities, in excess of the above establishment, shall be surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America, at places to be determined, to be destroyed or made useless. The surrender of material under this clause shall be executed within a period of thirty days from the date of signature of the present Convention.

The manufacture in Germany for foreign countries of naval ordnance, ammunition, mines and torpedoes, or their parts, or naval war materiel of any description, is prohibited.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to the final paragraph of this clause.

Clause 11. German Naval Laws.

(1) The personnel for the German Navy shall be recruited on a long-service system.

The authorised complement shall be obtained by classes of recruits, but the service of the men of the contingent called-up each year shall be continuous, and these men shall after their service, be definitely freed from all military obligation.

No measure of mobilisation shall be provided for, and men not called-up shall not be subject to any obligation for service in the Navy.

(2) The above regulations and Clauses 1, 8, 9 and 10 of Part I. of the present Convention shall form an integral part of the German Naval Laws.

(3) The German Naval Laws shall not include any provision in contradiction of any clauses of this Convention. On the contrary, they shall abrogate all previous legislative, financial or administrative measures which may be in contradiction of the Convention.

These laws shall be enforced in all German territory and shall be promulgated within three months from the date of this Convention.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.

Clause 12. Merchant Cruisers and Fleet Auxiliaries.

Armed German merchant cruisers, whether in ports of the Central Powers or interned in neutral ports, and Fleet auxiliaries which can be readily adapted for commercial purposes or which have been converted from merchant ships, shall be disarmed and treated as other merchant ships.

The vessels affected by this clause are given in Appendix.

Clause 13. Minesweeping.

Germany shall sweep up all mines in the areas which have been assigned to her in the agreement already entered into between the Allies and the United States of America.

In accordance with this agreement, Germany shall be responsible for sweeping in the following areas:—

(1) That portion of the North Sea which lies to the eastward of longitude 4°00′ E. from Greenwich—

(a) between the parallels of latitude 53°00′ N. and 59°00′ N.

(b) to the northward of latitude 60°30’ N.

(2) The Baltic Sea, excluding Russian waters. In regard to these waters further details will be given as soon as the Russian question is determined.

appendix to part i.—armed german merchant cruisers and fleet auxiliaries

(List referred to in Clause 12 (Part I) of Naval Terms.)

Interned in neutral countries (3).

• Berlin
• Santa Fe
• Yorck.

In Germany (28).

• Ammon
• Answald
• Bosnia
• Cordoba
• Cassel
• Dania
• Rio Negro
• Rio Pardo
• Santa Cruz
• Schwaben
• Solingen
• Steigerwald
• Franken
• Cundomar
• Fuerst Buelow
• Gertrud
• Kigoma
• Rugia
• Santa Elena
• Schleswig
• Moewe
• Sierra Ventana
• Chemnitz
• Emil Georg von Strauss
• Habsburg
• Meteor
• Waltraute
• Scharnhorst

Part II

Clause 1. Heligoland.

The fortifications, military establishments, and harbours of the Islands of Heligoland and Dune shall be destroyed under the supervision of Allied Commissioners, by German labour and at the expense of Germany, within a period to be determined by the Commissioners, which shall not exceed one year from the date of this Convention.

The term “harbours” shall include the north-east mole; the west wall; the outer and inner breakwaters and reclamation works within them; and all naval and military works, fortifications and buildings, constructed and under construction, between lines connecting the following positions taken from British Admiralty Chart No. 126 of 19 April, 1918:—

(a)	Lat.	54°10′49″N.,	long.	7°53′39″E.
(b)		54°10′35″N.,		7°54′18″E.
(c)		54°10′14″N.,		7°54′00″E.
(d)		54°10′17″N.,		7°53′37″E.
(e)		54°10′44″N.,		7°53′26″E.

The disposal of the Islands will be decided by the final Treaty of Peace.

Note. Admiral Benson makes a reservation regarding the destruction of the harbours.

Clause 2. Routes Into the Baltic.

In order to ensure free passage into the Baltic to all nations, Germany shall not erect any fortifications in the area comprised between latitudes 55°27′ N. and 54°00′ N. and longitudes 9°00′ E. and 16°00′ E. of the meridian of Greenwich, nor install any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic.

The fortifications now existing shall be demolished and the guns removed under the supervision of Allied Commissioners.

The German Government shall place at the disposal of the Allies and the United States of America complete copies of all hydrographical information now in its possession concerning the channels and adjoining waters between the Baltic and the North Sea.

Clause 3. Coast Fortifications.

All fortified works and fortifications within 50 kilometres of the German coast or on German islands off that coast shall be disarmed and dismantled. The construction of any new fortifications within the same limits is forbidden.

Note. Admirals Benson and Takeshita make reservations on this clause.

Clause 4. Kiel Canal.

The Kiel Canal shall be open at all times to all war or commercial vessels of every nation. No nation shall benefit by especially favourable treatment, and no class of vessels shall be excluded from the Canal.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to this Clause and believes that it cannot be justified except as a punitive measure.

Clause 5. Wireless Telegraphy.

(1) The German high-power W/T stations at

• Nauen,
• Hanover, and
• Berlin

shall not be used for the naval, military or political purposes of Germany, or of any State which has been allied to Germany in the war, without the assent of the Allied Powers and the United States of America, until the signature of the final Treaty of Peace. These stations may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America, who will decide the wavelength to be used.

(2) Germany shall not build any more high-power W/T stations in her own territory or that of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, until the signature of the final Treaty of Peace.

(3) In the event of Germany violating the provisions of the Treaty of Peace, the Allies and the United States of America shall be at liberty to withhold the services of their W/T stations from German stations.

(4) Germany shall have only one vote at the next International Radio-Telegraph Conference, irrespective of the number of independent or semi-independent states into which Germany may be divided.

Clause 6. Submarine Cables.

The German cables enumerated below shall not be returned to Germany:—

• Emden-Vigo
• Emden-Brest
• Emden-Teneriffe
• Emden-Azores (two cables)
• Azores-New York (two cables)
• Teneriffe-Monrovia
• Monrovia-Pernambuco
• Monrovia-Lome
• Lome-Duala
• Constantinople-Constanza
• Chifu-Tsingtau-Shanghai
• Yap-Shanghai
• Yap-Guam
• Yap-Menado (Celebes)

Note.—Admiral Benson disagrees.

appendix to part ii.—reparation for allied shipping losses

Reparation for Allied shipping losses shall be made by Germany to the extent and in the method to be laid down in the permanent Treaty of Peace. Part of such reparation shall consist in the handing-over by Germany to the Allies and the United States of America of all merchant ships (with such exceptions as may be laid down in the Treaty of Peace), completed, launched, or under construction, which were on 11 November, 1918, the property of the German Government or German owners or entitled to fly the German merchant flag.

For the removal of doubt as to the interpretation which shall be placed upon certain points which might be deemed open to question, and without prejudice to the further elucidations which may be inserted in the Treaty of Peace, it is hereby declared that:—

(a) Reparation for Shipping Losses.

The reparation required from Germany for shipping losses shall be based upon the total number of ships destroyed or lost, constructively or actually, through the hostile action of Germany, irrespective of the means employed for their destruction.

For the purpose of this paragraph the terms “ships” and “shipping” shall be deemed to include fishing vessels.

(b) Merchant Vessels captured by Germany.

All allied or neutral merchant vessels which have been condemned by the German Prize Court and which were German property at the date of the Armistice shall be regarded as being German vessels for the purpose of being included in the number of German merchant vessels which may be required to be surrendered under the heading of Reparation.

(c) Salvage of Allied Ships and Cargoes.

Notwithstanding that reparation may have been paid for sunken Allied ships and cargoes, the property in such ships and cargoes, if salved outside German territorial waters, shall remain at the disposal of the Allies.

Part III

Clause 1. Commissions for the Execution of Naval Terms.

All the measures prescribed by the Naval Clauses of this Convention shall be carried out under the control of a special Naval Commission appointed for the purpose by the Allies and the United States of America.

This Commission will act under the supreme direction of the Admiralties of the Allies and the United States. It will be established at the seat of the Central German Government and may appoint Sub-Commissions or Delegates as may be found necessary to visit any part of German territory.

The German Government shall facilitate, by all possible means, the exercise of this control, and shall furnish the fullest information demanded of it on all questions in connection with the same, including designs of warships, details and samples of naval war material, guns, ammunition, torpedoes, mines and other explosives, and W/T apparatus.

Note. Admiral Benson disagrees as to requiring Germany to furnish designs, samples, &c, of war materiel, and makes reservations regarding the participation by Naval representatives of the United States of America in any Commissions appointed to deal with the execution of Clauses 1, 2, 8, 10 and 11 of Part I and Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Part II.

Clause 2. Conventions.

Nothing in the present Convention shall invalidate anything done or required to be done under the Armistice Convention of 11 November, 1918, or subsequent Conventions for its renewal.

Germany undertakes to respect all the clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who sign this Convention with her.

1. The “Brief Summary” of the minutes of this meeting (BC–45a, SWC–12a) gives a copy of the telegraphic report on this subject received by the British delegation from the British representatives at Spa, the text of which also appears as Annexure “A” to BC–46 (SWC–13), p. 266.
2. Admiral de Bon, by direction of the Minister of Marine of France, makes reservations on this point. [Footnote in the original.]
3. Admiral de Bon, by direction of the Minister of Marine of France, makes reservations on this point. [Footnote in the original.]
4. Admiral de Bon, by direction of the Minister of Marine of France, makes reservations on this point. [Footnote in the original.]