Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IV

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/51

BC–44 SWC–11

Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, March 5, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 5, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
america, united states of	present during questions 1 to 7
Hon. R. Lansing.	France
Hon. E. M. House.	Marshal Foch.
Secretaries	General Weygand.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	present during question 6
Mr. L. Harrison.	France
Mr. G. Auchincloss.	M. Jules Cambon.
British Empire	present during question 7
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	America, United States of
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.	Mr. Davis.
Secretaries	Mr. Hoover.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. G. B.	Mr. McCormick.
Mr. E. Phipps.	British Empire
France	Lord Robert Cecil.
M. Clemenceau.	Brig. Gen. H. O. Mance, C. B.
M. Pichon.	France
Secretaries	M. Clementel.
M. Dutasta.	M. Seydoux.
M. Berthelot.	present during question 9
M. Arnavon.	America, United States of
M. de Bearn.	Dr. Lybyer.
Italy	British Empire
H. E. Baron Sonnino.	Mr. Leeper.
H. E. M. Crespi.	France
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.	M. Delaroche Vernet.
M. Bertele.	Italy
Japan	Colonel Castoldi.
H. E. Baron Makino.	Montenegrin Delegation
H. E. M. Matsui.	M. J. Plamenatz.
	Dr. P. Chotch.
	General A. Jvozdenovitch.

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Colonel U. S. Grant.
British Empire	Captain Abraham.
France	Captain Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan	M. Saburi.
Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Clemenceau opened the Meeting with a statement that he had an application from the Belgian Delegation to be given representation in the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Nations when the subject of preliminary peace terms was being discussed. Belgium, claimed to be as vitally interested in the terms formulated as any other nation represented in the Council, and he thought it would be difficult to refuse her request. Admission of Belgium to Deliberations Concerning Preliminaries of Peace in the Supreme War Council

Mr. Balfour agreed that a refusal would be very difficult, but he asked the Council to consider the consequence of admitting Belgian delegates. It would set a precedent which would give rise to claims by the other small Powers, some of whom were equally interested, as for instance the Poles, the whole future of whose country depended on the terms that would be considered.

Mr. Lansing suggested that the Bohemians might well claim an equal interest.

Mr. House thought the difference between the Belgians and the other cases mentioned was, that the latter were newly created States while the Belgians had waged the entire war with the Allies.

Mr. Balfour was not sure that the distinction could be sustained. Poland had been acknowledged and had representatives on an equal footing in the Plenary Conference. It might be difficult to justify any discrimination between her status and that of Belgium. The same question might then arise in regard to Serbia, Greece, Portugal, etc. He would like to have representatives of all of them present were he assured that their presence would not materially reduce the Council’s ability to do business.

M. Clemenceau called attention to the fact that a rule had already been adopted in the regulations for the Conference, which provided that delegates of every nation should be admitted when a subject was being discussed in which they were interested. Belgian representatives must, therefore, be admitted when such a subject as the West frontier of Germany was under discussion, while Polish representatives would have to be admitted under this rule when the Eastern frontier was being discussed.

(It was agreed that the light of the Belgian Government to be represented on the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers during the discussion of the Preliminary Peace Terms should be limited to the occasions coming within the regulations for the Peace Conference, viz., when terms in which Belgium was specially interested were under discussion.)

2. M. Clemenceau stated that the Danish House of Representatives had sent a special Delegation to be heard in the matter of Schleswig. As the Danish Minister had already been heard, he suggested that this Danish Delegation be referred to the special Commission on Belgian Affairs, to which the Danish claims had been referred. Hearing of a Danish Delegation

(There being no objection, the above suggestion was adopted.)

3. M. Clemenceau announced that Luxemburg had requested to be given a hearing. Luxemburg was not an Allied Power (if a power at all) but neutral or possibly enemy. The present Government in Luxemburg had not been officially recognised. He thought, therefore, that Luxemburg need not be heard for the time being. Hearing of Luxemburg

(It was agreed that Luxemburg would not be given a hearing for the present.)

4. M. Clemenceau stated that Marshal Foch had submitted a Report of financial rather than military interest on the subject of the cost of maintaining the Allied Army of occupation in Germany. As this report had only just been distributed, it could not be advantageously discussed immediately, but would be referred to the Finance Committee or put on the Agenda of a future meeting. Cost of Maintenance of Army of Occupation

(It was agreed to put discussion of this report on the Agenda of a future meeting.)

5. M. Clemenceau said that he had received from the American Delegation a proposal requiring that the Commissions and Committees should attach to their Reports, to be handed in on the 8th or 15th March special drafting for such articles as were to find a place in the preliminary Peace Treaty.¹ He suggested that examination of this proposal, which he understood was due to Mr. Lansing, should be postponed to the meeting on Thursday, March 6th. American Proposal in Regard to Drafting by committee and Commissions of Recommendations Concerning Preliminary Peace Terms

(This was agreed to.)

6. M. Clemenceau said that he had received a Report from M. Jules Cambon regarding a request by the Powers with special interests. He would ask M. Cambon to explain the matter.

Request of Powers With Special Interests for Increased Representation on Financial and Economic Councils M. Jules Cambon said that in pursuance of the Order of the Council he had on Monday, 3rd March presided over a Meeting of the Delegations of the smaller Powers.² These Delegations were to nominate five Members to serve on the Financial and Economic Councils in accordance with the decision of March 1st. At the beginning of the Meeting the principal representative of Brazil, M. Epitacio Pessoa, read the text of a declaration drawn up that very morning in an informal meeting of the small Powers demanding that the Council should allow them 10 representatives instead of 5 in each of these Bodies. They further declared that they would abstain from nominating any representatives until this request had been granted. M. Cambon had reminded them of the precedent of the 2nd Plenary Session in which they had nominated 5 representatives though expressing at the time the wish for more, a wish which had subsequently been taken into account. He had also pointed out to them that the form of their decision was somewhat discourteous. In this he had been supported by some Delegates especially those of the smaller European Powers. These Delegates after the meeting had informed him that the opposition was not directed so much against the decision of the great Powers as against the alleged privileged treatment of the smaller European Powers. In the end the meeting had not maintained its refusal to nominate Delegates. It had adopted a list of ten States requiring representation on each of the Councils. These lists had been drawn up in alphabetical order and from them when the number of Delegates had been fixed a choice would be made. As Chairman he had been asked to support this suggestion before the present meeting. The list was as follows. For the Financial Council:—Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, Greece, Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia. For the Economic Council:—Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Peru, Poland, Roumania, Serbia, Hedjaz and Czecho-Slovakia. M. Cambon concluded by asking that the matter be settled as soon as possible in order that he might inform the Delegations of the smaller Powers.

Mr. House expressed the view that the original decision for 5 representatives should be adhered to.

Mr. Lansing agreed as he thought this the best means of minimising conflict. He observed that Bolivia and Peru asked for inclusion in the Economic Commission and that Ecuador was a candidate for the Financial Commission. None of these States had been at war with Germany. Cuba and Nicaragua on the other hand, which had declared war on Germany, were not included. The Hedjaz representing a few hundred thousand men figured in both lists. He thought, therefore, there would be more confusion in allowing ten members than in maintaining five.

M. Clemenceau said that as no objection was raised Mr. Lansing’s proposal was adopted.

(It was therefore decided that the former decision be maintained; that the Powers with special interests should be represented on the Financial and Economic Councils by 5 Delegates. M. Jules Cambon was requested to inform the representatives of these States of this decision.)

7. M. Clemenceau said that he had had this subject placed on the Agenda after a conversation with Mr. Balfour and Mr. House. They had all agreed that the matter was urgent, and that it was incumbent on the Allied Powers to show goodwill to the German Austrians, in particular with a view to preventing them from throwing themselves into the arms of the Bavarians and Germans of Germany. This preamble was made for the benefit of Baron Sonnino who had not been present at the consultation. If he also agreed that it was advisable to discuss this matter at once, the discussion might proceed. If he preferred to think it over, the discussion might be delayed, but it would undoubtedly be advantageous to get the Germans in Austria in a good temper. Re-Victualling of Austria (a) Financial Proposals of Economic Council

Baron Sonnino said that he had no objection to immediate discussion. Italy had always done her utmost to feed Austria.

M. Clementel said that before producing the conclusions of the Supreme Economic Council, he wished to say that he had only heard on the previous night that the question was to come up before the Council. He had called together the four Secretaries, and between them, they had drawn up the Procès-Verbal of the Session held on the 3rd March. The text he was about to read had therefore been arrived at by Agreement of the four Secretaries but had not been formally passed, as was usual, by a subsequent meeting of the Council itself. In practice however, the text drawn up by the Secretaries was always passed without objection.

M. Clementel then read the following extracts from the Minutes of the fourth Session of the Supreme Economic Council:—

Credits to enemy countries other than Germany.

1(ex 3) “That credits to enemy countries other than Germany be granted only in the event of no cash assets being available for payment: that the best available non-liquid assets be taken as collateral security against such credits: and that their repayment be a first charge on the future resources of such country ranking in front of any payment for reparation or indemnity. The above principle is established in respect of credits not exceeding $60,000,000 in the first instance.”

Agreed with the following reservations:

1) That the U. S. Treasury is not empowered to make such loans excepting insofar as the Christian population of Turkey is concerned.

2) The Italian and French Delegates agreed to this only in this specific case which should not be construed as a precedent in other cases.

Finance of Supplies for Austria.

3(ex 5) “In order to secure immediate action for the finance of food supplies required in German-Austria to prevent extreme hardship and starvation and the spread of anarchy the following arrangement is proposed:

a) “That Great Britain, France and Italy agree to advance credits in equal thirds up to a maximum of $30,000,000 between now and the next harvest, to finance such food supplies as may be consigned to German-Austria under the direction of the Supreme Economic Council inclusive of those already provided under provisional arrangements, it being clearly understood that the above figure is a maximum and that the question of actually opening credits up to this amount depends on the progress of events and the decisions of the Economic Council from time to time.”

Agreed. The French and Italian Delegates making the same reservation as in the instance of paragraph 3 above.

Paragraph 6 was amended and agreed in the following form.

3 b (ex 6).

b) “That as security for such credits the Austrian Government should formally agree to place at the disposal of a Commission or Commissioners representative of the three leading powers a suitable lien on (a) the salt mines in Austria, (b) the properties of the City of Vienna, and (c) such other assets as may be agreed upon, in Austria, immediate steps being taken in the case of the salt mines to clear these mines of all prior claims.”

Paragraph 7 was amended and agreed in the following form:—

3 c (ex 7).

c) “That an Interallied Commission be appointed of three or four members with a view to taking the necessary steps to make arrangements for due repayment of the credits out of the income of the above properties or otherwise.”

3 d (ex 8).

d) “That the repayment of such credits be a first charge on the future resources of Austria, ranking in front of any payment for reparation.”

Agreed. The French and Italian Delegates making the same reservation as in the instance of paragraph 3 above.

Paragraph 15 was amended and agreed as follows:—

4 (ex 15)

“The associated Governments are prepared to allow imports of cereals from the Argentine into German-Austria up to a maximum of 30,000 tons, provided German-Austria is able to make its own financial arrangements subject to the approval of the financial Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

“The Associated Governments are prepared to transmit through the Wheat Executive to addressees in the Argentine cable messages from the Austrian Government properly and necessarily arising out of the proposed transactions. In the event of contracts being arranged by Austria the Associated Governments will as far as possible facilitate shipping arrangements, any cost being charged by the Associated Government providing the Shipping against credits available for the purpose accruing to the Austrian Government in respect of the Austrian mercantile marine under the management of the Associated Government.”

Lord Robert Cecil said that the texts read by M. Clemenceau represented the financial clauses of the scheme for revictualing Austria. These clauses had been adopted on the advice of the Financial Advisers of the Council. If the clauses were accepted by the Powers the financial side of the matter was disposed of, but there were other difficulties of a material nature which the Supreme Council would have to settle. He referred especially to railway transport between the ports and the countries for which the food was intended.

M. Clemenceau said that before proceeding to deal with that aspect of the matter, it might be well to dispose of the financial clauses. He asked whether there was in any quarter any comment to make on them.

(No objection having been raised, the clauses above mentioned were adopted.)

(b) Executive Power of Supreme Economic Council Mr. Balfour said that he had no objection to raise but would like to make a remark concerning the resolution just taken before proceeding with the most difficult part of the problem. He thought it was unnecessary that every proposal of the Supreme Economic Council should be referred for sanction to the five Powers. The Economic Council had, he understood, executive authority within the terms of its reference.

This principle was accepted.

(c) Railroad Transportation of Food Mr. Balfour said that the difficult question remained of finding means to convey the corn shipped from America, from the Adriatic ports to the consumers in Germany, Austria, Bohemia and Hungary. He did not know exactly what the obstacles were that impeded this process, but he was assured that they were producing very grievous results, and that before long these results would be even more grievous. He would suggest that Mr. Hoover be asked to furnish the Council with an explanation of these difficulties.

Mr. Hoover then read the following statement:—

The chaotic political and economic conditions in the states of the old Austrian Empire render the solution of the food problems extremely difficult. The newly constituted governments jealously guard their own supplies of food and coal and have created artificial barriers in the distribution of such native products as exist, and have made the distribution of imported foodstuffs extremely difficult by the disintegration of railway management and barriers on coal movements.

While the states comprising Czecho-Slovakia and the old state of Austria and some portions of Jugo-Slavia near seaboard are dangerously short of food, there are apparently sufficient surplus supplies in the interior of Jugo-Slavia and in the Banat to supply a sufficiency for some months to the interior of Jugo-Slavia, to Hungary and to Northern Serbia.

The problem, therefore, of maintenance of human life and the preservation of order through adequate food supplies not only revolves upon a large amount of imports with the proper finance and overseas transportation thereof, but also upon the organisation of some kind of economic unity amongst these states in respect to the distribution of supplies which they have available, and of transportation, and coal.

The total amount of imported food supplies required for these states as from the first of March until next harvest is approximately 185,000 tons per month of breadstuffs and 15,000 tons of fats per month. The total cost of such a programme will amount to approximately $50,000,000 per month. Of this amount, the American Relief Administration has arranged directly for about $14,000,000 to Czecho-Slovakia and Greater Serbia. A provision of approximately $8,000,000 per month has been arranged for the State of Austria through advance of England, France and Italy against securities, these countries in turn receiving an advance for the cost of food supplies purchased in the United States from the United States Government. Further finance from England, France and Italy is necessary for the other states. Recently the British Treasury has made an appropriation for these purposes but as yet no definite programme has been defined.

The overseas shipping, as to the American programme, has been undertaken by the United States Shipping Board. Further provision must be made from Allied shipping.

In an effort to secure some economic unity, a commission of the Associated Governments has been established at Trieste, through whom it is hoped that an adequate inter-change of such surplus commodities as there are in the different states could be secured.

During the month of February, the American Relief Administration provided approximately 70,000 tons of food-stuffs at various Adriatic ports for distribution into this area and the Allied Governments provided by advances from Italy approximately 20,000 tons; but, owing to inherent transportation difficulties and more particularly to the disturbances at Lubiana, which resulted in the Italian Government establishing a blockade against the Jugo-Slav area, it has been impossible to secure distribution of more than 30,000 tons during the month. This blockade has, I am informed, been raised yesterday.

Further arrivals by the American Food Administration make it possible to give a distribution of approximately 90,000 tons during the month of March, if transportation difficulties can be solved. Double this amount is needed but the balance must await arrangements by the Allied Governments. Aside from the arrangement of these further supplies, action by the Supreme War Council is critically necessary in the matter of control of interior transportation.

The solution which I propose, after elaborate investigation by American Railway Engineers, is one that I not only believe is feasible but will meet the various exigencies of the political situation. To this end the following plan is proposed: (a) AH the states of the old Austrian Empire, including the areas held by the Italians on the Adriatic, should be called upon to furnish a definite contribution of railway rolling stock; (b) This rolling stock should be marked as belonging to the Relief Administration and used solely for its purposes; (c) The Director General of Relief should be made the mandatory for the disposition of this rolling stock; (d) A regular train service should be established under his direction that will carry out the necessary programmes of food to the different localities; (e) This service should have entire freedom of movement over all railways regardless of political boundaries and in complete priority to other services; (f) The railway servants of any nationality may be employed in operations over any territory regardless of nationality or political boundaries; (g) Definite portions of j)ort facilities should be assigned to the Relief Administration at Trieste and Fiume for the consummation of these ends; (h) The rolling stock should not be demanded by any of the Allied Governments until this service is completely equipped; (i) That the railway officials of each state and port officials in each port should be called upon to co-operate in maintenance of this service.

With reference to the 7th. paragraph of this statement, Mr. Hoover pointed out that the main line to Prague and Vienna had been cut off by the blockade. This had led to serious disturbances in Yugo-Slavia and in Austria. The Italian Government had made efforts to relieve the situation by using the Udine line, but this line could only convey about 800 tons of food a day, whereas to save the situation, 3,000 tons were required.

Mr. Hoover added in regard to his recommendation (c) that he proposed that one person should be, made Director-General, because he did not think that any inter-allied body could give the requisite executive punch to a situation of this kind.

M. Clementel said that the Economic Council had reached a somewhat similar conclusion but instead of proposing to hand over the control to a single director it had instituted a sub-section of Military men with railway experience, one British, one French, one American and one Italian. This sub-section was already at work and it was somewhat difficult to supersede it by a single director, unless the execution of the director’s decision be left to them.

Lord Robert Cecil said that he entirely agreed with M. Clementel’s account of what the Council had proposed. The four railway experts on the sub-section were dealing with communications and were doing admirable work but the real lever in our possession to deal with the situation in Austria was food. It would, therefore, be necessary that the authority dealing with food should control this section. He would therefore suggest that in place of paragraph (c) of Mr. Hoover’s recommendations the following should be substituted:—

(c) The Director of Relief, working through the communications section of the Supreme Economic Council, should be made the mandatory for the disposition of this railway stock.

M. Clementel said that this proposal would satisfy him. He pointed out that there might be a conflict for instance for priority between troops and food on the railways. If the principle of absolute priority for food were accepted, a principle embodied in the decision to give the supreme directorate to the Food Controller, while the execution of his orders remained in the hands of those dealing with the transport of troops, no trouble ought to arise.

M. Crespi said that as Minister of Supplies in Italy he was in a position to give the Council some interesting details. Immediately after the Armistice, Italy began to send food to the ex-enemy countries beyond her frontiers. This was done gratis and out of Italian stocks. Food had gone to all nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire including the Yugo-Slavs. As soon as agreement had been reached with the Allies, Italy was charged with the revictualling of Austria. By the first agreement Italy supplied Vienna with 24 thousand tons of food. In this matter Mr. Hoover and himself had worked in complete accord. The undertaking was fully carried out. Meanwhile, Mr. Hoover employed other stocks accumulated at Trieste for Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia. The trains passed through Innsbruck, Tarvis and Lubiana. Vienna was satisfied with what had been done. He had himself received a report on the previous day that, though the food situation remained critical, the supplies sent from Genoa had afforded great relief. He had received a similar letter from M. Benes, thanking the Italian Government for the help sent to Bohemia, especially to Prague. As regards Yugo-Slavia, with Mr. Hoover’s consent, Italian trains were employed to carry food through Lubiana or Fiume. Traffic through Fiume still continued. It had been suspended through Lubiana owing to unfortunate incidents. On February 12th a train of Italian refugees was attacked by soldiers in Serbian uniform near Lubiana. Many were wounded; Italian flags were burned. Italy had asked for an apology from the provincial authorities. This had been followed on the 20th February by a demand that the Italian Armistice sub-Commission at Lubiana should withdraw immediately. This Commission was a branch of the Commission established in Vienna in accordance with Article 7 of the Armistice of Villa Giusti. The officers composing it had called on the local authorities, and the Commission was fully recognised and well established. Nevertheless it was compelled to leave Lubiana. The pretext alleged was that Lubiana was situated in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to which the Armistice could not apply, since the Entente Powers had recognised Yugo-Slavia. No such recognition in fact had been made. One of the officers composing the Commission was ill at the time and permission for him to remain was requested. This was denied, unless he submitted to medical examination by a local Doctor. This insult could not be overlooked by the Italian Government, which had in consequence closed the frontier line of the Armistice by way of protest. A Commission from Trieste was at that time in Rome, being received by the Italian Government. The English Delegate on this Commission, Mr. Butler, took it upon himself to go to Lubiana to settle the difficulty. Two days ago a report had been received that a settlement had been reached. The settlement was to the effect that the Italian Commission should return to Lubiana and should be honourably received. In consequence Baron Sonnino and he thought that the incident was closed. Mr. Hoover had said that the blockade had been raised on the previous day. Neither Baron Sonnino nor he had previously been aware of this, but they were glad to hear it. Nevertheless the Council must understand that the political situation remained very strained and that Mr. Hoover’s proposals required very careful consideration. The Italian Government had tried to relieve the situation in Bohemia through Tarvis and General Badoglio had just telegraphed that three trains a day were going to Prague. Attempts were being made to increase this number to five.

Mr. Lansing enquired how much food was represented by three trains.

Mr. Hoover said that the maximum delivery of three trains was about 800 tons, whereas 3,000 represented the minimum requisite

M. Crespi said that he thought three trains could carry as much as 1,000 tons. The whole situation was governed by the dearth of engines, Austria up to date having failed to supply what was required of her by the Armistice. It was only on the 28th February that deliveries of engines had begun at Vienna.

Mr. House said that he thought M. Clementel’s suggestion was a good one and might be adopted.

M. Clemenceau said that the amendment proposed by Lord Robert Cecil had been accepted by M. Clementel.

M. Sonnino said that the proposals put forward were of the greatest importance and could not, in his opinion, be adopted there and then. M. Clementel had confessed that they involved political questions. Italy could not allow a mandate to be given to any one man to override all national services, all political considerations, all military necessities, to establish complete priority for one kind of traffic, and to employ agents of all nationalities. M. Crespi had given some details about the Lubiana incident. Italy had done all it could to mitigate the consequences of the insult received. Italy had shown the greatest forbearance and had agreed to accept the solution proposed by Mr. Butler. He did not yet know what were the results of Italy’s effort at reconciliation. Before knowing it, he was asked to hand over the whole control to a single director. He could not do so. When at the beginning of the discussion he had said that he had no objection to talking over the question, he thought only the financial proposals of M. Clementel were to be brought forward. This was a far wider proposal and he must emphatically oppose its adoption at that sitting.

Mr. Balfour said that the position appeared to him to be very serious. Most of the delegates, except M. Sonnino, were agreed that the proposal suggested by Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, and M. Clementel, furnished adequate machinery for the conveyance of food to Austria. It appeared to him that no other machinery would do this. M. Sonnino objected that the Yugo-Slavs had behaved extremely badly, whereas Italy had shown a very conciliatory spirit. The situation was such that of the two possible railways by which food could go to German Austria, the larger was closed for political reasons. He, of course, accepted M. Sonnino’s account of the event, but he felt that the results of this incident were of extreme gravity. We could only send 800 or at the most 1,000 tons of food a day to a country that needed 3,000 to live. Could M. Sonnino offer any other solution than that proposed by Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil and M. Clementel?

M. Sonnino said that he had already accepted the solution arranged by Mr. Butler. He was not prepared to accept the other proposal without an adjournment.

Mr. Balfour suggested a resolution that the question of opening the railway from Trieste to Vienna through Laibach (Lubiana) is one of the most pressing urgency, on grounds not only of humanitarian, but also of political importance; that every hour’s delay may produce consequences of an incalculable character; and that no temporary or local difficulties should be permitted to interfere with the opening of the main line for the transport of supplies.

Mr. House said that the question should be settled either at once or on the following day. All reports indicated that the sending of food to German Austria would weigh heavily in the scale when the German-Austrians came to decide whether or not they would throw in their lot with Germany. This was the political aspect of the case.

M. Pichon said that he wished to support Mr. Balfour and Mr. House. It appeared to him most urgent to revictual German Austria, and not only German Austria, but Hungary. German Austria was about to take a decision regarding its adhesion to Germany. There was a possibility of influencing the decision. This was a question of general policy and of great interest to the whole of the Alliance. Similar considerations applied to Hungary. He understood M. Sonnino’s scruples, but he would ask that the question be settled on the following day.

Mr. Lansing pointed out that the Agenda for the following day contained the Naval and Military terms of the Preliminary Peace with Germany. This matter had already been once adjourned. He, therefore, suggested that the question now before the Council should be dealt with on Friday at the beginning of the Agenda for that day.

M. Crespi said that he thought there was some misunderstanding. German Austria was being re-victualled via the Brenner and not via Lubiana. Italy entirely agreed with the sentiment just expressed and had always done its utmost to serve the same ends. He, himself, had been seeking to arrange the question of credit since the 17th February, and he had only succeeded in obtaining a reply on the 5th March. It was, therefore, a little surprising to be told that the matter was so urgent that an hour’s delay was dangerous. He wished to draw the attention of the Council to the very sensitive condition of Italian public opinion since the incidents at Lubiana and Spalato. The Italian Delegation would agree to discuss the question on Friday, provided they had time to communicate with the President of the Council in Rome.

M. Clemenceau said that delay appeared to be dangerous.

M. Sonnino said that no notice had been taken of the far simpler solution proposed by Mr. Butler. As a provisional measure it appeared to him to be the most appropriate suggested. He would accept the discussion for Friday, provided he had time to obtain news and to communicate with the President of the Council in Rome. In the meanwhile, the Economic Council might study the means of mitigating the proposal put forward. He thought that a political consideration which was really foreign to the discussion was being used to establish its urgency and the Council was forgetting that it ran the risk of causing great offense to Italian public opinion.

Mr. Balfour said that he would have liked the Council to adopt as a resolution what he had proposed before.

M. Sonnino said that, as the matter was to be decided on Friday, he begged Mr. Balfour not to insist on putting this forward. The reasons for requiring an early and effective solution of the problem had been heard. He had agreed that a solution should be found on Friday. He deprecated any resolution taken in anticipation which could, in any way, pre-judge the decision to be taken on Friday. He, personally, would certainly resist any such anticipated resolution.

Lord Robert Cecil said that he had no wish to make any statement affecting policy but he would like to impress on Baron Sonnino the extreme urgency of sending food to Austria, and of getting the railways into working order for that purpose. He thought it was impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the situation. People were dying of hunger, not only in German Austria but in Bohemia. If this state of things continued, it would cause disaster, not only in the countries directly affected but throughout Europe. Unless the Allies were ready to put the transportation of food on a business footing, the direst consequences would result in all the Allied Countries. All that was proposed was that a certain quantity of rolling stock should be ear-marked, and given priority over other means of transport. Even the Germans had done as much for the civilian population of Belgium though they were in a state of war with that population. Even if the Council could not see its way to accept the proposal at once, he suggested that it should express general approval and remit the means of execution to the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr. Lansing said that after hearing this, he would withdraw his proposal that the discussion should be delayed until Friday. He suggested that it be resumed at the beginning of the next day’s meeting.

Baron Sonnino said that he regretted Mr. Lansing’s change of mind. The Italian Delegation must have an opportunity of consulting Rome. The proposal, as it stood, put all the guilt on Italy, and by implication exonerated the Serbs from responsibility for the unjustifiable insult suffered by Italy. He requested that the resumption of the discussion be delayed until Friday. Each Delegation could make a firm resolve that a solution of the problem should be found on that day. There was of course another possible solution, namely, the military occupation of Lubiana. This could be done at any moment, but the Italian Government did not wish to proceed to that extremity on its own undivided responsibility.

Lord Milner asked whether the Italian Delegation would not be able to communicate by telephone with Rome.

M. Crespi explained that the Italian Government in Rome would have to communicate with Trieste.

Lord Milner observed that people were dying for want of food.

M. Crespi expressed the view that this was an exaggeration. In any case, the situation was governed by the absence of rolling stock. Even the opening of ten lines of railway would not improve matters unless rolling stock could be found.

M. Clemenceau said that in his view the disquieting feature of the discussion was that, to safeguard Italian susceptibilities, a delay was being agreed to, which might endanger the whole European situation, and compromise the results of the war. He quite understood national susceptibilities, but in certain circumstances they must not be given precedence over other considerations. Baron Sonnino was well aware that France had suppressed her feelings on more than one occasion; notably in relation to certain Naval occurrences in the Adriatic. Baron Sonnino, to save Italian susceptibilities wished the discussion postponed until Friday. If on Friday, the Yugo-Slavs had not given satisfaction to Italian sentiment, what was to happen? France was ready to advise the Yugo-Slavs, and had already done so, to be as conciliatory as possible. He felt that an urgent decision should not be postponed for a question of sentiment.

Baron Sonnino said that he did not ask for delay for any such reason. He agreed that the matter should be decided finally on Friday. He had explained his reason for the delay. He must consult the President of the Council in Rome, and he must ascertain what had taken place. He would further point out that no notice had been given him that this matter would be discussed.

M. Crespi begged to read a letter dated March 1st, from M. Benes. He had previously mentioned this letter but thought it would interest the Council to hear it read. (For text see Annexure “A.”) He wished to add that on the previous day he had received a similar expression of thanks from M. Cramarz. In view of these expressions of gratitude he thought that the fears expressed on that day were exaggerated.

Mr. Balfour said that as Baron Sonnino had appealed to him and represented his proposed resolution as directed against Italy, he must express his regret that this interpretation should have been put upon it. Such had not been his intention, nor did he think that his words really suggested it. On the understanding that the question would not only be discussed but also solved on Friday, Baron Sonnino asked him to withdraw the Resolution. He recognized that the Italian Delegation had a right to consult the Government in Rome, and in view of this, he would reluctantly withdraw the Resolution, provided Baron Sonnino undertook to inform Signor Orlando that the other Powers represented were very strongly of the opinion which he had attempted to put into words in his proposed Resolution.

(Baron Sonnino undertook to do this. The discussion was accordingly postponed until Friday.)

8. Marshal Foch drew attention to a request received from the German Armistice Delegation to the effect that German troops be allowed to cooperate with the Poles in their resistance to Russian Bolshevik Forces, and that maritime transportation towards Libau should be authorized for that purpose. German Cooperation in Resistance to Bolsheviks

(For text of communication see Annexure “B”.)

(It was agreed that the discussion of this request should be taken up at a subsequent Meeting.)

9. General Jvoznenovitch then read the following statement:—

Statement on Behalf of King of Montenegro Gentlemen,

We consider it our duty to speak here, as we think we are entitled to address you on behalf of Montenegro.

Notwithstanding the intrigues and wiles of our adversaries (who are, alas! allies and brothers) we are the only official, legal and legitimate Government of the country.

Moreover, our existence is not denied by you, but rather clearly recognised—seeing that the Great Powers continue to accredit diplomatic representatives to the Royal Government, and that the Federal Republic of the United States recently approved the creation of a Royal Legation at Washington.

As a legitimate Government recognised by the Allies, the Royal Government considers that it has claims upon your good-will. Can you forget that it was its Head who, from the very beginning, wished to fight side by side with the Entente?

But, despite its heavy sacrifices and cruel sufferings during the war, Montenegro is the only one of your Allies—and even of your enemies—against whom the doors of the Conference have been closed.

The Royal Government has not been asked to name a representative for the seat reserved for it, because in your opinion the position of our country required explanation.

May we be permitted to say that its position is neither obscure nor confused? A perfidious propaganda has tried to make you believe that our country as a whole wished to be absorbed by Serbia, and Serbia has tried to do this by one audacious and forcible coup. But Montenegro opposed this arbitrary and impudent annexation. She cried aloud despite the gag; her defenceless hands smote the fresh oppressors still armed with weapons you had given them against a common enemy. That is the outline of what occurred. However telling it may be, permit us to add some details thereto.

The scheme of an official Serbia (which is only a part of the Imperialistic dreams of certain of its politicians) had been long in preparation, and in their haste since 1916 to carry them into effect gave rise to the amazing Corfu Agreement,³ which, without a single Montenegrin being consulted disposed of Montenegro from July, 1917 onwards.

This agreement was not only opposed to the laws of every age and country, but was also an insult to the high principles which the Allies have made their own.

In France, where the Royal Government received hospitality, in Italy, in England, in the whole of America, a fierce campaign was waged against us, our deeds and our persons—a campaign so false and mean that it stooped to any means of injuring us.

The word treason was repeatedly used. Without compunction King Nicholas was reproached for asking for peace in December, 1915 (in obedience, so it was said, to certain secret engagements). We state clearly that this rumour was the work of Serbian Agents. Such insults can best be answered by an authentic document. From the beginning of the war, the King decided to entrust the command of the Montenegrin armies to Serbian Staff Officers; their Chief, the Serbian Staff Colonel Pechich, was the real Commander-in-Chief of our troops.

When the Austrians advanced and lack of food and ammunition made it impossible for our soldiers to hold their positions, Colonel Pechich proposed asking for an armistice. When the Supreme Austrian Command answered this request with the utmost harshness and cruelty, Colonel Pechich advised the King to make peace.

In our memorandum you will find the text of this letter, written on 31st December, 1915, (13th January, 1916) and received by King Nicholas on the same day at 7 a.m.

The two most important passages are:—

“Sire, the Officers in Command of the Army on the Western Front declare that our Army is so demoralised that the enemy can no longer be resisted. …

“… Having shown you the true state of affairs in the army, I have the honour to point out to Your Majesty that it is utterly impossible to carry on the struggle under such conditions, and that, without delay and as quickly as possible, we must (1) ask to make peace with the enemy, since he would not accept the proposal for an armistice made two days ago by the Royal Government. …”

Peace was asked for, or, to be more exact, King Nicholas resigned himself to sue for it at the pressing request of his Government and of the Serbian Colonel Peter Pechich. The reply of the Austrian Government is well-known, it was of such a nature that the Montenegrin Government decided to break off negotiations, the King preferring exile to dishonour.

Serbia, in her desire to forget the part she played in this affair, has continually tried to distort the facts, to alter texts and destroy all memory of the sacrifices and the heroism of Montenegro. She made unscrupulous use of calumny in order to further this secret design which she was pursuing and which events soon permitted her to bring about.

In October, 1918, after the evacuation of Albania by Austrian troops, the Eastern Army advanced towards Montenegro, and the Serbian troops which formed part thereof rapidly poured over our territory. Our compatriots, glad to meet men of their race, greeted them joyfully; their welcome however met with no response.

The Serbs immediately assumed the attitude of conquerors, overthrowing established institutions and imposing their own authority by means of intimidation and bribery. They were dealing with a starving population, whose consciences it was not hard to corrupt. The Serbian Government considered that the time had come for the annexation it had premeditated. By means of bribery a number of persons of all descriptions were suborned and persuaded to act as an artificial skupchina. It will be remembered that at the very first meeting, the illegal assembly at Podgoritza, after making a pretence of deliberation proclaimed the union of Montenegro with Serbia, and the abolition of the Dynasty.

Mere villages had been permitted to elect four deputies, while entire districts had only sent one or two representatives. Out of fifty of the King’s former Ministers, only two voted against him. Not a single officer or priest voted for the abolition of the Dynasty. Out of the 56 Deputies elected by the people to the Parliament of 1914, only 5 declared against Nicholas I.

Events had developed too far and too rapidly. Such shameless juggling with a regularly established Kingdom could not be accepted by an intelligent population, proud of its history and traditions and conscious of its individuality and need for liberty. Discontent rapidly developed into indignation, which indignation manifested itself both against the Serbian troops and the Montenegrins in the pay of Serbia.

In Paris, the Royal Government protested to the Allies against the violence done to our country, against this contempt of all rights. Our complaint has hitherto met with no response. The Serbs are still in Montenegro, pursuing their aims by armed force. Martyrs fall each day; but it has at any rate been proved before the whole world that the will of Montenegro has not been freely manifested.

We most earnestly desire that our protests shall not be misinterpreted. We will not permit Montenegro to become a Serbian province and be ruled by princes neither of her own choice nor her own royal line. It affords us satisfaction to consider that our country has firmly resisted such brutal and humiliating annexation. We are conscious, however, of all that we owe to our race and our people. We will not set our faces against a confederation of the Jugo-Slav countries, the States constituting which league would retain full and complete autonomy. Thus it is evident that we are merely claiming for Montenegro a right which is now recognised as legitimate for all people—that of self-determination. If this right is to be exercised, an end must be made to the rule of terror and despotism from which our country has suffered so much. After investigation by you, the Serbians must be asked to evacuate Montenegrin territory at once. Their gold and their bayonets must affect us no longer.

Then the task which it has consoled us to think of during defeat and exile can be fulfilled; Montenegro can be restored, as we have been solemnly and repeatedly promised by the great Allied statesmen, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Poincaré, Mr. Briand, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Orlando, and Mr. Wilson, the President of the United States, whose eloquent telegram, dated July 1918, we here beg to record:—

“I thank Your Majesty sincerely for the courteous greetings you so kindly despatched to me on July 4th,⁴ which I value highly. I deeply sympathise with Your Majesty in the calamity which has overtaken Montenegro by the invasion of a ruthless force. I trust that Your Majesty and the noble and heroic people of Montenegro will not be cast down, but will have confidence in the determination of the” United States to see that in the final victory that will come, the integrity and rights of Montenegro shall be secured and recognised.”

The logical result of this restoration is the return to Montenegro of its lawful Government, which would ensure the working of its constitution and restore the country to normal conditions. We venture to hope that you will help us in this peaceful task.

Montenegro would then be free to express its aims, through the Parliament provided by its constitution, but for the present we can make known to you its fair and moderate claims.

Montenegro was poor, very poor; the present war has made it poorer still, and has deprived those who dwell in its mountains of the slight agricultural and commercial resources with which they were content. The losses caused by 18 months of fighting and 34 months of occupation must be made good. Its want is fearful. Montenegro is deserving of your help.

To allow of the restoration of the country, and to ensure its development and safety, its frontiers should be more logically connected with historical facts and natural features. We shall make known to the Peace Conference what we hold to be the legitimate frontiers of Montenegro, allowing her to exist peacefully without fear of compromising the independence so dear to her and which has been maintained since the 5th century by the heroism of our ancestors.

We have tried to express our views shortly, knowing only too well how precious is the time of the great Council which has given us a hearing; but in a memorandum which we take the liberty of presenting to each one of you you will find more detailed explanations of the questions which we have raised, together with documents justifying our statements and proving our good faith.

(M. Clemenceau thanked the Delegation, which then withdrew.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Paris, 6th March, 1919.

Annexure “A” to IC–154 [BC–44]

Paris, March 1, 1919.

[The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs (Benes) to the Italian Ambassador in France (Bonin-Longare)]⁵

Excellency: I have just received the report of Commandant Fierlinger on his return from Trieste where he had been sent to make contact with the Italian authorities with regard to the shipment of supplies for the Czechoslovak countries by way of the port of Trieste. The Royal Government of Italy was good enough to agree that our shipments of food stuffs be sent by the Udine-Tarvis route, on account of the recent closing of the railways in the south. Although the overloading of that route permits the passage of only a very limited number of our supply trains for Bohemia, there is hope of increasing their number as soon as the situation will permit.

I venture to ask, therefore, Your Excellency, that you will kindly be the interpreter to your Government of our warm gratitude for the measures mentioned above, which will greatly assist in bringing help to our populations at a critical moment, and also for the extreme good will with which the Royal Government of Italy so kindly carried out all the measures taken on our behalf in connection with this important matter.

Please accept [etc.]

E. Benes

Annexure “B” to IC–154 [BC–44]

Spa, March, 1919.

Messages, General Nudant, President Cipa,⁶ to Marshal Foch, 4 bis, Boul. Invalides, Paris⁷

No. 649. Wako⁸ has delivered long note on Bolshevism and necessity help of Entente to ward it off. First, to send supplies, then to help in establishing front against bolshevik offensive expected in Spring. German Supreme Command puts to Entente following plain question: Are Governments interested, yes or no, in having our troops fight Bolshevism? If yes, that transportation be authorized to the region of Libau, so as to constitute in East Prussia a front continuing that of the Poles. I remind you:

(1) That the Germans had prepared five boats for such transportation, but that Allies forbade sailing;

(2) That quarters for a German army corps are at Libau.

1. The “Brief Summary” of the minutes of this meeting (BC–44a, SWC–11a) gives the text of this draft resolution as follows:

   “Each Commission and Committee established by the Conference should attach to its report a draft of a clause or clauses embodying its recommendations for insertion in the Preliminary Peace Treaty provided its report is approved. In preparing such clauses, the members of the Commissions and Committees should consult their legal advisers.”

   (Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/51)

2. For minutes of this meeting, see vol. iii, pp. 456 ff.
3. The text of the Corfu agreement is printed in H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. v (London, 1921), p. 393. For a discussion of the agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, pp. 828–831.
4. Official U. S. Bulletin, July 12, 1918, p. 6.
5. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
6. Abbreviation for Commission interalliée permanente d’armistice (Interallied Permanent Armistice Commission).
7. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
8. Abbreviation for Waffenstillstandkommission (German Armistice Commission).