Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IV

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/50

BC–43 SWC–10

Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 3rd March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 3, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Admiral W. S. Benson
Hon. E. M. House	General Tasker H. Bliss
Secretaries	Major General M. N. Patrick
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Brigadier General D. Nolan
Mr. L. Harrison	Colonel W. S. Browning
Mr. G. Auchincloss	Captain F. H. Sehofield
British Empire	British Empire
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.	Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.	Major General W. Thwaltes, C.B.
Secretaries	Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C.M.G.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B.	Brigadier General P.R.C. Groves, D.S.O.
Mr. H. Norman	Brigadier General H. W. Studd, C.B., C. M.G., D.S.O.
France	Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.N.
M. Clemenceau	Paymaster Captain B. St. G. Pollard, C.B., R.N.
M. Pichon	France
M. Tardieu	Marshal Foch
Secretaries	General Weygand
M. Berthelot	General Belin
M. Arnavon	Comdt. Lacombe
M. de Bearn	Italy
Italy	Admiral Grassi
H. E. Baron Sonnino	General Cavallero
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi	Japan
Secretaries	Admiral Takeshita
Count Aldrovandi	General Nara
M. Bertele	Colonel Nagai
Japan	Capitaine Fujioka
H. E. Baron Makino	Capitaine de Vaisseau Nomura
H. E. M. Matsui	Capitaine de Vaisseau Yamamoto

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Colonel U. S. Grant.
British Empire	Captain E. Abraham
France	Captain A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan	M. Saburi.
Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Clemenceau asked whether the Powers were ready to nominate their delegates for the Financial and Economic Commissions.

Nomination of Delegates for Financial and Economic Commissions Mr. Lansing, on behalf of the United States, asked for a day’s delay for decision.

(It was that the names of the delegates should be communicated to the Secretary-General and that the Commissions should meet forthwith, without awaiting the nomination of all the members.)

2. M. Clemenceau said that Marshal Foch had summarised the report of the Military Commission in a short document, which he would read to the meeting.

Military, Naval and Air Conditions of Peace: (a) Summary of Marshal Foch Relating to Germany Marshal Foch then read the following document:— (distributed in English as here recorded.)

“I have the honour to forward herewith the Regulations concerning the definitive military and aerial Statutes of Germany.

These regulations have been formulated by the Inter-Allied Committee comprising three representatives of each Government designated in the report of February 12th, 1919,¹ and working under me as president, and are based on the decisions of the Supreme Allied Council which met at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 12th, 1919. The decisions were arrived at after consulting the Commanders-in-Chief.

These regulations provide for the military and aerial statutes of Germany, under the principle that Germany will only keep the forces necessary to ensure order and to police the interior of her territories.

They decide therefore:

(1) The maximum aerial and military strength.

(2) The staffing of this strength within a certain number of large units: Infantry divisions, Cavalry divisions, Army and Army Corps H.Q.

(3) The method of recruiting of this strength (officers and men).

(4) The armament, the war machines and the ammunition that the Germans will be authorised to keep, to maintain and to manufacture.

(5) The controlling measures which should be taken in view of the limitation of the strength and of the armament of the Germans.

(1) Strength.

All the delegations agreed to admit:

(a) that the land forces of Germany shall not exceed a strength of 200,000 men (officers not included)—that the number of officers and those assimilated from the land forces shall not exceed 9,000;

(b) that the air forces shall not exceed 1,000 men (officers included) and that these forces shall not be maintained after October 1st, 1919.

(2) Staffing of large units.

All the delegations agreed to fix the maximum number of the large units and staffs for the above strength at 15 Infantry divisions and 5 Cavalry divisions, 5 Army Corps H. Q. and one Army H. Q.

(3) Method of recruiting the strength.

The principle of permanent armies is applied to the officers and to the non-commissioned officers of the land forces; they are recruited voluntarily under the obligation to serve a long term, i. e. 25 years for the officers and 15 years for the non-commissioned officers.

The men of the land forces are, on the contrary, taken exclusively in each class of recruiting by drawing numbers, or by any other method chosen by Germany, under the reserve:

(a) that the total length of these men’s service shall not exceed one year and that the service shall be continuous;

(b) that the number of trained men, in each class of recruiting shall not exceed 180,000.

The British delegation was of opinion that a voluntary service for a long period would have been preferable; but they accepted the above conditions in order to arrive at a decision.

(4) Armament, war machines and ammunition.

The armament, the war machines and the ammunition left to the Germans are settled according to the quantities that are necessary for an army of 200,000 men staffed as indicated in paragraph (2), taking as a basis the armament of the German divisions shortly before the armistice.

The surplus armament, war machines and ammunition shall be handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers to be destroyed or rendered useless.

All the delegations agreed upon these questions.

(5) Controlling measures.

All the delegations also agreed to establish a Committee of Control with the object of supervising the execution, of the reductions imposed upon Germany as regards her strength and her armament within the prescribed period.

It has been unanimously admitted that this Committee will cease its duties at the end of such period, it being understood that in future the control will be continued by such means and such body as the League of Nations may deem necessary.”

Mr. Balfour said that he did not propose to criticise the work of the Military Commission. He thought, however, that there were probably some points on which all the military authorities were not agreed.

M. Clemenceau said that there was one such point.

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that there were also points which the civilian representatives would have to examine and that they would have to ask a number of questions to help them in their examination, which, if stated in the present meeting, might waste an undue portion of the Council’s time. He would like, himself, to have the opportunity of going over the proposals clause by clause with his own military advisers, and to resume the discussion in the Council after completing this preparatory examination.

Marshal Foch said that he specially wished to draw attention to the fact that all the Delegations had reached a unanimous agreement. The only exception was that the British Delegation had expressed a preference for a voluntary system of enlistment as the basis of Germany’s future military law. This, however, had not been pressed. The result, therefore, was the expression of a unanimous verdict.

M. Clemenceau said that it was not possible to refuse the extra time required by Mr. Balfour for consideration. All he would ask Mr. Balfour to say was on what approximate date he thought the discussion could be resumed.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought it not unlikely that Mr. Lloyd George would like to examine the report. As far as he was himself concerned, a very few days would be enough. One of his objects was really to save time. Some of the questions he would wish to ask would be answered with less loss of time to the business of the Conference by a meeting with his military advisers outside the Council. For instance, he gathered from the document that it was proposed that every officer in the future German army was to serve until he had reached the age of 45. He quite understood the object of this provision, but he had considerable doubt about its practicability. He had been told that there was a network of strategic railways on the left bank of the Ehine answering to no commercial necessity whatever. If this was so, it might be desirable to destroy them. On this point he required enlightenment and would prefer to discuss the question with his military advisers. He had also been told that there was a divergence of opinion between the Naval and Military Commissions. There should be harmony between them. He further noted that Admiral Benson dissented from some of the naval proposals on important issues. This also he would like to discuss outside the Council.

(b) Conditions for Austria-Hungary M. Sonnino remarked that the military representatives had been asked to make recommendations concerning the final military conditions of Austria-Hungary. He enquired whether any results had been obtained.

Marshal Foch said that he had prepared a note on this subject. The note was then distributed. (See Annexure “A.”)

Mr. House suggested that this matter should also be deferred, according to Mr. Balfour’s proposal.

(c) Time Within Which Military Terms Must Be Settled Marshal Foch said that the present rate of demobilisation in the Allied Armies required that the discussion with the Germans should not be delayed after 1st April. The Allies could impose their will on Germany until that date. If were to be in a position to impose their will on Germany after that date, the whole plan of demobilisation would have to be altered. He, therefore, begged the Council to agree upon the terms early enough to allow of a meeting with the Germans by March 20th. He considered that the period between that date and April 1st would not be too long for the discussion that would ensue with the Germans.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether the Council had ever laid down the principle that the terms of peace were to be ready by April 1st. He had no recollection of any such decision. The military delegates, however, appeared to have assumed that there was some such undertaking. They had, it seemed, so ordered demobilisation as to fit in with this plan. In effect, they wished to force the Council to settle peace by that date under pain of not being able to enforce their will upon the enemy. This was equivalent to holding a pistol at the head of the Council. If this were so, President Wilson would only have four days after his return to examine the conditions and to agree to them. This policy, Mr. Balfour added, was a complete novelty to him.

Mr. Lansing said that he would like to correct what seemed to be an error in Mr. Balfour’s statement. The American military authorities did not understand that there was such a policy; but they considered that these terms were final and evidently the Council could not be expected to settle the final peace terms by March 20th.

Mr. Balfour said that if he understood Marshal Foch aright, his view was that the terms must be ready by March 20th, or, failing that, that the Allies would not be able to enforce them. He felt it would not be right to put President Wilson in the dilemma of choosing to decide so important an issue in four days, or allowing it to go by default.

Mr. House suggested that, as the Council was awaiting reports from various Commissions on March 8th, this question might also be left over, at least until the return of Mr. Lloyd George.

Lord Milner observed that two of the Commissions set up had not been asked to report until the 15th. Some portion of the peace terms, therefore, could not be settled until after that date.

M. Clemenceau pointed out that the subject had been placed on the Agenda. Nevertheless, he was ready to put off the discussion until Thursday, if Mr. Balfour and Mr. House maintained their proposal.

Mr. Balfour said he thought it would be wise to decide to do this. He had only received the resolutions on the previous day. There were in them certain large questions which did not exclusively affect one or other of the fighting services. There was, for instance, one question which might be discussed immediately, namely, the question of the period during which the various proposals were to be enforced. The Aviation authorities wished to enforce their terms until the final conclusion of peace. The Naval authorities wished to enforce theirs until Germany had fulfilled all the terms of the armistice. The Military authorities wished to enforce theirs for all time. It might be desirable, therefore, to discuss the principle there and then in the Council.

(d) Duration of Terms to be Imposed on Germany M. Clemenceau said that an abstract discussion of this kind might not lead to useful results. The duration of the conditions could not be fixed without considering the nature of the conditions themselves. If this matter were discussed out of the relations to the conditions, it might be necessary to discuss it again in connection with the conditions themselves.

Mr. Balfour said that he saw the force of the suggestion, but he begged to submit that the Council should lay down some principle for the guidance of the experts. He thought it would not do to say to the Germans: “Here are aerial terms to last a short time, naval terms to endure for perhaps a generation, and military terms to last until the Day of Judgment.” He thought that the task of the experts would be made easier if they were told exactly what they were to provide for.

Mr. House said that the air terms referred to were, he understood, contrived to meet the purpose of seeking out mines, and October was set as the time limit for this purpose. As far as he could see, no conflict arose from these terms.

Marshal Foch said that from a report he had seen of the proceedings of the Council on February 12th, both Mr. Balfour and President Wilson had expressed the view that the final military condition of Germany was to be laid down. If this was so, it was unnecessary to discuss what principle was to be adopted, as the principle had been fixed on February 12th, and had remained unchanged since then.

Lord Milner enquired whether, in Marshal Foch’s opinion, the resolution taken on that date implied that the terms to be imposed on Germany were to last in perpetuity.

Mr. Balfour said that this point ought to be cleared up by the Council at once. For his part, he did not agree with Marshal Foch’s interpretation of the decision of February 12th. The word “final” he thought could not be held to convey the meaning of perpetuity. It had not been so interpreted by the Naval authorities and by the Aviation authorities. The Naval Terms, requiring a limitation of forces until certain undertakings had been carried out, were final terms, but not terms laid down to last for ever.

Marshal Foch said that if a definition of the term “final” were to be sought, it should be sought in the statements made on the 12th February by President Wilson.

(He then read certain extracts from an account of the proceedings of February 12th made by the French Foreign Office.)

M. Clemenceau said that he understood the discussion of the naval, military and air terms was postponed until the following Thursday.

(This was agreed to.)

The question of the meaning of the word “final” could, if Mr. Balfour so desired, be discussed immediately.

Mr. House drew attention to Marshal Foch’s suggestion in the concluding paragraph of his statement, vesting the power of enforcing the continuance of the limiting clauses in the League of Nations. He thought that if this suggestion were adopted, the naval and military terms would be in harmony.

Mr. Balfour said that during the discussion he had composed a draft, which he thought contained practically the same suggestion as Mr. House’s. He proposed the following draft:—

“The limitation on German armaments, whether military, or naval, or aerial, shall last until Germany has fulfilled all the obligations imposed on her by the Peace Terms, and thereafter for as long as, and with such modifications as, the League of Nations may determine.”

Admiral de Bon said that the Naval Advisers had not interpreted the terms of reference in the same manner as the Military Commission, because they had not had the advantage of having before them the proceedings of February 12th. They had therefore not worked on the same basis as the Military Commission. There was not, however, any essential divergence of view between the naval and military authorities.

Mr. Lansing called attention to certain of the proposed naval terms, which were evidently intended to be of indefinite duration, for instance, the dismantling of Heligoland, and of coastal forts denying access to the Baltic and the Kiel Canal.

Mr. Balfour said that his proposal referred only to the limitation of armaments.

M. Clemenceau said that this did not dispose of the seriousness of the question. Naval Powers had means of defending themselves which were not open to land Powers. He was not content to tell Germany to limit her forces until Peace Terms were fulfilled, and to leave the future at the mercy of events.

M. Sonnino said that on the 12th February the settlement of naval, military and aviation conditions had been referred to Commissions. These Commissions had worked independently, and, in consequence, the results obtained were not in complete harmony. Co-ordination of the results should have been obtained by Marshal Foch as Chairman of the Main Commission. Had this been done, the question of the period of enforcement would certainly have been discussed. The alternative now before the Council was either to decide this matter in principle or refer it to Marshal Foch to settle, together with the co-ordination of the three Reports.

M. Clemenceau asked whether Baron Sonnino’s suggestion that the three Commissions should meet together and co-ordinate their results, was accepted.

Lord Milner said that he thought the Council should lay down the principle on which the Commissions should proceed. Either the terms should be imposed on Germany until she had fulfilled the Terms of Peace, or they should be imposed unconditionally for ever.

M. Clemenceau said that President Wilson in that very room had declared that Germany must be disarmed. He did not say that Germany must be temporarily disarmed. Other countries might be content with transitory naval terms. He himself was not prepared to sign an invitation to Germany to prepare for another attack by land after an interval of three, ten, or even forty years. He would not be prepared to sign a Peace of that character.

Mr. Balfour said that before asking Marshal Foch to undertake co-ordination of the various Reports, some general direction should be given to him. He noticed that in the Naval Report, Admiral Benson had on four occasions made reservations relating to the period of enforcing the terms on Germany.

Admiral Benson said that he understood that the German Fleet was to be reduced to a fixed strength and kept there for an indeterminate period, and that the continuance of this régime was to be assigned to the League of Nations.

M. Clemenceau said that this might meet the case, provided the constitution of the League of Nations was satisfactory.

M. Sonnino suggested that Mr. Balfour’s proposal should be referred to the three Commissions, which were to meet to co-ordinate their reports.

Marshal Foch said he therefore understood that the Commissions would have to study the question of enforcing certain terms pending the execution of the conditions of Peace. If so, this represented an abandonment of the policy sketched by President Wilson on February 12th.

Mr. House proposed that the discussion be adjourned until the following Thursday.

M. Clemenceau agreed, but suggested that the three Commissions should meet together and co-ordinate their Reports in time for the renewal of the discussion on Thursday.

(This was agreed to.)

M. Sonnino asked whether the terms to be imposed on Austria and Hungary would also be discussed.

(It was agreed that the Note put forward by Marshal Foch—Appendix “A”—should be submitted to the Council on Thursday.)

Marshal Foch asked that the question of Germany’s future frontiers should also be taken up.

(e) Delimitation of German Frontiers M. Clemenceau said that in the absence of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson, it would not be possible to undertake the discussion of this question.

3. General Belin begged to submit a Joint Note of the Military and Naval Advisers to the Supreme War Council on this subject, in pursuance of the reference made on the 17th Feb. (I. C. 144, Minute 5.)²

Question of Permitting the Transfer by Sea of German Troops to Eastern Prussia and Latvia (For Joint Note see Annexure “B”.)

(After some discussion the Joint Note was accepted, and Marshal Foch was requested to communicate the result to the Germans.)

4. M. Sonnino proposed that the Montenegrin case should be heard.

Agenda for Next Meeting. Montenegro (It was agreed statement on behalf of Montenegro should be heard on the following Wednesday, at 3 p.m.)

(The Military, Naval and Air conditions of Peace were postponed until the following Thursday, and the question of Russia to a later date.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Paris, 4th March, 1919.

Annexure “A”

Note Concerning Limitation of Armaments in Austria-Hungary

The Military and Aviation members of the Committee appointed by the Supreme Allied Council to define the limitation of armaments, after examining the very detailed proposals of the Italian Delegation concerning the armaments of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, beg the Supreme Council of the Allies to re-examine the question as a whole. They further express the view that frontiers should be laid down as speedily as possible between the various States which are to be set up in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Once this delimitation has been made, the members of the Committee will make recommendations similar to those made for Germany for such of those States as are considered enemy States.

The Naval Delegates have agreed to the text attached to this Note.

Appendix “B”

Naval and Military Representatives,
Versailles, 3rd March, 1919.

Report on the Question of Permitting Transport by Sea of German Troops to East Prussia and to Latvia

(In Execution of the Decision of the Supreme War Council of 17–2–19.)³

The Naval and Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council,

After taking cognizance:

A. Of the request of the German Government for:

Free passage by sea between German ports in the West and ports of the Eastern shores of the Baltic for ships carrying troops, military stores and coal, in order to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks on the frontiers of East Prussia and in Latvia;

B. Of the opinion expressed by the Blockade Committee at their Meeting of February 24th to the effect that the Naval and Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council were alone competent to express an opinion;

Considering further:

(a) That the request of the German Government described above is contrary to Articles 12 and 13 of the Armistice Convention concluded on the 11th November 1918 with Germany;

(b) That Marshal Foch has already, on several occasions, refused to comply with a German demand for the rearming of certain Naval Units, notably on the 24th January, 1919 and on the 13th February, and that a similar refusal was made by the Naval Armistice Commission;

(c) That the authorisation for the Government of Germany to transport troops and material beyond the pre-war frontiers of Germany would lead to the sanctioning of co-operation in a common struggle against the Bolshevik of German forces on the one hand and of Russian contingents on the other, for whose up-keep and supply the Allies will be answerable;

That from this state of things might arise claims made by the German Government and even discussions with that Government likely to impede the work of the Peace Conference;

(d) That the Germans have already attempted to re-establish commercial relations in the Baltic, contrary to all the rules of the Blockade and specially to Article 8 of the Armistice Convention of January 16th last, which provides for the delivery to the Allies of the whole German Commercial Fleet for use in re-victualling Europe;

The Naval and Military Representatives are of opinion

1. That there is no ground for granting the German request to transport troops and supplies in the Baltic from West to East.

2. That the Blockade of Germany should be maintained in full force as at present in the Baltic.

3. That in order to prevent the Germans from representing this denial as an abandonment by the Allies of the Baltic provinces to the mercy of Bolshevism, it is urgently necessary to examine the question of furnishing support to such local contingents as may be in a position to resist the Bolshevik troops.

1. See BC–29 (SWC–6), vol. iii, p. 971.
2. See BC–34 (SWC–9), p. 27.
3. See BC–34 (SWC–9), p. 27.