File No. 893.00/2780

The Minister in China ( Reinsch ) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]
No. 1905

Sir: I have the honor to report on the general political situation in China as it has developed since the first of the year.

The contrast between the conciliatory policy of Acting President Feng and the desire for military gestures on the part of the Northern tuchuns, reported on in my No. 1788 of December 7, 1917,1 has become more marked as time has passed. While unity of action is outwardly maintained, there is known to be deep-seated hostility between the militarists under General Tuan and the followers of the Acting President. It is to be regretted that no way was found for taking General Tuan Ch’i-jui out of politics by giving him a dignified national mission abroad in connection with war action. As it is, General Tuan has again been completely identified with the Northern militarists, particularly the Anhui faction, and bitter feeling has been aroused against him in the center and south of China.

Notwithstanding their professed ardent desire for military action against the South, the Northern tuchuns have thus far been satisfied with making continuous exorbitant demands for money on the Peking Government, the funds supposedly to be expended for military preparation. In Hunan, their forces have retired from Changsha to Wuchang at the cost of about twelve million dollars and of a great deal of suffering to the country through which these military coolies passed.

The Acting President, while apparently desirous to have a conciliation with the South and always to leave the door open for peaceful [Page 85] settlement, has been weak in that he has not been able to formulate and carry out a clear, definite policy. When the so-called National Council was first convoked,1 it might easily have been possible to get the country to agree to a new election law for Parliament, if a definite time for such election had been fixed. Instead of that, General Feng gave the impression that he was supporting the National Council, and it was believed that he would not oppose an attempt to have it displace Parliament, an action most distasteful to the South. The Acting President’s traditional compromising tactics were not adequate to the present situation.

The crisis seemed to be impending when the President, on January 25, suddenly decided to leave Peking. It was formally given out that he was undertaking an inspection trip, with a view to persuade the “militant” tuchuns to take more active and concerted measures against the South. This is perhaps the most convoluted inversion that Chinese politics has yet produced; that the “militant” tuchuns, supposedly champing at their bits, should need presidential persuasion, and that it should be the pacifist President who started on such an errand is at first sight reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland, and yet this explanation of the reasons for the President’s trip was solemnly given out to the diplomats by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The fact was that neither the President nor the tuchuns really wanted to fight. The tuchuns were making quantities of money without any danger to themselves. Both, however, were in danger of losing face. Chinese politics has become more and more theatrical, and as the figures on the stage stamp about and try to make a deep impression by terrifying gestures, so in the minds of both the President and the tuchuns, a terrifying gesture against the South was needed, and it was hoped that this might do the business. From the point of view of the Acting President, who, after all, was supposedly at the head of the whole country, the action of the South involved a certain loss of face; the South, while willing to talk peace, was rather uncompromising with respect to the conditions. So it is possible that the President honestly believed that if a military show could be made in Hunan, a compromise might be more readily reached. This at any rate was the inner explanation which was given of his policy. As for the tuchuns, they also desired a terrifying gesture against the South, but they distrusted the President; before beginning to gesture, they demanded that he should issue a mandate declaring public hostilities in force against the South. After that they would act. So it might be understood that the President took his journey of inspection for the purpose of making the tuchuns agree to the terrifying show of military action against the South without first demanding the President to issue a mandate of absolute hostility, which was against his underlying instinct of compromise.

The President started on his trip, got as far as Peng-pu, where he met General Ni Ssu-ch’ung, the most notorious of the “militant” tuchuns, and returned to Peking. It was given out that his trip had been eminently successful, that he had persuaded the tuchuns to take common action, and that even Li Shun had promised to send a brigade against the Hunanese. Mandates have been issued, but [Page 86] so far there has been no result except further appropriations of public moneys to the “militants.”

The early return of the President is, however, not believed by any one to be in accordance with his original program. It is believed that his real objective was Nanking, where, in touch with Military Governor Li Shun, he might hold the balance of power between the North and the South. The Consul at Nanking and Mr. E. M. Lamb, the representative of the naval attaché, report from the accounts of eyewitnesses that Ni Ssu-ch’ung met the Acting President at Peng-pu, accompanied by the larger part of his military forces. He is said to have addressed the Acting President in the strongest language, and to have laid before him cogent reasons for returning immediately to Peking. The President had with him at the time only the military guard he was carrying on his own train. He accepted the suggestion of Ni Ssu-ch’ung.

At the present time the position of the Acting President in Peking is weak and full of embarrassment. Rumors of all kinds abound, including the perennial one of an impending restoration. From such information as I have from influential Chinese in close touch with the situation, it would appear that the faction which is grouped about General Tuan Ch’i-jui and which uses his name and reputation as their banner, is thinking seriously of ousting General Feng Kuochang from his position, and by an act of the so-called National Assembly, placing Hsti Shih-ch’ang in his place. Liang Shih-yi, Chow Tze-chi, and Chu Ch’i-ch’ien, with their minor associates, have just been pardoned. Liang Shih-yi is returning from a prolonged stay in Japan. It is most likely that the Tuan faction is attempting to make a combination with this so-called communications clique, counting on the ability of these men and the support which they supposedly might get from Japan, to strengthen the Tuan faction sufficiently to enable it to hold its own against the South. Through Ts’ao Ju-lin and General Tuan Chih-kwei, the Minister of War, Japanese support had already previously been arranged in the matter of the ten-million-yen loan and the furnishing of large quantities of arms. The extent of the support given and to be given by the Japanese Government to the Tuan fact [faction?] is, as will be known to you, one of the burning issues in Japanese politics at present.

Considered from the point of view of government and authority, the present Cabinet is the weakest which has existed during the last five years, at least. The Cabinet is weak through having no policy and through being divided on account of the deep-seated incompatibility of its component parts. The orders of the Government carry no authority beyond Peking. On the financial side, the weakness is most pitiable, and is clue to the exhaustion of the treasury through the demands of the “militant” tuchuns. Notwithstanding the large proceeds of the remitted Boxer indemnity, the Government banks are still in a state of approaching bankruptcy. The Minister of Finance, Wang K’o-min, … has not only been unable to carry on the finances of the country out of the abundant income of the customs and the salt revenue, but he has borrowed large sums from Japanese sources, in some cases with the mortgaging of specific valuable property and rights, in all cases to the injury of Chinese financial independence.

[Page 87]

Turning now to the Southern provinces, aside from the military successes of General T’an Hao-min in driving the Northern troops from Changsha and Yochow to the north, the most important development is an attempt to create a confederated council or commission for the constitutionalist provinces. The men who are now mentioned as likely to compose this council are the following: military, T’ang Chi-yao, Cheng Pi-kwang, and Lu Yung-t’ing; foreign affairs, Wu Ting-fang; finances, Tong Shao-yi; and peace negotiations, Ts’en Ch’un-hsüan. In connection with this proposal, I have the honor to enclose Canton’s despatch No. 62 of January 21, 1918.1

The project would involve the elimination of Sun Yat Sen from primary influence. In the words of Mr. C. C. Wu, the object of the leaders of this movement is not permanent separation of North and South, but an effort to bring about more complete cooperation and unity in the movement for constitutional government. The Southern leaders have protested to Japan against loans to the Peking Government. They are also planning to make representations with respect to the use of the customs and salt revenues, demanding assurances that these funds will not be used for factional militarist support. The chief difficulty with the Southern movement thus far has been lack of unity. The suspicion has been that while having the advantage of the North in standing for an important principle of public policy—constitutionalism and representative government—yet the individual military leaders of the South were probably animated by motives similar to those of the North, particularly the desire to maintain and fortify their own personal positions. In fact, all of China is in danger of disintegrating into feudalities under military men who do not even have the merit that they can fight but who do their work through crooked intrigue and corruption, hiring coolie forces as a matter of face and gain to themselves. If this spirit can be overcome in the South through encouragement for loyal cooperation in a common cause, the movement will gain enormously in strength. In fact any group of permanent leaders who would be bound together by loyalty to each other and a truly public motive, would be irresistible in China. As it is, each man stands alone, fights for his life, wealth, and official existence.

The importance of Nanking as a pivotal point in Chinese politics has become even greater than before. Military Governor Li Shun is the youngest of the tuchuns. He has therefore been accessible to ideas of national action which the older men are too [conservative] to receive. He too has to fight for his authority over his troops and provinces, because every possible means is brought to bear to undermine it. He is stigmatized as too ambitious for his youth, as inexperienced, and as desirous of playing his own game. But to all observers who stand outside of the intrigues of Chinese politics, he appears to be a man who has caught sight of the possibility of a national policy which the others had not even conceived. He belongs to the so-called Chihli group of the Northern military part, of which General Feng Kuo-chang and General Ts’ao K’un, the tuchun of Chihli Province, are also members. But he has of late tried more and more to disengage himself from the intrigues of the Northern military parties and to assume the position of a mediator between the North and the South, trying to develop a national policy to [Page 88] which they could all rally. The dirtiest methods of intrigue have been used against him in an effort to undermine him, particularly through buying his subordinate commanders. The only action that a “militant” tuchun is formidable in, is bribery; in this bloodless underground warfare they are thoroughly at home.

Since the return of Acting President Feng to Peking, the break between General Li Shun and the Northern tuchuns has become almost open, although it was announced, as reported above, that Li Shun had agreed to furnish a brigade for the expedition against the South. From information from various reliable sources, I am convinced that General Li Shun has now made up his mind that if there is to be any fighting it is not to be against the South, but against individual corrupt militarists who continue to disturb the peace of the country for selfish motives. With this in view, General Li Shun recently sent a circular telegram to all the military governors, a copy of which is herewith enclosed.1 The telegram puts the double inquiry as to whether the recipient desires to fight, and, if so, for what cause or principle: “If there is going to be civil war, that war should be waged for a just cause and with a definite and clear objective. … In the past both peace and war have been made without purpose, without consideration for the country, and recklessly.” General Li Shun through this telegram is attempting to arrive at a clear statement of the issue, and to isolate those who desire to continue the present confusion without public motives.

Another step which has been taken is an invitation on the part of the Kiangsu provincial assembly to all other provincial assemblies to send delegates to Nanking in order to discuss the possibility of national peace and concord. All but the Provinces of Anhui, Chihli, Honan and Sinkiang have already accepted this invitation. …

I have [etc.]

Paul S. Reinsch
  1. Not printed.
  2. See Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 106.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Not printed.