File No. 763.72111/4420
The Ambassador in Great Britain ( Page) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 15.]
Sir: With reference to your telegram No. 4216 December 27, 1916, 4 p.m. and my No. 5416 of the 4th instant1 in reply, I have the honor to submit the following report. The difficulties in the way of obtaining any reliable information on this subject have been great, and I have not in fact suceeded in ascertaining anything worth mentioning in regard to the reported activities in developing railroad terminals and dock facilities at Halifax, North Sydney, and St. John’s, nor on the point of the possible detail of disguised cruisers to protect the lines of trade, but I have gathered privately from an Admiralty source that though the British authorities do not appear to have taken any very definite steps as yet they are undoubtedly considering steps for the further protection of their merchant shipping to meet the increased dangers they apprehend.
The British Government does not appear to know exactly where they stand with our Government with regard to the arming of British merchantmen. In spite of our general pronouncement to the effect that merchantmen may properly be armed for defensive purposes they do not know how this would work out in practice or whether our authorities have laid down specific rules as to what constitutes defensive armament or what such rules might be. They understand in a general way that there is to be a limitation in number and in calibre of guns and that they should be mounted at the stern, failing which that ships might be classed as warships.
The British authorities look for a recrudescence of submarine activity off the American coast as soon as the Allies’ reply to the President’s note is made public, and they feel it their duty to see to it that their ships are adequately armed to meet this menace since from time immemorial it has been the undisputed right of merchant [Page 547] men to arm for defense. In old times it was not thought unusual for a merchantman to be armed not merely with bow and stern chasers but with broadsides as well, and the necessity for this sort of armament is greater to-day than ever before, for, whereas in old times a hostile cruiser would be sighted on the horizon and the merchantman would take to flight using her stern chasers for defense, to-day a hostile submarine might suddenly appear on the surface a mile ahead of the merchant ship and if the latter mounted guns only at the stern she would be in no position to defend herself. So much for the number and position of guns.
With regard to the calibre, the Admiralty has knowledge that the new German submarines carry comparatively heavy guns with a range of something like 8,000 yards. A merchantman with guns of less range might just as well be totally unarmed.
A point which seems to me to be of some importance is that the British Admiralty holds that there is nothing in the question as to whether British merchantmen are armed for defense or offense. Whatever the armament might be a merchantman to-day could be armed only for defense, since there is nothing afloat against which she could take the offensive. She can hot be armed for the purpose of seeking out and destroying less heavily armed enemy merchant ships since none such is at present on the high seas, and it is not reasonable to suppose that a merchant ship, being without armor—no matter how numerous or how heavy her guns, might be—could possibly be so rash as to attack an enemy man-of-war, but a heavy and mobile armament obviously seems necessary for merchantmen to meet the present submarine menace, and, if there is any danger of British merchant ships being refused clearance papers in American ports because of this, they may have to give up using American ports whenever possible.
I do not know that any difficulties have lately arisen in American ports with regard to this matter, but the British disposition appears to be that they can not afford to take the risk of arming their ships properly and then have three or four large ships libeled and interned at New York. This would be too expensive a way of ascertaining the attitude of our Government.
The foregoing should I think be considered in connection with the article I enclose on arming merchantmen from yesterday’s Morning Post and with the attached telegram in that newspaper from its Washington correspondent which states that the question of arming merchantmen is being reconsidered by the Neutrality Board, but that the President is opposed to permitting merchant ships to be more heavily armed than at present.1 This telegram also states that at [Page 548] present merchantmen are allowed two 6-inch guns at the stern but no more.
Another danger in New York Harbor under present conditions is that the municipal regulations appear to make it necessary for all ships entering that port to take up a pilot, who is taken on board outside territorial waters. This compels ships to come practically to a dead stop outside the 3-mile limit and would give a lurking hostile submarine an enormous advantage in attacking. The British Government, however, for obvious reasons has no desire at this time to make any efforts toward inducing neutrals to extend the limits of their territorial waters.
I have [etc.]