Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement 1, The World War

File No. 763.72/4244

The Minister in China ( Reinsch) to the Secretary of State

No. 1429

Peking, March 28, 1917.
[Received May 1.]

Sir: I have the honor to report further concerning the severance of diplomatic relations between China and Germany, and to enclose herewith certain articles,¹ dealing with this matter, published in the Peking Gazette of March 23, 24 and 26, and the Peking Daily News of to-day’s date; as well as an extra copy of a despatch (No. 10), dated the 16th instant, from the Consulate General at Canton, of which a copy has already been forwarded to the Department, and which is of special value as indicating the attitude of the southern part of China.

The severance of diplomatic relations brought with it a number of difficult technical questions, due to the régime of extraterritoriality and the existence of German municipal concessions. The Chinese did not always clearly distinguish between the effects of a breach of diplomatic relations and the results which would follow a declaration of war. As under existing conditions, China could give little military support to the Allied cause, one or two of the Allied Ministers urged strongly upon the Chinese Government that the chief manner of showing its benevolent neutrality, or eventually their good will as Allies, was by taking severe means against the Germans residing in China. The Chinese themselves being not unfriendly to the Germans and predisposed to deal gently with them, were nevertheless inclined to take advantage of the opportunity for recovering authority in the German concessions and making a breach in the system of extraterritoriality by giving wide scope to the breaking off of diplomatic relations.

It might have been argued that the only effect of the interruption of diplomatic relations was the departure of the German Minister and consuls, whose places were to be taken by Dutch officials, with all other relationships left unchanged. The Chinese decided to go beyond this minimum, giving as their reason for such action the principle of national protection and self-preservation. The policing of the German concessions was immediately taken over by the Chinese. The question of the actual relationship of the police to the German municipal authorities and the Dutch consular representatives has not yet been fully determined. It has been suggested that the Chinese authorities should inform the Dutch representative that the police were placed at his disposal for maintaining order in the concessions, but that the Chinese authorities reserve the right to issue orders to the police directly should conditions require.

I have been informed that after the Chinese police had entered the concession at Tientsin, the French and Japanese Ministers tried to prevail upon the British Chargé d’Affaires to join them in a protest with a view to having the policing turned over to one of the Entente powers, in this case Japan; and that the British Chargé d’Affaires stated that he considered the policing of the German concession by the Chinese as a simple and natural solution. The action of the Chinese was taken immediately after the breach of relations.

An even more difficult question has arisen in connection with extraterritoriality. The Chinese argue that the right of consular jurisdiction is one which can not be transferred from the officials of one country to those of another without the consent of the Chinese Government. They have been urged to assume jurisdiction over the Germans and to create a mixed tribunal, composed of Chinese and foreign judges, to adjudicate any actions brought against Germans. They have so far not decided to do this, although they see in it a possible method of establishing a precedent for such courts through which the system of extraterritoriality might be modified in favor of national sovereignty. The Dutch Minister, who discussed the matter with me and whose views appear to me as well founded, insists that the treaties with Germany are in no way affected through the absence of German diplomatic and consular officials, and that the officials representing German interests have a right to exercise consular jurisdiction at least as long as a state of war does not exist. I believe that the Chinese are inclined to accept this view, but that they will insist, in cases where political crimes are charged—such as espionage, plotting to destroy public property, etc.—that the Chinese Government will have to be represented by a magistrate in the judicial trial. Chinese officials have informed me that at all events they shall have to reserve this right: they base their position on the action taken by the American Government in the case of two Japanese spies in 1894. ( United States Foreign Relations, 1894; pages 95 and following.)

The French Minister has been urging the Chinese to go to the extreme length in this matter. In conversation with me he stated that the absence of the German Minister and consuls ipso facto suspended the treaty granting extraterritorial rights. He stated that it was desirable to inflict the greatest possible damage on Germans and that the Chinese could see [?] their account in this policy through recovering national jurisdiction. M. Conty considered it natural that the Chinese should thus recover their sovereign rights, a view which differs materially from his former attitude on such matters. When I asked him whether the exercise of authority by the Chinese over Germans and eventual harsh measures against them might possibly react unfavorably against all western nations, due to the fact that the Chinese masses do not distinguish clearly between the different countries (as indicated in my despatch No. 1418 of March 20 last¹), he stated that we must take care of such dangers as best we could. His attitude gave to everyone here the impression that his sole purpose is to inflict injuries on the enemies of his country, and that should trouble arise he would be ready to commit his interests to the protection of Japan. As far as I can gather, this particular attitude is not shared by the British and Russian representatives, who have however necessarily abstained from any definite advice or action.

On March 14 when the breach of diplomatic relations was announced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Ministers of the Entente powers, they presented to him a questionnaire as to the effect which the Chinese Government was ready to give the action taken, with respect to the treatment of German residents, disposal of German vessels, the rights of the German bank, and the treatment of German employees in the Chinese public service. On March 23 the Chinese Government answered to the effect that it had placed police control over the German merchant vessels in Chinese ports, and that it had dismissed employees in the operating department of railways, but that in other respects it had made no changes. I am informed that the Allied ministers then expressed the opinion that all German employees should be immediately dismissed; that the German bank, being partially a Government institution, should be prevented from doing further business, and that the German ships should be sequestered by the Chinese Government. No action has thus far been taken by the Chinese Government in response to these suggestions. German residents in China have, however, been ordered to register with the Chinese authorities for purposes of police protection.

I have the honor to enclose a paraphrase of a telegram, dated March 25, 5 p.m., from the Consul General at Shanghai, expressing the apprehensions of the American community in connection with the eventual assumption of jurisdiction over Germans by the Chinese Government; as well as a paraphrase of the telegram sent in reply.¹

It is my personal belief that the Chinese will proceed with circumspection in this matter, and should they upon the eventual outbreak of war assume jurisdiction over Germans, a form of mixed tribunal will be created which will give assurance of a just determination of actions. Notwithstanding the above, many difficult questions will undoubtedly continue to arise due to the exceptional international arrangements in China.

The political question as to the further action to be taken by China is a subject of intense discussion among all parties and classes. There is no question but that the prevailing opinion is strongly in favor of assimilating the Chinese course of action to that of the United States. This is apparent from newspaper discussions and from personal expressions coming from all parts of China. The Parliament itself is strongly in favor of this policy.

Among the high officials themselves, the prevailing desire is undoubtedly also for such a policy. They have, however, been induced to assume an attitude which appears to be more in accord with a policy ultimately to associate themselves with the Allies, though they strongly deny having committed themselves to such a course. I have already reported upon the motives which have induced them to take a somewhat equivocal position. The action of the American International Corporation in making, behind the back of the Chinese Government, an arrangement which is considered universally by the Chinese as a betrayal of their rights, has deeply shaken the confidence of the officials, who know about this matter, in American integrity. The financial needs of the Government, coupled with the political ambitions of certain leaders, have induced them to accept proffered financial assistance from Japan. A strong pro-Japanese clique, comprising Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Tang Hua-lung, Ts’ao Ju-lin, Lu Tsung-yü, and others, is at work with the Premier. As the solution of all the difficult questions concerning the concessions and extraterritoriality is also represented to be easier should war be declared, all factors cooperate to create in the official mind a predisposition to give favorable consideration to the suggestion of the Allies. Substantial benefits are hoped for as a result of such association in lightening the financial burden of China and making possible an increase of customs revenues.

Notwithstanding all these factors, I believe that even the majority of the officials, situated as described above, would prefer to continue in close association with the United States.

I have [etc.]

Paul S. Reinsch

[Enclosure]

The Consul General at Canton ( Heintzleman) to the Minister in China ( Reinsch)

No. 10

Canton, March 16, 1917.

Sir: I have the honor to inform the Legation that I was advised by the Civil Governor and the Admiral in charge of the Naval College and docks at Whampoa, on the evening of the 14th instant, that a telegram had been received from Peking in the afternoon of that day announcing the severance of diplomatic relations between China and Germany. Admiral Teng stated that he had been directed by the Naval Board to maintain most careful watch over the German gunboat Tsingtau, which has been interned at Whampoa since the beginning of the war, so that no harm could be done the vessel. He added that the Tsingtau would be placed, as a precautionary measure, in the Whampoa dock and that the crew of four, who had been retained on board as caretakers, would be removed from the vessel and brought to Canton to be interned. The same treatment was to be accorded the two or three German merchantmen and their crews at Swatow.

The Vice Consul for the Netherlands advised me yesterday that he had received a telegram from his Minister at Peking that the Dutch Government was entrusted with the protection of German interests in China. This morning I was informed by the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and also by a representative of the Civil Governor that the Department of the Interior had reported the rupture of friendly relations with Germany and had instructed the local authorities to protect German subjects. Dr. Lin, of the Civil Governor’s Secretariat, stated that no word had yet been received from the Foreign Office. He also told me that he had just called on the British Consul General, informing him of the instructions received from Peking and accordingly extending an offer of the local authorities to place Chinese police on Shameen to assist in preventing any disturbance or destruction of property by the Germans. Mr. Jamieson replied that Chinese police assistance was not desired and that he would assume full responsibility for the safety and proper conduct of the German residents on the British Concession. Mr. Jamieson suggested that the Chinese ask the German Consulate and business houses on Shameen not to fly the German flag; also that the Germans be forbidden to use so generally their motor boats which were moored off Shameen. The Chinese are prepared to comply with Mr. Jamieson’s wishes in both matters. Dr. Lin told me that the German in charge of the smokeless powder factory here would be relieved of his duties at once; and he thought the question of the Germans in the customs and postal services would be disposed of at Peking. Dr. Lin added that the secretary in the German Consulate would be permitted to remain as custodian of the consular archives and property.

The news of the action of the Central Government in breaking off relations with Germany is not being received with enthusiasm by the natives of the southern provinces. The Cantonese have been rather inclined toward Germany in their sympathies since the outbreak of the war, but this was chiefly due, not to any positive friendliness toward Germany, but rather to Chinese suspicion and fear of Japan and, likewise, to their experience of British and French encroachments on Chinese territory in the past. Moreover, Chinese military circles here, as elsewhere in China, have been impressed by the fighting power of Germany, though they profess an aversion to the essentially military fabric of that country. These facts serve to explain, in part at least, the attitude of South China on this question.

Many influential southern men and institutions have expressed themselves strongly and fearlessly against any rupture of relations with Germany. On the other hand, I have been unable to find a single official, public institution, or newspaper advocating such a course. Four members of the Kwangtung Provincial Assembly had jointly despatched a telegram to the Central Government urging that China should continue to maintain strict neutrality in the war and that she should not sever existing relations with Germany. The Seventy-two Commercial Guilds and the Nine Charitable Institutions had also telegraphed the Central Government petitioning it to remain neutral during the present crisis over the German submarine policy. The Provincial Assembly was expected to take similar action. The local chamber of commerce had telegraphed to the President, the Cabinet, the Parliament, and the United Chamber of Commerce protesting against the entry of China into the war, stating that by doing so trade would be adversely affected and the nation not benefited. They declared that the Government should preserve strict neutrality. The Acting German Consul here recently called on the Military Governor of this province, who had at the time as a guest the Military Governor of Kwangsi, Chen Ping-kun. Both Governors assured Mr. Tigges that the present crisis would not change their friendly attitude toward the Germans in the Two Kwangs. A senator from Kwangsi, educated in Germany, had addressed a memorandum to the Premier setting forth the reasons why China should not break off diplomatic relations with Germany and pointing out the dangers and disadvantages China would encounter in consequence of a diplomatic rupture.

An important factor determining the attitude of the Cantonese on this question was the historical opposition between North and South and a desire to embarrass the Central Government in any measure which the latter was believed to view with favor. The Kuomintang, whose southern members include leaders of such wide influence here as Ts’en Ch’un-hsuan, Tang Shao-yi, and Sun Yat-sen, is clearly identified with the protests sent to the Government against any extreme measures toward Germany, and Sun Yat-sen’s recent telegram to the British Premier was given wide publicity here and sympathetically commented upon by the officials and press. There can be no doubt that this recent action of the Central Government adds another disquieting factor to the local situation in that it affords an opportunity for Canton to oppose Peking. One local newspaper in a leading article made the following statement, which, however, should be taken as indicating the attitude of the extreme radicals, of whom, however, there are many, in the matter:

While China should stand with America in the attempt by peaceful measures to check ruthless submarine warfare and protect the interests of neutrals, yet if China really wishes to go to war, let the fourth revolution, which is expected, come immediately in order that the old corrupt officialdom may be eliminated once for all. Let the young republicans arise against internal foes to help China become a nation really independent!

In explanation of the reference to the disquieting political conditions here, I should report the constantly recurring rumor as to impending trouble in Yunnan. I am privately informed that the French diplomatic agent at Yunnan had told the agent of the Standard Oil Company there that he really believed that Yunnan would take the lead in another revolution of secession on the part of the southern provinces against the Central Government about April 1. Mr. Wilden, who has since been promoted as Acting Consul General for France at Shanghai, stated that he was not sure as to the date, but that he had many reasons to believe that the trouble would begin about April 1. My British colleague here tells me that he has information to the effect that the trouble brewing in Yunnan will commence about June 1. While these are merely rumors, in which too much reliance can not be placed, yet it is certain that the government of Yunnan is now receiving large amounts of guns and ammunition and that the general dissatisfaction throughout the southern provinces with the Central Government, as it is constituted at present, is growing. The chief menace in the situation lies in the provincial armies and the need of funds to pay the wages of the soldiers in arrears; and there is a real and justified fear that the problem of raising money will supply the seed of another revolution, since fresh taxation to maintain the military establishment or to meet interest charges on loans for that purpose will surely increase the prevailing discontent. There can be little doubt that the Kuomintang is working for the separation of the South from the North, and it is quite natural that this idea is receiving a stimulant through the failure of the authorities to solve the financial and other problems confronting them. There is also to be considered the strong provincial feeling and the desire for local autonomy which incline towards a system of government less autocratic than that regarded as superimposed from Peking. This intense sectionalism, which has doubtless given rise to the traditional opposition between North and South, continues to foster this spirit of hostility. The most hopeful element in the situation is the general belief that China’s attitude in the submarine controversy with Germany was taken in response to a request of America, in whose sincere friendship the people have every confidence and whose sympathy and helpfulness is acknowledged to be of vital importance to them; and the ground for hope lies in the likelihood that the southern Chinese will be loath to have this action, which grew out of the close relationship with America, appear to be the cause of a popular uprising or the beginning of another era of unrest in South China.

I shall keep the Legation fully and promptly informed of further developments in the situation.

I have [etc.]

P. S. Heintzleman

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