Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement 1, The World War
File No. 868.00/98
The Minister in Greece ( Droppers ) to the Secretary of State
No. 158
[Received March 19.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit to the Department the enclosed report on the political situation here, with especial regard to the question of Greek neutrality.
I have [etc.]
Report on the Neutrality Policy of Greece
I have often been informed during the past six months in a semiofficial manner that it is of the utmost importance that Greece should remain neutral and not mix up in this war. Some weeks ago Mr. Streit, an ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Venizelos Cabinet but since the outbreak of the war an ardent anti-Venizelist and a trusted counselor of His Majesty the King, informed me that it was highly undesirable for Greece to abandon her policy of neutrality, although her sentiments, both official and lay, were undoubtedly favorable to the Entente. Mr. Streit, I may add, is suspected, though on what grounds of evidence I am unable to say, of being a supporter of the Germanophile party in Athens. Putting aside the question of his sincerity, I wish to examine the facts of Greece’s neutrality and the reasons of state alleged therefor.
Mr. Streit mentioned two grounds which he thought were conclusive for this policy. One was the situation of the Greeks in Turkey. There were in that Empire several millions of Greeks, whose security for life and property depended upon the fact of Greece’s remaining neutral. If Greece entered the war, these people would be despoiled and irretrievably ruined. For this reason the King deserved well of those Greeks who lived under this foreign jurisdiction. The second [Page 71] reason was that Greece had just finished a very exhausting war against Turkey and later against Bulgaria. She needed now to recuperate her forces and resources and not to engage in a new war.
At the time that the first Venizelos Ministry fell (early in March 1915) there was little or no opposition to Greece’s entering the war, to the best of my recollection. Leaving this point aside, I was told by the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself of the succeeding Ministry (Mr. Zographos) that he submitted a formal note to Great Britain, offering the participation of Greece in the war on the side of the Allies on certain conditions, of which two were important: (1) That the Greek General Staff should have charge of all land operations against Constantinople; (2) that the Allies should guarantee Greece against attack by Bulgaria not only during the war, but also for some years thereafter. The British Government did not reply to this note. Sir Edward Grey, however, did send an informal reply to the British Minister at Athens, Sir F. Elliot, which I had the privilege of reading. It was simply to the effect that England could not entertain the propositions of the new Greek Ministry.
In substance there was little difference between the Venizelos offer and that of the Ministry which succeeded him, unless we deem important what was the essence of the entire transaction, namely, that Venizelos should have no share in the glory of the undertaking, if it proved successful. England’s reasoning may have been that bargaining in the matter of an alliance between the Allies and Greece was unwise; it may have been that she felt herself under obligation to accept nothing less than the Venizelos offer, since England herself had persuaded him to join the Allies and now was unwilling to desert him; it may have been that she distrusted the good faith of the Gounaris Ministry, since the Prime Minister was a noted pro-German. Whatever her reasons may have been, she did not respond to the advances of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Prince George returned to Greece in April 1915 soon after the Venizelos Ministry resigned. It is well known that he had vowed never to return to Greece so long as Venizelos was in power, owing to his quarrel with Venizelos in Crete some years before, when the Prince was high commissioner of that island. I had an audience of Prince George soon after his return to Athens. He spoke (I thought, undiplomatically) with the greatest bitterness about Venizelos, indeed, never alluded to him except as “that demagogue.” He informed me that now that Venizelos was out of the way, the Greek Government would be free to make an alliance with the Entente powers. This was the very same month that Mr. Zographos had sent his offer to England. On or about May 1 at an evening party attended by the entire Royal Family I spoke with another of the [Page 72] brothers of the King and after some preliminary discussion about politics, in which I tried to fence as much as possible, he said to me: “I can assure you that within six weeks Greece will join the Allies in the war.” I, who had read Sir E. Grey’s letter, replied that I must beg to differ with this view, and that my impression was that Greece would not enter the war either within six weeks or within six months. The Prince expressed the greatest surprise and asked the reason for my opinion. “That,” I replied, “I regret to say I am obliged to withhold.” I may add that Prince George, his brother, was at that time just returning to Paris from Athens assuring the members of the Royal Family that he could arrange matters with the French Cabinet and get more satisfactory terms than Venizelos. This promise of Prince George was the basis of the assurance given to me by his brother.
Matters went on from bad to worse in Greece, but finally another election was held, the result of which was that Venizelos was returned to power. There can be no doubt that extraordinary efforts were made in the campaign by the Government to defeat the Venizelists. Nor was Venizelos himself equivocal in his language. If elected, he declared, he would immediately exert all his influence to range Greece in the war on the side of the Entente. It seems to be clear therefore that Greece was not averse to joining the war actively on the side of the Allies. The organs opposed to Venizelos, it must be admitted, emphatically disputed this view. They claimed that it was Venizelos personally that the people voted for, not the war. But apart from this consideration, it is difficult to explain the order for mobilization, which was accepted by the King upon Venizelos proposal, on any other ground than that the nation would enter the war sooner or later. If on the side of the Allies, then the Venizelos program would be accepted in its integrity; if on the side of the Central Empires (as was at that time obscurely but probably falsely hinted), then in flagrant violation of every pretense of decent public policy.
However, on one ground or another, there was again a difference of opinion between the King and Venizelos and on October 6, 1915, after only five weeks in office the latter resigned. From this time on, for the space of almost ten months the army remained mobilized, but for what purpose no one was able to understand. This condition of things was demoralizing to the nation in more ways than one; the soldiers were in many instances unpaid, their services were employed for the most humiliating detective work, for propagandist purposes, and in the end for not even defending their country against aggression, until finally the Entente powers ordered Greece to demobilize her army, now thoroughly wearied of the thought of war.
[Page 73]During the month of September 1916 there again were rumors that Greece would join the Allies. About the middle of that month the Associated Press correspondent, Mr. P. Hibben, informed me that I could on the most positive authority telegraph to my Government that Greece would join the Allies in the war. When I questioned him closely on the matter, he replied that the King had given him his Royal word of honor to this effect. He stated in the most emphatic terms that the decision would be made public within two weeks. He also gave the same information at the same time to the British Minister, and all the Entente Ministers at Athens were more or less impressed. For various reasons this decision also fell through and Greece remained neutral, though in a very disastrous sense for her own interests. It was on the basis of this information that I sent my despatch No. 156 dated September 22, 1916, to the Department.1
There are thus two distinct cases—the first in May 1915, the second in September 1916—where the highest personages of the Greek Government gave assurances that Greece would abandon her policy of neutrality and join the Entente. In view of this fact I do not understand how a responsible person can say to me that the King from the start desired to pursue only a policy of neutrality and that he has consistently maintained this effort.
As to the main reason, which Mr. Streit mentioned in justification of this policy, namely, the vast number of Greek Ottoman subjects, who would be injured in life and property by an alliance of Greece with the Entente, I can only reply that such Greek Ottomans have already suffered much during the past two years in any case. Furthermore the Greek Ottomans, to the best of my knowledge, are almost to a man partisans of Venizelos and are not asking for a policy of neutrality. On the contrary, they deem the conduct of affairs in Greece during the past two years highly disastrous to their own interests. But this point is not one on which I have satisfactory evidence, having only such information as comes from the many refugees, who have fled from Turkey to Greece for safety.
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