94. Report Prepared in Research Service, Office of Research and Assessment, United States Information Agency1
[Omitted here are the title page and the abstract.]
HIGHLIGHTS
In eight countries surveyed around the second week in June, 1970 awareness both of fighting in Cambodia and U.S. participation ranged from 42 per cent in Delhi/Bombay to 78 per cent in Sweden.
Among those respondents with opinions about U.S. involvement in Cambodia, disapproval predominated by substantial margins in five countries—France, West Germany, Sweden, Japan and India (Delhi and Bombay). In Great Britain opinions were fairly evenly divided, and only in Australia and Manila did approval prevail.
The main reason voiced for approval of the U.S. entry into Cambodia was that the action was required to save the Cambodian government from Communists. This was closely followed by generalized anti-Communist sentiment and the view that the U.S. entry furthered termination of the war.
The most frequent reason cited for disapproval of the U.S. entry into Cambodia was that the U.S. allegedly had no business in Indochina. Others saw the action as spreading or lengthening the war, or increasing the danger of Chinese involvement.
More generally, reactions to U.S. policies and actions in Viet-Nam were predominantly negative in six of the eight countries surveyed. Only in Australia and Manila did favorable sentiments prevail.
With regard to respect for the U.S., substantial declines from the late 1969 level were registered in four of the six countries for which trend data are available—Great Britain, France, West Germany, and to a lesser extent, Japan. In Sweden and Manila there were no appreciable changes from prior surveys. No trend measurements are available for Australia and India.
Notable shifts in degree of respect for the USSR also occurred from late 1969 to mid-1970. There were substantial trend increases in respect [Page 231] for the USSR in Sweden and Britain, declines of comparable magnitude in France and Manila, and no appreciable change in West Germany and Japan.
Comparison of these trends for the USSR with those of the U.S. indicates that the U.S. has lost much of its earlier lead over the USSR in four countries, has completely lost its lead in Sweden, and only in Manila is there a greater U.S. lead than before.
The change in confidence in U.S. ability to deal wisely with world problems, from before to after U.S. entry into Cambodia, is the most dramatic trend in the present study. The losses in confidence range from large to very large in five of the six countries for which trend data are available. In the sixth, Manila, the trend is also downward, but not large enough to be wholly conclusive.
During this same time span, namely from late 1969 to mid-1970, the USSR suffered only limited losses in confidence in France, West Germany, and Manila, gained somewhat in Sweden, and showed no appreciable change in Great Britain and Japan.
The consequences of these trend changes is to leave the U.S. with a greatly reduced margin of leadership over the USSR in extent of foreign confidence in its ability to deal wisely with world problems.
An additional measurement of confidence in the U.S. was available from Great Britain in a May 7–10 survey, only about a week after the U.S. entry into Cambodia. This study showed British confidence to be somewhat lower in May than in June. The possibility therefore arises that the current comparatively low levels of confidence in the U.S. represent increases from even lower levels more immediately after the U.S. entry into Cambodia.
To shed some light on the possible reasons for the current low levels of confidence in the U.S., respondents in each of the eight countries were first asked whether their confidence had recently gone up or down. “Gone down” responses prevailed in seven countries and were a standoff in the eighth (Manila). Next, the respondents reporting changes in attitudes were asked for reasons. Most often cited as a cause for decline in confidence was U.S. entry into Cambodia, or more generally, U.S. actions in Viet-Nam. The reasons given for increases in confidence were for the most part too few for a meaningful picture.
Further indication of the influence of the U.S. entry into Cambodia on levels of confidence in the United States is provided by comparisons in confidence by respondents who approved of U.S. entry into Cambodia versus those who disapproved. The results show quite clearly [Page 232] that large losses in confidence are associated with disapproval of U.S. actions in Cambodia.2
[Omitted here are the table of contents, the introduction, the body of the report, tables, and the appendix: Description of Sample, 1969 and 1970 Opinion Surveys.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research, Research Reports: 1960–1999, Entry P–142, Box 35, R–17–70. Confidential.↩
- In August, the New York Times reported that USIA had provided Lowenstein certain sections of the research report. Lowenstein “made available the answers to two questions, which asked foreign citizens several weeks after the Cambodian operation began whether their confidence in the United States had increased or decreased and if they approved or disapproved of United States policy in Vietnam.” (“Cambodian Drive Hurt U.S. Prestige: Polls Taken by U.S.I.A. Find Drop in 7 of 8 Countries,” August 10, 1970, p. 5) On December 20, during his appearance on the ABC News public affairs program “Issues and Answers,” Shakespeare asserted that U.S. prestige abroad had “suffered” as a result of the Cambodian incursion. (Terence Smith, “U.S.I.A. Chief Says Cambodia Drive Hurt U.S. Abroad,” ibid., December 21, 1970, p. 4)↩