92. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the Deputy Director (Loomis)1
SUBJECT
- General Haig’s Request for Comments on Information Vacuum in Cambodia
General Haig asked that Jim Carrigan write some general notes on the communications vacuum in Cambodia. Jim’s comments follow:
GENERAL:
The ability of the GOC to communicate with Cambodia’s rural population is severely limited. Radio, television and motion pictures media resources have been neglected; equipment is old and in disrepair, and trained personnel are few in number. Military communications between army units in the field are sorely lacking, and communications between the field and headquarters are practically non-existant.
The NVN and the VC are reportedly carrying out effective psywar programs designed to reinforce their claim that Sihanouk is the legitimate leader of the people and that the Lon Nol Government is corrupt, illegal and is using the people of Cambodia to further the interests of their masters, the Americans and America’s allies.
The NVN and the VC soldiers have assumed a new identity. They are now members of Sihanouk’s Liberation Army of Cambodia. They have been seen wearing Sihanouk arm-bands. Others wear pictures of Sihanouk attached to their caps. It is reported that these troops are well-disciplined and seasoned. It is reported that they have “liberated” villages, given medical aid and food to the people. And this is followed with evening entertainment during which Sihanouk’s praises are sung and the traitorous activities of the Lon Nol Government are exposed ad infinitum. To cement this psychological advantage and to maintain a constant propaganda barrage, Peking and Hanoi beam powerful radio signals that are reportedly heard “loud and clear” throughout the country. The Lon Nol Government has very little at hand to counter this serious propaganda threat. The GOC radio is weak and there are insufficient trained programming personnel. However, if steps are not taken immediately to improve Cambodia’s ability to tell its own story, to keep its people informed, to point out Sihanouk’s true character and [Page 228] to exploit his “marriage” to the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists, the Lon Nol Government might well lose what support it now has in the provinces.
POSSIBLE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT:
1. Assess the condition and capabilities of present transmitter facilities. Determine whether it is feasible to repair this equipment. Reportedly, some of it is of Chinese origin.
2. Lend a portable transmitter to the GOC. It should be kept in mind that the American technical staff should be kept to a minimum. The Cambodians want to do as much as possible on their own and we should respect that desire.
3. Urge the Australians to give and install a permanent 50 KW medium and short wave transmitter in Cambodia.
4. Urge the Australians to assign at least one, preferably two, program advisors to the staff of the radio station. This will be essential if a regular flow of material is to be prepared.
5. Study the capabilities and potential effectiveness of the GOC TV station. There are over 15,000 receiving sets in and around Phnom Penh. As well, with a good antenna, Saigon is received easily.
6. Strengthen the GOC’s motion picture capability. Reportedly they have cameramen, film and equipment. Their processing ability however, is nil. Through Major Am Rong, we have been asked to process footage for the Government. This request has been given to USIA/IAF for consideration.
- Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 10, Field—Far East (IAF) 1970. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Drafted by James Carrigan (IAF); cleared by Schneidman and Albright.↩