Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

73. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 25, 1970

SUBJECT

• USIA Activities

The December 22 issue of the Chicago Tribune reported that Arthur Meyerhoff, a Chicago advertising executive, had criticized USIA for speaking primarily to the intellectual elite.² As you requested, we have analyzed these comments.³

The idea that USIA programs address themselves principally to intellectual elites is mistaken. USIA does attempt to focus, however, on bringing its message to present and potential leaders in a given country. This policy has been reinforced by USIA’s attempt to rationalize its operations through a planning-programming-budgeting system which requires that program effectiveness be judged principally by the exposure of well defined target groups to USIS program output. The target group approach to USIA programs is implemented world-wide. In a few countries, however, mass audiences are considered important target groups. Examples are Vietnam and Thailand where the threat of actual and potential insurgencies makes mass opinion critical.

It is doubtful that world-wide USIA activities could be reoriented toward mass audiences without an appreciable increase in USIA’s budget. Neither is it clear that such a reorientation would further U.S. foreign policy goals. On the whole, USIA’s effectiveness depends more on the quality of its personnel and its message than on whether it pursues a mass or an elitist approach to propaganda. I can request a study clarifying the costs and benefits of a mass audience as opposed to a target group approach.

RECOMMENDATION:

Approve study of mass audience approach⁴

Do not desire such a study

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 293, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. I [Apr 69–25 Feb 70]. Confidential. Sent for action. Lynn sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a February 24 covering memorandum for Kissinger’s signature, indicating that the memorandum “has been revised as you suggested.”
2. See John McDonnell, “4–A’s Committee Is Disbanded; Meyerhoff Rips USIA Director,” Chicago Tribune, December 22, 1969, p. C6.
3. In a December 31, 1969, memorandum to Kissinger, John R. Brown III indicated Meyerhoff’s frustration stemmed, in part, from the fact that Shakespeare and Loomis had not met with an American Association of Advertising Agencies (4–A) committee that Meyerhoff headed. Brown also noted Meyerhoff’s criticism of USIA in that it focused on elites, adding: “The President noted that this may be a sound criticism and asked that you see what an objective analysis turns up.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 293, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. I [Apr 69–25 Feb 70]) Watts, in a January 2, 1970, memorandum to Lynn, asked Lynn to prepare an analysis from Kissinger to the President. (Ibid.) An earlier draft of the Kissinger memorandum printed here was not found; however, according to an undated covering memorandum from Lynn to Kissinger, Kissinger provided comments for revision of the memorandum, noting that it should be “cut down a bit.” (Ibid.)
4. The President wrote “no” on the line next to the recommendation and wrote below it: “I prefer the emphasis on the elite groups—people who will lead the country—intellectuals, business etc. —The mass approach is too costly—& generally not productive. It is better to sell our idea to a local leader & count on him to sell it to the masses.” An unknown hand wrote below this “3–13–70.”