40. Editorial Note
On October 13, 1969, the United States Information Agency (USIA) released News Policy Note 27–69, entitled “October 15 Moratorium on the Viet-Nam War.” The Note, drafted in the Office of Policy and Plans (IOP) by Assistant Cultural Affairs Adviser Geoffrey Groff-Smith and Chief of the Policy Guidance Staff John Pauker, outlined the nature of the nationwide protest called for by the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC) and specified the guidelines for USIA treatment of the moratorium:
“It is no secret abroad that within the United States there is opposition to U.S. policy in Viet-Nam. We have reported manifestations of that opposition before, matter-of-factly and in perspective in order to balance sensational commercial coverage. The coming moratorium will be another manifestation of that opposition, and should be treated in the same way.
“Specifically, we want foreign audiences to view the activities relating to the moratorium in light of the many positive efforts of the U.S. Government, and of the President himself, to reduce the violence in Viet-Nam and end the war.
“You should gear the volume of output about the moratorium to the requirements of credibility and the newsworthiness of the developments, bearing in mind President Nixon’s recent call for national unity in support of the Administration’s Viet-Nam policy. In original comment, to set the stage for the moratorium and also while it proceeds, make the following points:
“With the President, all Americans want to end the war:
“‘I want to end this war. The American people want to end this war.’ (Address to the nation, May 14, 1969.)
“The question is how this can best be done. Organizers of the VMC propose speedier unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces. Others—most recently Senators Goldwater and Tower—advocate intensified conventional military pressures on the enemy. Many other Americans have varying views between these positions.
“The President has stated that ‘we have ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield.’ In his efforts to arrive at a disengagement, the President has put forth only one condition which is not negotiable: the right of the people of South Viet-Nam freely to determine their own future. In seeing that this basic right of the South Vietnamese people is met, the President has publicly set forth these three criteria for the disengagement of U.S. troops from Viet-Nam:
“(1) Progress at the Paris talks.
“(2) Reduction in the intensity of combat.
[Page 91]“(3) Ability of the South Vietnamese to undertake a larger responsibility for combat operations.
“The rights of free speech, assembly and petition are guaranteed and protected by the U.S. Constitution and by American democratic traditions. It is clear that the Federal Government will not interfere with the protests as long as they are peaceful and do not interfere with the right of other citizens to pursue their own activities.
“If violence should occur it will be detrimental not only to the aims of the Administration but to those of the dissenters as well.
“Caution: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, do not suggest that the moratorium is at the instigation of, or controlled by, any single political group of individuals or of another political party.” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural and Youth Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 6, EDX 12 October 15 Moratorium 1969)