15. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- East-West Center
During your London visit2 you indicated to the British general agreement with McGeorge Bundy’s project for an East-West Center on the Common Problems of Advanced Societies. (My earlier memo describing the project is at Tab A.)3
Bundy has now talked further with the British, who are prepared—if we do not object—to come up with a first-stage plan for a Center, with a British home and lead in the sponsorship.
He has also talked with the chief Russian negotiator, Dzerman Gvishiani (who is Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology, and Kosygin’s son-in-law).4 Gvishiani was encouraging about possible Soviet participation, and indicated his personal hope that Bundy would continue to work on the project. Bundy says he now believes the Soviets have made a decision in favor of joining the Center.
As a result of these talks, Bundy proposes that:
—The U.S. Government give a quiet indication to the Soviets of support for the project;
—We select an individual to be responsible for negotiations both in Washington and abroad (including a check with appropriate members of Congress to see that earlier indications of support still stand);
[Page 31]—We support, at a later time, an appropriation of up to $2 million for the National Science Foundation (as the U.S. contribution to the project).
The Issues
We now need to make several decisions.
First, should we agree to continue the project through the next stage? My own view is that we should go ahead. The Center has real substantive merit; further, a U.S. withdrawal now might be misinterpreted by the Soviets.
Recommendation: That you authorize me to tell Bundy that the U.S. is prepared to go ahead with the project, subject to review as plans progress.
| Approve5 | Disapprove | See me |
Second, do we ask Bundy to continue to represent the U.S. (either permanently or for the next stage)? I suggest that we keep Bundy, at least for the next round of talks—leaving open the possibility of setting up a new group (with a new chief) at a later date. Bundy knows the background to the project and is well known and trusted by his foreign counterparts.
Recommendation: That you authorize me to tell Bundy you would like him to continue on as U.S. representative for the next stage of the talks.
Approve6
Prefer that he be dropped and a new representative named
Prefer that Bundy be told he is to continue as U.S. representative throughout all stages of the negotiations
Finally, should we tell Bundy that we see no objection to telling the British that they should come up with a first-stage plan for the Center? I believe we should let them go ahead.
Recommendation: That Bundy be authorized to tell the British that we have no objection.
Approve7——Disapprove——See me
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 321, Subject Files, East/West Center [Feb 1969–Sept 1972]. Confidential. Sent for action. Eagleburger wrote “HAK called Bundy on Apr. 15, 1969” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. In the top left-hand corner of the memorandum, Eagleburger added: “Osgood to follow for NSC.” Eagleburger sent a copy of the memorandum to Osgood under an April 16 memorandum, noting that Nixon had approved “our going ahead” with the East-West Center project and that Kissinger “would like you to be the staff member to follow this project.” Eagleburger concluded: “In a previous incarnation I was somewhat involved in the Bundy proposal and would be happy to get together with you sometime this week to fill you in on what background I have.” (Ibid.)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 8.↩
- Printed as Document 8.↩
- Attached but not printed at Tab B is an undated memorandum prepared by Bundy concerning his April 3 meeting with Dzerman Gvishiani, which took place at the Ford Foundation in New York.↩
- The President initialed his approval.↩
- The President initialed his approval.↩
- The President initialed his approval.↩