Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

142. Memorandum From the Youth Adviser, Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Meyer) to the Director for Policy and Plans (White)¹

Washington, July 20, 1971

Increasing Emphasis on Young Professionals within Agency Youth Programs

I. At the youth meetings for Mexico-Central America and for East Asia, we discussed the desirability of changing the emphasis of State-USIA youth programs from students to young university graduates who have already taken the first step up their chosen career ladders. At the Singapore and Tokyo conferences there was general support for this idea, with USIS Seoul dissenting. The Mexico-Central America meeting produced no consensus on the question. The policy issues involved are of sufficient importance to merit top-level attention within USIA.

II. Why should we de-emphasize students?

A. Vast numbers of students. World university enrollments have doubled in the past decade and continue to grow at a high rate. It becomes increasingly difficult to single out the real leaders from this student mass.

B. Decline of student organizations. In some countries where student political organizations once existed, the rise of authoritarian regimes has led to their elimination or decay, e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Greece. Talented students thus have fewer structural frameworks within which to demonstrate their leadership potential.

C. Difficulty in predicting a student’s future influence. Students who look good today may fade tomorrow, while today’s obscure student may be tomorrow’s Prime Minister. Unfortunately, we don’t know enough about the probabilities of a student leader becoming a national leader—a substantial research effort on this question would be well worthwhile.

D. Scarcity of USIS resources. Recent reductions in personnel and budget leave us little choice but to narrow the scope of our youth activities. As our resources dwindle, the demands on students’ attention from competing information sources continue to increase.

E. Difficulty in changing student attitudes. Even if potential leaders among students could be accurately identified, it is extraordinarily difficult to achieve significant and lasting modifications in their political attitudes. You can achieve substantial attitude change that is short-lived, e.g., from a visit to the U.S., and you can achieve a modest attitude change that is permanent, e.g., from long-term, in-country exposure to seminars, personal contacts, and high-quality media products. Except for rare cases, you cannot—and we do not—achieve both. Indeed, I believe our dimension of time and resources in influencing students has frequently been way out of line with the return. Why?

1. Influence of environment and reference groups. The political and intellectual climate of universities frequently encourages leftist, anti-establishment and anti-American attitudes. Peer groups of student leaders are often even more radical in their viewpoints; group norms place individual students under considerable pressure to conform in both thought and action. Even if individual students are impressed by USIS efforts, it is almost impossible for them to maintain attitudes which diverge significantly from those of their reference group.

2. Early formation of attitudes. The student program is frequently defended on the grounds that we should reach potential leaders when they are young and thus, presumably, more easily influenced. However, there is considerable evidence, supported both by scholarly research and experience of USIS officers, that a person’s basic value structure is already well formed before he reaches university age. This is true of all persons, whether they go to college or not, but it appears to be especially true of university student leaders. The young activist is often politically-experienced and leftist-oriented at the high school level. One might argue that we should concentrate on secondary school students, but, for reasons noted above, this would be a near-impossible task.

III. In contrast, the potential leader in his late 20’s or 30’s is easier to identify, is usually functioning in a less radical environment, and is often easier to deal with. He may be a leftist, suspicious of the United States. His basic attitudes may be beyond influencing. But this does not mean we cannot program for such people. The key is to establish areas of mutual interest within which the potential leader and USIS have a logical reason to maintain personal and professional contact. If our programs are structured properly, the young professional will view them as directly useful in his career area. Students will often perceive the same program as mere imperialist propaganda. While desirable, it is not imperative for a person to like, or even to understand, the United States in order for us profitably to work with him. America deals every day with governments and political groups that waste little love on us. The practiced goal of our youth program should not be to convert people, but to try to show them where it is in their own interest to work with us—or, at least, to coexist with us.

IV. Overseas posts continually ask for more guidance from Washington on the youth program. I suggest we formulate a policy memo along the above lines and send it to the field with the suggestion that they implement it to the extent local conditions permit.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural and Youth Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 4, EDX 12 Youth Program 1970. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Meyer and Glazer. Sent through Joyce, who did not initial the memorandum. Copies were sent to Inman and Cecere.