Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

140. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 29, 1971

SUBJECT

• USIA Comments on US–USSR Exhibits² Negotiations

With the memorandum at Tab A,³ Frank Shakespeare forwards a copy of his comments to Secretary Rogers on State’s next steps in the US–USSR Exhibits negotiations.

Shakespeare believes that our exhibits in the Soviet Union are a very important instrument of propaganda,⁴ and he suggests that Rogers take a tougher line with the Soviets:

—forcefully remind Dobrynin of our request for high-level Soviet reconsideration of the exhibits issue;⁵ and

—tell Dobrynin for the record that “Soviet refusal to abide by the exhibit portion of the [exchange] agreement will force us to review the value of the agreement itself, and that we [will] consider publicizing the respective positions of the two governments.”

You have already approved State’s next steps and have asked Rogers to keep you posted. While no action is required on the Shakespeare memorandum, you should be aware of his line of argument, which, in my view, has a good deal of force.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. III—1971 [Jan–Dec 1971] [1 of 2]. Confidential. Sent for information. All brackets are in the original. There is no indication that Kissinger saw the memorandum.
2. The joint exhibits were considered a component of the broader U.S.–USSR Exchanges agreement signed in February 1970; see footnote 2, Document 70.
3. Attached but not printed are a June 23 covering note from Shakespeare to Kissinger attached to a June 21 memorandum from Shakespeare to Rogers concerning the exhibits negotiations. In the June 21 memorandum, Shakespeare noted Soviet views of exhibits: “Obviously, the Soviets are aware of the value of the exhibits to us and, conversely, of the limited effect of their own exhibits in the United States. Naturally, they are anxious to curtail the exhibits and limit the agreement to scientific and technical exchanges which are of primary benefit to them.” He continued: “Thus, it is axiomatic that to let the Soviets have scientific exchanges without allowing us to have face-to-face exhibits in the Soviet Union is not in the national interest.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. III—1971 [Jan–Dec 1971] [1 of 2])
4. In the memorandum to Rogers (see footnote 3, above), Shakespeare stated: “I regard exhibits in the Soviet Union along with Radios RFE–RL (and VOA) as our most potent propaganda weapons in Eastern Europe and especially in the Soviet Union. The curiosity of the Soviet peoples about the United States is insatiable and to be able to see and touch products or exhibits produced in the United States seems to add a sense of excitement to the drabness of Soviet life.” (Ibid.)
5. According to Shakespeare, during the course of the negotiations in 1970, Hillenbrand stated that the United States believed that the exhibits component was essential to the broader exchanges agreement. As such, Shakespeare asserted: “It seems to me that unless the Soviets are forcefully reminded of the Hillenbrand statement, we can expect nothing but further breaches of our agreements.” (Ibid.)