Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

124. Memorandum Prepared by the Youth Adviser, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Meyer)¹

Washington, February 1971

SUBJECT

• Worldwide Youth Revolution and What It Means for USIA

There’s a revolution going on in the attitudes and values of the world’s young people. Among other things, the world’s youth are becoming increasingly leftist and anti-American. This has the most serious implications for American foreign policy and for USIA, but, unfortunately, the youth phenomenon is widely misunderstood within the foreign affairs establishment.

What are the causes of this revolution? Where is it going? What, if anything, can we do about it? In seeking answers to these questions, we can start with last summer’s World Youth Assembly—a microcosm of the world youth scene.

BACKGROUND

The first World Youth Assembly met under United Nations auspices in New York, July 9–17, 1970. The general tenor of the meeting was expressed in the WYA’s “Message to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” Among other things, it called for:

—“ending under-development, hunger, misery, racism and illiteracy to assure the free development of each country;”

—“the immediate cessation of American aggression against the Indo-Chinese peoples;”

—“the Soviet Union to immediately withdraw its occupying forces from Czechoslovakia, and to restore full democracy to that country;”

—“an end to any system of neo-colonialist exploitation;”

—“a repudiation of “the bloc politics of the Great Powers;”

—“non-interference in the affairs of other countries;”

Many generalizations may be drawn from the WYA. Among them:

—youth is increasingly impatient for rapid social, political and economic change;

—more and more educated young people are becoming radical leftists;

—U.S. policies are widely opposed; many are hostile to the U.S.;

—America is seen as a status quo, imperialistic nation;

—suspicion of the USSR is common;

—a Third World orientation is gaining ground;

—capitalism has few friends;

—a more responsive, humane form of democratic socialism is being sought by youth of industrialized nations;

—Third World youth is more and more disenchanted with political democracy, tending to favor some form of left-wing dictatorship;

—Marxism is youth’s prevalent language;

—youth from under-developed areas are intensely nationalistic;

—internationalism is becoming popular among youth in developed nations.

WAS IT REPRESENTATIVE?

The WYA is indicative of a clear and growing trend among the politically-aware members of the world’s youth.

It may be argued that students were over-represented at the WYA. But students are the most important sector of world youth. Ex-students are “over-represented” in almost all the institutions that matter—Government, business, universities, etc. As knowledge becomes more crucial to national development, students will be even more over-represented in the future.

It may be argued that the activists are not typical of youth in general. They are atypical only in that they are more committed and more sophisticated. Their attitudes, while often more extreme, are broadly reflective of the thinking of politically-aware young people. The militants’ opinions are not developed in isolation. They stem from the psychological orientation of their generation.

It may be argued that most young persons are interested mainly in personal, day-to-day problems and have few political feelings. This is less true than it was 20 years ago. In the developed nations, the politically-conscious may already be in the majority among the young. The important point is that the young people that count are the concerned ones. They set the tone and provide the impetus for the entire generation. The uninterested person is politically inert. Only those motivated enough to express themselves—whether by voting or by rioting—can influence society. History is made by the activists. The WYA delegates expressed opinions representative of the young activists of the world.

On the other hand, the negative aspect of youth thinking are too often overemphasized, both in the information media and the Government. Most of what went on at the WYA was quite positive. The resolutions expressed the real idealism of youth and their genuine and deep-felt concern for improving world conditions. Most of the sentiments voiced by youth, e.g., for economic development, for self-determination, are completely consistent with American goals and policies. We should not let our differences obscure our real areas of agreement with the world’s young people.

SURVEYS AND POLLS

A variety of opinion studies in various countries suggest that the views expressed at the WYA reflect the present trends in youth—and especially in student—thinking. Among those that can be mentioned:

A poll of Dutch, Swedish, Danish and Finnish university students, sponsored by the Office of Naval Research and concluded in 1969, found that a low of 26.4% in Finland and a high of 45% in the Netherlands answered “yes” to the question, “Is revolution by force better than evolution?” A poll conducted by Der Spiegel in 1968 found that 74% of German university students and 67% of all Germans between 15 and 25 supported the leftist-led student demonstrations in Germany that year.

Professor Robert Arnove, in The Impact of University Social Structure on Student Alienation: A Venezuelan Study (Stanford, 1970), finds that the more talented and self-confident university students “more frequently mention Marxism, Communism or a leftist ideology in general as alternatives to the present political regime.” Attitude studies conducted by Arnove in Venezuela indicate that some 60% of the university students surveyed believe that violence is needed to change the political situation in that country.

THE SCHOLARLY VIEW

A plethora of research by scholars and journalists also finds a leftist, Third World trend to be increasingly significant among youth. Dr. Seymour Martin Lipset, author of several articles and books on student activism,² asserts in a Rand Corporation study that the decline of the cold war is a major reason why “youth on both sides of the curtain are seeking to reform or revolutionize their own societies.” (Rand document D–17567–PR August 7, 1968) Dr. Lipset says that the new political consciousness of youth leads them to oppose any power which they see “as a source of support for the status quo at home and abroad.”

A study conducted in Chile by Professor Myron Glazer in 1964 turned up attitudes typical of university students in developing nations. Dr. Glazer’s poll of Chilean students found that 88% favored either “substantial” reforms or “structural changes” in Chilean society. Only 12% thought that “moderate reforms” were adequate. (Reported in Student Politics in Developing Nations, Praeger, 1968).³

In the light of this and similar studies, no observor of the youth scene can be surprised by the results of the recent Chilean elections.

More straws-in-the-wind: about 80% of the graduate students at the relatively-conservative Cebu branch of the University of the Philippines are “significantly discontented” with the country’s ruling establishment (Asian Survey, October, 1970). Professor Frank Penner in Students in Revolt, states that the political beliefs of German students “diverge radically from those of the average citizen.” He cites polls in the Suddeutche Zeitung, February, 1968, as examples of this attitude gap.

RADICAL TODAY, CONSERVATIVE TOMORROW?

Of course, unorthodox behavior among youth has been common for ages. This disquieting phenomenon is widely discounted on the grounds that “boys will be boys,” and that once young people mature and settle down, they will become “just like everybody else.” Up until ten or twenty years ago this may have been true. But today’s young person is a different breed of cat. The experience of the 1950’s or the 1930’s is no longer a reliable guide to the 1970’s.

Undoubtedly most of today’s youth will become more moderate in the future, as they assume career and family responsibilities. Many, especially the more articulate and dedicated ones, will not. However, the crucial point is this: even if all young people were to become conservative to the same degree as did past generations, most of them will still end up in much more leftist positions than did their fathers. This is so because today’s youth starts from a position so much further to the left, and so much further from adults, than used to be the case. What used to be a generation gap, tolerable and expected, has become for many a generation chasm, intolerable and mystifying. But one has to understand this chasm to understand why youth will not opt for “business as usual” tomorrow. One has to understand it to appreciate the tidal wave of change that is already upon us. Surveying the situation from his position as Director-General of UNESCO, Rene Maheu declares, “The gulf separating young people from adults seems to be growing bigger everyday. This revolt is sweeping across virtually every part of the world; it has taken the form of an open dispute, not only with the university, but with society as a whole.”

Perhaps the leading expert on the youth mentality is Dr. Kenneth Keniston, Yale University psychologist and author of two books⁴ and several articles⁵ on the younger generation. Dr. Keniston was one of the participants in the State Department-sponsored symposium, “Worldwide Youth Unrest—Implications for Foreign Policy,” held in the Washington International Center, February 14, 1970. During the discussions, Dr. Keniston and other participants emphasized that the outlook of tomorrow’s adults is likely to be considerably different from that of the present over-35 generation. He said, “The rate of change is accelerating, not just in this country but all over the world . . . in every country . . . the gap between fathers and sons is not merely the usual fighting that goes on even in a static society, but is a real difference in the life situations in which the sons are growing up . . . There is something really new going on, and it is going to be going on more and more as the rate of socio-economic change accelerates.”

Dr. Lipset, in his Rand study, comments, “It is likely that the current generation of radical university students will continue to affect the larger body politic in many countries ten, twenty and even thirty years from now. Their elites will contain a much larger proportion of liberals or leftists than they now do. This will include many whose image of the United States and its role in the world will be quite different from that of earlier generations.” Dr. Lipset cites as an example studies in Japan which showed that a majority of businessmen under 40 voted for the “pro-Marxist, relatively radical” Japanese Socialist Party. “This more radical elite may not do anything to change the system,” Dr. Lipset comments, “but their beliefs may affect the way they react toward radical pressure on them from other groups, as well as their view of new issues as they occur.”

YOUTH’S NEW WORLDVIEW

The sum of serious research on the situation reveals that today’s youth has a frame of reference, a way of perceiving reality and a psychological make-up that is such that their differences with adults are becoming more and more qualitative rather than quantitative. It used to be that, however great the differences of opinion may have seemed between adults and youth, the disagreements were essentially differences of degree within the same, overall cultural consensus. All shared basic assumptions about the nature of things. The Argentine, the Iranian or the French youth of yesterday may have been in left field and his father in right, but at least they were in the same ball park. Today more and more adults and youth are finding themselves in different ball parks. Differences are increasingly not those of degree within a tacitly-accepted set of social norms, but of kind between mutually-exclusive value systems. These are differences difficult, if not impossible, to resolve with the passage of time, because they are differences in the conception of morality, something that most people regard as non-negotiable.

The causes of these wide qualitative differences in psychological orientation are basic and omnipresent. Psychologists and social scientists long ago determined that a person’s worldview is determined primarily by his early experiences. Dr. Lipset sums it up with “people tend to form a defined frame of reference in late adolescence or early youth within which they fit subsequent experiences. That is, the first formative political experiences are most important.” (Rand document) The world that formed today’s 20-year old, wherever he may be, is a qualitatively different world from the one that formed his father. It is not unusual that the result is a different kind of person. The fathers of today grew up in a world that, for all its superficial changes, was not much different from the world of their fathers. Today’s sons have grown up in a world (the 1960’s) that, in terms of social change, is light-years away from the formative years of their fathers (the 1930’s and 1920’s).

Today’s older generation, as generations have always done, continues to abide by the values it learned in its youth. Dr. Margaret Mead, in her perceptive book, Culture and Commitment,⁶ believes that the present social-psychological dislocation is so great that the older generation must be considered “immigrants” into a modern world that only youth can really understand. “Our thinking still binds us to the past—to the world as it existed in our childhood and youth,” she writes. “Born and bred before the electronic revolution, most of us do not realize what it means.”

THE CHANGING SCENE

Since 1945, several revolutionary developments have helped create this radically-new environment. Briefly noted, they include:

1. Rapid Technological Progress. Ninety percent of the scientists that ever lived are alive today. Much of the world is entering the industrial age. Some of it is entering the post-industrial or, as Zbigniew Brzezinski terms it, the “technotronic age.” Salient in the process is the impact of electronic communications media. The transistor radio in the under-developed world and television in the developed nations have done more than provide new sources of information—they have changed man’s perception of reality. Unlike the over-35 generation, today’s youth are growing up acutely aware of alternative life-styles. As Margaret Mead points out, innovations in technology “inevitably bring about alternations in cultural character.”

2. The Education Explosion. In just six years, 1960–66, the total world school enrollment burgeoned 32%. Between 1960 and 1965, the world total of university students rose 61%. (UNESCO figures) This rapid expansion is continuing at all levels. Education, even of the most elementary kind, is a basic cause of attitude change.

3. The Urban Explosion. Urbanization and value change are closely related. Urban areas in the underdeveloped areas alone have quadrupled in size in 40 years, UNESCO says. Much of this growth has occurred in the large capital cities which are focal points of political and social discontent.

4. Increased Material Wellbeing. Despite the continuing poverty and disease in much of the world, real gains in health and economic prosperity have been registered in many areas. Meanwhile, the industrialized nations have moved into an era of unprecedented affluence.

5. The Combined Effects of the Above Have Led to the Famous “Revolution of Rising Expectations.” It is a basic tenet of social science that the most unstable societies are those undergoing profound changes in value systems. Also, as people get a taste of a better life, they are awakened from complacency and despair and demand more. In the underdeveloped countries this follows a familiar pattern: the cry for economic progress and a voice in Government by those groups that have traditionally been excluded from economic wellbeing and/or political influence. The industrialized countries are experiencing their own brand of rising expectations, and not just from racial and religious minorities. The affluent young now have expectations of realizing the professed ideals of their societies, ideals they feel are widely ignored in practice.

6. Finally, The Bomb. Youth, especially in the advanced nations, are resentful of the continuing threat of nuclear annihilation. With the decline of the cold war, this threat is no longer seen as a necessary evil.

WHAT TO DO?

The first thing we have to realize is that youth unrest will not go away. Rather, all indications are it will spread and intensify. It appears to be an inevitable result of the process of technological and social change, which nobody imagines can be reversed. We may not like youth unrest, but we are going to have to learn to live with it.

The second thing is by now a USIA truism. Whatever we may do, and however well we may do it, USIA by itself cannot hope to divert the main thrust of the world youth movement. Into the total world flood of information, our output is measured from an eye-dropper. This does not mean we can do nothing. It does mean we must avoid unrealistic expectations.

Socialism, anti-Americanism and Third Worldism will dominate world youth thinking for a long time to come. What the effects of this will be in five or ten years is a problem that our highest policymakers may wish to ponder.

In spite of a seemingly-bleak situation, there is much we can do with the middle-of-the-road and even the moderate leftist segment of world youth. Our influence on carefully-chosen target groups can make a difference. But the difference will be largely one of greater understanding and of cultivating a live-and-let-live attitude. We cannot expect that any but a handful of youth will like our system or support our policies. “We cannot expect to make every one our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy,” President Nixon said in his Inaugural Address.⁷ We cannot bring them into our camp. But we can help keep them out of the Russian or Chinese camps.

GENERAL SUGGESTIONS

With these caveats in mind, I offer some general recommendations on USIA youth programming.

1. Concentrate on Areas of Mutual Interest. Everybody’s favorite topic is himself. Students and youth, especially those in underdeveloped areas are so intensely concerned with the problem of their own future and their countries that it is difficult to attract their interest with unrelated matters. A few are curious about the U.S., but this curiosity pales beside their overwhelming, parochial fascination with themselves. All our youth programming should therefore address itself to the first concern of human nature—“What’s in it for me?” Youth will be interested in American policies and American life only so far as they perceive a relevance to their own situation. The overriding interest of youth is the economic and/or political development of their own nations. We should concentrate on relating American policies and the American national experience to this central concern. There is a place for programming and media output that focuses entirely on the U.S., but it is a secondary place. With youth, an indirect approach is better than a frontal assault.

2. Be Honest and Open. Credibility is extremely difficult, and often impossible, for USIA to obtain from young people. The news media show all of America’s warts. Youth, even more than others, react negatively to anything they perceive as a cover-up, distortion or a half-truth. The first hint of an attempt to whitewash America’s problems and whatever hard-won credibility we may have established is gone—often for good. We shouldn’t be ashamed of being less than perfect. Young people are perfectly willing to understand that Americans can commit errors like anybody else, and still be human.

3. Let Controversy Thrive. It attracts interest. It aids credibility. It’s the stuff today’s young people are raised on. Our youth output should jump right into all the touchy issues of the day—campus unrest, drugs, black power, urban violence, U.S. investments overseas, etc. Let’s not suppose young people aren’t aware of these things and have not heard the negative side of the story many times over. The difficulty is that few of them will ever hear our side of the story unless we first gain their attention, respect and at least some credibility by boldly facing up to these questions. It’s well worth giving exposure to problems everybody knows about already in order to give exposure to facts that everybody doesn’t know about.

4. Use the Soft-Sell. You can’t communicate with a suspicious and often hostile audience by flag-waving, tub-thumping and self-congratulation. America has no guaranteed solutions to world problems. Perhaps we should be more humble; certainly we should be more subtle.

5. Maintain High Quality and Intellectual Content. Our youth targets are primarily, if not exclusively, university student leaders, and young intellectuals, politicians and the like. These people are intelligent and often better informed than we realize. If they want anything at all from us, it’s serious and up-to-date information. Dialogue magazine is a good example of a top-quality product for this audience.

6. Use Third Country Examples. Students frequently complain that we talk about ourselves too much. Some may wonder how USIA can do its job without talking about America. With youth, at least, we often can’t do our job if we do talk about America. Many young people are so hostile to us they won’t listen to anything about us. Others are suspicious of USIA output, or bored by it. Many of our policy objectives—promotion of democracy, economic development, international cooperation—can be better advanced by talking about places such as Japan, Sweden, or Australia. The moral of the story may be the same. Only the setting would be different—and more acceptable to many. Likewise, books, films, lectures and articles by non-Americans are often better received than material by Americans. We can achieve our goals without blowing our own horn.

7. Don’t Fight the Third World Trend. Despite all the headaches it will give us, it’s the best thing—probably the only thing—we have going for us among youth. Young people may belabor the U.S., but they are not wild about the Russians either. We should respect this intense nationalism of youth, and recognize it as the biggest force preventing them from embracing the Russians or the Chinese. Respect for Third World sentiment fits in with the Nixon Doctrine⁸ of a lower profile overseas.

Official statements of American policy have frequently declared that we seek a world climate of mutual respect in which other nations may choose any form of government they wish and may develop their own potential as they see fit.

When today’s youth become tomorrow’s leaders, it would be unrealistic not to expect such things as increased criticism of the U.S., nationalization of many American firms abroad, and expanded trade with the Communists from the underdeveloped world. This may make life more difficult for us, but by itself it won’t strike at our most vital interests. Real cause for alarm would be other nations aligning themselves militarily with our potential enemies. Fortunately, this is very unlikely if the Third World movement continues to grow at its present pace.

A SPECIFIC SUGGESTION FOR PROGRAMMING

With the above in mind, I recommend that the Agency establish a program of traveling seminars as the basis of its youth-directed activities. Seminars and similar multi-media workshops are perhaps the most effective tool we have for communicating with young audiences of all kinds. Programs of this type have been successfully used in Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Korea and the Philippines, as well as other posts. They have the advantage of prolonged personal contacts, frank and open dialogue, and in-depth study of problems of mutual concern. Also, a seminar is a vehicle around which other program elements can logically be organized, e.g., educational exchange, book presentations. Top-notch speakers and discussion leaders are the crucial ingredient of a successful seminar. The best books, films and/or exhibits are required. A convenient simultaneous translating arrangement may be needed. Few posts have the resources, time or talent to meet these demands, especially now, with the extensive cuts in personnel and budget. Nonetheless, many posts appear to be interested in offering youth seminars.

A series of circulating seminars might be the answer. We do not expect posts to organize their own ballets, string quartets or basketball teams. The Cultural Presentations program sends these groups out, and posts stage them. Why could not youth seminars be presented in the same way? A seminar could be put together on a topic of wide interest, such as economic development. This could be used by different posts with minor local adaptations. It would feature the best speakers and supporting material available. This approach would have several advantages. It would allow seminars to be presented at posts that are not able to mount their own. It would assure a high-quality product, avoid duplication of effort between posts and save money by spreading costs over a wider area.

A FOLLOW-UP ON TWO PERSISTENT QUESTIONS

The views offered above have been the subject of considerable debate within the Agency over past weeks. I would like to try to give more complete answers to the two questions that have been raised most frequently.

“Even if there is a leftist, anti-American trend among world youth, isn’t it just a fad? Won’t they see things differently when they grow older?”

This assumption is based on social and political conditions that existed prior to 1950. The world milieu has changed so radically since then that it is no longer a reliable prediction. I believe that most leftist students will retain most of their dissident attitudes as they grow older. To appreciate this, we must first identify the causes of the profound attitude changes among youth. Then we must ask if these causes will continue to operate in the future. If they do, it is reasonable to predict that the development of new attitude structures will continue and spread in years to come.

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

The basic, ultimate cause of worldwide youth unrest is rapid technological change. Technology affects man’s attitudes both directly and indirectly. It is the main force leading to such phenomena as increased urbanization, spreading mass education and prosperity. These developments are supported by technology, and, in an unending circle, also stimulate more and more advances in technology as time goes by.

All of this should be no surprise. Technology has been a root cause of social change throughout history. Inventions such as the steam engine and the spinning jenny contributed to the Industrial Revolution, which radically altered the environment, changed man’s conception of himself and society, sundered traditional political relationships and provoked an ongoing generation gap. These changes took place over a 150-year period. Nonetheless, they produced tremendous social upheavals and frequent violence.

The technological changes behind today’s attitudinal revolution occurred largely in the last 25 years. This speed-up of change is exemplified by the decreasing time lag between scientific discoveries and their practical applications—for photography it was 112 years; radio, 35 years; the A-bomb, six years; the solar battery, two years. Zbigniew Brzezinski says that “men living in the developed world will undergo during the next several decades a mutation potentially as basic as that experienced through the slow process of evolution from animal to human experience. The difference, however, is that the process will be telescoped in time—and hence the shock effect of the change may be quite profound.”

GENERATION GAP

Accelerated change greatly widens the generation gap because it affects young people, especially students, much more than older persons. Young people are the barometers of the times. As Prof. Robert Jay Lifton says in Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism,⁹ “. . . youth groups represent a human vanguard in the sense that they are the first and most intense indicators of the kinds of psychological experience and identity shift which will occur subsequently in adult populations throughout a particular society.”

Those under 30 have experienced only one social and political age, the post-1945 era. Naturally enough, their attitudes are a response to their perceptions of this modern epoch. Student attitudes are even more responsive to the times than those of non-students because education widens one’s perceptions of and receptivity to contemporary developments.

Older persons, on the other hand, have experienced two ages, the present and the pre-1945 past. Their attitudes were shaped in an era that was, in many ways, radically different from today. Experiences of childhood and teenage years are the most important as far as value development is concerned. For most people, these early, formative experiences serve as perception filters, shielding their attitude structure from the disruptive effects of subsequent social change. Prof. Cyril Black, in The Dynamics of Modernization,¹⁰ says, “People tend to cling tightly to the traditional way of doing things, identifying their personal security with the culture with which they were indoctrinated in childhood.” Thus, most older persons have been psychologically unable to adjust their world view to respond to the new world environment, for to do so would threaten the whole moral and ideological foundation upon which they have built their lives. The result, as Raymond Aron notes, is that we now have “a generation whose perception of the world is in many respects radically different from that of the preceding generation.”

FORCES OF CHANGE

What are some of the broad social forces generated by technological change?

1. Urbanization. The cities of the developing nations are growing at a rate that will double their population in 11 years. The number of cities with more than a million persons has doubled (to 90) in the past 25 years. Within the next 20 years, 75% of the world’s people will live in urban areas. Most of this growth is due to internal migration. Studies by Samuel Huntington, Irving Horowitz and others show how the urban environment nurtures radicalism and dissent, especially among the young, by disrupting traditional attitude patterns developed in rural settings.

2. Communications. Traditional belief systems have begun to crumble before the onslaught of electronic communications media. The number of radios increased 88%, and television sets, 257%, in Brazil from 1958 to 1966. In India comparable figures for the same period were 316% and 900%. Other countries show similar increases.

During the reign of print media, information dissemination was greatly limited by illiteracy and geography. Also, reading a newspaper is a less dramatic experience than watching television. Thus it was easier for people to be ignorant of, or emotionally detached from, current events. Today, TV and radio help young people break through the limits of parochial experience to discover the possibilities of new modes of existence. This causes intense dissatisfaction with the status quo and impels a search for radical solutions.

3. Education. India’s primary school enrollment jumped from 18.5 million in 1951 to 51.5 million in 1966. France’s university population, climbed 174% between 1958 and 1965. World university enrollment has risen 100% since 1960. Such figures suggest the dimensions of the recent educational explosion.

As Dr. Lipset and others point out (see Youth and Leadership in the Developing Nations, report of Foreign Area Research Coordination Group, Sept., 1967), increasing mass education is highly correlated with political instability, leftism and anti-Americanism. Dr. Arnove, in the study cited above, says, “Intense student involvement in the problems of a developing country also is likely to lead to more radical political sympathies.”

Professors David Abernathy and Trevor Coombe (“Education and Politics in Developing Countries,” Harvard Educational Review, Summer, 1965) say, “The expansion of education contributes directly towards instability because it generates demands upon the political system which that system is unable to meet.” Brzezinski notes the same problem in Between Two Ages.¹¹ Dr. Huntington, in Political Order in Changing Societies,¹² cites a recent study of 70 nations where the correlation between the rate of increase in primary enrollment and political instability was .61. He concludes, “The faster the enlightenment of the population, the more frequent the overthrow of the government.”

4. Material progress or the possibility of it. When your material needs are satisfied, you can afford to denounce materialism. Many young people in the industrialized countries have known nothing but prosperity. They are in the fortunate position of being able to concern themselves with questions that go beyond society’s material requirements into the realm of social ethnics and the quality of man’s existence. In a seeming paradox, their values have been made possible by technologically-induced prosperity, yet they challenge the way prosperity has been created and used in advanced societies.

Brzezinski says, “Now, for the first time in recorded history, man is beginning—though just beginning—to liberate himself from the oppressive struggle to survive as a physical being. This has prompted a renewed concern with the more elusive, spiritual aspects of existence; it has also created a state of agitation; in which systematic dialogue increasingly breaks down because of the lack of shared assumptions.”

In the underdeveloped countries, however, the possibilities of progress are widely perceived but little realized. However, enough progress has been made so that poverty is no longer stoically accepted as inevitable. The gap between rising expectations and brutal reality is a leading cause of radicalism. As Brzezinski says, modernization in traditional societies “both lays the ground work for well-being and stability and enhances the forces working for instability and revolution.”

5. Decline of Cold War. In addition to the impact of technology, lessening cold war tensions have been a factor in youth unrest, especially in Europe. Societies that feel threatened tend to draw together. They value conformity, overlook social ills and indulge in self-congratulation on the grounds that dissent weakens the society vis-à-vis the enemy. When outside challenges seem less dangerous, societies become less defensive of their shortcomings. Social and intellectual diversity set in. Domestic concerns regain priority. Young people respond to these changes more quickly than do older persons. As a result, they become dissatisfied with public policies and attitudes derived from the cold war milieu.

THE PERMANENCE OF THE NEW WORLD VIEW

The aforementioned social forces form a chain of directly related causes and effects. Technology leads to increased urbanization, mass communications, mass education and material progress. In turn these developments stimulate more and newer technology. They also bring about the formation of new attitude patterns which collide with traditional values and institutions.

The slowness of institutional change breeds political radicalism. Lagging development causes old-style leftism in the Third World, while widespread prosperity contributes to New Leftism in the industrialized nations. Both leftisms develop into cultural and political anti-Americanism because the United States is widely perceived by young people to be an energetic supporter of the world status quo.

Student and youth unrest will continue and spread in coming years because the social forces that cause it will continue and spread. More important for the future of American foreign policy, as the dissatisfied young grow older, they will maintain most of their dissenting attitudes. This is not only because the disgruntled young are more numerous and more radical than they used to be—though they certainly will derive sustenance from their numbers and the intensity of their beliefs. It is because the social conditions that caused youthful attitude changes will be continually available in the future to support and reinforce this new world view.

Today’s young rebels were nurtured in an environment created by technology. Despite the modifying effects of family and career responsibilities—not to mention hostile mainstream cultures—these new attitudes will be largely sustained by a world environment that will be even more technologically influenced in the future.

This contrasts sharply with the situation of 30 years ago, which is frequently and erroneously cited as an example of how today’s radicals will become conservative with age. In the industrialized countries, yesterday’s radicals were mostly products of the Depression. Their radicalism was mostly concerned with material conditions. By and large, their basic values were not too different from those of the mainstream culture. They wanted to restore prosperity and gain a more equitable distribution of wealth and political power, usually through a statist approach. It was generally assumed that any philosophical problems of alienation and identity would automatically be resolved if “economic man” was taken care of. Their radicalism was essentially one-dimensional and, in many cases, only skin deep. When the economic crisis ended, so did most radicalism. Today, however, the causes of youthful radicalism are not going to disappear. While the Depression was a shortlived exception to the main tide of events, the cause of today’s radicalism is the main tide of events.

In the Third World, yesterday’s radicals were scarce. Such as existed were products of isolated, modern enclaves such as universities, or of experience in alien, modern countries. Both situations were exceptions to the mainstream of their native societies, which were still traditional and as yet little affected by the broad impact of technology. It was difficult for attitudes born of advanced societies to flourish in such an environment. Youthful radicals easily reverted to traditional value patterns after leaving school or returning home from overseas. Today, the underdeveloped world is changing so rapidly that old values are in disarray. The old cultures are strong enough to conflict violently with the new attitudes, but not strong enough to stifle them. As the pace of change quickens in the Third World, traditional cultures will continue to weaken and the new environment will offer increasing support for radical viewpoints.

In short, yesterday’s radicalism, whether in the developed or underdeveloped world, was largely caused by situations that were exceptions to the rule. Today’s radicalism is caused by events that are, and will continue to be, the rule.

“Even if radical new attitudes persist, only a minority maintains such views. Aren’t we paying too much attention to it?”

History is strewn with the wreckage of social systems that were threatened by minorities. If conditions are right and their ideas are attractive enough, such minorities can become the predominant influence in society. The tide of events indicate that this will happen in many countries in the not-too-distant future.

In the Third World, radical and anti-American viewpoints are becoming common among all urban youth, regardless of their educational level. Such attitudes are more frequent, of course, among better educated young persons. In the industrialized nations these views are largely, but by no means, entirely, confined to the small university-educated elite. In all nations, the revolution in youth attitudes is taking place most rapidly among university students.

When one talks of minorities, it must be remembered that the college-educated is the single most important minority in many societies. The tide of events makes this educated elite even more important as time goes by. This is because, as nations modernize and develop, knowledge in all its forms becomes increasingly important as the fuel for still further social and economic progress. The university becomes more and more indispensable as a source of innovation. Consequently, those persons who develop and use knowledge become more influential. Knowledge increasingly becomes the basis for social and political power. Traditional sources of power—money, ascriptive status, religion, repression—decline in relative significance.

Brzezinski points out that, as societies become more advanced, political leadership is increasingly permeated “by individuals possessing special skills and intellectual talents. Knowledge becomes a tool of power and the effective mobilization of talent an important way to acquire power.”

In his introduction to the multi-national student survey sponsored by the Office of Naval Research in 1968, Prof. John Raser says there is considerable empirical evidence to indicate that the students he surveyed will play key social and political roles in their respective countries in the future. He also says the attitudes of these students are stable enough so that they will be “much the same” in the future. Partial results of this survey are noted earlier in this study.

In short, the tremendous importance of this educated minority resides in the fact that, to an even greater degree than in the past, it will supply the power wielders of tomorrow.

WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

The youth revolution raises important—even frightening—questions about the future of American foreign relations. Specifically, it raises fundamental questions about USIA’s raison d’etre in a rapidly-changing world. Brzezinski believes that our overseas representatives must be “capable of serving as creative interpreters of the new age, willing to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the host intellectual community, and concerned with promoting the widest possible dissemination of available knowledge.”

In The Great Ascent,¹³ Robert Heilbroner puts it more bluntly: “If America wishes to make its counsels heard among the revolutionary elites, its spokesmen must speak the words that answer their questions.”

Do we answer their questions, or do we talk to ourselves?

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Subject Files of Assistant Secretary John Richardson, 1968–1976, Lots 76D186 and 78D184, Entry P–242, Box 2, Youth Affairs 1971. No classification marking. Addressed to “Agency Young Officers.” Richardson initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. Presumable reference to Seymour Martin Lipset and Sheldon S. Wolin, The Berkeley Student Revolt: Facts and Interpretations, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1965; Seymour Martin Lipset and Philip G. Altbach, Students in Revolt, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968; and Student Politics, New York: Basic Books, 1967.
3. Reference is to Donald K. Emmerson, ed., Students and Politics in Developing Nations, New York: Praeger, 1968.
4. Presumable reference to The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society, New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1965, and Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth, New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1968.
5. See, for example, “Youth: A New Stage of Life,” The American Scholar, vol. 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1970), pp. 631–654 and “Youth, Change, and Violence,” The American Scholar, vol. 37, no. 2 (Spring 1968), pp. 227–245.
6. Culture and Commitment: A Study of the Generation Gap, New York: Doubleday (Natural History Press, published for the American Museum of Natural History), 1970.
7. The full text of Nixon’s address is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 3–4.
8. See footnote 3, Document 65.
9. Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of “Brainwashing” in China, New York: Norton, 1961.
10. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History, New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
11. Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era, New York: The Viking Press, 1970.
12. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.
13. The Great Ascent: The Struggle for Economic Development in Our Time, New York: Harper & Row, 1963.