Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

100. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 3, 1970

I request that, effective immediately, the USIA Director attend all meetings of WSAG dealing with SE Asia, particularly Cambodia.

The USIA chairs the SE Asia PSYOPS Committee of the USG.² This afternoon the committee had an extensive discussion on the steps necessary to promptly provide the GOC with an effective national radio communications system. Several matters arose in which a deep and direct knowledge of USG policy was necessary to proper evaluation. I found myself uncertain, as has occurred on previous occasions, because my understanding of all the policy considerations involved is too sketchy. This is unsuitable from the point of view of direction of the committee for this Agency and unacceptable to me.

If it is not convenient for you to have the USIA Director participate in WSAG meetings, I respectfully request that our responsibilities relating to the PSYOPS program for SE Asia be transferred to a USG agency which does participate.

I understand the next WSAG meeting is Tuesday afternoon (August 4.)³ The subject is Cambodia. May I attend?

Frank Shakespeare⁴

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970] [2 of 2]. Eyes Only. Kissinger wrote “Nonsense HK” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. National Security Decision Memorandum 63, “Psychological Warfare Operations Against the Vietnamese Communists,” issued on June 2, called for the establishment of the Ad Hoc PSYOP Committee, chaired by a “senior representative” of USIA appointed by Shakespeare, in order to develop a “National Psychological Warfare strategy.” It is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 315.
3. For the summary of conclusions of the August 4 WSAG meeting, which took place in the White House Situation Room from 5:10 to 6:45 p.m., see ibid., vol. VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 7. According to the Summary of Conclusions, Shakespeare did not attend the meeting. In a September 11 memorandum to Kissinger, Shakespeare inquired: “Has a decision been reached concerning participation by USIA on WSAG?” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–December 14, 1970] [1 of 2] Under an October 5 memorandum to Kissinger, Richard Kennedy forwarded a copy of Shakespeare’s memorandum and a draft memorandum from Kissinger to Shakespeare. In his memorandum, Kennedy explained that Shakespeare “will be consulted in matters affecting his agency or when his agency is in a position to make a contribution to the on-going effort.” (Ibid.) Haig sent copies of these three memoranda to Kissinger under an October 5 note, stating that it “would be of benefit” to include Shakespeare or Loomis at WSAG meetings focused on crisis management, adding: “Also, recognizing that most of the WSAG deliberations are none of USIA’s business, I nonetheless believe that Shakespeare’s attendance only in an observer status during crisis management periods would be of some value since he can be generally expected to follow your lead.” (Ibid.) Kissinger wrote on Haig’s note: “Let me talk to him. HK.”
4. Shakespeare initialed “FS” above this typed signature.