Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

51. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, September 19, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee to examine U.S. effectiveness in propaganda-political warfare

1. In the course of the meeting of the Berlin Steering Group on August 17, 1961,² you directed the following to examine United States effectiveness in the field of propaganda-political warfare: Mr. Robert Kennedy, a representative of the State Department (Mr. Alexis Johnson was later designated), Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Edward Murrow and General Taylor. The members of this ad hoc committee have since met on several occasions and have consulted among themselves and with government officials and individuals with competence in this field. We have reached the following conclusions and recommendations.³

2. We believe the United States has very considerable resources for waging effective propaganda-political warfare. As we use this phrase, it refers to the whole range of activities designed to influence the attitudes of peoples on the great issues of the day and to stimulate public support and the active support of public and private individuals and organizations throughout the world for the U.S. position on these issues. The resources our country can use in this contest are dispersed in many places—in the executive departments of the Government, in our embassies abroad, and in many private organizations at home and abroad. This dispersion makes centralized direction difficult—indeed, there is no single agency short of the President with authority to direct all these elements. The committee found that this condition makes it difficult if not impossible to determine how well or badly we are doing in the propaganda-political warfare field. Views as to our effectiveness differ somewhat among the members of the committee, but we are unanimous in feeling that the United States must do better and that to do better there is need for more centralized direction and responsibility at the Washington level.

3. We make the following recommendations which have the concurrence of the Secretary of State:

a. That the Secretary of State appoint a Special Assistant for Special Projects (the title is tentative) to give full time to the coordination and overall supervision of all United States resources in the propaganda-political warfare field.

b. That the Secretary of State call upon the other federal agencies with a capability in this field to contribute a senior official to form an interdepartmental task force to work under the Special Assistant.

c. That, as an early step, the Special Assistant review United States results in exploiting the Soviet action in sealing off West Berlin and comment on the adequacy of these results.

d. That the President approve the foregoing recommendations and refer this paper to the Secretary of State for implementation.⁴

Maxwell D. Taylor⁵

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/9–2861. Confidential. The copy of the memorandum printed here is attached to a September 28 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Bowles, in which Johnson noted Bowles’ September 28 meeting with Cater regarding the proposed position of Special Assistant to the Secretary for Special Projects.
2. The record of the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Document 118.
3. In a September 11 memorandum to Rusk, Johnson reported that at the Ad Hoc Committee’s meeting that day, “It was left that General Taylor is going to report our views to the President and that, if the President is inclined to consider any procedure other than a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, he will recommend that the President discuss the matter with you. The formula of another Under Secretary of State was also discussed. I, of course, opposed, pointing out that, in addition to the problem of the multiplicity of Under Secretaries, this would require legislation and inevitable delays.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/9–1161)
4. In a September 20 memorandum to Rusk, Johnson stated that he had “approved,” at that day’s Committee meeting, the recommendations contained in Taylor’s memorandum to the President. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/9–2061)
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.