[Untitled]
Washington , November 30, 1901 .
Sir: In July, 1900, when the antiforeign uprising in China had cut the Government off from communication with our minister at Peking, and it was deemed of great importance that the general condition of affairs in that country should be promptly reported on and the bearing of events on American interests exactly determined, the President was pleased to appoint me commissioner of the United States to China.
[Page 4]I reached Shanghai on the 29th of August and proceeded at once to Peking, where I discussed with our minister, Mr. Conger, the situation and the steps he proposed taking to hasten the restoration of order and for the protection of American persons and property, and I was pleased to be able to report to you that I fully concurred with him in all the measures he had been and was advocating.
After a brief stay at Peking I returned to Shanghai and then visited the Viceroy Liu K’un-yi at Nanking, and later the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung at Wu-chang, for the purpose of thanking them, in the name of the United States, for the perfect manner in which they and the other viceroys had maintained peace, and the friendly spirit they and their provincial administrations were showing foreigners during these troublesome times. I wished also to ascertain their views on the question of the restoration of order and the return of His Majesty the Emperor to Peking. The courteous and friendly receptions given me by the two viceroys, and the personal relations which I was thus so fortunate as to establish, and which were kept up during the remainder of my mission in China, did not a little, I think, in the interest of peace and the common benefit of the two countries.
After returning to Shanghai and conferring with the various American commercial and missionary bodies there, I left again for Peking, where you had directed me to proceed to act as counselor and adviser of the American minister in the negotiations then begun. I discharged this duty, and, I am pleased to say, always in perfect harmony with our minister, until the 23d of February of this year, when Mr. Conger, having obtained from you leave of absence with permission to visit the United States, I was appointed by the President, under telegraphic instructions from you, plenipotentiary to continue the negotiations on the part of the United States. In this capacity I acted until September 7, when the Final Protocol, embodying the results of the negotiations between the various powers and China, was signed. I then left for the United States and arrived at Washington on October 23.
The different phases of the negotiations between the powers and China, which extended over a period of about fourteen months, are shown in detail in the correspondence of Mr. Conger and myself with the Department and also in the printed minutes of the various meetings of the conference at Peking. With these before you I shall not go over these questions again. I shall confine myself to summarizing the work of the United States in the conference.
The circular note which you telegraphed on July 3, 1900, to our embassies in Europe and to our missions in Vienna, Brussels, Madrid, Tokyo, The Hague, and Lisbon defined the policy then already adopted by the United States in the settlement of affairs in China and from which they never departed. Bearing these instructions always in mind, the task of the agents of our Government in Peking was a comparatively easy one. Throughout the negotiations our object was to use the influence of our Government in the interest of justice and moderation and in a spirit of equal friendship to the powers negotiating jointly with us and the Chinese nation.
The twelve demands made by the powers on China, the accomplishment of which was deemed necessary for the restoration of normal relations with that country and which were embodied in the joint note of December 22, 1900, may be classified under four principal heads: (1) Adequate punishment for the authors of and those guilty of actual [Page 5] participation in the antiforeign massacres and riots; (2) the adoption of measures necessary to prevent their recurrence; (3) the indemnification for losses sustained by States and foreigners through these riots; and (4) the improvement of our relations, both official and commercial, with the Chinese Government and with China generally.
As regards the punishment of the responsible authors and actual perpetrators of the antiforeign outrages, the Government of the United States, while insisting that all such should be held to the utmost accountability, declined to determine in every case the nature of the punishment to be inflicted, and maintained that the Chinese Government itself should in all cases carry them out.
As soon as the chief culprits had been punished, considering the terrible losses in life and property sustained by China, not only through the Boxers and their adherents, but by the destruction of Tientsin, Peking, and the military occupation of a large portion of the Province of Chih-li, the United States threw the weight of its influence on the side of moderation and the prevention of further bloodshed. To this it was mainly due that the long lists of proscription, which had been prepared by the representatives of the powers, of Chinese in the provinces charged with participation in the massacres or riots, were repeatedly revised before presentation to the Chinese Government. The demands for capital punishment were finally reduced from ten to four and many names erroneously or on insufficient evidence placed on the lists were removed, or lighter forms of punishment asked for numbers of those left on them.
While seeking with the other powers the best means to prevent the recurrence of such troubles and to guard the future American residents in Peking from such dangers as they had passed through, the United States did not lend its support to any plan which contemplated either the prolonged occupation by foreign troops of any portions or points in China or the erection of an international fort in the city of Peking from which to carry on friendly relations with the Chinese Government. Our policy has always been in favor of a strong, independent, and responsible Chinese Government, which can and will be held accountable for the maintenance of order and the protection of our citizens and their rights under the treaties. Throughout the negotiations we strictly adhered to this just principle, with results which have proved beneficial to all.
As regards the third point of the negotiations, the equitable indemnification of the various states for the losses and expenses incurred by them in China and in sending expeditionary forces to relieve the legations and foreign residents at Peking and restore order, and also the securing of indemnities to societies, companies, and individuals for their private losses through the antiforeign riots, the Government of the United States advocated that the sum total of these indemnities should not exceed a reasonable amount, well within the power of China to pay. After careful inquiry you reached the conclusion that with her present resources and liabilities, China could not pay as indemnities to the powers more than two hundred millions of dollars, and that the exaction of any larger amount would not only entail permanent financial embarrassment on the country, but might possibly result in either international financial control or even loss of territory. The representative of the United States was instructed accordingly, and he was further told that in the opinion of our Government the amount [Page 6] should be asked of China by the powers jointly, without detail or explanation, and afterwards divided among them, according to their losses and disbursements. You also stated that every facility of payment should be accorded China, and that the debt should be paid by bonds issued at par and bearing 3 per cent interest and running for thirty or forty years.
Though it became necessary, after protracted discussion in the conference, to accept the proposition of the other powers to demand of China the sum total of their losses and disbursements, reaching the enormous sum of $333,000,000, our insistance in pressing for a much lower sum, and the weight of the arguments adduced in favor of such a policy, resulted in closing the indemnities at the above lump sum, when they bid fair to go on swelling indefinitely. This, and the acceptance of your suggestion that the indemnities be paid in bonds issued at par and bearing a low rate of interest (4 per cent was finally agreed upon) and running for forty years, resulted in saving a vast sum to China, hastened the evacuation of the country by the expeditionary forces and the restoration of order and of normal relations with the Chinese Government.
In connection with the question of the indemnity, I should particularly mention that, it having been proved necessary to the powers in their search for revenues applicable to the service of the indemnity debt that the existing nominal 5 per cent ad valorem customs tariff on foreign imports should be made an effective 5 per cent ad valorem, the United States, mindful of the furtherance of lawful commerce in China in the interests of the world, and believing that no opportunity should be lost to secure to foreign trade all the facilities its vast importance entitles it to, and that any additional tax on trade should be met by commercial compensations on the part of China of equal value, declined to consent to the above increase of the customs tariff on imports unless (1) all the treaty powers and China agreed to cooperate in the long desired improvement of the water approaches to Shanghai and Tientsin, and (2) that specific duties should be substituted to the present ad valorem ones in the tariff on foreign imports. Both of these conditions were ultimately agreed upon.
No divergence of views existed fortunately between the representatives the powers on the question of improving the channels of direct communication between them and the Chinese Government. The long vexed question of the ceremonial to be observed in the public audiences granted by the Emperor of China to foreign representatives was finally settled by the plenipotentiaries on lines perfectly satisfactory to all parties to the negotiations. The Tsungli Yamen, or bureau of foreign affairs, which the experience of forty years had shown Chinese and foreigners alike was unwieldly and incapable of discharging the duties devolving upon it, was altered in the way suggested by the conference, changed into a responsible ministry of foreign affairs, and organized on lines similar to those adopted in every other country of the world.
Such, in brief, has been the part played by the United States in the conference of Peking. While we maintained complete independence, we were able to act harmoniously in the concert or powers, the existence of which was so essential to a prompt and peaceful settlement of the situation, we retained the friendship of all the negotiating powers, exerted a salutary influence in the cause of moderation, humanity, and justice, secured adequate reparation for wrongs done our citizens, [Page 7] guaranties for their future protection, and labored successfully in the interests of the whole world in the cause of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Commissioner of the United States to China
Hon. John Hay,
Secretary
of State Washington.