No. 56.
Mr. Bayard
to Mr. Gresham.
London, May 28, 1894. (Received June 7.)
Sir: On the 9th instant I had the honor to receive your instruction dated April 30, in relation to the incident at Bluefields, transmitting the report of Captain Watson, commanding U. S. S. San Francisco, to the [Page 95] Secretary of the Navy, dated April 16, and accompanied by copies of sundry proclamations and documents issued at Bluefields variously during the period covered by the report.
With the foregoing papers I also beg to acknowledge the precis of the documentary history of the events at Bluefields, now under consideration, which had been prepared at the State Department, and styled “Mosquito Territory, course of events, 1894.”
* * * * * * *
When Lord Kimberly returned to London on Tuesday, the 22d instant, he promptly accorded me an interview, which was one of frank and friendly interchange of views in relation to the Bluefields incident, and the position occupied by Her Majesty’s Gov eminent in relation to Nicaragua and the Mosquito Reservation.
On leaving the foreign office I telegraphed you the purport of all that he said, and of that telegram I have now the honor to inclose herewith a deciphered copy.
Lord Kimberly gave me clearly to understand that Great Britain was contemplating no extension of her influence in Nicaraguan territory nor any violation whatever of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, which his Government continues to recognize as extant and in full force.
I pointed out to him the changes wrought by the lapse of time and progress of immigration into Bluefields and Nicaragua since that treaty was made, under which a new population had gathered there, composed of Americans, English, Germans, Jamaica negroes, and others who, and whose property interests, were not in existence in January, 1860, when the treaty of Managua between Great Britain and Nicaragua was framed, under which the sovereignty of Nicaragua over the reservation of the Mosquito Indians was fully and distinctly stipulated, with certain qualifications; but the renunciation of any protectorate by Great Britain over the Mosquito Indians and their territory was clear, distinct, and unquestionable.
I did not consider it opportune to refer to the very questionable propriety or right of submitting the treaty of Managua, of January, 1860—an instrument dealing wholly with Central American jurisdiction and, interests, which were also manifestly within the purview and scope of the anterior Clayton-Bulwer treaty—to the arbitrament of a European power (Austria) without notice to the United States, or inviting that power to come into the consultation respecting interests which were the subject-matter of existing treaty stipulations between Great Britain and the United States; and not being a party to any such arbitration, the United States were in no way bound to the award.
I preferred, upon the broad but well-defined provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, to treat all British protectorates in Central America as long since at an end, and never to be renewed in any shape, form, or degree.
I also drew his lordship’s attention to the fact that, in the history of this last incident of disorder at Bluefields, which led to the landing of an armed British force, no question as to the right of the Mosquito Indians being governed by their own customs and regulations, as established in their reservation, seemed to have arisen; and yet it was to such “customs and regulations” alone that any shadowy remnant of a guaranty on the part of Great Britain could possibly be argued or suggested.
And such a guaranty, or right of its enforcement, was not admitted by the United States, but, on the contrary, was held by them to be [Page 96] inconsistent and at variance with the engagements of Great Britain, under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
The assumption of the British consul to become a signatory to a protocol or provisional agreement of a political and commercial nature between the Mosquito territory and Nicaragua was a cause of surprise to the United States and apparently inconsistent with our conventional understanding (1850) with Great Britain.
To this his lordship replied that the British consul had acted without instructions, and that it was to be assumed that nothing but instant peril to the life, and property of English and other residents induced him, as a kind of modus vivendi, to tide over a crisis, and by some method peaceably to allay disorders and procure some settlement.
His lordship further expressed a strong desire to learn what the United States Government considered it advisable should be done in the present status of affairs at Bluefields.
He said the United States are, as it were, “on the spot,” and being better informed could better judge what line of action was necessary to produce requisite and reasonable security for persons and property in that region.
He appeared to be disposed to follow in the line which should be approved and adopted by the United States, so that a coincidence of view and action should be arrived at by the United States and Great Britain.
Our conversation was wholly verbal, with occasional references to the treaty of Managua, and some telegrams on the subject.
I believe I may fairly say that, in this conversation, Lord Kimberley desired me to understand that the interposition and interference by British officials, civil or naval, in the Bluefields incident—whatever it may have been—was merely to keep the peace in a semicivilized region, where law was displaced and disregarded, and for the purpose of securing order and safety to the lives of peaceable residents of British, and also of other nationalities, who all joined in asking for protection from violence, in the shape of truculent and undisciplined troops claiming authority from Nicaragua.
His lordship incidentally mentioned (as I had previously done) the interest felt in the United States on the subject of the proposed inter-oceanic canal, and recognized, with apparent approval, the increased interest naturally felt in the region of the contemplated work, owing to the large investments of capital, present and prospective, and said the condition of affairs was no doubt much better understood in the United States than in Great Britain, and that his Government was desirous of knowing the opinion to which the former Government might come in order that Great Britain might be better prepared to act in line with them.
The interview was frank and full on both sides, and we agreed that in the present status such mode of treatment of the matter was the most expedient.
There is no doubt in my mind that Great Britain has no desire to have the Clayton-Bulwer treaty abrogated, nor to do anything inconsistent with its provisions, nor to extend their influence in any way in the region of country or transactions to which that instrument has relation, nor to interfere in any way with the plans or works of the United States in relation to the projected canal. They do not desire to have any but the most friendly and mutually accommodating relations with the United States, so that I believe we shall find this Government prepared to lend a ready ear and to entertain in an accommodating [Page 97] spirit any proposals which it may be the desire of the United States to present for their consideration. Indeed, Lord Kimberley told me the British ambassador in Washington had been instructed in this sense.
I have, etc.,