Mr. Hall to Mr. Bayard.
Guatemala, June 26, 1885. (Received July 16.)
Sir: In my dispatch No. 373, of the 12th instant, I informed you that I should leave the next day for La Libertad, for the purpose of communicating with you by cable in regard to the state of affairs in Salvador. The steamer in which I took passage was detained at San Jose until the night of the 15th; it was also detained a full day at Acajutla; in consequence, I did not arrive at La Libertad until the morning of the 17th instant. From that place I cabled to you the following:
Arrived to-day with the object of ascertaining the state of affairs in Salvador, and to communicate to you.
Telegraphic communication with Guatemala interrupted since 15th May. The belligerents are of about equal strength; recent engagements are in favor of insurgents. Nicaragua sends forces to the aid of the Salvadorian Government, without notifying the other Central American States, in consequence of which Guatemala has placed 4,000 men on the Salvadorian frontier, thereby causing imminent danger of a general war. My opinion is that your instructions to me to promote peace, if possible, will be of great service.
At La Libertad I learned that a few days before there had been a severe battle at a place called Cojutepeque, which resulted in the defeat and surrender of the Government forces; the defeat also at the same time, and near the same place, of some 600 Nicaraguan troops and their forced retreat towards La Union.
I left La Libertad at noon of the 17th, and reached the capital, San Salvador, in the evening of the same day. Here I learned that General Figueroa, ex-President Zaldivar’s successor, had resigned and turned over the executive office, to Señor Rosales, the third designated substitute for the Presidency, General Figueroa retaining the command of the army. I called on them the following morning, the 18th, and was very cordially received. Up to that time no definite advances had been made towards an arrangement with the revolutionary chief, General Menendez, who it was known was hourly gaining strength and prestige [Page 131] throughout the county in virtue of his recent successes, public opinion being also decidedly in his favor.
Anticipating your instructions, asked for in any above-mentioned telegram, I offered President Rosales and General Figueroa my best offices to bring about an arrangement with General Menendez and a restoration of peace to that distracted country, to be used in any way they might deem most conducive to that end. They expressed their appreciation of my offer, promising to advise me later in what way my mediation might be most effective. Within an hour after this interview the Nicaraguan commissioner called on me in their behalf and suggested that I should offer my mediation to General Menendez. I accordingly addressed him a telegram recommending, in the name of my Government, that he should enter into an arrangement with the Government of Señor Rosales that would put an end to the state of war which was causing such injuries to all interests, national and foreign, in Central America. I informed him of the good intentions of President Rosales, and assured him that my Government would be glad to learn that an honorable settlement had been attained, and, further, that I was authorized to express the same sentiments in behalf of the Government of Guatemala. General Menendez responded immediately, manifesting his appreciation of the sentiments expressed in the name of my Government in favor of a peaceful settlement. He said he had full confidence such a result would be reached, since he had learned that he could treat with patriots like Señor Rosales, and that I was authorized to say as much to him.
In virtue of these assurances it was arranged the same day between Señor Rosales and General Menendez that commissioners of each party should meet the next day, the 19th, at San Andres, between San Salvadar and Santa Ana, to treat of peace. They met accordingly and agreed to the bases of a settlement which doubtless would have been more liberal to the Government, and might have resulted in the retention of Señor Rosales as provisional President, but for the occurrences which I shall now refer to.
The affair of Cojutepeque, to which I have already referred, greatly weakened the Government, but they still counted upon a force of 2,000 men at Sonsonate and another of 1,200 men at Coatepeque, to hold Menendez in check. But while the commissioners at San Andres were treating of peace these forces revolted and disbanded, leaving the Government with no other support than the small detachment at the capital, and the Nicaraguans, numbering in all some 1,800 men. The Government was thus at the mercy of the revolution, with no alternative but to accept the terms offered by Menendez. These terms, however, under the circumstances, appear to be liberal.
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I am, &c.,