We are in the midst of great excitement and, I may say, danger. It seems that
the entire movement is an attempted revolution, concocted by a few ill
advised young men, under the leadership of Kim OK Kinn, vice-president of
the Corean foreign office; Hong Heng Shik, postmaster-general, and Pak Yong
Hio, brother-in-law of the King.
Ostensibly dissatisfied with the non-progressive spirit manifested by the
leading officials, they determined to seize the Government, obtain control
of the person of the King, and to administer public affairs for their own
purposes. The first move in their plot was the attempted assassination of
Min Yong Ik, and during the excitement occasioned thereby, they rushed to
the palace, informed the King that he was in great danger, and persuaded him
to remove to a smaller palace. The King, fearing perhaps that some great
public commotion was taking place, sent messengers to the Japanese legation
asking the minister to come to the palace with his guard of soldiers. After
three messages of this kind, the minister consented, and went to the palace,
the Japanese soldiers, two hundred in number, being stationed at the gates.
In the mean time five of the leading officials of the Government were called
to the palace, ostensibly by direction of the King, and while there were put
to death. These things occurred on the night of the 4th and the morning of
the 5th instant.
About 12 o’clock on the night of the 4th messengers came to me from the King,
asking me to come to the palace with my wife and suite, saying that he
feared somewhat for our safety, and felt that we would be more secure with
him.
The same messengers with the same messages were sent to Mr. Aston, Her
Britannic Majesty’s consul-general, and to Captain Zembsch, His Imperial
German Majesty’s commissioner, shortly after. Mr. Aston, his wife and
assistant, came to the United States legation with the intention
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of going to the palace. I told him
that upon consideration I had determined not to leave the legation; that I
would wait upon His Majesty in the morning to learn his wishes, but that in
the uncertainty of affairs I should rely upon the inviolability of the
legation, making such preparations for defense as I could. On the morning of
the 5th, with Her Britannic Majesty’s consul-general, Mr. Aston, and His
Imperial German Majesty’s commissioner, Captain Zembsch, I went to the small
palace occupied by the King. We found crowds of excited people in the
streets. Corean soldiers were massed around the entrance, outside; within,
Japanese soldiers were guarding the gateways. In the palace I saw the
leading revolutionists, who had been installed in the positions made vacant
by the death of the high officials. I also met the Japanese minister and his
secretary of legation. The King had little to say, and seemed to be in a
state of great excitement. After some unimportant conversation we
retired.
Immediately after this I called a conference of the representatives,
endeavoring to secure the attendance of the Japanese minister, but could not
reach him. We jointly counseled the Chinese commissioner to do nothing to
disturb the peace or to excite the populace, and under all circumstances to
avoid a conflict between Japanese and Chinese troops. He seemed to sanction
this line of policy.
During the day, by my advice, the two Americans residing with their families
in Seoul came to the legation. That night the King, accompanied by the
Japanese guard, returned to the palace proper.
From sundown until morning crowds of excited people were surging through the
streets, but no actual outbreak occurred. Her Britannia Majesty’s
consul-general, Mr. Aston, his wife, one attaché, and servants, came to the
legation on the night of the 4th, and remained, by my invitation, for
several days.
As before stated, I had arranged, with the assistance of Ensign Bernadon, U.
S. N., as complete a system of defense as possible. By the kindness of the
Japanese minister, four Japanese soldiers had been sent to the legation. I
had also asked for, and obtained, a Corean guard, upon whom I placed but
little reliance. Early on the morning of the 6th the populace commenced to
commit outrages upon the Japanese subjects residing in different parts of
the city. The cry was “Death to the Japanese!” During the day numbers were
killed and their property destroyed. Several came to the legation for
refuge, and I gave directions that all who came should be admitted. Between
3 and 4 o’clock p.m. we heard firing in the direction of the palace, and
shortly thereafter the Japanese guard, one hundred and eighty in number,
evacuated the palace grounds and marched to their legation. Along their line
of march they were attacked by the people with stones and occasional shots.
After they reached their legation great numbers of angry people gathered in
the vicinity, making threats, and occasional shots were fired. Between 4 and
5 o’clock p.m. on the 7th the Japanese soldiers and civilians left their
legation grounds and marched out of the city, on their way to Chemulpo. Two
cannon shots were fired at them as they passed, and an occasional volley of
musketry, which they returned.
The wildest excitement now prevailed. As night came on we noticed that the
Japanese legation buildings were in flames. These buildings were the finest
in Corea, and had just been completed, partly in the European style.
At this time there were congregated in this legation, of American citizens,
myself and wife, C. L. Scudder, private secretary 5 Ensign J. B. Bernadon,
[Page 334]
U. S. N.; Dr. and Mrs. Allen
and child, Mr. W. D. Townsend; of British subjects, W. G. Aston, esq., Her
Britannic Majesty’s consul-general; Mrs. Aston, Mr. E. S. B. Allen, consul’s
assistant; Mr. Hallifax, wife and child. Of Japanese subjects there were
twenty-two men, women, and children. Fifteen Chinese and Corean servants,
and a guard of twenty Corean soldiers, upon whom I placed no reliance, and
only retained in the legation fearing that they might inform the populace
that we were protecting Japanese.
The night was one of great anxiety, but the day dawned, and from that moment
the excitement seemed to decrease. During the 6th and 7th a number of public
and private buildings were burned. On the morning of the 8th I was asked to
have an audience with His Majesty, who had temporarily taken up his
residence at the Chinese camp. In company with the other representatives, I
waited upon His Majesty. At this audience we were asked if we could
consistently go to Chemulpo and have an interview with the Japanese
minister, conveying to him the earnest desire of His Majesty to maintain
friendly relations with Japan. After consultation we decided to accede to
His Majesty’s wishes.
After the audience I took occasion to say that I had at the United States
legation, and under my protection, a number of Japanese men, women, and
children, and that I had determined to send them to Chemulpo under the
escort of Ensign J. B. Bernadon, U. S. N., and to ask that a joint Corean
and Chinese guard be furnished for their protection. This request was
seconded by the other representatives, and was acceded to by both the Corean
and Chinese authorities. On the morning of the 9th Ensign Bernadon left the
legation with the Japanese refugees, escorted by Corean and Chinese
soldiers, and arriving safely at Chemulpo on the morning of the 10th
delivered them, as directed by me, to his excellency the Japanese minister.
During the night of the 10th messengers came from the King and Queen, saying
that they had heard it was the intention of the foreign ladies to retire
with their husbands to Chemulpo, and urging that Mrs. Foote should remain,
promising her all the protection in their power, saying that her stay would
do much to quiet the excitement of the people. We replied that we were the
first to come and would be the last to leave. On the morning of the 10th,
with His Imperial German Majesty’s commissioner, Captain Zembsch, and Her
Britannic Majesty’s consul-general, Mr. Aston, accompanied by his wife, I
went to Chemulpo, leaving Mrs. Foote at the legation. Arriving at Chemulpo
we sought for and obtained an interview with his excellency the Japanese
minister. We informed him of the sentiment of His Majesty, and afterwards
engaged in an informal discussion concerning the temper of the Corean
Government, as evinced by certain dispatches which had been written to the
minister by the president of the Corean foreign office. We were assured by
the minister that the messages of the King should be transmitted to his
Government. On the following day we had other interviews, discussing certain
questions of fact which had been asserted by Corean officials and denied by
the Japanese minister.
On the morning of the 12th I returned alone to Seoul, His Imperial German
Majesty’s commissioner and Her Britannic Majesty’s consul-general deciding
to remain at Chemulpo.
On the 14th I had an audience with His Majesty and reported to him the result
of our interview with Mr. Takezoye. His Majesty asked me if I would
accompany an envoy whom he was about to send to Japan, invoking thereby the
good offices of the United States to bring about
[Page 335]
an amicable settlement between that country and Corea.
I replied to him that I should prefer, first, to consult with my Government,
but that the means of communication were difficult and the emergency
imminent. I would consider the matter and decide at the earliest possible
moment.
Recurring to the events of the 6th instant, I would say that the conflict
with the Japanese troops was brought about by an attempt of the Chinese
troops to force their way into the palace grounds, ostensibly to protect the
King. In this attack the Corean troops joined forces with the Chinese.
During the engagement the King determined to seek a place of greater safety.
“Learning this fact,” as Mr. Takezoye, the Japanese minister says in a note
to me, “I took my leave of His Majesty and withdrew with the Japanese
guard.”
[Inclosure in No. 128.]
Report of information relative to the revolutionary
attempt in Seoul, Corea, by Ensign George C. Foulk, December
4–7, 1884.
The Government of Corea has been for an indefinite period under the
practical control of the Min family, of which the Queen of Corea* is at present the highest
representative. The blood of this family is largely Chinese, and it has
been always, and remains, the desire and aim of this family to subject,
and retain in subjection, their country to the suzerainty of China.
Members of this family are accorded special privileges by China, and
are, to the exclusion of other Corean noble families, on comparatively
social terms with the court of China, which they visit frequently. The
family is very large, and includes the highest number of great nobles,
with the greatest landed estates, of all the families of the nobility in
Corea. Political differences of the several degrees of strength have
long existed between this family and that of the King and a large body
of the other nobles.
The Queen is a woman of strong will and considerable ability. * * * The
great body of the Corean people at large know little or nothing of the
politics of their Government, nor do they dare to use any information
they may by chance possess on government affairs. They only know their
King, for whom, so far as my own experience and observation goes, they
hold unbounded reverence and affection. It is, however, ground deeply
into the whole Corean nation, so far as the people are concerned, that
their’s is the “little house” of China. Chinese coming among them are
detested for their appearance, conduct, and customs; yet nothing a
Chinaman might do in the
[Page 336]
course of his association with the common people would prompt a blow
from any of them, for he is a “Ta-kuk-in,” a man of the “great country.”
Japanese, on the contrary, are even admired by Coreans of the present
day for their appearance, customs, and conduct; yet against them lies a
deep current of hereditary hatred for their alleged cruelties in their
ancient invasions of Corea, and the Coreans are always ready for the
license when they may vent this feeling in shedding Japanese blood.
The first Corean nobles to leave their country to visit a progressive
one, were So Kwang Pom and Kim Ok Kiun. These two men, nine years ago,
left Corea secretly and visited. Japan; upon their return to Corea, they
went boldly before the King and described” what they there had seen. In
later years other Corean nobles visited Japan and China; of these,
however, until within the past two years, but one, Pak Yong Hyo, joined
the two above named in their aim towards adopting western civilization
for Corea and advocated openly such a policy.
The family of So is claimed to be truly Corean, and is highly illustrious
for the number of just and wise officers it has produced; it has no
superior in Corea in regard to this and ancient, creditable
ancestry.
The family of Kim is likewise regarded as truly Corean; it is remarkable
for its extent and antiquity. Pok Yong Hyo is also of an ancient family,
and is the brother-in-law of the King, bearing as such the title of
royalty Kum-oi-nung, which by the ancient law, forbade his holding
actual office in the government.
Prior to the revolt of the troops in Seoul in 1882, under the Tai-wen Kun, So and Kim, who held nightly discussions of
the civilization problem, and were endeavoring to induce Min Yong Ik and
several other young nobles to join them, were charged by the fanatical
Tai-Wen-Kun with endeavoring to introduce Christianity into Corea, and
both came very near losing their heads. The Tai-wen-Kun was the
ex-regent and the father of the King; long after his regency had ceased
he held the administrative power of the Government, and directed his
great energy with fanatical zeal against the efforts of the Jesuit
fathers and Christian Coreans to extend Christianity in Corea.
The members of the Corean embassy to the United States have repeatedly
told me that the number of Coreans executed after torture by him for
professing Christianity or being suspected of it can only be reckoned by
tens of thousands; also that his fanatical hatred of the foreign
religion was mainly due to the raid upon the grave of one of his
ancestors by the German Jew Oppert.
Obedient to the will and direction of China the Mins were pre-eminent
among Corean nobles in conducting for Corea the negotiations for a
treaty with the United States, in May, 1882, at Inchun, on which
occasion Admiral Shufeldt represented the United States Government,
having come there in the U. S. S. Swatara.
This energy of the Mins has given them the mistaken reputation of being
members of the progress party in Corea; in fact they only acted in
obedience to their hereditary lord, China, without a thought patriotic
to Corea, beyond that they in common with all Coreans at that time felt
the danger of seizure of a part of Corea by Russia. By the King of Corea
and the true progress party of three the treaty with the United States
was hailed as the forerunner of complete independence from China.
To the call of China for Corea to treat with the United States for their
several reasons, all the chief members of the Corean Government were
obedient but the Tai-wen-Kun, who though purely patriotic to Corea, only
saw in making treaties with western powers the means of introducing
broadcast hated Christianity. It is natural therefore that he should be
at enmity with the Mins who were negotiating the treaty with Admiral
Shufeldt.
Consequently in July, 1882, we find that, taking advantage of
disaffection among the soldiers of the capital, occasioned by short
rations issued by the Mins, he directs their revolt against that family,
and having disposed of its members, seizes the Government himself. Many
Mins were killed; Min Thai Ho (father of Min Yong Ik) was left supposed
to be fatally wounded in a ditch; poison was to be administered to the
Queen, but a maid personating her in disguise, took the poison and died
while the Queen escaped. Min Yong Ik shaved his head and after hiding in
the mountains three days, walked to Fusan whence he escaped to Japan in
the disguise of a Buddhist priest. For his disobedience to its command
and his attempt to annihilate its loyal servants, the Mins, the Chinese
Government sent its troops to Corea and carried off in banishment the
Tai-wen Kun; the power of the Mins for China having been greatly cut off
by the revolt. Chinese troops were placed in Seoul to strengthen the
remainder, and have remained there ever since.
It has been said the Chinese did not execute the Tai-wen-Kun, because he
was the father of the King; this is true if it be explained that such an
action as executing the father of the King would have embittered the
masses of the common people against the Mins and China, and probably to
the extent of open rebellion against China.
At the time of the revolt under the Tai-wen-Kun there were no Chinese in
Corea nor
[Page 337]
had there been for
more than a hundred years. In Seoul however, resided a Japanese minister
with a small guard of Japanese soldiers.
The news of the revolt of the soldiers under the Tai-wen-Kun went to
Japan first, and at once that Government prepared a force to send to the
assistance of the Japanese minister in Seoul. The Chinese consul at
Nagasaki telegraphed to China that the Japanese were sending a force to
seize Corea; this at least was the substance of what was told three
Corean nobles, then at Tientsin in China, by the Chinese authorities
there. These Corean nobles were, in order of rank, Cho Yong Ha, Kim Yun
Sik, and O-Yun Chung.
Cho was a noted Chinese scholar and a strong Confucianist. Min Yong Ik
has represented to me that Cho and his companions at Tien-Tsin held
powers plenipotentiary; this, however, is emphatically denied by So
Kwang Pom and the progressive party, who say that such powers were
simply assumed, such deliberate assumption of the King’s power being no
unusual thing for members of the Min faction. Knowing that Corea was
helpless after the revolt of the soldiers to resist an invasion of the
Japanese, Cho applied to the deputy viceroy at Tien-Tsin (Li-Hung Chang
being then absent, in mourning for his mother) for the use of Chinese
troops which he might take to Corea. His first appeal was refused, but
on the second, made by him as holding powers plenipotentiary, the use of
the soldiers was granted him; Cho and his companions came to Chemulpo
with the soldiers on board Chinese vessels of war.
At the time the news of the revolt came to Japan there were two Corean
nobles residing in Tokio; these were Kim Ok Kuin and So Kwang Pom, who
had gone there with an ambassador and remained behind to study and make
purchases. They heard that the Japanese were about to send an expedition
to Corea, and the rumor that it was to seize their country.
Going at once to the minister for foreign affairs in Japan, they made
inquiry as to the exact object of the expedition, and were assured that
Japan had no intention to seize Corea, and only sent a force there to
protect her subjects in Corea. Satisfied with this Kim and So proceeded
to Corea at once, arriving at Chemulpo with the Japanese force. They had
realized that the Tai-wen-kun’s revolt endangered their hopes of
independence and progress for Corea by giving the Chinese a new lien
upon them; and anticipating that Cho would bring Chinese soldiers to
Chemulpo, had drawn up during the voyage from Japan a series of
arguments in writing against the employment by Corea of Chinese troops
in Seoul, and favoring the use of the Japanese force to restore order
there.
The Japanese force with So and Kim, and the Chinese force with Cho and
his companions, arrived at Chemulpo at about the same time, and while
neither force was yet landed, the two parties of Corean officers
discovered each other. A consultation ensued between them, in which So
and Kim used every argument in their power to induce Cho to abandon the
use of the Chinese troops. They urged more particularly that as Japan
had a legation in Seoul to protect, she had every right to send troops
there; the use of the Chinese, however, could be called for on no ground
except such as would give China the opportunity of tightening more
firmly than ever the grip on Corea she had loosened in aiding and
permitting the American treaty negotiations three months before.
After a prolonged discussion, which grew hot towards the end, it was
agreed to by all that, if practicable, to the King should be submitted
the question, “Should the Chinese land and enter Seoul or not.” Kim Ok
Kiun, disguised as a low Corean, then went to Seoul to submit the
question to the King. He found the Tai-wen Kun (his bitter enemy) in
charge of the King’s person, his friends driven away, ami that it would
be impossible to reach the King. His mission having failed, he returned
to Chemulpo, soon after which the Chinese force landed and entered the
capital. The Tai-wen Kun was abducted, order restored, and affairs
settled into the condition found in Corea on the arrival of Minister
Foote.
The Chinese force took up permanent quarters in extensive camps within
the walls; almost by the palace gates they erected a fort, as well as
two others outside of the city near the approaches from the river
Han—these two for use in case of invasion against the advance of a
Japanese army towards Seoul. The number of troops landed was augmented a
little later to 3,000 men, which number remained in Seoul until June of
1884, when it was reduced to 1,500. A Chinese commissioner arrived in
October, 1883.
It has been positively stated to me, though not until they seemed forced
to divulge it, by So Kwang Pom and Kim Ok Kiun, that the result of this
use of Chinese troops was the exactment of a new agreement between China
and Corea, by which the Chinese obtained such rights in Corea as made
her more intimately a dependency of China than had ever been the case
before. The full particulars of this agreement had not been (on
principle) divulged to the western world by either Corea or China; nor
could either have well done so. It was undoubtedly the effect of this
new agreement with China, originated by Cho-Yong Ha, and the execution
of its terms willingly abetted and enforced
[Page 338]
by the Mins, which drove the progressive and truly
loyal party in Corea to the extreme measures taken by them in the
revolutionary attempt of December 4–7 last.
The King and the progressive Coreans looked upon the American treaty as
the wedge which, at least politically, freed Corea from China, and it
was hailed by them with great joy. It may then be understood how great
was their chagrin to find Corea, by the action of Cho and the Mins
before the American treaty was yet ratified, placed anew and more
rigidly than ever subservient to China. Thinking that the new status of
Corea to China would be understood abroad, they feared that the American
treaty would never be ratified, consequently I have been told
repeatedly, “His Majesty danced for joy when Minister Foote
arrived.”
This meant to them one of two things, namely: That the United States
understood the real relations between China and Corea, and meant at all
hazards to claim independence for Corea; or that the United States did
not know of the real status of Corea, in which case, by concealment of
the late agreement with China, Corea still had a hope of becoming free,
through the effect of her being regarded as independent in the relations
between her and the United States. The mission to the United States
Government, headed by Min Yong Ik, in 1884, determined for the King and
the progressive men (represented in the embassy by So Kwang Pom alone)
that the latter view was correct, and they regulated their line of
action accordingly.
At the time the Corean embassy was in the United States, Kim Ok Kiun (the
oldest of the progressive party of three and its leader in all active
measures) was in Japan and in regular correspondence with So Kwang Pom
with the embassy. These two men of all Korea were the only ones who
possessed any knowledge of the principles of western government; they
had both made long visits to Japan, were naturally highly intelligent,
and had entered with great perseverance and energy into the progressive
spirit of the official classes in Japan; both had been in effect pupils
of Fukuzawa, the distinguished leader of Japan in political progress.
Both, but particularly So Kwang Pom, were noted among foreigners of all
classes who had met them as frank, intelligent, active, useful men. In
Corea they and their families were respected and beloved for their just
conduct as officials.
With a view to organizing an efficient military force for Corea to
replace that loaned by China, the Corean Government had after the revolt
of 1882 established four battalions of Corean soldiers, and to furnish
officers for these, through Kim and So, fourteen Corean young men, many
of whom were connections of the houses of the progressive men, were sent
to Japan to pursue a course of study and exercise in the Government
military school in Tokio. The leader of these students was So Che Pil, a
near relative of So Kwang Pom.
During their preparation, the troops were placed under the instruction of
Chinese officers, procured for this service by the Mins and Cho-Yong Ha.
Kim was much in Japan overseeing the instruction of the students, as
well as directing the efforts of other Coreans who had been gotten
there, largely through his energy, to study manufactures and trade, and
to make purchases of certain machinery and furniture, upholstery,
&c., the latter for the palace. Kim’s rank of nobility corresponds
to that of baron, and his office is president of the department for
improvement and colonization of waste lands. As this embodied
intercourse with foreign countries, he was later made a vice-president
of the foreign office.
Pak Yong-Hyo by ancient Corean law could not hold office, yet the King
assigned to him the office of mayor of Seoul. He was not familar with
any foreign language and was much less advanced in progressive ideas
than So and Kim; he was, however, earnestly and rather hot-headedly
progressive, and entered into reform in Seoul with such over-energy that
loud complaints came from the common people, encouraged by the
conservative faction, which soon resulted in his removal from office.
The anger of the Mins was particularly aroused at the departure from the
ancient law as shown, in his being given an office by the King.
All the above evidences of progress in Corea are embraced in the interval
between the revolt in 1882 and the return of the embassy from the United
States in May, 1884. All the work of the three progressive leaders was
warmly aided by the king, who had ample opportunities of time at least
for encouraging it, the actual machinery of his internal government
being worked entirely by the Mins, and in which he had little or no
power to act.
A part of the embassy to the United States, headed by the vice-minister,
Hong Yong Sik, returned to Corea in the winter of 1883. From this time
dates Hong’s connection with the progressive party. He expressed himself
as having been in a “light so bright as to dazzle him.” He entered into
the progressive spirit of the King’s party with great caution, however,
and was always regarded by So and Kim as too slow or aggravatingly
indecisive. He received the appointment of postmaster-general from the
King, but for a long interval little was done by him toward establishing
a postal system. With Hong,
[Page 339]
Chen Kyung Sok returned from America, bringing with him the generous
supply of seeds furnished by the Department of Agriculture. He was
promptly granted a large tract of valuable land, which he very
commendably converted into what is now known as the American farm.
In May the Trenton arrived at Chemulpo, having on board Min Yong Ik, So
Kwang Pom, and Pyon Su, with whom I had lived in the closest possible
friendship during eight months. Min Yong Ik, the chief of the embassy,
had seemed sincere in expressions of his intention to use his utmost
energy towards the development of his country, yet I had long since
observed that he was faint-hearted and very changeable in disposition;
and his constant study of Confucian books he carried on I deemed sadly
at the expense of what should have been to him invaluable opportunities
for observation and enlightenment. So Kwang Pom and Pyon Su were,
however, indefatigable in compiling notes on useful subjects, and from
encyclopedia sources, through my translations, they brought home a great
mass of information on the political and progressive histories of the
principal countries of the world.
On June 2, in a gay procession I went to Seoul with these members of the
embassy. On the way, So Kwang Pom took occasion to say to me that he
greatly feared that the ambassador, Min Yong Ik, in spite of all that
had been done for him, and however good his intentions had been while
abroad, might be turned directly to the opposite of what might be
expected from him; that what he had learned and seen, through his
Confucian training and the hereditary instincts of his family, might be
employed, after the manner of the Chinese, directly against Western
progress.
The reception of the, ambassador in Seoul was enthusiastic. All parties
seemed to join in it. The visit of the officers of the Trenton, the
expression of good feeling exchanged between the Corean and American
Governments, and of their officers, these with much else seemed to
strengthen the progressive feeling in Seoul. A shadow fell, however, on
the King and the progressive men when they learned that Admiral Shufeldt
was not soon to arrive in Corea, for the embassy had brought word that
he was to arrive in Corea in May. It was then supposed that military
officers from the United States would probably arrive with Admiral
Shufeldt.
Soon after his arrival Min Yong Ik became a vice-president of the foreign
office; So Kwang Pom was elevated in the order of nobility, and Pyon Su,
heretofore not an officer in the Government, was made a chusa, by virtue
of which rank he was given direct access to the King. The progressive
party, now strengthened by the addition of these members of the embassy
to the United States, was in high hopes, and with the King himself as
their director, began a series of preparations for a vigorous infusion
of Western civilization into Corea. Evidently, however, all great
measures were not to be taken in this direction until the Chinese troops
had left Seoul, in effecting which the services of an adviser, and
indirectly those of other persons soon expected from the United States,
were believed to be efficient.
It was not long before the Chinese instructors of the Corean troops were
dismissed by the King, a charge of cruel treatment having been brought
against them. This was followed by the acceptance of the resignation of
Mr. P. G. von Mollendorff, from the foreign office, in which he had had
great influence as adviser. The creation of these vacancies was too
significant to make comment necessary. Arms were also purchased, and
under my direction, as requested, stored away carefully in the palace
grounds. From Japan, to execute contracts made by Kim Ok Kiun, came a
number of qualified Japanese, who were held in readiness to begin
teaching the use of machinery, the manufacture of paper, pottery,
&c.
Steps were also taken toward securing a director of agriculture,
school-teachers, and several other foreigners for service under the
Corean Government. In regard to these, the initiatory steps were taken
in consultations of the progressive leaders, including the King, in
which I was warmly invited to have a voice. I was also daily visited by
Pyon Chusa, who came direct from the King with requests for services of
different kinds. These I obeyed whenever permitted by my
instructions.
Upon the occasion of being asked by His Majesty to order for him an
electric-light plant for the palace, I declined, until it was explained
to me that it was also meant to extend the right to furnish electrical
apparatus to the United States; that such rights had just been refused
the British consul-general, and that courtesy would prevent the
immediate granting of such rights to the United States minister, who it
was known held an application to do so from Mr. Thomas A. Edison. The
electric-light plant I only ordered when assured that $10,000 had been
secured to make prompt payments. I also ordered and paid for six head of
breeding stock, purchased in California, for the Corean-American farm,
to which His Majesty had added an extension some 8 miles square for
breeding purposes.
In July the fourteen Corean military students returned from Japan, and
were enthusiastically greeted by the progressive men. They were
exercised before the King and
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gave great satisfaction. A few were given appointments in the battalion
of the palace guard commanded by General Han Kin Chik at once.
Min Yong Ik soon showed the effects of the influence brought to bear on
him by his family. First he endeavored to pay a visit to China, which
the progressive men regarded with dissatisfaction, believing it to be
intended as a make-peace visit to off-set any ill-impressions in the
Chinese court due to his long association with Western foreigners. This
he deferred, however, and originated the idea of changing the national
dress in certain details, most prominent of which were the tightening of
belts and narrowing the sleeves. This, too, was unsatisfactory to the
progressive party, who saw in the change an approach to the Chinese
costume, or food for an excuse against the move they contemplated, which
was permitting freedom in matters of dress. Min Yong Ik’s scheme became
a law, and by royal edict the changes in costume were effected by a
fixed date.
Suddenly Min Yong Ik resigned from the foreign office and received an
appointment as general in command of the Right Palace Guard Battalion.
This was immediately following a discussion before His Majesty between
himself and So Kwang Pom, in which the King decided a question in favor
of the latter. Word had been received through me that Admiral Shufeldt,
then expected by every steamer, had not yet left America, and that he
would only come to Corea at once upon a formal invitation to do so from
the King. This delay in his coming, as well as that of the military
officers, left the Government in an embarrassed position, as it was
without any adviser in the foreign office or instruction officers in the
new army.
Min Yong Ik then proposed, as suggested by the Chinese commissioner, Chen
Shu Yang, that ex-Consul-General Benny be at once invited to accept the
position of adviser in place of Admiral Shufeldt. So Kwang Pom opposed
this, and it was in a discussion of this question in which the King with
much firmness favored So Kwang Pom. A telegraphic message was sent at
once through General Foote to Admiral Shufeldt to “come at once.”
A little later, and through Min-Yong-Ik, five Chinese instructors were
called from China for service with the Corean army. This created a great
sensation among the progressive men, but was most disastrous to the
fourteen students who, by the employment of the Chinese instructors,
were thrown clear of any chance of holding military offices consistent
with their rank as Corean citizens, to say the least. With the exception
of three employed in General Han’s battalion, the students were turned
entirely adrift from military service and given subordinate positions,
out of half charity, by the progressive leaders, in the post-office
department, under Hong-Yong Sik.
By September of 1884, Min-Yong-Ik was entirely clear of the progressive
party. His associates were Chinese, and the strongest members of the
pro-Chinese faction; he did not receive visits from Western foreigners
in the daytime, and on several occasions showed contemptuous insolence
in their presence. In August a Corean officer of high grade was openly
seized by a party of Chinese soldiers and beaten so severely by them in
the street that his life was despaired of; this was the outcome of a
quarrel between the Chinese commissioner and the Corean officer about
the right of passage through a gateway of the Corean officer’s house,
which was next to that of the Chinese officer.
After having been beaten, the Corean officer was held as a prisoner in a
Chinese house until released by the interference of the British
consul-general, Mr. Aston. Min-Yong-Ik’s indifference to an appeal to
him for action against the Chinese in this case served only to
strengthen the feeling against him of the progressive men, and of the
common people against his family.
During the autumn the numbers of Chinese in Seoul increased rapidly, and
the foreign office business was reported to be almost entirely confined
to actions of Chinese against Coreans for debt Chinese began to extend
their homes and trading-places into the country; they came and went as
they pleased without passports. Mr. P. G. von Möllendorff had again
practically become the adviser in the foreign office.
In September and October some of the Japanese who had long been waiting
for employment under the contracts arranged by Kim-Ok-Kiun began to push
their claims through their legation.
The new army at this time consisted of the four palace guard battalions,
in aggregate 5,500 men, of whom 3,000 were armed with Peabody-Martini
rifles. The battalions were commanded by Generals Min-Yong-Ik,
Cho-Yong-Ha, and I-jo-yun of the strong Chinese faction, and General
Han-Kin-Chik; the latter officer had at first been regarded as one of
the progressive party, but latterly I was told that his real political
status was doubtful; that at heart he was progressive, but feared the
opposition of the Chinese party. However his real status may have been,
it was in his battalion only that the military students were employed,
and he was on friendly terms with the progressive men.
This officer, Han-Kin-Chik, was the highest general in rank, and as such
he was the representative head of the government in the great guild
among the common people,
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called pusang, which may be likened to a great body of militia. It was
by the invitation of this officer that I was conducted through the
Pukhan Mountain fortress of Seoul, with the view of obtaining advice
from me as to sites for certain new forts. Reference is made to this in
a report on my first journey into the interior of Corea.
The attitude of the Japanese in Seoul had always been such as to indicate
an earnest desire to aid the progress party and to be on peaceable,
friendly terms with the people. The conduct of Japanese citizens towards
Coreans was commendable. Indicating great consideration on the part of
the Japanese Government towards Corea, was the restraint placed upon
Japanese merchants establishing themselves in Seoul by the Japanese
minister, who evidently in doing so followed the spirit of the treaties
by which the capital was not to be thrown open to trade if the Chinese
left.
In October one of the progressive party leaders told me that unless
foreign intervention prevented, Corea would soon be irreclaimably in the
hands of the Chinese, and with great bitterness went on to say that his
small party had not only lost power to proceed further and had been
receding, but that they were in actual danger of execution; that this
might follow any charge made against them by the Chinese faction. He
also stated that that part of the King’s revenue meant to be used by the
King through them to fulfill all progressive contracts had been cut off
from him by the Mins, (notably through Min-Thai-Ho, who controlled the
chief revenues), and was being used to pay Chinese instructors and equip
Corean soldiers with a view to amalgamation with the Chinese army.
Having heard on unquestionable authority that certain Chinese officers
had informed some Corean officers of the Chinese faction that in case of
war French ships would be fired on by Chinese from Corean territory, I
believe that the Mins have been preparing in obedience to the will of
China, their contingent of Corean troops for the use of China in the war
with France. In December the annual tribute of Corea to China was to
start overland for Peking in charge of the usual procession of
ambassadors and underlings, numbering in all about one hundred persons;
it is more than likely that, with the tribute party in this December, it
was intended that Corean troops should go to Peking; above all things
this would move the progressive party to desperate action.
On October 25 one of the progressive leaders called upon me, and at once
began to speak passionately of the unfortunate situation of the King and
his party. Later, with deliberation, he stated that for the sake of
Corea Min-Thai-Ho, Cho-Yong-Ha, the four generals, and four other lower
officials possibly, would have to be killed. Though the officer was
passionate in his manner, he was one whom I had always found positive
and correct in his statements to me; his words, therefore, did not seem
empty to me, and I became indignant that he should communicate such an
idea to me. A few sharp words passed between us and he then quieted
down.
On October 26, during a call on Min-Yong-Ik, I learned that the
separation of the two parties was so wide as to prevent any discussion
of public affairs in which officers of the two parties might be brought
together; this convinced me that a crisis was near at hand and one which
would probably result in blood-shedding and violence not confined to the
official classes of Coreans.
Prior to this I had constantly been in the habit of communicating any and
all news of political interest to the United States minister, to whom I
had felt this a particular duty and one which I believed would give him
satisfaction, for living in the midst of the city and having intimate
associates among all classes of officials, I believe I had exceptional
means for obtaining useful information.
On October 28 I told him every detail of what I had heard, and expressed
firmly the opinion that these were sufficient to forewarn some serious
outbreak in Seoul. On October 31 I called upon Ensign Bernadon and Mr.
W. D. Townsend, the two other Americans in Seoul, and told them what I
believed to be the situation. On this day Hong-Yong-Sik called upon me,
and I received notes from two other members of the progressive party
requesting interviews; these I was forced to refuse, and on the
following day I set out from Seoul to make a second journey into the
interior of Corea in accordance with my instructions from the Navy
Department. A report summarizing my experience during this journey,
including the period of the revolutionary attempt in Seoul I have
already submitted to the Department.
I append to this a list of the officers of the Corean Government,
including members of both parties, who were foremost pre-eminently in
Corean politics and active duty under it, together with other notes
which, in my opinion, may assist in throwing light upon the situation in
Corea.
Very respectfully submitted.
GEORGE C. FOULK,
Ensign, United States
Navy, Naval Attaché.
list of corean officers, with titles, offices,
etc.
The pro Chinese, or Min party.
Min-Thai-Bo, —Rank, earl (poguk);
a blood relative of the Queen; father of princess royal by affinity; a
brother of Queen by adoption. Head of home department; treasurer for all
general revenues expended for maintenance of troops of capital guard;
subsistence of relatives of King’s family and their dependencies, which
include a large part of the population of Séoul. Father of Min-Yong-Ik.
Held several other offices.
Min-Yong-Mok.—Rank, count
(pansoh); blood relative of Queen; ex-president of foreign office. Head
of military post at Poupyong, and chief recruiting officer general. Held
two other offices.
Min-Ung-Sik.—Rank, count
(pansoh); blood relative of Queen. Recently given, in addition to other
offices, office of kaussa, governor of Pyongan province (Chinese
border), and was engaged in equipping provincial troops.
Min-Yong-Ik.—Rank, prince; by
affinity through adoption, nephew to Queen, to whom is nearest relative
through the Min (deceased) who adopted him from his natural father
Min-Thai-Ho; this made him court favorite as also champau (assistant) in
board of ceremonies, but chief office is general of right palace guard
battalion.
Cho-Yong-Ha.—Rank, earl (poguk);
by marriage related to Mins. Greatly beloved by people for justice and
generosity; bore honorable title “loyal knight” for meritorious services
to the King. Since 1882 not in favor in King’s court; out of active
office, yet active in all business between China and Corea, a fluent
Chinese scholar; arranged contract for employment of Von
Mollendorff.
I-jo-Yun.—Rank, marquis
(champau); a strong member of faction; commanded left guard battalion of
palace.
Yun-Tae-Jun.—Rank, marquis
(champau); a rank Confucianist. Champau (assistant) in board of justice;
ex-vice president of foreign office; commanded rear battalion of palace
guard.
Kim-Hong-Chip.—Rank, count;
president of foreign office; had risen rapidly; noted for obstinate
hatred of Christianity and having torn up copy of Scriptures presented
to board of which he was a member to decide as to whether it was a lit
volume for the King to have.
Kim-Yun-Sik—Rank, marquis
(champau), vice-president of foreign office: one of nobles who brought
Chinese troops to Seoul in 1882.
Shim-S’hang-Un.—Rank, marquis
(champau), governor of capital province.
O-Yun-Chung.— Rank, marquis
(champau) vice head of one of the six boards; one of the nobles who
brought Chinese troops to Seoul in 1882.
Kim-Kin-Pok.— Chief eunuch, head
of palace household department and in constant attendance upon the
Queen.
The above officers were leaders; each held large estates, and resided in
extensive establishments in Séoul, connected with each of which was a
great body of underlings of various grades. Besides there are many other
high nobles as well as others of lower grades, but not active in
international affairs of the Government.
The Progress party.
Hong-Yong-Sik.—Rank, count
(pansoh) postmaster-general; of an illustrious Corean family;
vice-minister in embassy to the United States. Held office in one of the
six boards.
Kim-Ok-Kiun.—Rank, marquis
(champau), vice-president foreign office, head of colonization
department; chief of progress party; extremist.
So-Kwang-Pom.—Rank, baron
(chamise); held also special rank of nobility called takiyo, by virtue
of which was near person of the King constantly; held office in home
department; secretary to embassy to United States, as regarded abroad;
was third minister in embassy and sent with it specially for King’s
service.
Pak-Yong-Hyo.—Rank, prince
(kum-oi-nung); brother-in-law to King; not in office; had been mayor of
Seoul; in title, first in rank of progress party; extremist.
Han-Kin-Chik.—Rank, count
(pansoh); relative of So-Kwang-Pom; general commanding front palace
guard battalion; government head of the guild called pusang, a large
body resembling militia among lower orders of people; long a doubtful
member of the progress party.
Pyon-Su.—Rank, chusa (no English
equivalent); member of embassy to the United States; actively engaged in
progressive affairs for the King; had long resided in Japan.
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Other than the above-named progressive officers there were a few officers
of low rank who were inactive members; a small body of the middle class
among the people favored them.
Mok-Champau is the Corean title of Mr. P. G. von Mollendorff, who regards
himself as a Corean subject; rank, marquis, vice-president of foreign
office; had at one time held four different offices; head of Corean
customs; practically, foreign adviser of the Government; an active
member of the pro-Chinese party, and highly influential, mainly through
Cho-Yong-Ha, Kim-Hong-Chip, and Min-Yong-Mok.
