Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 6, 1880
No. 171.
Mr. Seward
to Mr. Evarts.
Peking, June 10, 1880. (Received August 2.)
Sir: Referring to my dispatch No 555, with which I transmitted to you a copy of a circular addressed by me to our consular officers in China, asking for information upon the war power of China as indicated in their respective districts, I have now the honor to hand to you copies of the responses which have been received. These include reports from all our officers, except Mr. Shepard, at Hankow, and embody much interesting information upon the subject.
I have, &c.,
Mr. Goldshorough to Mr. Seward.
Sir: In reply to your No. 83, requesting me to report to you upon the war power of China, including the condition of the army and navy, and of the forts, arsenals, and training establishments of this district, I beg to state that I have endeavored to procure the desired information and herewith submit the result of my investigations.
At the entrance of Amoy, on the eastern side, there is a battery some 1,500 feet long, commonly called the “200–gun battery,” and is guarded by a few hundred soldiers. There are several other smaller forts and batteries on the southwestern side of the harbor, but they are not of much consequence.
There is no training establishment nor arsenal here, and with regard to the land forces I have not been able to procure any information which would be reliable, but from my own observations I should fancy that they are very limited and of trivial consequence.
I may here state that we have now and then a number of Chinese gunboats, but these I am informed belong properly to Foochow. As to their efficiency, I am unable to speak. I have addressed no dispatches to the authorities here relative to the subject, but would have done so had I not been informed that little information could be derived from them.
I have, &c.,
Mr. Cheshire to Mr. Seward.
Canton, March 15, 1880.
Sir: Pursuant to the request contained in your dispatch No. 74, I now have the honor to submit to you such facts as I have been able to obtain bearing upon the war power of this province, army of Kwang-tung. The number of regular troops allotted to the whole of Canton province is stated to be from 60,000 to 70,000. These are divided into the active forces and the garrison forces, the first category drawing higher pay than the second.
The pay of a soldier is 9 mace, 7 candareens, or equivalent to about $1.25 per month. To this is added a certain quantity of rice a month. When on active service I understand that an additional allowance is frequently made by the provincial administrative office, which amounts in some cases, to about $13 per month. Most of the fighting on land is done by “braves” or irregulars (see Mayer’s Chinese Government, page 59), who are paid from $6 to $7 per month for each man.
The real centers of military strength in the Canton province are Wei Chow, Canton, Shin Kuan, Swatow, Chin-chow, Lungwen, Hainan, and Kao Yao. The number of forces stationed at these places is put down at from 10,000 to 12,000 in all, and are mostly equipped with foreign rifles. Most of the forces stationed inland are armed with gingals.
The Chu-fang or Manchu garrison stationed at Canton is estimated to number about 3,500 men, including infantry and cavalry, 2,000 of which are drilled after the European fashion. This garrison is under the command of a Tartar general and two Tartar lieutenant generals, The majority of this force is assigned to guard duty, while some are employed at the various Tartar Yamêns in the capacity of clerks or assistants.
The pay of the Manchu soldier varies from $3 to $6 per month; petty officers, such as corporate and warrant officers, receive from $7 to $10 per month.
navy.
The Chinese navy of Canton consists principally of native craft. I am informed by a captain in command of one of the viceroy’s gunboats that there is a very large fleet of junks of war plying in the Canton waters. They are armed with from two to five guns, ranging from 12 to 18 pounders.
The principal naval station is at “The Bogue,” where the Chinese admiral-in-chief has his headquarter. There are also, in addition to these junks of war, about twelve foreign gunboats under the control of the viceroy, five of which are commanded by English and French officers. Of those commanded by foreign officers there are two carrying each seven guns of Armstrong and Krupp manufacture, viz: one 70-pounder [Page 275] Armstrong, two 20-pounders Krupp, two 18-pounders Krupp, two 12-pounders Krupp. The other three carry each four guns, and twelve 18-pounders (Krupp.)
The seven vessels commanded by Chinese officers are armed with three to four guns 18 to 24-pounders (Krupp.)
It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of men in the Canton navy, but I understand that there are not more than 3,000 regular marines.
forts.
During the past three years the provincial government has built five new forts, all of concrete, and said to be formidable defenses. There are three at or near “The Bogue,” commonly called “The Bogue Forts,” one between this and Whampoa, and another about three miles from Canton city, on the southern branch of the Pearl River. These forts have not as yet been supplied with guns.
arsenals.
There are three arsenals (so-called by the Chinese) within this consular district, one at a place called Tsing Pu, about four miles north of Canton, one at the south gate of Canton, and one at Whampoa.
The Tsing Pu arsenal was established about four years ago. It is the largest establishment of the kind in the Canton province, and it is fitted with very heavy machinery of English manufacture. There is a powder factory attached to the arsenal where the Chinese have been manufacturing powder for the past year and a half. Several small vessels (steamers) have been built at this place, ranging from 100 to 200 tons burden, but owing to the small depth of water in front of the ship-building yards, I do not think that any other but small vessels can be built there.
south gate arsenal.
This is a small establishment and the principal work done there is the manufacture of machinery, jingalls, and cartridges.
whampoa arsenal.
This was formerly the Hong-Kong and Whampoa Dock Company, which was purchased by the provincial government some three years ago. The only use the Chinese have made of this place, thus far, has been docking and repairing the foreign built steamers belonging to this province. There are no training schools at any of these establishments such as at the Foo Chow arsenal, where navigation, mechanics, &c., are taught. Most of the workmen employed at the above arsenals are Chinese who served an apprenticeship in foreign machine shops, boiler factories, and ship-building establishments.
Mr. Williams, at Swatow, writes as follows:
war power of china.
From personal inspection in this part of the Chinese Empire, I am satisfied that no serious opposition could be made by the Chinese local officials to the invasion of this part of the empire by any nation having the inclination to do so. It is true there are some seven different forts within a radius of 40 miles, only one of these being good for anything, having one gun mounted in it at present, with embrasures for about a dozen others; that is the new fortification built some two years since at Kialut, about two miles below the town; the remaining six are in a state of ruin and decay with a few old rusted cannon half buried in the mud, in and around the ruins.
On the occasional visits of some military officials a display of banners is made from the walls of these old ruins, and a few coolies are employed and dressed up as soldiers for the occasion. From continued inquiries in various quarters and information received, I am quite satisfied that a large proportion of the troops in this part of the province of Kwang-tung exists on paper only, and in numbers makes a good show on the pay-roll. I have no doubt, however, but the military mandarins could procure a number Of recruits in case of an emergency; troops of this kind would naturally be deficient in drill, poorly armed, and lacking the knowledge of modern warfare, and would make but a poor resistance against drilled troops, equipped with the modern implements of war.
I may safely say that not more than five thousand troops armed with foreign weapons exist in this part of Kwang-tung province, who understand anything about foreign drill—the majority being armed with flint-locks, spears, and pikes, and knowing nothing about foreign drill; the total of all arms at present do not amount to over nine thousand, and those are scattered through the different districts.
[Page 276]vessels of war.
The Chinese have no modern war vessels stationed here, but the port is occasionally visited by one of the Foo-Chow gunboats, which remains but a short time. One small Chinese lorcha, with four rifle cannons, 9-pounders, remains in and around this port, looking after smugglers, and some eight or ten war junks are stationed at the island of Namao some thirty miles distant, which is the head station of the Chinese admiral.
Serious damage could be inflicted on the Chinese by an enemy having the control of this port, as several rich and important cities are conveniently located to Swatow, the centers of an extensive import and export trade all of these places can be reached by the boats or fleets of an enemy, and but a very few troops would be required, if assisted by vessels of war, to completely destroy innumerable towns and villages in addition to the walled cities of Chow-Chow-fu, Kit-Yang, and Chow-Chow-Yang, the latter with a population of 155,000, the next about 130,000 and the former with a population of about 300,000.
arsenals.
The Chinese have no places of this kind here, I have been lately informed that at the city of Kit-Yang, some forty miles above Swatow on the main river, which is the home of Ting Fu-tai, the ex-governor of Fuh-Chien. There also a considerable supply of gunpowder stowed, and a few hundred stand of rifles of foreign manufacture.
It is also known here, that the Chinese General Fang, locally named Peng Tye-Gin, has been for some few months past employed in the manufacture of gunpowder, in the vicinity of Chow-Chow-fu. He has in his employ a Chinaman educated in France, who is a chemist, and who, I understand, is managing the powder factory.
I have, &c.,
Vice-Consul in Charge.
Mr. Scruggs to Mr. Seward.
Sir: In compliance with the request contained in your No. 59 of the 10th ultimo, I have the honor to submit a brief memorandum of the war fooling of this empire within this consular district.
At Kiang Ying on the opposite shores of the Yangtse River, about half way between here and Shanghai, are substantial fortifications, armed with Crook guns, so arranged as completely to enfilade the river passage. The number and calibre of these guns, as also the number of the garrison, are not known. These fortifications are of recent completion, though begun some years ago.
The next fortifications above, are those at Silver Island, about a mile below Chin Kiang. The navigable channel at this point is the narrow, rapid current between the bluffs of the island and those on the opposite south bank of the river. The north current is wider and less rapid, but too shallow for heavy draught vessels. Both shores opposite the island, as also the island itself, are strongly fortified. Those on the south bank and on the island, and which completely enfilade the pass, are particularly strong. Indeed, engineers have pronounced them impregnable. They are armed with Crook guns of large calibre, and manned by a strong and well disciplined garrison.
On the opposite shores at Nanking, are similar fortifications, with Crook guns.
Chin Kiang is a garrisoned city. Its present available force is about 2,000 infantry and cavalry; nearly all Manchus, most of them natives of the place. The Manchus are arranged and drilled under different banners according to their tribal traditions and usage, and armed with match-locks. The commander (a Manchu of course) has the rank of brevet lieutenant general, and is under the immediate command of the general at Nanking.
On one of the high hills outside the city walls, and commanding its approaches from inland southwest, is a large stockade of recent construction, garrisoned by some 600 men, armed with match-locks, together with some 15 field pieces of 6 and 9 pounds calibre.
The mode of drilling (except for the Manchus) is that in use by the British Government. The words of command are given in English; the reason assigned for this is, that raw recruits will learn them quite as readily as those given in Chinese, since both sets of terms and methods are equally new to them, and that it will prevent confusion should a foreign commander be called to the service.
[Page 277]The only soldiers in the district that are armed with breech-loading rifles are those of the viceroy’s guard, some 6,000 strong, now stationed at Nanking.
Foreign powder, imported and sold only by special permission, (and then only for the use of the regular troops,) is principally used. The native powder is coarser grained, and thought to be more liable to accidental explosion. The high provincial authorities take good care to have as little of this (or any other) powder in the hands of the people as possible. Indeed, they seem to be constantly on the watch for possible insurrections. The lead used is imported (in pig form) from England, or through English agents.
Military preparations continue quite active, and seem to be directed mainly to the defenses of the country, and have, for months past, received more attention from the provincial authorities than any other branch of the public service.
I am, &c.,
Mr. De Lano to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I have had the honor to receive your dispatch No. 97, in which you request me to report to you such facts as I may be able to obtain, bearing upon the war power of China, including the condition of the army and navy, and of the forts, arsenals, and training establishments of my consular district.
I regret to have to say in reply that at the moment I cannot give you any reliable information on the subject. Such information, if obtained at all, must be gathered from the Chinese, and to be at all reliable must come from official sources, and the extreme reticence and suspiciousness of the officials when information on such subjects is openly sought for by foreigners render it very difficult to obtain from them any reliable data for such a report as you desire.
If later on I should obtain such information on the subject as would enable me to give you an intelligent and reliable report I shall have much pleasure in submitting one.
I have, &c.,
Mr. Bandinel to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I have the honor to own receipt of your communication of 10th January, No. 63, wherein you desire me to report on such facts as I may be able to obtain bearing upon the war power of China, including the condition of the army and navy, and of the forts, arsenals, and training establishments in my district.
After careful inquiry I am able to lay before your excellency the following information upon the subject named.
There are in the three Manchurian provinces 100,000 Tartar soldiers—i. e., in Shin-King 30,000, in Kirin 40,000, and Hai-Lung-Chiang 30,000. These soldiers are not at present in active service, but are distributed about the provinces, tilling the ground allotted them by the Imperial Government, which, in addition, pays them a monthly allowance of 2 taels. They are not permitted to engage in any other business, and are liable to be called out at the requisition of the government, when they would be formed into infantry and cavalry, as the nature of the circumstances demanded, the tactics of which would be the ancient drill of China. According to established rules these soldiers should be drilled once a month, but this seems to be almost a dead letter, as they are really only manoeuvered once or twice in a twelvemonth.
At Moukhen, capital of this province, there are stationed 600 foreign-drilled troops from Tientsin, at Fing-Huang-Ching (Corean gate) there are 500 more under the Taotai of that place, and a like number stationed here, styled “The Taotai Guard.” There are no foreign-drilled troops in the other two provinces, although in each there are from 2,000 to 3,000 Manchu soldiers being instructed in foreign drill.
There is no naval establishment of importance in my district. The only one of which I can learn is at Kirin, described by the late Mr. Consul T. T. Meadows in the following words:
“Chun-Chang, or Navy-Yard, officially called Kuh-lin, and known to foreigners as Kirin, is the capital of the northeasterly Manchurian province, Kirin. * * * It owes its existence as a provincial capital, and its subsequent growth, to hostile parties of Cossack adventurers who, about two hundred years ago, ascended the Amoor, [Page 278] and came up the river Sungari in river craft. In his measures to repel them, the then Huang-li-Tanghe moved the military governor from Ning-Ku-ta to Kirin, at which he at the same time established a chun-chang, or navy-yard, where river war-craft were constructed to aid in the defensive operations.* * * The navy-yard still exists, and a number of vessels in good condition, some quite new, were laid up in it when I was there (1867 or ’68). They are one-masted craft of about the size of small lorchas.”
I may remark that during the greater part of the open season there is in this port one or more of the Foochow arsenal foreign-type gunboats, under the command of and manned by Chinese, but partially foreign disciplined.
At present there is no fort in my district, but it is stated, on good authority, that the Taotai has been instructed to erect one at the west of the native town of Yangtse, on the left bank of the river Liao, and the location has already been decided upon by him, and the work is to begin at once.
It is rumored here that Sung-Ching, the szchuen-ti-tu (commander-in-chief), at present in Houan, has been ordered to transport to this place 100,000 troops. Taking, the standard of one soldier representing four, this means that 25,000 soldiers are to be quartered here, the first detachment of which, 10,000 (2,500), is expected to arrive within three or four days.
For the truth of these statements I cannot vouch, but the active construction of barracks is going on, and four encampments are already laid out near the site of the projected fort.
I may have occasion to address your excellency a further communication on the subject of this dispatch.
I have, &c.,
Mr. Lord to Mr. Seward.
Ningpo, February 28, 1880.
Sir: In reply to the request made in your dispatch, No. 51, dated the 10th ultimo, that I should report to you such facts as I might be able to obtain bearing upon the war power of China, including the condition of the army and navy, and of the forts, arsenals, and training establishments of this district, I beg to submit the following notes:
1. In speaking of the army and navy of China, it is needful at the outset to observe that these institutions are very unlike those to which these names are given in the West) The armies and the navies of England, France, Germany, and the United States, though differing as to size, make-up, and equipment, are yet all organizations. Each is a body, made up indeed of many parts, but of parts in which there is a mutual relation and a mutual dependence. And this body, however complicated, however vast, is governed by one law, animated by one spirit, and moved by one mind. An arm of the nation to which it belongs, the life of that nation lives in it, and the will of that nation controls it. The case is different here. Here there are men called soldiers, but there is no army; there are vessels called men-of-war, but there is no navy. Materials there may be adequate for both, but they are only materials, they are not yet constructed. In other words, the war power of China is essentially wanting in organization. Bearing this in mind, there will perhaps be no objection to the use of these terms, army and navy, in our notes on this subject.
2. There is in this province, as I suppose there is in each of the others, what in theory resembles a standing army. That is to say, there is a certain number of men enlisted and employed as soldiers. They are commanded by officers of various ranks, under the control of the te-tuh, or provincial general. The te-tuh of this province has naval, as well as army, jurisdiction. And for this reason he resides at Ningpo, the provincial port, rather than at Hangchow, the provincial capital. This officer is not, in our sense of the terms, either a naval or a military commander. He seems to be a sort of provincial secretary of war and of the navy. His jurisdiction and his powers are certainly large, but his knowledge of the matters over which he is placed must be very limited. He is supposed to know the number and location of his soldiers; the kind of arm—jingall, matchlock, or musket—which they bear; the names and commands of his subordinates; the amount of pay which soldiers and officers receive; and such like matters. He is supposed to know also when, where, and how many soldiers are needed, either to man forts, hold positions, or to put down disturbances. And, to a similar extent, his knowledge and authority extend to the vessels of war belonging to or serving within his district. But in matters of practical warfare, such as army organization and discipline, navigation, naval architecture, gunnery, army and naval tactics, as they are understood in the West, he has probably very little theoretical and no practical knowledge. What, then, one might ask, is he good for? Well, in [Page 279] war, as it is carried on among western nations, he would be good for nothing. But he has his place here.
The war power of this province, such as it is, needs a head. And the head that he makes has at least this to recommend it, that it is suited to the body. And, it may be added, both are in keeping with the ideas and institutions of the country.
3. The number of soldiers enrolled in this province is not always the same. A few years ago it is said to have been some 39,000. The present number is said to be about 20,000. And it seems to be regulated in this way: The te-tuh, the officer of whom I have spoken, is presumed to know the number, kind, and equipment of the soldiers needed to defend and keep in order his district. He reports on these matters to the lieutenant-governor or to the governor, or to both, and through them, or with their concurrence, to the head government at Peking. And the order received in reply settles, in theory, the matter. I say “in theory,” for in this, as in many other things here, theory and practice are not always the same.
If the general government assents to the enrollment of 20,000 soldiers in this province, it must of course allow the expense for the pay and equipment of this number, to be deducted from the provincial revenue. This being understood, it is easy to see that those in charge of the matter might, if so inclined, actually employ a number considerably less than that reported as needed, and appropriate the amount thus saved to objects nearer home; common report says that this is done, and done to a very considerable extent. And common report in this matter is very likely correct. There is no way to ascertain the actual number of soldiers in this province. But I should be inclined to place it below rather than above 10,000. This number, or the number whatever it may be, is distributed in larger or smaller detachments throughout the province. The nominal number assigned to Ningpo and its surroundings is betwixt two and three thousand. This includes also those who serve on board the gunboats.
4. The land forces of this province are infantry. The country, owing to the want of roads, and to the numerous canals and watercourses, is adapted to the use of neither cavalry nor artillery. They are armed mainly with jingalls, matchlocks, and muskets. These jingalls and matchlocks are very rude and unwieldy weapons of war, and they could be of very little use in conflict with arms now used in the West. The muskets are foreign made, but only a small number are in use; and those in use are most likely of inferior kind.
5. Chinese soldiers are poorly paid. Each man is allowed a pound or two of rice per diem, and, in addition, a little money. The monthly pay of a soldier, including his rice, would probably not exceed $4. No clothing, I believe, is found him, except his uniform. This consists of a coarse blue cotton jacket, with some red trimming, and with some letters stitched on the front and back. The whole cost of this garment would probably be less than a dollar. And it is of very little use, except to indicate that the person wearing it is a soldier.
6. These soldiers are not only poorly equipped and poorly paid, but they are poorly disciplined. Indeed, they can hardly be said to have any discipline. A large number of them are engaged in other pursuits, and are seldom or never called upon to render any military service. And even those supposed to be in the service are only to a very limited extent charged with the duties of ordinary soldiers. Their mode of life is essentially idle, and their idleness results in demoralization. Thus, badly equipped, badly paid, and badly disciplined, they could not, one would suppose, be of any great benefit to their country. They may be, and probably they are, of some use in putting down or preventing local disturbances, though in doing it they are sure to commit extortions and cruelties of every kind. But the protection which they would afford their country, in case of hostile invasion, would probably be very small. The soldiery of this province a few years ago, when called to face the long-haired rebels, were not only weak, but they were utterly contemptible. It was said of them, and I believe with entire justice, that they were more formidable to their friends than to their enemies. They may have improved somewhat since then; yet, even now, were similar troubles to arise, is it likely that their behavior would be such as to redeem them from this old contempt? I think it very doubtful.
7. On the whole, then, the war power of this province, so far as concerns the number, character, and equipment of its soldiers, does not seem to be very formidable. Formidable no doubt it would be in attacking and cutting down unarmed peasants, and in burning and ravaging their districts. But placed face to face with well-armed and well-disciplined troops, it would not and could not stand.
8. The fortifications that are kept up in this province are not numerous, and most of them, I should judge, would be of very little use in case of hostile invasion. An exception to this remark should perhaps be made in favor of a fort of some pretensions recently built at the mouth of the Ningpo River. I have not Visited this fort myself, and I can give no better account of it than that found in the Reports on Trade at the Treaty Ports in China for the year 1875, page 181, and which, to save the trouble of reference, I will here copy: “The out station of Chinhai has been some time in the hands of the military engineers. A large fort is being built there on the extremity of the citadel hill, on the left bank of the river. This fort is being built after foreign [Page 280] designs—I believe supplied by Germans. It stands about 60 feet above the water, and commands the entrance to the river, the direct line of fire of the guns bearing (as far as I could judge) on the Seaon Yew Spit buoy. This fort, which is being built of native stone, is intended to be bomb-proof. The guns will be mounted on three platforms, four on the lower, three on the next, and one on the top. The lower ones at least will be mounted en embrasure, the openings being plated with iron to a thickness of about three inches, and provided with riveted iron doors of about the same thickness. The guns on the lower platforms are English made, of rather early date, but I believe they have been bored out and refined. The piece de resistance will be mounted on the upper platform. It is a large, breech-loading 10-ton Krupp cannon, mounted on a carriage worked by hydraulic power, and made to train over an arc of some 150°. It was brought here on the 5th June in the Chinese gun-vessel Fupo, and remained for some time on board pending the devising of some means of getting it landed at Chinhai. After some three or four months it was landed close under the fort and raised to the necessary elevation on a series of wooden platforms securely fixed into the rock. I have not yet heard of its being mounted. The estimated cost of the whole fort is put down at Haikwan taels 30,000. The work is being principally done by soldier labor.”
There was a fort in the process of construction in the harbor of Ting-hai at Chu-san, in the summer of 1876. I saw it at that time. It was built of stone. Its form was round or polygonal. Its walls were some seven or eight feet high, and some five or six feet thick. It had ports, I think, for some five or six guns, and quarters sufficient to accommodate some fifty soldiers. The work was yet unfinished. No guns were seen in or about the place. The work appeared to me unsubstantial, and good for nothing against heavy cannon shot. I do not know whether the work has been completed, but I suppose it has.
There are two forts that I have noticed on the banks of the Wenchow River; one is at the city of Wenchow, a little east of the city wall, the other is on the opposite bank of the river and several miles further down. I have not seen the inside of either, but I should judge them to be frail structures, and with no effective armament.
9. There is no arsenal or place where arms are manufactured or ships are built in this province. The war steamers on this station (there are three of them now) were built at the Foochow Arsenal. Two of these vessels are stationed at Ningpo, and one at Wenchow. This vessel is but recently built. She was waiting for her armament a week or two ago. These three vessels, both in size and equipment, are very respectable, and in war, if well handled, they would no doubt do good service. They are commanded and worked entirely by natives.
I have, &c.,
Mr. Denny to Mr. Seward.
Tientsin, February 3, 1880.
Sir: Referring to your dispatch No. 70, requesting me to report to you such facts, as I may be able to obtain regarding the war power of China, the condition of her army, navy, forts, arsenals, and training establishments, I beg to say in regard to the questions generally, that as my experience with them is limited, perhaps the most appropriate thing I can do is to refer to the valuable report of that accomplished soldier and military critic General Upton, upon the war power of China, contained between pages 12 and 32, and continued on page 389, made to the War Department in December, 1877.
The condition of the army, its numbers, and kinds of arms used, are about the same as when the general visited China. The navy in these waters now, instead of consisting of two wooden gun-boats as it did then, has had added to it eight small iron gunboats, each with one 35-ton gun, which are intended for harbor defense only. These additions, as well as all other military and naval changes, have hitherto been fully reported to the War Department at Washington by the commanders of the different United States gun-boats visiting this port.
The number and condition of the forts remain the same, the only increase in strength being the addition of a few medium sized Krupp guns.
There are two arsenals at Tientsin, and a recent visit to these showed them to be apparently in good working condition.
As to training establishments, I am not aware that there are any such in my district, except the torpedo school, which is now closed temporarily.
I am, sir, &c.