Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 6, 1880

No. 168.
Mr. Denny to Mr. Payson.

United States Consulate-General,
Shanghai, May 15, 1880. (Received June 14.)

No. 32.]

Sir: I have the honor to forward to yon the text of the original treaty recently negotiated by Chung How, between Russia and China, which has been the cause of so much excitement in China, and which has also been the alleged cause of sentence of death being pronounced against the unfortunate minister by the Tsung-li Yamên at Peking. Until now no one has ever been able to get the text of this treaty.

I am, &c.,

O. N. DENNY.

[Inclosure 1 with No. 32.]

the russo-chinese treaty, negotiated by chung-how.

The following is the substance of the treaty entered into by Chung-How with Russia, and which has not been before published. The part referring to the right of each Russian to carry a gun, noticed in the memorial, appears to be omitted from the copy sent to us, and we have not been able to supply the Omission.

• Article 1. Russia consents to restore Ili.
• Article 2. China consents to grant an amnesty to the inhabitants of Ili.
• Article 3. The inhabitants of Ili who remove to Russian territory shall be treated equally and enjoy the same rights as Russians.
• Article 4. The property hitherto acquired by Russians in Ili shall be retained by them in future.
• Article 5. The negotiations for the rendition of Ili shall be conducted on behalf of China by Tso-Tsung-t’ang and others, appointed for this purpose by a special imperial decree, and on behalf of Russia by (General) Kauffmann, specially delegated for it.
• Article 6. For the restoration of Ili, China agrees to pay to Russia the sum of 5,000,000 rubles, payment thereof to begin from the day of the exchange of the treaty, and to be completed within a year.
• Article 7. Ili being restored, the land west of E-Ko-si River and south of the Li-shan (mouDtains) down to Tekes River is ceded to Russia.
• Article 8. It is agreed that the frontier at Ta-ch’eng (Tashkend?) shall be modified.
• Article 9. After the boundaries have been fixed by the special delegates, boundary posts shall be erected.
• Article 10. In addition to the consulates already established, in accordance with previous treaties at Kashgar and Urg, new consulates shall be established at Kia-yü-kuan, Wuko, Hami, Turfan, Lumutsi, and Kuché.
• Article 11. In dealing with official affairs, the consuls and the local authorities shall use in their correspondence to each other the form of a “letter,” and the consuls shall be treated according to customs as guests.
• Article 12. Russian merchants in Mongolia and in the provinces of T’ien-shan, Nan-lu, and T’ien-shan Peh-lu shall not pay duties for their merchandise.
• Article 13. Mercantile depots shall be established in all those places where consulates are, and also in Kaligan.
• Article 14. Russian merchants may transport their goods from and to Kaligan, Kia-yu-kuan, Tientsin, and Hankow, by passing Tung-chau, Ti-an-fu, and Han-chung, and when transporting native produce for Russia they shall use the same route.
• Article 15. Not until five years after the imperial sanction shall this treaty be revised or altered.
• Article 16. As regards the desire of the Russian merchants for a special duty for inferior tea, this question shall be settled by the Tsung-li Yamên.
• Article 17. As in the previous treaties the local authorities shall endeavor to find out the cattle which run away beyond the frontier, but they shall not pay for any such actual loss.
• Article 18. One year after the conclusion and imperial signature of the treaty, the ratifications of the same shall be exchanged in the Russian capital.

[Inclosure 2 with. No. 32.—Translation.]

russia and china.—important memorial to the throne.—the marquis tseng’s instructions.—the nature of the russo-chinese treaty explained.

Chang Chih-t’ung, a sub-reader, (1) begs, prostrated, to make the following most humble memorial to the throne, in relation to the repudiation of a treaty concluded and in order to devise means for guarding oneself against insults. The petitioner will therefore most humbly take the liberty to point out the injuries caused (by the treaty to China), and to make his most urgent representations, most respectfully hereby begging His Majesty to deign to give this most humble petition his sacred glance.

The petitioner, perusing the Peking Gazette of the last days in reference to the treaty with Russia and to the shameful behavior of our ambassador, thereby exposing the honor of our country, found therein an imperial decree convoking the high statesmen for consulting thereupon. What the petitioner knows about the treaty itself is by hearsay and only a general outline, but even that suffices to rouse his deepest indignation.

The evil consequences and injuries caused by consenting to or refusing the execution of the treaty in question, the petitioner now begs, most humbly, to lay before their majesties the Empresses and His Majesty the Emperor. Nothing shall be mentioned of the eighteen articles of the new treaty in general, but the worst point, namely, the question of the overland trade route, from Kia-yü-kuan, (2) over Si-an-fu (3) and Han-chung, (4) to Hankow, by which the (for China) most important provinces of Tsin and Lung, (5) as well King and Ts’u, (6) and Shang-yen (7) are delivered up, deserves particular attention. The number of trading places there will grow up with daily-increasing abundance, like weeds, nothing more will be kept secret, everything will be known, and while the passes of the frontier are well guarded, the interior of the country is already lost. To refuse the consent to that is the first and most essential point.

Concerning the three eastern provinces (8), forming the cradle of the Imperial family, and Patuna (9), the most important and beautiful place of Kirin (10), should it be allowed (to the Russians) to approach with their ships the last-mentioned place, for then also all the places of the three eastern provinces will be approachable at their pleasure; the capital will thus be made nearer to them, and China will become more and more divested of its present character. But there is not the slightest reason why she should push herself back from Sui-fen (11) towards the west, a tract of land of 2,000 li. Moreover, as far as the inland navigation on rivers is concerned, all the governments have already asked for this privilege, without, however, succeeding in getting it. If this privilege should now be conceded to the Russians, all other nations will follow their example successively. To refuse consent to that is the second point.

That the government gives up the levying of duties is for the benefit of the trading classes; should this benefit be now extended to all the tribes and leagues (12) of the Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Russians will profit by this advantage for their trade and feel themselves also exempted from the payment of duties. That the trade in hands of the Chinese will thereby get more and more beggared, is a trifle in comparison to the further consequence, considering that already the Mongolians are poor and weak, that the Russians will thereby coil around and fleece them, and that all the enormous expenses of the campaign in Sinking (13) have been made only for the benefit of Russians. Concerning the places in the interior, as Chang-kia-Kow (14) and others, where (Russian) firms have established themselves, their number gradually increases and their business becomes more and more extended. If hostilities should now begin, the head and tail, or a space of over 10,000 li, is hereby connected. Not to agree to such a state of things is the third point.

All the dependencies of China are situated in Inner and Outer Mongolia; the desert Shamo (15), several thousand li distant, separates them from the Russians. Should these desire to trespass on the frontier, they will find on the northern side a great many obstructions and difficulties. The mail service in Mongolia is performed by the Mongolians on behalf of Russia; should she increase to the Mongolians the money they receive for it, then on a day of important events the dispatch of the hews will be accelerated, the transport of provisions for her army will find no obstruction, and it will be inevitable that our dependencies will be incited and make for them the leaders on the road. To stop this state of affairs is the fourth point.

By the treaty, permission is given to the Russians to pass thirty-six frontier barriers, a line far too long in peaceful times for the merchants. Is that not ridiculous, showing that the Russians are fooling us? At a time of great events, soldiers will enter thereby, and how shall we then guard ourselves? To refuse them this stipulation is the fifth point.

To no merchant whatever is permitted the right of carrying arms. Now, with no reason whatever, the right is conceded to every individual to carry with him a gun. What is the meaning of that? When a multitude, numbering a hundred or thousand of them, quite suddenly enters our territory, how can the distinction he made as to who are soldiers and who are merchants? To refuse this right is the sixth point.

As in everything, so also in the question of duties, the Russians think to cunningly evade payment thereof. Should the other nations expect the same concession, the income of the customs of Hankow will gradually, and year by year, diminish to the extent of several millions. To refuse this concession is the seventh point.

Although in the third year of Tungchih (1864–’65) the frontiers of Sin-Kiang were already defined, again they desire to occupy more of our country and cut us off from the southern portion of the road of the eight cities (16). The actual situation of Sin-Kiang is thus, that the northern road is hare and depopulated, while the southern places are prosperous and populous; (China) has now to receive a stony and arid soil, and for it give up the fertile and rich soil, and all this for a visionary fame, hut in reality to cause misery. This is a reason for refusing the eighth point.

At Ili (17), Tarhagatai (18), Khobdo (19), Uliasutai (20), Kashgar, Urumtsi (21), Kuché (22), Turfan (23), Hami (24), and all the other places beyond the Kin-zü-Kuan, consular establishments are to be allowed; thus the whole frontier region of the western cities will be entirely under their control. The presence of foreign officials will bring also foreign customs establishments. These, when established, will receive (for protection) foreign soldiers. Thus the power heretofore wielded by us will be at once usurped, so that we shall be the guests and they the hosts; they will have at those places their authorities, while we shall be without any of them; they will have a garrison, while we shall have no garrison.

The law prevailing with all the other nations is to allow the establishment of consulates of other nations in the remotest spots on the sea-shore. If nowadays Russia, in this respect, takes the start with Uliasutai, Khobdo, Urumtsi, Kuche, Hami, and Kia-yü-kuan, which places are all within our boundaries, then all the other nations will also like to profit by this article; then all the places in the interior of the eighteen provinces will be filled with foreign officials. To disallow this is the ninth point.

Russia returns three-fourths of Ili. From the ridges of the mountains and heft yond the passes the (Russian) settlements there remain as heretofore, thus giving them the dominating position and checking us by their strongholds. The division being made so that the western part of Ko-ho-erh-ko-si River and the north of Ko-erh-man-tou is restored to us, we get thereby no new land to cultivate, no pastures, and no benefit whatever in this country. In Kin-ting-szi the Russians ever since had their trading establishments. According to the treaty now concluded, this territory has been ceded to Russia, and will not be restored to China. It is true only a strip of land (remains with Russia), but the eastern part of the road (25) will go through Russian territory, and we shall be cut off from the outlet; the few people remaining with us will thus remove there, and we shall be hereafter without people. We threw away 1,800,000 (taels) of most useful money in return for a useless tract of land, the ground of which is of no benefit without people and without the outlet of the road of Hi. What is the use of it? Not to allow this is the tenth point.

The Russian demands show covetousness and truculency in the highest degree, and Chung How, in his extreme stupidity and madness, agreed to them, but Their Majesties the Empresses and His Majesty the Emperor being incensed by this outrage, the ambassador was changed accordingly, and, fully aware of the clearness and justice of the case, the grand council was convoked. The high dignitaries of the privy council, his imperial highness the prince and the ministers of the Tsungli-Yamên, the hundreds of officials of the various parts of the empire—in one word, all the people—are fully aware that this state of affairs should not be allowed, and although not daring to express the public sentiment for an alteration of the stipulations, fully apprehending, considering that as the treaty is an accomplished work, serious complications between the two nations may arise, still the petitioner himself thinks that such apprehensions are groundless. The treaty must be altered in spite of all future troubles. If we do not alter the treaty, we are not worthy to be called a nation.

Earnestly begging that my entreaties for an alteration of the treaty may be heard, there are four most important reasons for it: For the first, the absolute necessity; for the second, a strong voice; for the third, the right; and for the fourth, the scheme (to be carried out).

What is the absolute necessity? A treaty was concluded with every disregard of right and agreed upon by the ambassador, but refused by the government, whereby Chung How brought evil on the empire and joy to the enemy. Returning home by his own will and on his own responsibility, all our countrymen demanded his decapitation, asking that he should be delivered to the board of punishments, and that the crimes of an ambassador should be dealt with according to law, and thus also to shut the mouth of the Russians. According to international law, any disobedience shown to the orders of the Emperor is regarded as exceeding the powers conferred by his Majesty, and all the powers of such a minister are, point by point, made out by the government. Chung How’s crime is the disregard he had for the secret instructions and for the imperial will. His case is similar to the one which brought Ki-ying to prison. The final decision is clear, and I therefore say, let Chung How he executed. This is the absolute necessity.

What is a strong voice? The Russians insulted our helpless and sluggish ambassador and extorted his signature. For one penny the Russians spend, they want the return of hundreds of pounds; and even then they are dissatisfied. Although Russia is a great empire, she ought to feel ashamed of her dealings. Though she outrageously incites China, yet all the kingdoms of the globe are on our side. The Russian minister at Peking, not waiting for the final issue of the treaty, threatens to withdraw to Russia, but even in foreign countries such custom does not exist. Moreover, Mr. Koyander is only a chargé d’affaires. How can he return by his own will and responsibility? It is clearly nothing else but a threat. Let him go or remain, as he pleases; it is not necessary to consult him about it. The best course now to be adopted is to issue an imperial decree clearly stating therein that the Russians are unjust, and also giving the reasons why the people and officials object to the stipulations. Let (this decree) be promulgated in Inner and Outer China; let all the other powers decide for themselves which of us two is in the wrong; order also the assembly (?) to publish in the newspapers how reasonable we were towards Russia, and how all our yielding is now exhausted. Let orders be issued to the high officials along the frontier to prepare quietly for war, according to the people’s wrath, for they are wearied with the continual yielding, and accordingly China is resolved not to yield further.

Although Russia is very great, yet since the last wars with Turkey she has weary soldiers and is without funds, her statesmen have parted, the people are exasperated, and during the last years many attempts were made against the life of her ruler. Should he now again reject our friendship and attack us as enemies, the people there, considering the distance, will get wearied, and outbreaks in his own household will be inevitable, to which finally he will succumb. How can he then look after other people’s affairs? To proclaim this near and afar, this is what I call a strong voice.

What is the right? A great many gifts originated on account of Ili. According to the treaty in question, what China receives is only the two empty characters, I and li; what she in lieu thereof throws away is 20,000 li of real ground at Sin-kiang, besides to pay every year from 40,000 to 50,000 (?) taels for the maintenance of the army garrisoned at those remote parts of our frontier for cultivating land and building cities. The possession of Sin-kiang for us amounts to about the same as if we were not to possess it. For the desire to have Hi, we have to sign a treaty, the blame for which rests entirely with us. The recovery of Ili is also a fault, which, however, is shared by them. Although the ambassador has signed the treaty, still he did not receive the imperial assent to it, and the treaty cannot therefore be considered as ratified. The case is precisely the same as described in old books, where no treaty concluded could come into force unless the blood of a sacrifice was sipped by the contracting parties. How can the Russians, without any right whatever, and bare of any argument, consider it as a wrong done to them? For this reason all our subsequent claims on Hi will only increase our right to it.

What is the scheme? Should the Russians declare their good faith in us, the movements of their armies may stop. But if Russia disregards justice and law, and rejects our friendship, then preparations (for a war) have to be made in three directions; one at Sin-kiang, one at Kirin, and one at Tientsin. Tso-Tsung-t’ang, with his so many times victorious army, has an always vigorous military strength in hand. (His seconds in command) Kin-shun (26,), Lieu-kin-t’ang (27), Hso-lun (28), and Chang-yao-lu (29), are very able generals; besides, we can quietly await the movements of the Russians, who, worn out by fatigue, must be defeated. Combined with the Lamas and Djassaks (30), plans can be devised for cutting off their retreat, and then horses and steamers cannot bring them home again. Should they break out at Kirin, the frontiers there are very distant, and the forests are very thick. From that region to the Russian capital is a distance of over 20,000 li. The solitary army has to enter very deep, but the supply and transport of the provisions will be very difficult. The army used there cannot be very strong. A general skillful in civil and military matters should be specially selected; he should be invested with great and extraordinary powers, and be provided with sufficient funds for his army. Half of the armies of the southern and northern sea are to be brought under the command of clever leaders to the three eastern provinces. Tso-Tsung-t’ang and Kin-shun should be ordered to detach from Chihli (31) generals of military abilities for the three eastern provinces, and arrived there they should be ready for orders. The butchers of So-lun (32) and Ha-t’sin shall be called together and taught military drill, as these men are in general of a martial disposition and brave, and already accustomed to fight with the Russians. The victory will be thus sure. Should, however, a small defeat occur, let the force keep together for a few months, as the Russians will disperse by themselves and retreat.

Although Tientsin is close to the capital, still the Russian men-of-war will not be allowed by the English and French to proceed thither, and, according to law, they cannot pass the Suez Canal; thus they will be constrained to carry their troops in merchant vessels, but these again are not to be compared with the European iron-clads.

Li Hung-chang declared that China shall do her duty; in a forthcoming struggle with Russia she need not fear of remaining isolated. With the greatest possible speed let our selected soldiers be drilled; arm the fortifications according to the newest German improvements. If we should be victorious in this war, bestow on the victors the titles of dukes and earls; if not victorious, punish the warriors with additional severity. Instead of paying 2,800,000 taels as indemnity for Hi, this sum should be used for engaging strong European soldiers, who will fight for us. The Russians-encroach steadily on Huei-kiang (33) and swallow How-han; their object thereby is to have the line at the back of India connected with these distressing designs. England is also harassed.

Should Li Hung-chang explain to the English minister in this way, that if the lips-are lost the teeth will feel cold (viz, if the outlying states are taken by Russia, England will be in danger), he will perceive and also hate the common enemy. Let the generals who distinguished themselves during the latter years, such as P’eng-Yü-lin (34), Yang-Yo-pin (35), Pao-Ch’ao (36), Lieu-Min-chuang (37), Shan-Kuei, Tseng-Yü-ying (38), Kuo-Sung-ling (39), Sung-K’ing (40), Shou-C’hang, Peng-Tsu-hang (41), Kuo-Pao ch’ang, Tsao-Keh-shang, Li-Yung-lin, Chen-Kwo-jin (42), who are either still in office or retired, after due consideration, be called by Imperial mandate to the capital, and be ordered to arrange an excellent plan; then place them either in Peking, or Tung-chau, or Tientsin, or Taku, or in the three eastern provinces, so that they shall be ready there in case of the outbreak of the war. Placed there, they will be like ferocious tigers in the mountains, of which people are terrified. This is the scheme.

Although inexperienced, the petitioner nevertheless dares to express his opinion. He does so only from the deep interest he feels in his isolated native country, fully aware of the changes of the time, and how troubles and difficulties daily accumulate, by the Europeans usurping our power, by the Japanese earnestly endeavoring to annex parts of our territory, and by the Russians, who are stirring up mischief. If we again suffer and yield, then from that moment all the other nations will also press upon us. What will happen if we suffer that, or if we do not suffer it? If we yield to that, or if we do not yield to it? No matter, if we only do resist the Russians; for although victory was hitherto with us, in the event of war victory and defeat are uncertain. The petitioner thinks that if the Russians should tight they would not be able to cross the Kia-yü-kuan, and, even if they win, they will not be able to approach Ning-kü-tah (43), and therefore they cannot hurt us much. As their advance will last a considerable time, they will not find food at the resting places, and their strength will thereby get weakened. What is then to be dreaded? Now is the time to ascertain if China is weak or strong, and if she possesses clever men, and accordingly whether she will rise or sink. Now, with valorous generals and scheming statesmen, is the time to fight. If, again, several years elapse, Tso-Tsung-t’ang, although then perhaps still alive, will be too old; Li-Hung-chang, although not weakened, will be too old; and so with the skilled and ardent ones gradually dying out, even if the desire for war should still prevail it would be impossible to go to war. The Russians have already built up cities in the east; their troops are garrisoned in the west; their trading establishments are situated in the north, and so, up and down and across their abodes are to be found this side and beyond the great wall, on every highroad; even Core a is intimidated by them. As we are now distant and separated from them we can guard ourselves, but later, when they have reached our outposts to fight with us, it will be too late. The most important thing is now, while negotiations for a revision of the treaty are going on, to prepare for a war. But, even if the treaty should not be altered, the warlike preparations should nevertheless not be discontinued. As far as the negotiations in regard to Hi are concerned they might be delayed, in order that our preparations might be more effective. Chung How, however, has to lose his life. Even in the case that the treaty has been altered, his life should be forfeited; also in the case that the treaty will not be altered. This is the general opinion, and not simply the petitioner’s own.

To assist His Majesty in the government is the duty of all the high provincial officers, and also the duty of all the officials; the negotiations with Russia have, accord-ding to the rule, to be conducted by the Tsung-li Yamên, but the final decision rests with Your Majesties the Empresses, and Your Majesty the Emperor.

As this question concerns the deepest interests of the country, the most humble petitioner cannot keep silent, and does not dare to remain idle; he begs therefore that Sublime Grace may lay the petition before the high statesmen, that they may deliberate upon a petition made in grief and wrath. May Your Majesties deign to bestow upon this most humble petition your sacred glance.

Explanatory notes to Chang-Chih-t’ung’s memorial.

(1). She Tuh, a subreader of the Han-lin Academy. Two are Manchu and three Chinese. Secondary fifth degree.

(2). Kia-yü-kuan, the most westerly gate in the Great Wall, at the end of it, in Kansuh.

(3). Si-an-fu, capital of the province of Shen-si, latitude 34° 17ʹ, longitude 108° 58ʹ.

(4). Han-chung, prefectural city in Shen-si, latitude 3.2° 53ʹ, longitude 107° 12ʹ.

(5). Ts-in and Lung, old historical names for Shen-si and Kansuh.

(6). Kiang and Tsu, old historical names for Hu-kuang, viz, Hu-peh and Hunan.

(7). Shang-yeu, above the elbow of the Yellow River, in Shansi, near Tung-kuan.

(8). The three eastern (Manchurian) provinces are Heh-lung Kiang, Kirin, and Feng-tien.

(9). Pa-tu-na, Petuné, lies in the northwestern part of Kirin, latitude 45° 10ʹ north, and longitude 124° 40ʹ east.

(10). Kirin or Ghirin, a large country to the northeast of Shing-king, bordering on the Sea of Japan and the Gulf of Tartary.

(11). Sui-fen, a little river discharging in the bay of Peter the Great, opposite and to the west of Wladiwostok.

(12). The banners of the Inner Mongolia are divided into six leagues (meng), which embrace the whole of the 24 tribes (pu) under which they are distributed.

(13). The territories of Sungaria on the north, and of the Mohammedan cities (Kashgaria) on the south, are designated generically as Sin-kiang, or the New Dominion.

(14). Chang kia-k’au, or Kalgan, a large town on the line of the caravan road, latitude 40° 51ʹ north, and longitude 114° 15ʹ east. Other places where Russian firms are established are: Urga, Ili, Tarbagatai, and Kurun.

(15). Shamo, the desert of Gobi.

(16). The eight cities are Kashgar, Kharashar, Kuchd, Aksu, Khoten, Hami, Ush, and Yarkand.

(17). Ili for Kuldja.

(18). Tarbagatai or Tashtava, an important garrison and town on the frontier of Ili, in latitude 47° north.

(19). Khobdo or Cobdo lies in the northwest of Mongolia, latitude 47° 30ʹ north, and longitude 85° 30ʹ east.

(20). Uliasutai, lying northwest of the Selenga River.

(21). Urumtsi, a town in Songaria, now included in Kansuhlatitude 43° 45ʹ north, and longitude 89° east.

(22). Kuché, a large garrisoned town, in latitude 41° 37ʹ north, and longitude 82° 55ʹ.

(23). Turfan, now included in Kansuh, on the confines of the Great Desert, in latitude 42° 40ʹ north, and longitude 90° 48ʹ east.

(24). Hami or Hamil, a town included in Kansuh, west of the Great Wall, in latitude 42°, 1600 li beyond Kia-yü-kwan. This note comprises a map of the places, but we are compelled to hold it over for the present.

(25). The road from Kuldja to Ak-su and Kashgar.

(26). Kin-shun, the conqueror and butcher of Hami and Manas, in Mandchu, banner general of Ili.

(27). Lieu-kin-t’ang, from Hunan, commissioner of the office of transmission, a nobleman of the fifth degree.

(28). Hsi lun, a Manchu, formerly a general in Tso’s army, now retired.

(29). Chang-yao, camp and garrison intendant of the province of Kuang-tung.

(30). The characters in the Chinese original must be wrong. They cannot be anything else but meaning Djassak, chieftain of a Mongolian banner.

(31). One would scarcely believe it, but such is the case. In the event of war Peking shall order Tso in Kansuh, who occupies also the highest military command, to order Li in Chihli to detach generals for the three eastern provinces which border in the east and northeast of Chihli.

(32). So-lun Manchus, from the region of the Amur, also partly settled in the Ili region.

(33). Huei-kiang, a name for Chinese or Eastern Turkestan.

(34). Peng-yu-ling, formerly vice-president of the board of war, now commanding admiral on the Yangtse, native of Hunan.

(35). Yang-yo-pin, formerly viceroy of Szi-chuen, now retired.

(36). Pao-ch’ao, native of Szi-chuen, formerly lieutenant-general of Peh-kiang, retired, and now called by the emperor to Peking.

(37). Lieu-min-chuang, native of Anhuei, formerly lieutenant-general in Chihli, now retired.

(38). Tseng-yu-ying, native of Yun-nan, now governor of Kui-chan.

(39). Kuo-Sung-ling, now lieutenant-general in Chihli.

(40). Sung-k’ing, now lieutenant-general in Szi-chuan.

(41). Peng-Tsu-Hong, a native of Hunan, now commanding admiral in Fuh-kien.

(42). Chen-Kwo-Jin, known by foreigners as the instigator of the massacre of Tientsin.

(43). Ning-Ku-Ta or Ningunta, the largest town in the province of Kirin, the residence of the officers commanding the southeastern part of Kirin, lying on the sea of Japan; it lies on the Hurba, a branch of the Soagar River, in latitude 44° 55ʹ north, and longitude 128° east.