Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 6, 1875, Volume I

No. 270.
General Schenck to Mr. Fish.

Legation of the United States,
London, June 1, 1875. (Received June 14.)

No. 758.]

Sir: A very interesting discussion took place yesterday in the House of Lords in relation to the part recently enacted by Great Britain in maintaining the peace of Europe by friendly intervention between Germany and France. I send you, in shape to be preserved, a full report of the debate, taken from the “London Times” of this morning. You can infer from the language used by both Lord Derby and Lord Russell on this occasion how general has been the excitement in British political circles, and how deep the uneasiness, from an apprehension that Germany and France might possibly rush again into war. Her Majesty’s government have declined to disclose, in answer to Lord Russell’s motion for the production of papers, to what extent there has been negotiation or correspondence directed toward a restoration of good understanding, or at least a removal of misunderstanding between the two powers. In doing this, the secretary for foreign affairs has also done something of much more general interest, and something worth recording and remembering. He has announced, not very boldly but yet with some distinct significance, what is to be the attitude and policy of Great Britain, under the present administration, in regard to interposing in future continental disputes. “A policy of non-intervention does not mean a policy of isolation and indifference, and it does not mean that England either is or can be indifferent to the maintenance of European peace.” This is obviously meant for answer as well to those who claim that Great Britain no longer has any weight, or can exercise any influence among the great European powers, as to those who are of opinion that Her Majesty’s government should hold entirely aloof from, and not intermeddle, even as a peacemaker, with the disturbed relations of neighboring nations.

I have, &c.,

ROBT. C. SCHENCK.

[Inclosure in No. 758.]

THE PEACE OF EUROPE.

House of Lords, Monday, May 31.

[From the Times, Tuesday, June 1, 1875.]

Earl Russell. My lords, I rise to move an address to Her Majesty for papers connected with the present state of Europe. It is fit that I should say at the commencement that I do not wish to unduly press upon the noble earl the secretary of state for foreign affairs whether Her Majesty’s government will produce the correspondence or a part of it, or whether they will deny to Parliament any such communication, I rise rather with the view of calling the attention of your lordships’ house to the present state of foreign affairs, because I think it necessary that your lordships’ attention should be directed to it under existing circumstances. My lords, I cannot forget that on the 30th of May, 1814, a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Russia and Prussia on the one side, and France on the other, by which treaty the boundaries of France were reduced to what they had been previously to 1792. I must say that on a comparison between the policy of that time and the policy which we have seen in more recent times, I have been struck with the great wisdom and circumspection and care shown when that treaty was made to preserve the position of Great Britain, and place her in a situation of considerable power and influence. Whether owing to any change which may have occurred in the public mind in regard to foreign affairs or for some other reason, it seems to me that, while in 1814 great circumspection and great vigilance were displayed in securing the position of Great Britain in Europe, there has been some carelessness in recent times, and that we run the danger of losing what the policy of 1814 achieved. In 1814, as I have said, care was taken, by the making of the treaty of the 30th of May at Paris, that the boundaries of France were reduced to what they ‘hail been in the month of January, 1792. I cannot help comparing the situation in 1814 and the position taken up by the English government of that day with what occurred five years ago—in 1870. In 1870, so far from the government of France being willing to remain divested of all territory beyond the limits of the boundaries of 1792, the Emperor of the French declared, and had no scruple in declaring, that he did not regard as binding the treaties of 1815, by which Great Britain and France had bound themselves. He announced that he intended to restore to France territory which she had lost on the Rhine, and to retake those fortresses which by the treaty of 1814 France had yielded to Germany. That was the demand of the sovereign of France; and just consider what would have happened if, instead of having been defeated and overwhelmed by the Germans, the French had been successful in the war of 1870–’71. If the French army, instead of the German, had been successful in that war, we should have been called upon to vindicate the faith of treaties and uphold what we had taken a prominent part in establishing. I do not say that at the present moment there is any danger of war, but I will recall to the recollection of your lordships what happened in May or June, 1870. At that time my noble friend near me, (Earl Granville,) who was secretary for foreign affairs, assured this house and assured Parliament and the country that all the documents which came to the foreign office were documents attesting to a desire for the continuance of peace, and to the peaceful disposition of the government of France among the other European governments. That was the declaration made in June, 1870, and yet in July one of the most violent, the most purposeless and wanton wars ever waged in Europe broke out between France and Prussia. [Hear, hear.] It appears to me, my lords, that, with such a warning in remembrance, we ought at present to take means which would afford some security for the peace of Europe. In 1814 it was thought necessary to make a treaty with Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia on the one side and. France on the other, in order to secure peace, and I cannot think that this country is safe or the peace of Europe is secure unless we have treaties, and see that our power in respect of treaties is fully maintained. The result of the late war was favorable to Germany, and territory which had belonged to France for two hundred years was wrested from her. But, my lords, it is impossible that there should not exist great resentment and great humiliation on the part, of France in consequence of her having had to make these large concessions; and when France has again a great army, and when she has effected what she desires on all those points in connection with the, reconstruction of her army to which she has been so closely attending—when she has a formidable army of perhaps 780,000 men, it is not unlikely that France may make use of that army to regain what she has lost. On the other hand, we see to what a standard of strength Germany keeps up her military forces, and, further, that she wishes to maintain a fleet. My lords, I do not say that either on the part of France or that of Germany there is a desire for war; but when we see the things to which I have been referring, I ask whether, in 1875, we have obtained any better security for peace than we had when my noble friend spoke in June, 1870. My noble friend made the statement to which I have alluded, and in a few weeks—I may say in’ a few days—there burst out a violent war, in which the interests of this country were greatly concerned. I hope, therefore, that we shall not only receive the same assurances of peace which we did in June, 1870, but that the policy of Great Britain in 1814 will be revived, that we shall see something of the spirit which was then displayed, and that this country will combine with other nations for the maintenance of the peace of Europe. I observe that Her Majesty’s government have been in communication on this subject with the governments of other countries; and my object in asking for this correspondence, or any part of it which may be produced without damage to the public interest, is to see whether the old spirit which used to prevail and did prevail in 1814 has been revived. I think that if Great Britain and Russia and Austria and other powers interested in peace were to declare not Only that they were favorable to it, but that they would use their means to preserve it, as England, Russia, and Prussia did in 1814, we should have a security for peace. I for one cannot rely on assurances such as those which we had in June, 1870, and I move for these papers in the hope, that an English policy—a British policy—may be declared by the government, and that we shall no longer exhibit that indifference, that carelessness of foreign policy which I regret we have in recent times allowed to prevail. [Hear, hear.] The noble earl concluded by moving “that an humble address be presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to communicate to this house so much of the correspondence between Her Majesty’s government and the governments of France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal relating to the peace of Europe which/has taken place since the commencement of the present year as can he made known to Parliament without injury to the public service.”

The Earl of Derby. My lords, with regard to the motion which the noble earl has made for the production of the correspondence relating to the late European crisis, I think that the noble earl himself—of whom and to whom I wish to speak with the greatest possible respect—-has by anticipation indicated the answer which I shall feel myself reluctantly comeplled to give him, because the noble earl more than once said it was not his intention to press for any correspondence the production of which might be injurious to the public service. I can quite understand and sympathize with the curiosity—the natural curiosity—and the deep interest with which your lordships and the country must have been watching the course of foreign affairs during the last few weeks, and I can quite appreciate the desire for information with respect to the details of what was passed. And, my lords, as far as Her Majesty’s government are concerned, there is nothing we have said or done which we have the slightest desire to keep from the knowledge of this house or the other house of Parliament, or the public. [Hear, hear.] But there is this objection to the production of those documents: that it would be impossible to give anything like such an account of these matters as Parliament and the country would expect without making use of confidential communications as to the opinions and policy of other governments, and those other governments would object in the strongest manner to our disclosing this confidential information. We could not in fairness disclose it without their consent; but even if we could, I do not think that in good policy we ought to do so, because the result would be to give other governments reason to conclude that whatever passed into the hands of the British diplomatists would be sure to be published. The consequence of that conviction would be that British diplomatists would receive very little confidential information in future. [Hear hear.] Therefore, my lords, the production of the whole of the correspondence is impossible; and I do not think the production of the correspondence mutilated or severely edited would answer any useful purpose. If published in full, its publication would be unfair to other governments; if published in a mutilated form, it would be useless.

But, my lords, there is another consideration, which is that the points of difference were of such a nature that they are likely to re-occur—though I hope they will not—and, therefore, looking at it from that point, I do not think it would be in the interest of European peace to give wider publicity and a larger circulation to all the details of the negotiations. [Hear, hear.] Indeed, I cannot conceive anything more calculated to revive and exasperate those feelings of irritation and mutual uneasiness which we know did unfortunately exist, and therefore I believe your lordships will have anticipated the answer I feel called upon to give when I say I think that on every ground it would be undesirable to produce those papers. [Hear, hear.] As to the action taken by the British government in the course of the negotiations, I feel that Parliament and the country have a right to know what we have been doing, in order that they may not seem to favor any policy which they do not approve; but while I say that, I am bound to confess that I can give your lordships very little information of which you are not, in substance at least, if not in detail, already in possession. Every one knows that great uneasiness existed a few weeks ago in respect of the relations of the governments of France and Germany. Language had been held by persons of the highest authority and position—statement shad been made by the semi-official press of Germany—to the effect that the French army was being increased to a degree which was dangerous to Germany and exceeded the requirements of France, and that the course being pursued in respect of that army manifested a determination on the part of France to renew the war of 1870–’71 at the earliest period at which she would be in a position to do so. It was further said that if such was to be taken as the object which France had in view, it might not be the duty of the German government to wait until France had made her preparations, but that government might feel itself called upon to take the initiative. It was said that Germany did not desire war, but that if war was to be avoided, it seemed necessary that th3 French armaments should be discontinued. My lords, those statements were, as I have observed, made by persons in high position in Germany, and they were repeated in other countries. In France, of course, they caused great uneasiness, and the French government disclaimed all such intentions as those which were thus attributed to them. I am bound to say that I accepted, and I still accept, that disclaimer as one made in all sincerity. I do not believe that any public man in France contemplated a renewal of the war of 1870—’71. After the misfortunes which they have undergone and the humiliations which they have endured, the French very naturally desire to keep up such an army as shall not only give them security at home, but shall give them such power and influence in Europe as they feel their importance as a great nation entitles them to. The existence of such a feeling on the part of the French cannot be disputed, nor is there any reason why it should not exist. [Hear, hear.] But it is one thing to desire to be safe and even strong at home, and it is another to be arming with ulterior motives. We believe that the apprehensions that have been entertained on this point have been unfounded. [Cheers.] One of the greatest difficulties that we had to encounter in the matter was that the French, on their side seemed hardly able to understand or to conceive that these apprehensions, which were felt on the part of the German government, were genuine or sincere, and that they—I won’t say the French government— but the French people, undoubtedly looked upon these apprehensions as being put forward by Germany as a mere pretext for a fresh attack. Now, that was the situation with which we had to deal, and it appeared to Her Majesty’s government that in such a state of things a mutual misunderstanding existed which might lead to the very gravest consequences. On the one hand, if the German government continued to entertain these apprehensions of the designs of France which they expressed, the next step on their part might be a formal request to France to discontinue arming. Had such a request been made it would have been very difficult to preserve peace, and the cause of quarrel between the two nations might have been revived. On the other hand, it will be obvious to your lordships that if the French statesmen believed that the apprehensions entertained by Germany were not genuine and were merely put forward as a pretext for war, such a belief on their part was not unlikely to lead lo most undesirable complications. Under these circumstances, therefore, it appeared to Her Majesty’s government that much good might be done by their endeavoring, quietly and unostentatiously, to calm down these feelings of mutual suspicion and distrust-entertained by the two countries. [Cheers.] It appeared to Her Majesty’s government that when two great nations are determined upon going to war with each other it is of very little use for their neighbors to attempt to interpose in the cause of peace; but that when the feeling between them is not so much one of violent irritation as of extreme mutual suspicion and distrust, there is room for the friendly offices of their neighbors. We did not think that France was contemplating a renewal of the war, neither did we believe that the German government were contemplating an act so entirely repugnant to the moral sense of Europe as that of running into an unprovoked war with the intention of completing the destruction of her former foe. [Cheers.] We found that the Russian government were determined to use their best efforts in the interests of peace, and the late visit of the Emperor of Russia to Berlin furnished us with a convenient opportunity of supporting, as far as support appeared necessary, the representations in favor of peace which we were led to believe the Emperor of Russia intended to make in the course of his visit to the German capital. That is substantially what has occurred in reference to this question as far as we are concerned. I can assure the house that I did not in any way wish to exaggerate the part Her Majesty’s government have played in the matter, neither do I wish to claim any particular merit for them. We have only done what it seems to me it was our obvious duty to do, and what we could not have avoided doing in the interest of peace and in the interest of justice. [Hear, hear.] My lords, it has been asked in some quarters whether the results which I am happy to say have been brought about were secured by any sacrifice on our part of our freedom of action, either present or prospective, and whether we had entered into any engagements which may bind us in future. I am glad to have this opportunity of stating that such is not the case. [Cheers.] We have used no language, we have entered into no engagement, and we have given no pledges that will fetter our freedom of action in the future, and if we were to quit office to-morrow we should leave our successors neither embarrassed nor committed by anything said or done by us in reference to this matter. I will not enter into the wide and deep-rooted question as to the rule which the noble earl said ought to guide our foreign policy. I do not believe that it is possible for us to lay down any formula or any general rule which shall bind us in our foreign policy for all time and on all occasions. We must deal with the circumstances of each case as it arises. I believe that the policy of non-intervention in general in continental disputes is the one which finds most favor with the people of this country; but a policy of non-intervention does not mean a policy of isolation and indifference, and it does not mean that England either is or can be indifferent to the maintenance of European peace. [Cheers.] I will not enlarge on this subject, and I can only end as I began, by expressing my conviction that it is not desirable that we should lay the correspondence which has been asked for before the house. [Cheers.]

Earl Granville. I wish to observe, in the first place, that I have no distinct recollection of the statement which the noble earl says I made in May or June, 1870, to the effect that all the dispatches which we had received were of the most pacific character. I have no recollection of having given any assurance of that kind. The noble earl has suggested that in making that statement I was not expressing my own views, but that I was quoting the language of my noble friend, who, all parties agree, has discharged the duties of under secretary of state for foreign affairs with such eminent success. Since I can find no record of my statement in Hansard, it would be indiscreet of me to say positively what that statement conveyed. What I believe, however, I stated on the occasion was, that I had been informed that I should find much less work in the office then than I had found 20 years previously. I have nothing to find fault with in the announcement of the noble earl opposite with reference to the papers asked for. I think that the production of such papers should he left to the discretion of Her Majesty’s government. On the one hand, it is their duty, and very much to their interest, to keep the country informed as to what they are doing with regard to political affairs abroad; and, on the other hand, were they to produce confidential correspondence they would destroy the sources of information for the future. If you hastily publish what you have yourself done in influencing foreign politics, you will be very apt-to weaken the influence you hope to exercise over foreign governments in the future. I know nothing about the papers asked for nor about what the government have done in the matter, and therefore I can express no opinion on the determination at which they have arrived on the point; but if, as has just been stated by the noble earl, Her Majesty’s government have without ostentation usefully put themselves forward in a spirit of complete neutrality to endeavor to remove misconceptions on each side, I think that they have pursued a right course. [Hear.] I am glad that the noble earl did not assume on behalf of Her Majesty’s government any extraordinary credit for the course which they have taken in this matter, because there is rather too much of that sort of thing done in other places, where it is said that this country has obtained something like a diplomatic victory by having brought matters to a successful and peaceful termination. I believe that any assumption of that sort is calculated to weaken our influence in the future. On the whole, however, it seems to me that Her Majesty’s government have acted in a wise and judicious manner.

Earl Russell did not desire that any confidential papers should be produced, but merely that the country should be fully informed with regard to our foreign policy.

The motion was negatived.