Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, with the Annual Message of the President, December 6, 1875, Volume I

No. 265.
General Schenck to Mr. Fish.

Legation of the United States,
London, April 15, 1875. (Received April 26.)

No. 733.]

Sir: On the 13th instant a debate of much interest took place in the House of Commons, in relation to the declaration of Paris.

I send you a full report of it, extracted from the London Times of yesterday. The discussion came up on a resolution offered by Mr. Baillie Cochrane, a conservative member sitting for the Isle of Wight. The proposition, after earnest argument, was disposed of by a vote refusing the previous question—261 yeas to 36 nays. This is, however, by no means to be taken as indicating the relative division of opinion in Parliament on the subject. There is a strong party in England in favor of withdrawing entirely from committal to that extended doctrine of neutrality, and, if a vote could have been forced directly on the merits of the matter, the result would have shown a very much larger number in favor of abrogation. The resolution, as you will observe, did not take the ground of immediate abrogation, but was limited to declaring that the proposed international conference at St. Petersburg would afford a favorable occasion for Great Britain to re-assert her maritime rights by withdrawal from what she assented to at Paris. As indicating the views, and temper prevailing in certain quarters of the kingdom on this subject, I also append a copy of a petition presented yesterday by Mr. Foster from his Bradford constituency, which I find printed in the newspapers of this morning. Mr. Foster, you know, is a leading and influential liberal, who was in Mr. Gladstone’s ministry. The difference of opinion among public men here on this subject is by no means marked by present party lines,

I have, &c.,

ROBT. C. SCHENCK.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 733.]

THE DECLARATION OF PARIS.

House of Commons,
Tuesday, April 13, 1875.

From the Times, Wednesday, April 14, 1875.

Mr. B. Cochrane, in rising to move a resolution in favor of withdrawing from the declaration of the treaty of Paris, said that the question was last brought before the house by the honorable member for Whitehaven, [Mr. C. Bentinck,] and he regretted that the circumstances of his honorable friend’s official position precluded him from recurring to the subject. It had previously been brought before the house in 1866 and 1867. The general feeling of the house then was in favor of withdrawing from the declaration of Paris, yet, as no particular question of international law was then before Europe, it was not thought desirable that the house should come to any resolution against the declaration of Paris. Last year a conference of international law met at Brussels, and this year another conference was to be held at St. Petersburg, and now when attention was directed to the subject of international law was the time, if ever, for that house to say whether the country should be bound for all time by the declaration of Paris of 1856.

The Brussels conference was convened with the professed object of ameliorating the condition of prisoners of war. The conference, however, went further, and considered the whole question of military warfare by land. The great object of this conference, which Lord Derby, with his usual sagacity, discovered, was to entangle this country into a confirmation of the declaration of Paris. This was clear from all the documents, and when Lord Derby appointed General Sir A. Horsford to go to the conference and watch its proceedings, he said:

“The powers must give the most positive assurance that the delegates shall not entertain in any shape, direct or indirect, anything relating to maritime operations or naval warfare;” and again, “It will be your duty to guard carefully against being led into any discussions which may affect, however remotely, the subject of maritime warfare.” In the last dispatch of Prince Gortchakoff, in reply to Lord Derby’s declining to recognize any future conference, the Russian minister, after saying there does not exist, strictly speaking, any positive international law, proceeds to say: “In the last century the rights of maritime neutrality had no legal existence, until the Empress Catherine had proclaimed them, and made them the object of treaties with other governments. England for a long time contested these rights as being derogatory to existing laws and customs. At the present time they are generally admitted, but have the force of obligatory laws only by the treaties that sanction them;” and in conclusion of the dispatch, “If the English government says it will keep to the principles of international law, and that it will impose the same on its allies, it would have been desirable that its meaning should have been rendered complete by stating what these principles are.” He proposed that the House of Commons should say to-night what were those principles of international law. He would not complain of the atrocities and calamities of war, for they were the best safeguards for the preservation of peace. You could not make war with kid gloves and rose-water. Peace congresses were not of modern origin. In one of Æsops fables a peace congress of animals was held, of bears, and wolves, and bulls, to discuss the laws of war. The wolves and bears proposed that the only weapon used for fighting should be the teeth. The bulls, however, replied, “You may do what you please, but nature has given us two horns, and we intend to use them.” The two horns of England were her power of Issuing letters of marque and the right of search. What was that right? From the earliest days of England’s greatness and maritime power the right had been claimed and exercised of seizing an enemy’s goods in whatever ship they might be, and whether under a neutral or any other flag. That right among ourselves had never been questioned. Lord Mansfield, when appealed to by the government of the day, distinctly laid down the following principles:

1. The goods of an enemy on board the ships of a friend may be taken.

2. The lawful goods of a friend on board the ships of an enemy ought to be restored; and

3. Contraband goods going to an enemy, although the property of a friend, may be taken as prize.

The principle was held by the English government of that day that they would not waive the right of seizing an enemy’s goods under whatever flag they might be found. The next occasion on which this principle was questioned was in 1780, when the famous armed neutrality was formed; but England declined to give way, and the whole question was again settled for the time being. Again, in 1801, an armed neutrality was entered into, but England, laying an embargo upon the property of the countries which had formed the league, issued letters of marque, and in six months the armed neutrality came to an end. He would not go back so far as Vattel or the other great authorities of days long past, but would quote a few of the authorities of later times on the subject. Lord Eldon, for instance, held that the right of searching neutral vessels originated in the rights of nature, and no convention or treaty could destroy the right. The opinion of Lord Stowell was conveyed in the following words: “A war and a commercial peace is a state of things not yet seen in the world; there is no such thing as a war for arms and a peace for commerce, and the right of visiting and searching merchantmen on the high seas, whatever be the cargoes, whatever the destination, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent state.” Lord Nelson, again, expressed not only the opinion of his own time, but foreshadowed the views of the great naval officers of the present day, when, in the House of Lords in 1800, he described the proposition that free ships should make free goods, as—

“A proposition so monstrous, so contrary to the law of nations, so injurious to the maritime interests of this country, that if it had been insisted on it would have been our duty never to have ceased war with these powers while a single man, a single shilling, or a single drop of blood remained in this country.”

Napoleon, again, speaking on the same question, said: “The greatest blow that could be given to England would be to compel her to give up her maritime rights.”

Such was the state of opinion in England down to the year 1854, when, as we were drifting into a war with Russia, by what was to him a perfectly inconceivable act on the part of a public man, the following order in council was issued: “In order to preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary destruction, Her Majesty consents to suspend a portion of the belligerent rights that belong to her by the law of nations; Her Majesty will suspend the right of seizing enemies’ property on board neutral vessels unless contraband of war.” The result of this extraordinary order was to afford perfect safety to Russian commerce which sailed under neutral flags. (Hear, hear.) Coming on to 1856, they found occurring an event which was not to be paralleled in the diplomatic and political annals of England. Representatives of the great powers assembled in Paris to conclude a treaty of peace, and after the treaty was concluded, Count Walewski proposed to the congress to conclude its work by a declaration which would constitute a remarkable advance in international law, and which would be received by the whole world with a sentiment of lively gratitude. It would, he said, be truly worthy of the Congress of Paris to lay down the basis of a uniform maritime law in time of war as regards neutrals. The four following principles would completely effect that object: (1) The abolition of privateering; (2) the neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, except contraband of war; (3) neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to capture even under an enemy’s flag; and (4) blockades are not binding except in so far as they are effective. The Earl of Clarendon observed that, like France, England at the commencement of the war sought by every means to mitigate its effects, and that with this view she renounced, for the benefit of neutrals, during the struggle which had then come to an end, principles which up to that time she had invariably maintained. If the whole of the congress were to adopt the propositions of Count Walewski it should be well understood that it would only be binding in regard to the powers who might accede to it, and it could not be appealed to by governments who might refuse their accession. Count Orloff observed that the powers with which he was furnished having for their sole object the restoration of peace, he did not consider himself authorized to take part in a discussion which his, instructions had not provided for. On the same occasion Count Buol declared that he appreciated the spirit and beauty of the principles of maritime law which Count Walewski had proposed for adoption, but that, not being authorized by his instructions to express an opinion upon a matter of such importance, he must for the time confine himself to announcing to the congress that he is prepared to request the orders of his sovereign. This treaty, or declaration, was not ratified by Parliament, and, as far as he could see, was in no way binding upon this country. It was simply a declaration consented to in an evil moment of weak philanthropy by the late Lord Clarendon. He should not quote opinions on this question which had been expressed by any politicians who were now responsible for the foreign policy of this country, but he should like to lay before the house the opinion of Lord Russell concerning it. In 1857 the noble earl said:

“The rule that free ships make free goods, and the goods of a belligerent are safe in neutral vessels, has always been regarded as injurious to the supremacy of maritime countries, and especially to the maritime power of England. I hope no minister will set his seal to a treaty containing any stipulations of this kind without the most cautious deliberation.”

What said Mr. Stuart Mill?

“Sir, I venture to call the renunciation of the right to seize enemy’s property at sea a national blunder, and unless, by resuming our natural and indispensable weapon, we place ourselves again on an equality with our possible enemies, we shall be burdened with these enormous establishments and these onerous budgets for a permanency; and in spite of it all, we shall be forever in danger, forever in alarm, cowed before any power or combination of powers capable of invading any of our widely-spread possessions. Happily, the blunder is not an irretrievable one; the declaration of 1856 is not a treaty; it has not been ratified. The authority on which it was entered was the private letter of a minister. How war is to be humanized by shooting at men’s bodies instead of taking their property, I own, surprises me.” [Hear, hear.]

Mr. Cobden said:

“The congress declared that the neutral flag covered enemy’s goods. The resolution reverses the most venerated judgments of our admiralty courts, and for the first time imparts the force of maritime law to principles which were resisted by England against the world in arms until the close of 1815. The practical effect would be, in case of war with a naval power, to transfer the trade of even our own ports to the neutral powers.”

Mr. Mitchell, once his colleague, said: “I believe there is no man who is acquainted with Russia who would not be of opinion that the greatest means of coercion that could be made against Russia would be the closing of her ports and the stopping of her export trade; and that the best means of hostility against Russia at the beginning of a war would have been to take steps to stop the whole of her export trade.”

The authorities he had quoted were most eminent men on both sides of the house. He could refer to several other men in support of his view, but to none more important than these. This was not a party question. It was a question concerning the interests and the maritime greatness of this country. [Hear.] If we accepted the principle that a neutral flag covered enemy’s property all the neutral countries would take possession of our place, and the name that Napoleon gave to our volunteers of the sea in time of war—viz, les loups de mer—would be swept away. If we were to have volunteers for the defense of our shores, we were equally justified in making use of our great commercial marine in case of war to defend this country.

There were some who said that the sea was the highway of all countries, and that in the case even of a ship carrying contraband of war she should not be searched, but he could not conceive anything more fatal, he might almost say more ridiculous, than such an idea as that. There were persons who said, “Silent leges inter arma; your declaration of Paris is nothing, and when war comes we will tear it up,” but that was not an honorable view. [Hear, hear.] It would not be honorable to us to follow the bad example set in 1870. It had been well said that England did not so much support the right of search as the right of search supported England. The extent and variety of our commerce was so great that we more than any other nation were bound over to keep the peace in Europe, but for that very reason we ought to have at our command every means of hostility in case we were dragged into war. No fortifications, no torpedoes, no iron-clads, no increase of our army or navy, could give us the power that we should derive from the right of seizing enemy’s goods at sea in time of war. He denied that we might be called upon by military powers to discuss that right. We were a great maritime power. [Hear.] Of all the commercial navies of the world put together, what was the proportion of ships which belonged to England? Thirty-seven per cent. And of the steam navies of the world, 58 per cent, of the steamers belonged to England. Surely that placed us in an exceptional position.

If we armed those great ocean steamers in case of war, and allowed them to defend themselves, what a force we should have! He knew that Lord Clarendon said he was going to inaugurate an era of peace. That prophecy was not fulfilled at all. He [Mr. Baillie Cochrane] was not there to prophesy disaster, but he could not be blind to facts. Twenty years ago the Russian frontier was 1,000 miles from our Indian possessions; now it was not much more than 80; and that was owing to the apathy with which we had viewed these matters. He contended that unless we were to adopt forever a principle of selfish isolation, we should do everything to maintain the maritime greatness of this country. [Hear.] We had heard a great deal, and he thought we had heard too much, about the silver streak that protected us. As long as we insisted on having our maritime rights we should have command of the seas of the world. As Lord Nelson said: “We should lose our last shilling and the last drop of blood of our last man sooner than give up those maritime rights.” In 1870 Prince Gortchakoff wrote to Count Brunow: “The Emperor commands you to declare that His Imperial Majesty cannot any longer be bound by the stipulations of the treaty of Paris, as they restrict His Majesty’s rights in the Black Sea.” If, then, he [Mr. Baillie Cochrane] should be told that he was doing wrong in proposing that this country should withdraw from the declaration of Paris, his reply would be that the treaty of Paris was at an end when the Emperor of Russia disregarded the greatest stipulation in it, and for the insertion of which stipulation we had expended a great deal of money and blood. He trusted that by their vote that night the house would declare that we should go back to the former days of our naval supremacy. [Cheers.] The honorable gentleman concluded by moving the following resolution:

“That, in consequence of a conference having been held at Brussels in 1874 on international law, and the proposed renewal of the conference at St. Petersburg this year, a favorable opportunity is afforded to the country of withdrawing from the declaration of Paris of 1856, and thus maintaining our maritime rights, so essential to the power, prosperity, and independence of the empire.”

Mr. Hermon in seconding the motion thanked his honorable friend, to whom he thought the house and the country were indebted, for having brought forward this important question. His honorable friend said that in case this country were involved in war, the treaty of Paris ought to be rescinded, and that was a declaration which he hoped would find acceptance in the House of Commons. For his part he hated and detested war, and he might be asked why then did he support the motion. His object in doing so was that war might be made as disagreeable as possible, so that it might become hateful in the eyes of all civilized nations, and they might be induced to recoil from it. He was aware that the proposition before the house would not be pleasant to the representatives of those nations who took part in the declaration agreed to at Paris, but they were not there to make things pleasant, but rather to make war odious. [Hear, hear.] It ought to be thoroughly understood by other nations that England was prepared to exercise in time of war her great maritime power in her own defense, and that, he thought, was one of the things which would prevent us drifting into war. He could not but remember the great amount of sympathy which had been exhibited in this country for the sick and wounded during the Franco-German war, and the large fund which had been raised for their relief. He must say he regretted that he had contributed to that fund, for he now believed that it was false philanthropy to do so. The horrors war entailed ought to be forced upon the attention of the nations that went to war, and it ought to be shown them that it was as much their duty to provide food and medicine for their soldiers as it was to provide powder and shot for them to fight with. [Hear, hear. J With respect to the question of the neutral flag, Mr. Pitt said in that house, in the face of a powerful opposition, that although he was anxious for peace, yet upon the question of the neutral flag covering the cargo of the enemy, sooner than give it up he would wind it around him, and find his glory in his grave.

On the 22d of May, 1856, Lord Colchester brought forward a motion in the House of Lords to the effect that the right to capture an enemy’s goods on board a neutral vessel was an inherent right, the abandonment of which was a serious injury to our naval power; and the late Lord Derby declared that “in signing that declaration”—that of Paris—“you have sacrificed the maritime independence of England on the shrine of Russia,” while Lord Hardwick said that it had struck down the maritime supremacy of England. And what said Lord Clarendon himself on that occasion? He intimated that he had not acted within the strict limit of his attributions, by which he supposed the noble earl meant his instructions. He would remind the house that the United States had declared that in the event of war they would not renounce the use of their mercantile marine. Under such circumstances what position would we be in if we were at war with the United States or with any country of which the United States was an ally? Surely England would not allow herself to be placed at so great and serious disadvantage? On such a subject the house ought to take a decided view, and express themselves as those who had gone before them had done—in a manner which could not be mistaken. The opinion expressed by Mr. John Stuart Mill on this question had been already quoted by his honorable friend, and in that patriotic opinion he fully concurred. The right honorable gentleman at the head of the government had expressed himself strongly on this subject. He said: “The stipulations of the declaration of Paris were impolitic, and tended to weaken and cripple the strength of this country; but, so far as we are concerned, we must emancipate ourselves from those trammels in a regular manner.” There could not, then, be a more regular or constitutional manner of doing so than by means of the action of Parliament. [Hear, hear.] It having been declared that by the declaration in the treaty of Paris we had given up the cardinal principle of our maritime power, and that in consequence of that treaty never having been ratified by Parliament or by the Queen it was not binding on us, he thought the present moment, when peace was universal, was the best that could be selected for repudiating our obligations under it. He further suggested that Her Majesty’s government should take this opportunity of sweeping away many other obsolete treaties which trammeled us, and which, at some future date, might be productive of inconvenience if not danger to this country. Mr. Cartwright, who was indistinctly heard, assured the honorable member for the Isle of Wight that it was not from any underrating of the importance of the subject, or from any desire to restrict the maritime force which this country command in time of war, that he rose to move the previous question. It had seemed to him from the first that the resolution which had just been submitted was extremely inopportune; that there was no practical reason for bringing it forward, and this impression had been fully confirmed by the speech of the honorable member. The substance of the charge brought against the declaration of Paris appeared to be that it involved an apostasy from principles which had hitherto governed the policy of this country. He believed it could be shown conclusively by a reference to the acts of English statesmen of undoubted patriotism that that argument was not founded in fact. The Lord Protector Cromwell, who in a peculiar degree sought to establish British ascendency at sea, put his hand to a treaty by which the principle of a neutral flag covering an enemy’s goods was recognized. Sir William Temple, no mean exponent of British feeling, took part in carrying out a similar policy. The principle was acknowledged in the treaty of Utrecht, and in 1786 it was embodied by Mr. Pitt in a celebrated treaty of commerce. In one respect the declaration of Paris was an improvement on preceding instruments, for it did not renew a preferential bonus in favor of French shipping, which had previously been allowed. On no occasion, he would observe, was the declaration of Paris condemned, although it had been reviewed and discussed in that house, not only in heat and passion, but also at subsequent periods. In 1860, he might add, a select committee had been appointed on merchant shipping, composed, among others, of such able men as Mr. Milner Gibson, Mr. T. Baring, and Mr. Horsf all. By that committee the question of belligerent rights was discussed, and they stated in their report that, while aware that grave objections had been urged by high authorities against the declaration of Paris, they could not refrain from expressing the hope that in the interests of humanity and civilization all private property not being contraband of war should be exempt from seizure. The committee went on to say that Great Britain was deeply interested in the adoption of such a course, inasmuch as she had at all times a greater amount of property afloat than any other nation. On that recommendation he would not venture to pronounce any opinion, beyond remarking that it showed the declaration of Paris had not been subjected to all the censure which some supposed. But it was contended that the declaration might be acted upon unjustly. In contradiction, however, to that he would point out that when hostilities had occurred between the republic of Chili, which was a party to the declaration, and Spain, which was not a party to it, all the facilities and advantages for war, the loss of which was deplored by those who were opposed to the declaration, were brought into requisition with the assent of all by the republic of Chili. No argument had, therefore, he maintained, been adduced by the honorable member for the Isle of Wight to justify the course which he asked the house to adopt, and he would appeal to honorable members not by a chance vote to reverse that which was a very solemn agreement, made after mature consideration, and the spirit and substance of which had been ratified by public opinion, as expressed by those who represented it in Parliament. He begged to conclude by moving the previous question.

Sir John Hay said the argument of the honorable member who had just sat down was rather in support of maintaining the principles of the declaration of Paris untouched than the postponement of its consideration to some more convenient time. He would, therefore, endeavor to show that it was an entire mistake, and would go far to sap the naval power of this country in the event of our being engaged in war. The neutralization of the Black Sea constituted one of the principal articles of the treaty of Paris, and was considered one of the securities for the peace of the East, although the late government thought it right to give up that stipulation. The declaration of Paris, which succeeded that treaty, was not a treaty in any sense of the term. In his opinion the first two articles of that treaty were calculated to impair the naval supremacy of England. One abolished privateering; the other, which was now under the consideration of the house, provided that a neutral flag should cover an enemy’s goods, with the exception of contraband of war. Now, in all treatises on international law, the fact that a neutral flag did not cover an enemy’s goods had been held to conduce in no small degree to the peace of the world. The right of belligerent cruisers to search suspected vessels was distinctly recognized in international law, and neutral goods found in an enemy’s possession were specifically exempted from seizure and capture. These principles were laid down in a book which was put into the hands of naval officers for their guidance. As a general principle it seemed to him that this right of seizing an enemy’s goods wherever they might be found ought to be maintained. [Cheers.] There was no doubt that unless our navy had that power the enemy would obtain an advantage over us. In this view-he was borne out by the experience of Lord Nelson, who in 1803 found that a large number of French vessels which he had at his mercy in the Black Sea escaped capture by changing their flag. If Nelson had not had the power to search those vessels as neutrals, the change of flag would have enabled them entirely to elude his vigilance. [Hear, hear.] All experience, he maintained, went to show that this power of searching neutral vessels and seizing an enemy’s goods on board was one of the highest importance. In respect to privateering, also, he thought we should do well to denounce the declaration of Paris. Even if this country kept up a very large naval force, the only means by which we could effectually destroy an enemy’s commerce would be the hiring or commissioning of merchant-ships; and he contended that since Russia declined to be bound by the portion of the treaty which related to the Black Sea, the best course for us to pursue was to declare that we would no longer abide by declarations which were framed, not in our interest, but in that of others. [Cheers.]

Mr. Sergeant Simon concurred entirely in the views expressed by the mover of the resolution. The honorable member for the Isle of Wight [Mr. Baillie Cochrane] had made the important question before them depend On what he called the opportunity arising out of the Brussels conference. Now, the course adopted by the government with respect to that conference was one for which the country had great reason to be thankful. [Hear, hear.] But what opportunity, with regard to the present question, did that conference present? Surely the honorable member did not mean that we ought to reverse our policy and accept the rules laid down by the second conference about to be held at St. Petersburg? With regard to our withdrawal from the declaration of Paris, he had merely to remark that if there was an engagement we could not withdraw from it without committing a breach of faith, and that if it was not an engagement, there was nothing to withdraw from. A minister of the Crown had pledged this country—which he had no right to do—to a declaration, the principle of which, in his judgment, involved the honor and safety of England in time of war. In that opinion he might be wrong, but, if so, he was wrong in company, not only with the present prime minister, and several of his colleagues, but also with Earl Russell, the late Mr. John Stuart Mill, and other most distinguished statesmen and practical philosophers. He regretted the course adopted at the time of the declaration of Paris, and he regretted, also, that this country should have slept on the matter so long. Considering the circumstances under which that declaration was entered into, we had at the time a right to renounce and denounce it altogether. That was what England should have done, and what the Parliament of England ought to have required the government of the day to do. But having slept on their rights for nineteen years, they were not now in a position to call upon the government to take the course indicated by that resolution. Still, in his opinion, that declaration was so disastrous that the time would come when, for the safety and even for the national existence of this country, Parliament would call upon the government of the day to do that which it was now an unfitting time to do, namely, to relieve them from that engagement. The honorable member for Oxfordshire had referred to various treaties which had been entered into between England and other countries, but by those treaties England had stipulated for corresponding advantages; and, moreover, those treaties did not apply to a time of war, because, either by express stipulation or by the operation of a general principle of international law, on the outbreak of war between the two contracting powers the treaties were at an end. Therefore the treaties we had been in the habit of making with other nations were of no force to show that the general sentiment of Europe was in favor of the abolition of the right of search. The treaty made by Sir W. Temple with Holland was one of the most unfortunate instances that the honorable member for Oxfordshire could have cited, because after it had been concluded this country went to war with France, and when the Dutch assisted the French to carry on their trade with their colonies, England issued an order in council stopping the Dutch trade; and thus in time of war we were under the necessity of annulling the treaty. As to the principle of taking the enemy’s goods wherever we found them, it did not originate in barbarous times, but at a period when commerce had sprung into life, and they had trade with foreign countries throughout the Mediterranean, up the North Sea and the Baltic, and when the republics of Venice and Genoa existed. That principle formed part of a maritime code which had received the sanction of every civilized nation and every great philosophic writer on the subject; it was confirmed by Grotius, Chancellor Kent, and every eminent jurist down to the time when Frederick the Great disputed the claim of Englishmen for injuries done them in Silesia. Then it was put forward for the first time that “free ships make free goods” ought to be a general principle of international law. Eminent writers in this country contradicted that doctrine, and then came “the armed neutrality “when the Empress Catherine sought to give effect to those new principles. France, in 1793, by a decree of the national convention, declared that enemy’s goods in neutral ships were good prize; while Russia also declared that until the restoration of order in France—that was, until the French acknowledged the divine right of kings—the stipulation, which was the main object of the “armed neutrality,” should be no longer obligatory. The great grievance was always the right of search, and especially with regard to the United States of America in 1812. But how did the declaration of Paris meet that? The principle was confined to contraband of war, but how could you ascertain that a vessel carried contraband of war unless you went on board? There was no stipulation that the sight of a ship’s papers was sufficient, and according to the declaration of Paris you might go on board a ship in time of war and satisfy yourself whether she carried contraband of war. It was said you must not interfere with trade, and the demoralizing effect of bringing up the maritime population in the idea that they might become rovers on the ocean to carry away the spoil of the enemy was often pointed out. But was it not more demoralizing that one part of the nation should be at peace and the other part at war: that while merchants were carrying on a roaring trade and strengthening the resources of the enemy the government were sending their soldiers and sailors out to do battle with the enemy? [Hear.] By pursuing such a policy they might, in the eloquent language of the right honorable gentleman opposite, “produce a rich state, but a weak one.” According to the new idea, you must spare the enemy’s property and take his life, but he contended that the best way to cripple an enemy was to destroy his resources. If Russia, who was now not far from India, crossed our frontier, what army could they send to resist her? How else could they oppose her except by crippling her trade and annihilating her commerce? [Cheers.] If a war were to arise—and God forbid it—between England and the United States—if Canada were seized, what resistance could England make, except upon the ocean? These were considerations which outweighed the supposed notions of humanity. Every nation had a mission to fulfill. Rome taught the world science of law and government. England taught the world how to combine freedom with social order; and looking upon this country as one of the great civilizing influences; he deplored any act which would render England unable to fulfill her mission. [Cheers.]

Sir H. D. Wolff said he could not see what great services the navy could render if they maintained the stipulations of the declaration of Paris. Were they to confine the operations of men-of-war to attacking fortresses situated on the sea, or to attacking the vessels of war of other nations? They were debarred from attacking the fortresses on the sea by torpedoes, and from attacking the vessels by their remaining under the protection of the fortresses. The whole functions of their war-ships would be to defend the shores of England and capture merchant vessels if they ventured to come forth. He pointed out how Russia had, after the treaty of Paris, apparently evaded the treaty by subsidizing a company to keep ships built which might be converted readily into ships of war. This seemed to be an evasion of the treaty, and the point now was how far they would be justified in withdrawing from the declaration of Paris.

He did not allude to the conduct of Russia in 1870 in withdrawing from the stipulation of the treaty of Paris with regard to the neutrality of the Black Sea. But there were certain other declarations from which other nations had withdrawn. In the first place, the principalities were to be governed by two princes. The principalities evaded that by each electing the same man, Prince Couza, and when he was driven away, Prince Charles took his place.

And now Austria, Germany, and Russia insisted on making a commercial treaty with the principalities, which was a third evasion. Then there was another arrangement at the time of the congress at Paris, not so solemn as those with regard to privateering and the immunity from seizure of foreign goods in neutral bottoms, but it came next, as it was solemnly made in the protocol. At that time Lord Clarendon proposed, and the proposal was agreed to and signed by the plenipotentiaries, that in case of any difference arising between the powers they would have recourse to arbitration instead of going to war. Almost every foreign government gave its adhesion to that declaration, but how many governments had stuck to it? England was the only one which had done so in the ease of that celebrated episode in our history, the Alabama claims. Having shown that it would be necessary to resume the rights abandoned in 1856, and that there was full margin for doing so, he would recommend his honorable friend not to press his motion to a division. An almost unanimous opinion had been expressed by the house that we were not bound. He hoped his honorable friend would rest satisfied with that, and allow the motion of the honorable member for Oxfordshire to be adopted. [Hear.]

Mr. Ashley said that honorable members seemed to have treated the matter as if Lord Clarendon at Paris had suddenly abandoned rights which England claimed, and which were essential to her prosperity. But it should be remembered that at the commencement of the Crimean war this concession to neutral nations was deliberately adopted by Lord Palmerston. And it was adopted not only with a view to maintain the peace of the world, and not to drag neutral nations unnecessarily into the war, but, above all, as a concession to the progress of commerce and civilization which undoubtedly had marked the space which had elapsed from the times of Nelson. [Hear.] No doubt we were very far removed from the times, though not from the spirit, of Nelson. But when honorable members called on us to practice those excessive acts of power and tyranny which were exercised in Nelson’s time, they seemed, as the honorable member for the Isle of Wight seemed, like another Kip Van Winkle, who, awaking from a fifty years’ slumber, rushed into the house, and exclaimed, “Good heavens! what has happened since I was last among you?” It was well known that at the commencement of the Crimean war the Russian government was going to commission privateers from the United States, and it was only the declaration in question which saved the world from a horde of pirates issuing from the United States under the Russian flag. When, therefore, honorable members discussed this question of the declaration of Paris he must ask them to discuss it as a whole. [Hear, hear.] Let it be taken in connection with that very important article of the declaration of Paris—very important for us as a maritime power—that blockades to be effective must be real: that there must be no such thing as paper blockades. [Hear, hear.] Let it be taken in connection also with the article which abolished privateering, and he could not believe that any honorable member could be in earnest when he expressed a desire to see us go back to times gone by, when the practice of piracy and privateering pervailed. [Hear, hear.]

Mr. Bourke said the house would agree with him that the subject which had been so ably brought before it by his honorable friend, the member for the Isle of Wight, was one well deserving consideration. Her Majesty’s government was well aware that it was a question in which not only many members of this house, but many people out of doors, took the deepest interest. [Hear.] The form of the motion before the house was one of considerable ambiguity; but after the speech of his honorable friend, it might be divided into two different propositions: the first, that Her Majesty’s government ought to have taken advantage of the conference of Brussels to bring the subject of the declaration before it; and the second, that Her Majesty’s government was not bound by the declaration. As to the first proposition, if Her Majesty’s government had been ever so willing to bring the subject before the conference it would have been impossible to do so for this reason, that the powers who were signatories to the declaration of Paris were not the same as those which met at Brussels. Because, although the declaration of Paris was signed only by Turkey, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Italy, and England, yet upon the invitation of those powers, various other powers of the world subsequently sent in their adhesion to that arrangement. That might be looked upon by many as a technical reason for not going into the subject at the conference of Brussels. But there was a stronger reason which must suggest itself to every man’s mind, and that was that the object of the conference at Brussels was entirely foreign to the subject of the declaration of Paris. [Hear, hear.] The subject to be brought before the congress of Brussels was an inquiry into the rules of military warfare for the purpose of mitigating the horrors and calamities of war, and the object of Her Majesty’s government was to limit that inquiry as much as possible. If the course suggested by his honorable friend behind him [Mr. Baillie Cochrane] had been adopted by the government, the various theories of maritime warfare would have been discussed; the immunity of all private property at sea and the most delicate questions of international law would have been debated in the congress, and our declared intention to depart from the declaration of Paris would no doubt have been made the pretext by others for getting rid of engagements which, for some reason, they thought themselves entitled to get rid of. Therefore he said the course taken by the government was to limit as much as possible the subjects to be considered by the congress at Brussels. That course was clear and decided. It was laid down in the papers before the house. They were perfectly determined not to enter into any discussion of the rules of international law by which the relations of belligerents are guided, or undertake any new obligations or engagements of any kind in regard to general principles, and they required, before sending a delegate to the conference, the most positive and distinct assurances from every power taking part in the congress that they agreed to the course proposed by the government, and would not entertain in any shape, directly or indirectly, anything relating to maritime operations or naval warfare. Such were the instructions given to General Hors-ford, and that officer had carried out his instructions to the entire satisfaction of the government. Having laid down that rule for their own conduct, he thought they should have been very much to blame if they had adopted the course proposed by the honorable member for the Isle of Wight. He need not advert to the reasons for not going further. It was said there was some secret reason for asking us to go to that conference. He was not aware what that secret reason could be; but if there was a secret reason it was all the more necessary for the government to take the course they did on that occasion. That course had been supported by Parliament, by the unanimous voice of the press and the country. The declaration of Paris embraced four points, but, after all, there was only one to which any very serious exception could be taken. That was the article of “free ships, free goods.” In conceding that, there could be no doubt the country gave up a belligerent right she had from very ancient times, and which she considered a powerful arm of maritime warfare. [Hear, hear.] That right had been sanctioned by the highest authorities, ancient and modern—by Grotius, Vattel, Hubner, Chief-Justice Marshall, Kent, Story, and Wheaton.

Under these circumstances we could not be surprised that there were living statesmen among us who had the greatest doubt as to the wisdom of the course taken in 1856, and that we ought to leave ourselves to act as in 1854, not binding ourselves by any new declaration, but acting on the principle of what was most expedient for us to adopt. But that was not the question of the present day. The question now was, having found this declaration as part and parcel of an international agreement by which we believed ourselves bound, if it was our duty to denounce that declaration as if we were not bound by it. Those who recommended that course seemed to forget that we should then be met face to face with another declaration of a more recent date than that of Paris—he meant the conference of 1871, which was to this effect: “That it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of an amicable arrangement.” Both houses of Parliament had refused to denounce the declaration of Paris when the subject had been brought before them. They had refused to alter the terms of the declaration of Paris, and he was a little surprised to hear some honorable gentlemen say that, because that instrument was not ratified, we were not bound by it. He hoped he should never hear a minister of the Crown say that we ought to repudiate an engagement because it lacked certain formalities. [Hear, hear.] The plenipotentiary had full power to sign the declaration, and that went a great way to show that the declaration was binding upon us. He must say that he thought his honorable friends who were in favor of doing away with the declaration of Paris seemed to have forgotten that in the last century the principle which had been acted upon for nearly seventy or eighty years of peace between France, Portugal, and England was that free ships made free goods, although no doubt in time of war everyone of those powers did not act upon that principle. He need not, however, remind the house that we had entered into treaties with various powers acknowledging the principle, but that other powers had done so to even a greater extent than ourselves. And when the effect of the rule was taken into consideration we could not be surprised that such was the case, because everybody must admit that if the right of taking enemies’ goods out of neutral ships did to a great extent allow a belligerent to injure his adversary, yet it must be admitted that it had at the same time the result of irritating one’s friends. [Hear.]

It had a tendency in times of war to involve belligerents with their allies and to excite the most rancorous disputes between neutrals, while it also served to produce litigation between individuals, for it was always most difficult to prove that the goods seized were the property of the belligerents. He could not, therefore, help thinking that no one could well doubt that circumstances might arise when the advantage we had gained, and which we certainly did sometimes gain, by capturing enemies’ goods in neutral vessels would be more than counterbalanced by the very great evils which might be caused by the irritation of our friends. Should we, he would ask, be likely to bear with equanimity to see our neutral vessels stopped on the high seas and brought into port on the ground that there were enemies’ goods on board f Yet, if we withdraw from the declaration of Paris, that was a result which we must expect, because by withdrawing from that declaration we should be asserting in the strongest terms our refusal to recognize the doctrine that the neutral flag covered ah enemy’s goods. He had heard it stated in the course of the discussion that neutrals gained very little by the concession which had been made, but that was, he confessed, to him a somewhat novel statement, for lie had always understood that it had been admitted that, whatever effect might have been produced by the declaration of Paris on belligerents, there had been no doubt whatever entertained of its advantages in the case of neutral powers. His honorable friend, the member for the Isle of Wight, did not seem to be quite satisfied with the position of neutrals, but he could not quite follow his arguments with respect to the taking of tallow during the Russian war, nor could he concur with what had been said by many honorable gentlemen with respect to the abolition of privateers. Whenever he had occasion to speak on that subject he had always stated that this part of the declaration of Paris, at all events, admitted of no doubt. He could not understand how honorable gentlemen could justify privateering in a point of view which had been called by almost every person the curse of commerce. [Hear, hear.] Even those by whom it had been upheld as the last resource of war had admitted that; it was most desirable it should, if possible, be got rid of.

Of one thing he was quite sure, and that was that this country would gain more by its abolition than any other if we could only get the rest of the world to act in that direction.

No nation was more open to privateers in proportion to the strength of our commercial marine compared with a belligerent. Let him suppose that one of the nations, not ourselves, were to be engaged in war with a country at the other end of the world. If either of those countries sent out privateers, there was no doubt our commerce would suffer, because in all probability those privateers would not be very particular as to the ships which they took, and in all likelihood a great many of those ships would have on board English goods.

One honorable gentleman had spoken of privateering, indeed, as carried on by a commissioned officer belonging to Her Majesty’s navy. That was, however, not privateering in the sense in which it was ever carried on, and in point of fact there was a provision in the declaration of Paris to prevent that being done. There was the greatest difference, he would beg to remind his honorable friend the member for the Isle of Wight, between volunteer seamen acting under a commissioned officer in a regular manner, and privateers who could do whatever they chose, bound by no rule whatsoever except those which they made themselves, waging war for their own profit. [Hear, hear.] If, again, we became belligerents, there was no doubt we should lose a certain portion of our carrying trade; but we should also recollect that we should be able to carry on our commerce in neutral vessels. He trusted, however, that if unfortunately we should be at war, we should be able to protect our commerce with our navy, so that as long as we continued to be a powerful maritime nation the fancied evil which would result to our carrying-trade seemed to him to be very much exaggerated. For his own part, he did not think anything would be more impolitic than that we should declare beforehand that we were about to sacrifice the declaration of Paris by stopping the neutral ships of our allies and searching for belligerent goods. Such a course would, in his opinion, be very likely to turn neutrals into enemies. If we were to re-abandon the right of capturing belligerent goods in neutral ships we should have to take what we could not help thinking would not be a very dignified course, after saying that we would not be bound by the declaration, while, if we held ourselves bound by it, we should inevitably run the risk of turning neutrals into enemies, as he had just observed. We must also bear in mind that although neutral rights were now more generally recognized than in more remote times, yet the declaration did not infringe on the right of search or on the law of contraband, and so long as those two laws remained we need not, in his opinion, apprehend any of those evil results which some honorable gentlemen seemed to imagine. In consequence of the progress of science in the present day the tendency was to increase the number of articles declared to be contraband of war, and such articles would, of course, be liable to seizure if carried in neutral vessels In the few remarks he had made he had endeavored to look at this question in a candid spirit. [Hear, hear.] He did not think that the declaration of Paris was open to all the grave objections that had been urged against it. He could not concur with those who wished to go further and to give immunity to all private property at sea, because he believed that by so doing we should be sweeping away the most valuable belligerent rights the great maritime powers possessed. [Hear, hear.] There was a cardinal difference between such a principle and anything that was contained in the declaration of Paris, which put forward stipulations that were to be carried out by neutral powers, whereas the abandonment of the right of capture of all private property at sea would concern those powers who might be belligerent; and there was, therefore, no use in laying down a principle which would be swept aside the moment the two powers interested went to war with each other. On the whole, therefore, it would not, in his opinion, be prudent or expedient to attempt to get rid of the declaration of Paris, and Her Majesty’s government could not be blind to the grave results that would arise from disturbing that arrangement. A course of that kind could not be taken without arousing a great difference of opinion not only among the powers who were the original signatories to the treaty, but also among the other powers who had since signed it, and it could not be taken without infringing the great principle of fidelity to international engagements which this country had always endeavored to uphold. He therefore did not agree with the honorable gentleman that the occasion of the conference at Brussels or of the proposed conference at St. Petersburg was one on which it was desirable that this question should be discussed. Entertaining as he did the views he had endeavored to lay before the house, he should, in the event of the house being called upon to to divide on the subject, vote with the honorable member for Oxfordshire in support of the previous question. [Hear, hear.]

Sir W. Harcourt had heard with satisfaction—and he was certain the country would hear with satisfaction—the prudent, moderate, and sagacious statement of the undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. It was a statement worthy of himself, and of the high position which he occupied as one of the responsible, ministers of the Crown. [Hear, hear.] He could assure the honorable member for the Isle of Wight that he would not find in him an advocate of the selfish isolation, nor had he addicted himself to the new-fangled doctrines of international maritime law which had long prevailed on the continent of Europe, and which had been largely disseminated in this country. The little he had learned on the subject of maritime law had been acquired as a disciple in the school of the great masters, of Lord Stowell, Chief-Justice Marshall, Kent, and Story, those great publicists who had established upon unshakable foundations the great principles which governed the maritime relations of states. He entirely agreed with the under-secretary for foreign affairs that to have introduced a discussion on this subject at the conference at Brussels, would have been entirely impertinent to the matters with which that conference dealt, and would have been extremely imprudent and unwise on the part of Great Britain. When the honorable member for the Isle of Wight said that by the declaration of Paris two great blows were struck at the maritime supremacy of England—by the abolition of letters of marque and by the abandonment of the right of search—he confessed that he heard him with some surprise. Every one knew that letters of marque were the powerful instruments of weak maritime states, and that they were a thorn in the side of states possessing great navies, and that if any nation was interested in getting rid of privateering, it was the one that expended ten or eleven millions a year in supporting the greatest and most powerful navy in the world. The nation that raised the strongest objections to the abolition of privateering was the United States, which possessed no considerable navy, hut which, from the enterprise of its sailors, and the extent of its mercantile marine, would, in the event of war, be able to send forth hordes of privateers all over the world. The very fact of the United States objecting to the abolition of privateering, therefore, was the strongest argument to show that privateering was injurious to England.

It must have been by inadvertence that the honorable member had suggested that the right of search had been surrendered by the declaration of Paris, because the right of search existed at the present time, otherwise the right to seize contraband of war, and blockade could not be enforced. The honorable member had made another extraordinary statement to the effect that he did not believe that the system of exempting enemies’ goods on board neutral ships from capture existed until the date of the Silesian loan, the history of which was not very creditable to England. He had often heard the prime minister refer with warm approbation to the great tory administration which concluded the treaty of Utrecht, and, although he had never been an admirer of the political principles of that administration, he frankly admitted that they had one title to fame in the history of this country as the founders of our present commercial policy, that free ships make free goods as between the parties to that engagement—a principle that was settled by the treaty of Utrecht as one of its cardinal points. He rather envied the tory party for being the originators of that principle, which was consecrated in 1856, in the treaty of Paris. That principle was maintained by Mr. Pitt in the commercial treaty with France in 1786. His honorable friend, the member for the Isle of Wight, had referred to the history of the armed neutrality, but the declaration of armed neutrality was made in 1780, at the period of the great weakness of England, when, owing to the unfortunate policy of the war with America, the greatness which Chatham achieved for her had been almost annulled in Europe. England, it was true, accepted the principles of the armed neutrality, but she was not in a situation to resist them, and therefore, in 1780, although she protested against these principles, she was practically compelled to acquiesce in them. It was perfectly true that in the second armed neutrality, in 1800, she stood in a different position. She was then, by the genius of Nelson and the valor of her sailors, mistress of the sea, and in a situation to dictate to the world, as she did, in the attack on Copenhagen; and then followed the great maritime treaty of 1801. Well, from 1815 this question slept. It slept in the policy of cabinets, but it did not sleep in the literature of international law. There were continental writers who were unanimous upon this subject, and unanimous against the claimer of capture. It was perfectly true that England had never conceded that right, but she was not bound to concede it. But when, unhappily, as he should always think, the great peace, which had lasted forty years, was broken up by the Crimean war, England had to consider what she ought to do upon this matter. She was engaged in a war with Russia, one of the parties to, indeed, the principal promoter of, the doctrine of the armed neutrality. She was looking for allies, and her ally was France, and France was as deeply pledged to this principle as Russia, her opponent, was. She could not have found in Europe or this side of the Atlantic a single maritime ally who would have joined her upon the principles she desired to maintain. She could not have found such an ally on the other side of the Atlantic. If she had gone into that war maintaining the right of capture of enemies’ goods in neutral vessels she would have found herself not only without an ally, hut with every neutral power in the world her enemy. [Hear, hear.] It was under these circumstances that the government of England waived—only in the first instance waived— this principle at the outset of the Crimean war. Then came the peace and the conference of Paris. He had often had the advantage of conversing with Lord Clarendon, and he regretted, from the reverence he bore his name, the manner in which his honorable friend, the member for the Isle of Wight, had spoken of him. But he had heard Lord Clarendon say that this declaration would have been made in Paris whether England had joined in it or not—that the declaration of all the powers of Europe upon the subject was so pronounced and unanimous that in that great conference, which was in some sense a re-adjustment of Europe, that declaration would inevitably have been made; and Lord Palmerston had also made that statement. Now, a very strong proof that the concession then made was irresistible was to be found in this, that the American Government declined to be bound, and was not under any obligation to observe it. But what happened? When they went to war with the Southern States, in 1861, they were compelled to adopt the principles of the declaration of Paris, and did adopt them. Both sides in that war, in fact, adhered to the abrogation of privateering, to the principle that the goods of an enemy are not to be taken in a neutral vessel, and acted in every sense as if they were signatories of the treaty of Paris. That, he thought, was a sufficient proof that the course that was taken was necessary. [Hear, hear.]

He had always regarded the declaration of Paris as a compromise, and not an unfair compromise, between the rival pretensions, on the one hand, of the neutral claims of the armed neutrality, and, on the other hand, of the belligerent claims which had been previously maintained by England. The document should be looked upon as a whole. While his honorable friend had only referred to two points of the declaration, his resolution would abrogate the whole of it. He would first point out what was gained by the declaration of Paris, and then allude to what was lost by it. We gained the abolition of privateering, and he agreed with the under-secretary of state that to a great maritime power that was an infinite gain. It was more; ft was a gain to the civilized world.

According to the French name for the word a privateer was a corsair, and that thoroughly expressed the meaning. Privateers were not bound by the sentiments which belonged to officers in the naval service, or by the discipline which was to be found among regular soldiers. His honorable friend compared them to volunteers, but they were more like franctireurs, and volunteers did not go out for gain as they did. That was not the spirit by which they were actuated.

The second gain was a practical regulation of the claim of the second armed neutrality on the subject of convoy—a claim set up in the great Swedish case decided by Lord Stow ell, namely, that a single armed ship might exempt a fleet of merchantmen from search, although they might be laden with contraband of war. The declaration practically repudiated that claim. The third thing England gained was a definition of blockade; and since that declaration the war with the United States had established the doctrine of blockade on a sounder footing, and had guarded it with greater stringency with regard to belligerents than before. Now that was a most valuable right to a maritime power. It was shown to be in the war with the South, as it was by the stress of the blockade that; the great superiority of the Northern States reduced the South to submission. The declaration of Paris had strengthened rather than weakened a right which was most valuable to a maritime power. One other right had practically been confirmed, and that was the right of search. There had been put forward by writers on behalf of neutrals, all sorts of claims to limit the right of search, but these were practically repudiated by the declaration, and in the war with the United States the right of search was more rigorously exercised than ever before. That was what England had gained. What had she lost? She had conceded the principle—for unquestionably it was a concession—of free ships, free goods. When we are a belligerent we lose the right to seize an enemy’s goods on board a neutral vessel. But England had found herself unable to exercise that right, and she could not at present exercise it in Europe or in America, unless she was prepared to fight the whole world, and no other statesman in his senses would maintain that the declaration should be repudiated on such terms. [Hear, hear.] His honorable friend the member for the Isle of Wight laughed, but did he expect that we should be at war longer than at peace? Since 1815, happily, we had been very little at war, and he hoped our policy might be long of that character. [Hear, hear.] But what had been the result?, Since the declartion of Paris, Europe had been at war and America had been at war, and England had monopolized the carrying trade of the world. In time of war what would happen? It might be thought that we should carry our own trade in our own vessels. Since the declaration of Paris, however, there has been war in the United States, and a single Alabama drove the whole trade of the States into neutral bottoms. A merchant’s goods would always be safer in a neutral bottom, and the mere difference of the insurance would induce the merchants of a belligerent state to ship them in neutral bottoms. What would be the result of a withdrawal on our part from the declaration of Paris? That our enormous foreign trade, which was thirty times as great as in the days of Nelson, would be at the mercy of every South American republic. [Oh.] Yes, England could not monopolize the principle, and if two American States went to war, they would have a right to search the whole merchant shipping of England in search of contraband of war. Was it for our advantage that hostilities, whether in Spain or elsewhere, should expose us to the exercise of the right of search by other powers? No doubt the declaration of Paris operated as a premium in favor of neutral powers, and he was glad of it. It was a reward upon those who remained at peace, and a tine upon those who went to war. Railway communication had made great changes in Europe, and goods which used to go by sea now went by land, where none of these principles of capture applied. The honorable member for the Isle of Wight did not deny that the declaration of Paris was advantageous to England in time of peace. For twenty years we had derived advantages from it and had become the carriers of the world, and yet the honorable member wished now to repudiate this obligation. England derived great advantages from her maritime superiority and the courage of her seamen, but she derived still greater advantages from the moral strength belonging to a country that knew how to observe its engagements and maintain the stability of its policy. The honorable member for Preston had referred to the late Lord Derby. He would, on the other hand, refer to the present Lord Derby, who now represented the Queen in her relations with foreign states. He occupied the same high position in 1887, when this question was brought before the house by the late J. S. Mill. Lord Derby answered Mr. Mill; and what would be the position of the House of Commons and the country if, after declarations such as he was about to quote had been made by minister after minister belonging to both parties in the state, the House of Commons should now attempt to evade engagements of this character? Lord Derby, then Lord Stanley, told the house in 1867 that if the declaration of Paris had prevented us from mixing ourselves up in continental complications with which we have nothing to do, that was one of the best arguments in its defense. He added that we were bound either to repudiate the declaration of Paris at once or to act upon it when the occasion arose. We must look upon it as a matter of good fath and consistency, and we had given a pledge to the whole civilized world from which we could not now withdraw, because, Lord Derby added, the forty states which had adopted this principle, did so mainly at the instance of Great Britain. Some honorable members thought that as this declaration of Paris was not a treaty we need not be bound by it. Our present foreign minister had, however, pointed out that this declaration was not the act of the executive alone, but had been repeatedly brought before Parliament, and on every occasion Parliament had refused to interfere and had practically given its adhesion to the declaration of Paris. He would not think so meanly of one bearing the name of Stanley as to suppose that the foreign secretary, after holding that language in the presence of the House of Commons and in the face of Europe, could consent to repudiate that which he had declared England was morally bound to maintain If the motion of the honorable member for the Isle of Wight was carried, Lord Derby, he was sure, would rather resign than give effect to it. He would detain the house no longer. The language he had read was far more deserving of attention than any he could command. It was worthy of the man, worthy of the office he held, and expressed the spirit which he ventured to think would influence the House of Commons in the decision at which they would arrive. [Cheers.]

Mr. Forsyth, who rose amid cries of “divide,” regretted that he could not say, with the honorable and learned member from Oxford, that he had listened with satisfaction to the speech of the under secretary for foreign affairs. It would have been different if the under secretary had merely maintained that we had been right in not taking part in the conference at Brussels, and that the present time was inopportune for a withdrawal of the declaration of Paris; but he had gone much further than that, for he had defended categorically every one of the propositions involved in the declaration.

It remained to be seen whether other members of the government concurred in that speech; but the present first lord of the treasury, in March, 1862, pointed out how seriously the declaration of Paris affected the maritime strength of England, and suggested that the ministers of the day ought to consider by what means it might be altered. It was right that the goods of neutrals should be respected wherever found, but in assenting to the proposition that the goods of an enemy ought not to be seized on board neutral ships they give up a cardinal principle of England’s power and greatness. The principle for which he contended had, except in certain peculiar cases and for exceptionable purposes, been steadily adhered to from the earliest times down to 1856. It had been said that we ought not at present to withdraw from the declaration. That was a most dangerous argument, for, as time went on, we should find ourselves more and more bound to abide by it. If we deferred withdrawal till the outbreak of a war, it would be natural for foreign nations to say to us, “You have lulled us with a false security, and you have no right to take this step now.” Now was the time, a time of profound peace, when we had a right to say to foreign nations, “We made a mistake some years ago; we are not now going to war; but we are determined to assert the old principle which England always maintained, namely, that we have a right to seize the goods of the enemy wherever they are found.” If it was not right to seize the goods of the enemy in neutral ships, he did not see on what principle the seizure of the merchant-ships of the enemy could be justified. Whatever might be the result of the division, he trusted there would be no misapprehension on the part of other nations as to the fact that the great body of opinion in that house was in favor of the proposition that free ships did not make free goods.

Lord C. Beresford pointed out that if the declaration of Paris remained unaltered, the effect upon the merchant-fleet might be very serious. Of course, if we went to war there would be many crusiers of the Alabama class belonging to the enemy, and after a few of our vessels had been destroyed by them merchants would naturally put their goods in the vessels of other nations, and ship-owners would either have to lock up their ships in harbors at home or sell them to foreigners, as has been done in America. The result in the case of the United States was that they had now a very small fleet. [Hear, hear.] It might happen under these circumstances that the country would be even more affected after the war than during it. There was a consideration also as to prize-money. [Laughter.] He did not say that naval officers joined the service for the sake of prize-money, but probably most gentlemen would agree with him that a large bag of prize-money was not at all to be despised. [Laughter.]

Mr. Baillie Cochrane, in reply, said he had not spoken disrespectfully of Lord Clarendon. What he said was that he could not comprehend how Lord Clarendon took the step he did of signing the declaration of Paris. Under the circumstances, he was unwilling to press his motion to a division. It was well know that a division did not always represent the opinion of the house.

There being some cries of “No” to the question that the amendment be withdrawn, the house then divided, and the numbers were:

For the previous question	261
Against	36
Majority	225

The motion of Mr. Baillie Cochrane was, therefore, not put.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 733.]

Petition in favor of the abrogation of the declaration of Paris.

Mr. Foster has presented the following petition to the House of Commons from certain inhabitants of Bradford, in favor of the abrogation of the declaration of Paris, which states “that in 1668 the Dutch, being a trading power, concluded a treaty with England, which contained a clause which secured a free passage to her merchant-vessels between belligerents in time of war. The full effects of that treaty were not felt by England before 1758, when, England and France being at war, the Dutch undertook to carry on the West India trade for the French. The result proved so injurious to England, that she declared the agreement null and void. When England was at war with her American colonies, in 1780, Russia, under the Empress Catharine, founded a league, called the armed neutrality, between herself, Sweden, Denmark, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and Naples, to force upon England the doctrine that free ships make free goods; but, great and powerful as the combination was, it was of no avail. England declared her right to search for and to seize enemies’ goods in neutral bottoms, issued letters of marque, and by the vigorous use of her maritime power, maintained her honor and position throughout the world.

“The armed neutrality was revived by Russia in the year 1800, with the same object in view; but England again resisted and defeated the maritime forces brought against her. On the maintaining of that right, which is now placed in abeyance, has depended the success of Great Britain. This was strikingly exemplified in the war with Russia of 1801, when Russia succumbed in less than five months to the operations of the cruisers of England, without their being assisted by any naval or military expedition against her.

“In July, 1807, the treaty of Tilsit was made between Napoleon and Alexander of Russia. The Czar issued a proclamation, in which he declared anew the principles of the armed neutrality, and engaged never to depart from them. At this time England stood isolated in Europe; Napoleon had the nations at his feet. There could not be imagined a position of greater danger than that of England, yet her invincible spirit did not quail, for she knew the strength of her arm. The King declared ‘that it was his right and his duty to maintain those principles, (of the right of search,) and against every confederacy he was determined, under the blessings of divine Providence, to maintain them.’ Again the stoppage of her trade by our privateers and cruisers reduced her (Russia) to such straits as to imperil the existence of her empire. We still remember with shame the Crimean war, during which the right of search was suspended. That war caused England to lament the sacrifice of 40,000 brave men and of nearly a hundred millions of money, and at the same time supplied Russia with gold for the war by her trade carried on simultaneously with England. Thus Russia was enabled to dispense altogether with the employment of her navy, and finally the British plenipotentiaries at Paris were compelled to ask permission of the Emperor of Russia to use the harbor of Sebastopol to expedite the departure of our troops from the Crimea.

“On the 16th of April, 1856, a paper entitled a declaration respecting maritime law was signed by the British plenipotentiaries at Paris, in which it is declared that, ‘First, privateering is and remains abolished. Second, the neutral flag covers enemies’ goods, with the exception of contraband of war.’

“That the late Lord Dundonald said ‘the true fortification of England is always to be in a position to strike the first blow at sea the moment it may become necessary; to wait for it would, under any circumstances, be folly; to be unprepared for it, national suicide.’ The United States and Spain have not agreed to the declaration of Paris, and if England were unfortunately engaged in a war with either of those powers, England would be unable to seize their goods in neutral ships, while they would be able to seize English goods where they could find them.

“That by placing us in this equivocal position the declaration of Paris has made it impossible for England to go to war, and has thus rendered us powerless to resist any aggression either on ourselves or on our allies.

“That the declaration of Paris is void of all legal validity, because it was signed by Lord Clarendon without the consent of Parliament.

“That it has never been ratified by Her Majesty the Queen.

“That Her Majesty has been pleased to call to her council as first lord of the treasury the right honorable Benjamin Disraeli.

“That on the 17th of March, 1862, Mr. Disraeli said ‘By the declaration of Paris, we have given up the cardinal principles of our maritime power; we might be at war with the United States, and the United States might at the same time, by virtue of the new principle that the flag covers the cargo, carry on the whole of their trade in neutral vessels, while they poured forth thousands of privateers to prey upon our merchant-shipping. In giving up this cardinal point, therefore, for a, to a certain degree, visionary apprehension which could not be put to a practical test, we have, without having effected our object, placed ourselves absolutely at the mercy of the United States. If, which God forbid, a war should ever take place between the two countries, I would suggest to Her Majesty’s minister for their next subject of meeting the consideration of the means, to use the lauguage of the secretary of state, how the declaration of the treaty of Paris may be altered.’

“Your petitioners therefore pray that your honorable house will address Her Majesty the Queen, praying her to acquaint foreign states that the declaration of Paris, which has been made and signed without her authority or consent, is not binding upon the country.

“And your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.”