Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, with the Annual Message of the President, December 6, 1875, Volume I

No. 12.
Mr. Osborn to Mr. Fish.

United States Legation,
Buenos Ayres, April 12, 1875. (Received May 22.)

No. 48.]

Sir: In my dispatch numbered 43, and dated March 15, I had the honor to inform you of the mission of Dr. Carlos Tejedor to the Brazilian government.

The departure of Dr. Tejedor has been delayed by the yellow fever reported at Rio de Janeiro. I understand now, from Mr. Lamarca, secretary of the legation, that passage has been secured on the steamer that leaves here on Thursday next.

Since my arrival here I have abstained from transmitting any opinions to the Department in reference to the foreign affairs of this country, as I desire first to acquire some knowledge of its language and history, to enable me to do so with some exactness.

Since the dispatch of the acting chargé d’affaires of this legation, dated November 15, 1872, and published by the Department, the official correspondence has been confined to matters of routine, caused doubtless by the frequent changes in the personnel of the legation.

I think it not improper now to take up the thread of events concerning the Paraguayan question since the date of the above dispatch, and unravel it to the present time, as another and probably successful effort is about to be made to settle it between Brazil and the Argentine Republic, the two principal parties to the controversy.

The somewhat celebrated note of Dr. Tejedor to the Brazilian governent, dated April 27, 1872, which was transmitted to you with the dispatch mentioned, remains as yet without any substantial contradiction, and must, I think, be considered as already belonging to the truths of history.

The mission of General Mitre to Rio de Janeiro subsequent to the note of Dr. Tejedor, while serving to pacify the irritation caused by the language of the note, in fact accomplished nothing as regards the main question of the limits beween the Argentine and Paraguayan Republics, to which is intimately allied the evacuation of Paraguay and of the Argentine island of Cerrito, at the junction of the Rivers Parana and Paraguay, by the forces of Brazil.

In the agreement, the sole result of this mission, signed by the Brazilian and Argentine plenipotentiaries at Rio de Janeiro, and which was approved by the Argentine government, but as yet never sent to Congress for ratification. Article VI provides that the two contracting parties shall withdraw their forces then in Paraguay (November, 1872) within three months after the celebration of the definitive treaties with Paraguay; or, in case of a delay of more than six months from the date of this agreement, then Brazil and the Argentine Republic will come to an understanding as to a time for the evacuation, when Brazil will also leave the island of Cerrito, (or Otajo.)

* * * * * * *

The discussion of boundaries between this country and Bolivia has made no progress for more than a year, although Dr. Tejedor placed on record some three years ago the cordial desire of this Government to help Bolivia to a solution of its difficulties, by granting a liberal boundary, and material aid to construct a railway (originated by an American citizen) from the capital of Sucre to the River Paraguay, by the valley of the Pilcomayo, its natural southern outlet.

These limits are intimately connected with all the other matters above mentioned, and perhaps a tripartite arrangement between the three republics would be the best way to settle them, although it does not appear that Paraguay has any original right or reasonable claim to any part of the Chaco. I have conversed with several Paraguayans, and they all say that a separate jurisdiction over the opposite bank of their river is the only way to enable civilization to penetrate to their country, as well as the only safeguard of their own lives in case of insurrection or revolution. The latter has proved to be the case several times in the last three or four years. The claim to the opposite bank they declare really originated, and is sustained by the influence of the Brazilian government, with their chiefs, for the sole purpose of preventing that friendship between the two republics which a common origin and a common interest so imperatively require.

Dr. Tejedor goes to Rio de Janeiro to make a fifth attempt to bring all these difficulties to a final solution. He goes, as it is understood, at the express desire of the Emperor, and under positive promises previously rendered, which will probably make his mission a success on Argentine principles. But time alone can prove the truth of this.

In the event of an unfavorable result, I think no war will ensue between the two countries for some time, as I think neither party is mad enough to desire it or begin it, and would prefer to wait and leave matters as at present.

The whole diplomatic and consular corps at Montevideo, a few days ago, protested against the passage of a law making paper money a legal tender there. The Argentine government immediately by telegraph disapproved of the action of its minister, and ordered him to withdraw his signature and apologize. This act has been severely commented on by the press, and the course of this government fully approved.

I have, &c.,

THOMAS O. OSBORN.

[Inclosure in No. 48.—Translation.]

department of foreign affairs—memorandum on the question of limits with paraguay.

There are two periods to the negotiation with Paraguay.

• In the first, Dr. Quintana could not obtain an understanding with Baron Cotegipe, in reference to certain previous declarations intended to define the obligation taken by Brazil, to protect the territorial rights of the Argentine Republic as far as Bahia Negro.
• In the second, General Mitre was unable to come to an understanding with the Paraguayan government, notwithstanding the unlimited countenance offered by the empire, according to the agreement of November 19, celebrated in Rio de Janeiro, 1872, where useless efforts of two of the most distinguished men of the republic are alone sufficient to prove that the negotiations with Paraguay contain something more than difficulties about limits. In fact the war with Paraguay so completely prostrated that country, that its own sons doubt the possibility of preserving its national independence.

The death of Lopez gave it liberty; a constitution irreproachable in a theoretical point of view has confirmed it; but the civilization, customs, and power necessary to maintain it are wanting; and it is the general conviction that Paraguayan liberties for a long time will be at the mercy of daily insurrectionists.

Under these circumstances, a negotiation in which this republic only defends its national integrity, presents a complicated problem of difficult solution, and the undersigned, minister of foreign affairs, when a resolution is about to be taken which may be of incalculable consequence, feels the necessity of setting forth in writing the motives for his opinion.

Paraguay, withdrawn by the Dictator Francia from the general movement of manipulation in 1810, when that movement commenced, was a province of the vice-royalty, and bound by the rivers Paraguay and Parana; even the line of the Parana was only de facto, because her true limits on that side was the river.

The province of Paraguay in colonial times did not permanently occupy any point whatever on the left margin of the river Parana, nor of the right bank of the river Paraguay, the Villa Occidental being of much later origin, as also the Tranguera de Lareto upon the Parana.

The treaty of May 1, (Alliance, 1865,) establishing, as it does by Article XVI, the right to exact the definitive treaty-limits on the following bases: the Argentine Republic shall be separated from the republic of Paraguay by the rivers Parana and Paraguay until the limits of Brazil are met, these being at Bahia Negro, on the right bank of the river Paraguay, did nothing more than corroborate the truth of facts and right.

The Argentine Republic neither received nor increased a single right through victory.

In the first negotiation, nevertheless, Baron Cotegipe did not wish to admit any declaration which might oblige the empire to countenance claims which passed to the north of the Pilcomayo.

In the second, the marquis of San Vincent admitted the force of the treaty of alliance in all its points; but it appears that his government reserved to itself the right again to deny its approval beyond the Pilcomayo, Señor Magalhaens having said in Asuncion that he said San Vicente had disobeyed his instructions by not thus stating in the agreement of November 19.

The question, therefore, of the Chaco with Paraguay, is only on the territory comprised between the Pilcomayo and Bahia Negro; or rather in the Villa Occidental, which Paraguay does not wish to lose, and which Brazil wishes her to keep.

The Argentine Republic as a danger to the independence to Paraguay; as a menace to her commerce.

It may here be asked, is the real danger for Paraguay, perchance, to come from the Argentine Republic? Could not the alleged inconveniences to her commerce be settled by customs agreements? Is not the independence of Paraguay recognized by the Argentine government and guaranteed by the allies? But the answer to all these questions would carry me too far, and I must sacrifice them to brevity, only occupying myself with the attitude which it becomes the republic to assume in this delicate situation.

The Argentine negotiator decided in favor of the cession of the Villa Occidental, and all the territory comprised between the Pilcomayo and Bahia Negro, with the promise on the part of Paraguay to recognize to the Argentine Republic dominion over the missions, island of Cerrito, and Chaco from the frontiers of Sante Fé to the Pilcomayo.

On my part I have maintained my previous negotiation with Bolivia, and during the present one with Paraguay, that the Villa Occidental ought to belong to the Argentine Republic, its northern boundary being the nearest stream or river, and ceding the remainder up to Bahia Negro to the republic which first treated with us.

The reasons on which we both founded our different-opinions are extensively set forth in the notes exchanged during the negotiations, and it seems useless to repeat them now. In this memorandum I ought to limit myself to considerations of another order, which corroborate my opinion before omitted, to wit, the cession of the Villa Occidental, were it granted, would import its immediate evacuation, thus repudiating our own conduct when we occupied it. By this cession our frontier on that side would de facto be withdrawn to the populated part of the province of Sante Fé, [Note by translator.—Seven hundred miles down the river,] leaving the intermediate bank subject to new settlements de facto, of Paraguay, such as those realized from 1810 to 1850.

Paraguay being master of the banks from twenty degrees to twenty-five degrees thirty minutes of latitude, would hold the power to again impede the navigation of the river, and withdraw itself from the civilizing influences of commerce and contact with other nations.

The weakness of the present government of Paraguay offers no security that it would not fall before the compact which contained such a cession could be constitutionally ratified; or that the successor would refuse to continue it; or congress, on its part, to approve it; then the Argentine government would have entered upon the road of concession, in which it would not be possible to stop.

The instability of the Argentine government, and the resistance of its congress to: a treaty made by the executive upon the above-mentioned basis, are not to be feared to the same degree; nevertheless, in prudence, they ought not to be forgotten, because it is not impossible that, for the purpose of rejecting such a treaty, we might witness a coalition of those who formerly opposed the alliance on account of its enemies, no matter in what form it might have been made, because they are the enemies of the empire, whose little friendly influence in this emergency could not be concealed.

But, supposing all for the best, while the Argentine Republic, fulfilling its word, should immediately evacuate the Villa Occidental, Paraguay, through the Brazilian forces, would be subject to an agreement which could not be evaded for much time, neither from considerations of public order in Paraguay, nor from the guarantee offered in the Cotegipe treaties, or from the want of participation of the republic of Uruguay; this fact constitutes a greater danger than the want of treaties with Paraguay.

I do not believe that the good name and patriotism of the Argentine government ought to be exposed to so many and great inconvenience in order that a conventional law may grant that which she already possesses; and, on my part, I propose as follows:

1st. That within the time fixed by the Paraguayan government, it be informed that the last word of the Argentine government is arbitration, exclusively applied to the territory confined between the Pilcomayo and Bahia Negro, including the Villa Occidental; or, instead of this, the definitive line of the Pilcomayo by way of transaction, saving to the Argentine Republic the Villa Occidental.

2d. That this same communication be made simultaneously to the Brazilian government by means of its envoy extraordinary near the Argentine government, Baron de Araguaya, expressing to him, at the same time, the desire that he receive instructions to support either of these pacific solutions; or, in defect thereof, agree to the evacuation of Paraguay, according to article 6th of the agreement of November, 1872.

CARLOS TEJEDOR.

Buenos Ayres, October 14, 1873.