No. 145.
Mr. Avery
to Mr. Fish.
Peking, February 28, 1875. (Received May 1.)
Sir: I have the honor to inform you of the latest phase of the telegraph question.
First, as to the common action to secure protection for the cables. Prince Kung thought it necessary to reply to our identical note of February 1, and to reiterate his previous disclaimer of responsibility. His letter is a characteristic specimen of Chinese casuistry. It is evidently dictated by a fear that we understood him to promise more on behalf of the central government than he intended, and by anxiety to shield the government from any demand for damages growing out of injuries to the cable. Certainly we asked no more than an exertion of good-will to be shown by such directions to the provincial authorities as the Prince repeats have been issued, i. e., that they devise measures for protecting [Page 268] the cable. To deny the practicability of protection is to take issue with well-known facts. The cable has been frequently protected by the action of the local officials on application to them by consuls, particularly those of the United States. Nothing more has ever been required, or is likely to be, than that persons willfully injuring the cable shall be apprehended and punished. The Danish minister, on behalf of his nationals, who own the line, and his colleagues who have been acting with him at Peking, desired to insure regularity and certainty in protective measures by enlisting the good-will of the central government, so that the matter would not be left to the caprice of local officials. It is true that, incidentally, they desired a quasi recognition of the right of the cable to be, and trusted such recognition would have a favorable bearing on the construction of land-lines; but this was an arrière pensé, and was never put forward or hinted in any protocol, note, or dispatch, except confidentially to governments at home.
It is unprofitable, however, to enter into an argument with Prince Kung as to his meaning or ours, at least until we shall have learned what the officials of the maritime provinces propose doing under the instructions or directions they have received. With this view no response has been made to the Prince’s last note. Meanwhile, the necessity for protective intervention on the part of the central government has been strikingly shown at Foo-chow, where the pagoda anchorage line was cut on the 16th of January, and about 1,500 feet of wire stolen. This line was built, as I have already informed the Department, with the permission of the local officials, and under their promise of protection; yet nothing was done toward keeping this promise until the foreign consuls took up the case. Mr. Sinclair, the British consul, through whom the concession was obtained, refused to lead in the necessary application to the Chinese officials, as the representative and senior of the .consular body, though repeatedly asked to do so by the telegraph company. What action has since been had I have yet to learn.
With reference to the land-line between Foo-chow and Amoy, of which about 35 miles had been quietly erected when the Foo-chow officials said it must go no farther, I learn from Consul De Lano that on the 24th of January their threats to stop it were carried into effect. The workmen at the end of the line were attacked by a mob, some of them hurt, a number of poles torn down, and a quantity of poles and wire carried off. Captain Hoskiar, of the telegraph company, learned enough from the people to satisfy him that the mob was acting under instructions from the Foo-chow officials, conveyed to them through the mandarins of the village. Work on the line had been voluntarily suspended by the company before the attack, but was resumed on orders from Copenhagen, as Mr. De Lano learns, when the assault occurred. Mr. De Lano writes, further, that he learns instructions had been received from the Tsungli Yamen by the governor-general of Fuhkien province to buy the Amoy line. This is not unlikely, in view of subsequent occurrences at Peking, which will be given farther on in this dispatch; indeed, there is reason to believe the Tsungli Yamen has known from the beginning what was going on at Foo-chow, and has had a definite policy, manger repeated professions of ignorance and irresponsibility. In the first place, as I am well convinced, Shun, the director-in-chief of the arsenal at Foo-chow, who was last year charged with the defense of Formosa against the Japanese, was authorized from Peking to erects three telegraph-lines, which he deemed necessary for rapid military communication, namely, a cable between Foo-chow and Formosa, a land-line along the coast of that island, and a land-line between Foo-chow and Amoy. Under the orders of Shun, a formal contract was made by Mr. Giquel (a French-man [Page 269] of ability and influence in the employ of the Chinese at the arsenal) with the Danish telegraph company, for the two lines first named. The contract was not ratified in Denmark on the ground of insufficiency of compensation; Mr. Dreyer, the agent of the company in Shanghai, having, by an oversight in his estimates, calculated only the cost of the material in Denmark.
The project, therefore, unfortunately, was dropped, except so far as the Foo-chow and Amoy line, which the company desired to build on its own account. Foo-chow is the center of the tea industry, and the company has a cable-office at Amoy, so that a land line between the two cities would give connection with London through its northern line. Mr. De Lano aided them in securing permission for a survey of the route. The company’s engineer was accompanied by a member of the Chinese board of trade, which has cognizance of foreign affairs, who satisfied himself and reported to the board that the people along the route had shown no hostility, and that none need be expected. Mr. De Lano then succeeded in effecting a verbal agreement for a contract, which was finally drawn Up in the terms set forth in my No. 7, one of the clauses giving the government the right to buy the line whenever it wished. This contract, as I have already informed the Department, was never signed, the officials opposing objections, insisting upon changes, and finally refusing to sign altogether. This was in October last, when the Formosa difficulty was on the eve of settlement. In view of a probably peaceful solution of that trouble, the ardor of the authorities for telegraphs suddenly cooled. Meanwhile, however, the Danish, company, relying upon the good faith of the officials, and believing the conclusion of the contract was only a matter of form, had begun work on the line, and the subprefect of Foo-chow, acting under orders of the higher authorities, as he stated himself, issued a proclamation declaring that the line was being erected with the sanction of the board of trade, which had ordered him to see that it was protected; wherefore, he warned the people, on peril of punishment, not to molest it. I have seen a translation of this proclamation, copies of the Chineses text of which were affixed to the telegraph-poles, and the fact of such a document having been issued must have been known to the Tsungli Yamen, who were in correspondence with the Fuhkien officials on the subject of the line, by their own admission to the Russian minister, as early as October last. It is certainly an encouraging and significant fact that thirty-five miles of wire were stretched through a populous country without the least sign of hostility from the people, until the Foo-chow officials, as Mr. De Lano believes, gave instructions to stop the work by violence.
One cannot help suspecting that this measure of intimidation was resorted to in order to make the company willing to sell out cheaply. Whatever the motive, however, I am of opinion that they would have kept their original agreement, and permitted the completion of the line, had the foreign influences at Foo-chow and Peking been united in its favor, as, considering the common welfare, they should have been.
* * * * * * *
On learning that violence had been committed upon the workmen and property of the Danish company, General Raasloff, the Danish minister, represented the facts to the Tsungli Yamen, and hinted that unless the work was permitted to go on he would have a claim for indemnity to urge upon them. After much beating about the bush they admitted, I think somewhat to his surprise, that lie would have a right to indemnity; but as to the resumption of the work, one of the ministers observed that it was for China herself to determine if she would have telegraphs. General Raasloff frankly admitted this, and disclaimed [Page 270] any intention to dictate or to ask more than might be conceded through good-will, or could be claimed by virtue of an agreement. The Yamen finally said they would both indemnify the Danish company and buy the Foo-chow-Amoy line, and General Raasloff at once took them up. At the request of the Yamen he submitted in writing a statement of facts and an offer to negotiate for a sale, and the Yamen responded. Through the courtesy of the Danish minister I am able to forward copies of both communications, from which it appears that the Yamen have already directed the provincial authorities of Fuhkien at Foo-chow to arrange for the carrying out of the sale. There seems to be no doubt of the perfect good faith of the Peking government in this transaction, and I presume a settlement on the basis of sale and transfer is only a matter of detail and time.
The readiness with which the members of the Tsungli Yamen consented to such a settlement confirms my belief that they have been constantly informed of what was done at Foo-chow, and have had for some time a definite policy looking to the adoption of telegraphs under government control. If their determination to buy the Foo-chow-Amoy line means that they will complete and maintain it, as the initial line of a system of government telegraphs, that will be, as I said in my first dispatch on this subject, a happy conclusion, avoiding the embarrassment of foreign rivalry, which has already entered into the Foo-chow project, and starting China sooner on the road of substantial progress. If, however, they purchase the Foo-chow line, including, probably, that to the Pagoda anchorage, only to get rid of it and prevent any further enterprise in the same direction, the result would be disheartening. I think, however, there is reason to believe, as hinted in earlier dispatches, that the Yamen actually contemplate setting up government lines, possibly under the general superintendence or direction of the inspector-general of customs, Mr. Hart, who is known to favor the erection of telegraph-lines by the government. In this connection I have only to repeat what was said in my number 7:
“Should the choice arise between no telegraphs at all or telegraphs under Chinese ownership and control, everybody who desires the advancement of the Chinese more than some selfish advantage must prefer the latter alternative. Foreigners would in any event have the profits of construction and of management until such time, far in the future, as the Chinese may have learned to do the work efficiently by themselves. Foreigners would also derive the advantage to their commercial, financial, and political interests which rapid communication even in Chinese hands would insure.”
I ought to add that it seemed proper to me to express to the Tsungli Yamen, verbally, the interest our country has in the efforts making to introduce land-lines in China, and my hope that the Foo-chow line would be allowed to go on to completion. I learn that the Yamen were approached in similar terms by the legations of Great Britain, France, and Germany, if not of Russia. In each case they uttered no objection to telegraphs per se, intimated that they did not know what had occurred lately at the end of the Foo-chow line, and said they would “inquire into it.” There can be no question that the support given the Danish minister in his request for protection to the cable, and the common representations made in reference to the land-line, have much impressed the Yamen, and hastened their apparent conclusion that they can no longer ignore or prevent telegraph enterprise.
The important bearing of the subject on our relations with China, as well as upon her own future, will, I trust, excuse the frequency and the length of my allusions to it.
I have, &c.,
A delay in the transmission of the foregoing dispatch enables me to complete the statement of facts it contains by inclosing, first, a later note from the Tsungli Yamen, informing the Danish minister that the projected purchase of the Foo-chow-Amoy telegraph had received imperial sanction, and, second, the reply of General Raasloff. The action of the Chinese government in this matter is highly novel and important, implying such an admission of responsibility in provincial affairs as it never made before, and being its first direct and open approval and adoption of a leading foreign improvement. The Danish minister has just left for Shanghai to confer with the telegraph company on the terms of sale and indemnity. He will insist that no speculative demands be made, and that negotiations be conducted in a fair and moderate spirit. If his advice is followed I anticipate the best results for the future.