No. 63.
Mr. Low to Mr. Fish.
Legation of the
United States,
Peking, March 15, 1873.
(Received May 23.)
No. 238.]
Sir: In continuing the narrative of proceedings
concerning the request for personal audience of the Emperor, I have now to
inform you that a second conference was held yesterday at the German
legation.
A summary of what was said at that interview is contained in a memorandum
herewith. (Inclosure No. 1.)
To avoid misconception it was deemed advisable to submit written memorandums,
in which were embodied the substance of the arguments advanced by us in
support of our claim, copies of which are transmitted herewith. (Inclosures
2 and 3.) Chinese versions of these memorandums were prepared by Mr.
Wade, the British minister, and handed to the
Chinese ministers at the close of the conferences, in order that they might
be able to present the case fairly to their associates.
The second conference was much less satisfactory than the first. At our first
meeting the Chinese ministers were evidently troubled, and seemed anxious to
find some means by which the matter could be arranged satisfactorily; at the
second their composure and apparent indifference indicated that their fears
of untoward results in case of refusal to comply with our request had been
in some way dispelled. The final reply of the grand secretary to us was that
they had no further propositions to make, and intimated that audience would
not be granted except upon the condition that the foreign ministers would
kneel.
Under these circumstances further discussion with them seemed useless, and
the interview was brought to a close in the manner stated in inclosure No.
1.
The change in the attitude of the yamên between the 11th and 14th instant was
clearly perceptible to all. Whether this change is due entirely to the
departure of the Russian minister from Peking may be doubted, although his
absence at this particular time unquestionably weakens the force of our
demand in the minds of the Chinese not a little.
I am of the opinion that the government will not care to incur the risk of
sending us a positive refusal to our demand; nor is it probable
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that it is prepared to yield
gracefully. Delay is the favorite weapon of defense with Chinese officials
when troublesome questions are forced upon them; and I shall be much
surprised if the prince does not ask for a further discussion of the
question before an answer of any sort is returned to our note.
I have, &c.,
[Inclosure 1.]
Memorandum of a conference at the German legation
March 14th, 1873, at
which four members of the yamên, and the ministers of Germany, the
United States, England, and France, were present.
Pursuant to an appointment made at the interview on the 11th instant, the
ministers above named met to discuss the subject-matter of the
collective note of the 24th of February.
The Chinese ministers were the same as on the 11th, with the exception of
Shên, whose place was filled by Pao.
On our side the Russian minister was absent, he having started for
Shanghai on the 13th, for the purpose of meeting the Grand Duke
Alexis.
The discussion commenced by Baron de Rehfues
remarking that we had assembled to hear what further observations the
Chinese ministers had to make in regard to the request contained in our
collective note. The grand secretary replied saying, that they had no
additional propositions to make; he hoped, however, that we were ready
to suggest some compromise by which the whole question could be amicably
arranged.
We then asked him if they still insisted that the foreign representatives
should kneel in the presence of the Emperor, as a condition of admitting
them to an audience, to which he replied in the affirmative. He then
went on to argue that none but equals of the Emperor could be allowed to
stand in his presence, and that he had no equals except the actual heads
of foreign governments; that while the diplomatic representatives of
those governments represented their sovereigns, they were not possessed
of the same power, and therefore could not be considered equal in rank;
the proposition submitted to us on the 11th placed us on a par with
princes of the blood, in point of rank and dignity, which was as far as
they could go, and which they thought we ought to be satisfied with.
In response we said that at our last meeting they were distinctly
informed that their proposition could not be entertained; and we now
desired to say, in the most unequivocal and emphatic manner, that such a
thing was quite impossible; that to accept audience upon those terms
would be considered by our governments an admission of their
inferiority, and therefore unacceptable; and that, unless the Emperor is
inclined to yield this point, further discussion of the question would
be entirely useless. We further remarked, that if this difficulty could
be got out of the way, we were willing to discuss all minor points of
etiquette, and that they would find a willingness on our part to make
any concession which would not positively derogate from our position as
the representatives of equal nations.
In response the grand secretary said, that the fact of our kneeling would
not, according to their views, imply that our countries were inferior to
China, and cited as an argument in support of his position the fact that
Russian embassadors had on many occasions conformed to Chinese etiquette
when presented to the Emperor, while Russia was at the same time
acknowledged as an equal state. He then went on to argue that if the
ceremony be now changed, and the Russian embassador is admitted to an
audience according to the custom of western nations, it would be a
virtual admission that Russia is a superior power.
This argument being so absurd, we could not do more than express our
surprise that a person so intelligent as the minister W6n Hsiang should
make such a statement; nor did it seem possible that such arguments were
brought forward with any expectation that they would be seriously
considered.
Further discussion followed, but no new propositions were made on either
side. The Chinese ministers intimated that to kneel in the presence of
the Emperor was a sine qua non to audience, and
as this was impossible, it was not deemed advisable on our part to make
any suggestions with reference to minor points of etiquette, on which we
were prepared to make some concessions.
We finally closed the conference by saying that it seemed a waste of time
to discuss the question further, as there seemed to be no possibility of
our assenting to the demand they made; that if they had no additional
propositions to make we begged them to report
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the substance of our two conferences to the
prince, and say that we would feel obliged if he would lay our note
before the Emperor and return us an answer at his earliest
convenience.
They were also authorized to inform the prince that if, prior to laying
our note before His Majesty, he thought further discussion would serve
any useful purpose, we were willing to meet him at any time he might
name, either at the foreign office, or at one of the legations.
At this interview the Chinese ministers seemed to be much more at their
ease than on the 11th; they evidently endeavored to impress us by their
bearing, as well as what they said, with the fact that it was useless to
expect that they would yield further to our demands.
The interview lasted about two hours.
[Inclosure 2.]
Memorandum on the audience question, presented by
Mr. Wade, the British minister, at the
conference on the 11th March.
The question of the audience, in reality, lies above all treaties.
The reception of foreign ministers of a certain rank, when armed with
letters of credence, is an evidence of friendly relations between the
states concerned. The refusal to receive them is an evidence of the
incompleteness of relations.
But, were the question to be argued with reference to treaty
stipulations, the right of the British minister to claim audience is
established by Article IV of the treaty of Tein-tsin, in which it is
laid down that “generally he shall enjoy the same privileges as are
accorded to officers of the same rank by the usage and consent of
western nations.”
The audience is the chief of these privileges, and the conditions under
which it is accorded are more or less known to the Chinese government
from the translation of the “Laws of Nations.”
When foreign legations were established in Peking, His Majesty, the late
Emperor, was absent at Jehol, and he remained there until his death. Sir
F. Bruce, therefore, although in his reply of the 10th of December,
1860, to a dispatch from Prince Kung, under date of
the 26th November, had fully explained the nature of the privilege, had
no opportunity of claiming its exercise, nor, although frequently
alluded to in discussion, has this since been formally claimed. By
common consent it has been agreed that, during the minority of the
reigning sovereign, the government of China should not be pressed upon
the subject that, whenever the minority terminated the right waived
would be asserted must have been apparent to the ministers of the yamên
of foreign affairs from the conversations held with various ministers on
different occasions any time during the last twelve years.
The letters addressed to Mr. Burlingame by Mr.
Seward and the Marquis de Lavalette upon the subject, distinctly record
the intention of the United States and France to claim it whenever the
regency should end; and so lately as the 18th of February the yamên
proposed to send a reply, prepared in accordance with an imperial
decree, to the letter of credence not yet delivered by M. de
Rehfues, the minister of Germany. It was explained by
M. de Rehfues to the ministers of the yamên,
who called upon him, that the reception of foreign ministers was a
question that must immediately present itself.
It cannot be doubted that, as the letter prepared by order of His Majesty
was not delivered to the minister of Germany, some explanation of its
non-delivery has been tendered to the throne; and it would be desirable
to learn, if the ministers of the yamên feel at liberty to state it,
what observations in reply His Majesty was pleased to make.
If, as foreigners are given to understand, the great difficulty
surrounding the question of audience, from a Chinese point of view, be
the ceremonial, it will he well to say a few words that will dissipate
erroneous beliefs.
One of these is that, because a foreign minister represents his own
sovereign, he claims, in every sense, equality with the sovereign to
whom he is sent. As the representative of his own, his person can no
more be touched than that of his sovereign were he present in person;
but the foreign minister does not claim to be the equal of the sovereign
to whom he is accredited. As to forms, such a sovereign may receive him
seated or standing; and if he ask the minister to be seated, to drink
tea or wine, or otherwise show him civility as his host, such acts are
but acts of graciousness on the part of the sovereign. The foreign
minister, when presented, will commonly address the sovereign certain
words of compliment or congratulation, but he will not initiate a
conversation on business. The sovereign visited can, if he pleases,
discuss affairs with a foreign minister, but he is perfectly free to
decline any such discussion should
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the minister commence or desire to continue it. In
the present case, when the Emperor of China receives the ministers, it
is most likely that the doyen alone will speak on behalf of his
colleagues, and, this ended, it will rest with His Majesty whether
anything more is said.
The essential is the improvement of relations. Foreign governments are
dissatisfied not only because many of the provisions of the treaties do
not work satisfactorily, but because there is a belief that China wishes
still to keep foreign nations at arms’ length. The reception of
ministers will dispell this belief, because it will prove that China
fairly distinguishes between friendly powers and outer barbarians or
dependent states, and the change in their sentiment towards China, which
will be the natural consequence of such a change of belief, will be of
value to China in more ways than one. It is not only with foreign states
that she has difficulties. Her internal condition, though gradually
improving, demands that she should not be embarrassed by
misunderstandings abroad.
Once for all, the concession should be made promptly and without an
attempt to annex to it conditions which would affront the dignity of the
foreign nations represented.
Once assured that there was no intention to put upon them such an
affront, foreign ministers would without doubt do all that in them lay
to make the necessary departure from Chinese etiquette as little
offensive as possible to the prejudices of the Chinese.
[Inclosure 3.]
memorandum.
It is urged that if foreign ministers remain standing while the princes
of the blood kneel, the latter are made to appear the inferiors of the
foreign ministers.
The princes of the blood in the presence of the Emperor of China are but
His Majesty’s ministers and subjects.
Foreign ministers sent to China are the representatives of their own
sovereigns. They come before the Emperor in the place of their own
sovereigns, and not as ministers or subjects of His Majesty. It is for
this reason that they claim to be received by His Majesty under other
conditions than His Majesty’s ministers or subjects.
It is then urged that these are relations in vogue among foreign nations,
but contrary to the traditions of China. The traditions of China, it is
not intended to state it offensively, ignore the equality of independent
governments; but the tradition was departed from the moment that China
signed a treaty with a foreign state. From that moment she admitted the
equality with herself of foreign powers, and she made it impossible for
her to refuse to maintain intercourse with foreign powers, under the
conditions accepted by foreign powers, without affronting the powers
with which she might refuse to entertain intercourse under these
conditions. The whole question resolves itself into this: The admittance
into the presence of the Emperor of a foreign minister bearing a letter
of credence from his sovereign implies that the friendliness of
relations between his sovereign and the Emperor of China is complete.
The refusal to admit him implies that it is incomplete.
It need scarcely be added that to promise him admittance under conditions
which would be derogatory to the dignity of his sovereign is virtually
to refuse to admit him at all.
