Annex D.–Further note on the clause presented by the government of the United States for expenditure alleged to have been incurred in the pursuit and capture of Confederate cruisers.

Efforts made to capture Confederate cruisers.

ALABAMA.

The United States in their Counter Case, while denying the pertinence of the point to the questions at issue, reiterate the assertion that they “made great efforts and incurred great expense in their efforts to capture the Alabama.”

It is not proposed in this paper to do more than make a passing reference to the cases which the British Government considers point to an opposite conclusion, and which have been fully discussed in its Case and Counter Case:

(a.) The Tuscarora’s remissness in not following up the Alabama after getting away from Liverpool.

(b.) The escape of the Alabama from the San Jacinto at Martinique, on 16th November, 1862.

(c.) Commodore Bell’s remissness in not capturing her after she sunk the Hatteras off Galveston.

(d.) Admiral Wilkes’s interference with the Secretary of the Navy’s orders to the Vanderbilt; the failure of the captain of that ship to carry out the orders implicitly when allowed to. proceed in their execution, and his final abandonment of the pursuit at the Cape of Good Hope.

The question now to be considered is, did the United States Government, with the means at its disposal, use “due diligence” in its efforts to arrest the career of the Alabama?

Mr. Welles, the Secretary of the United States Navy, in his first Report to Congress after the commissioning of the Alabama, of 1st December, 1862, stated that his department had “dispatched vessels to effect the capture of the Alabama, and there is now quite a fleet on the ocean engaged in pursuing her.” (Page 24.)

Now, on referring to the claims put forth against Great Britain, in Volume VII of the Appendices to the United States Case, and comparing the several dates, we find this “fleet” is stated to have consisted of—

1. The Tuscarora, a suitable ship for the service, which was ordered on the “5th September, 1862, to go to the West Indies in search of the Alabama and Florida.”1

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As Mr. Welles, in the same Report to Congress, stated that “the Tuscarora is now in pursuit of this pirate,” (Alabama,) it may be taken that these orders were sent to her about the time that the Chippewa was ordered to relieve her at Algeçiras in watching the Sumter. The Chippewa was at Cadiz early in November, 1862. It may therefore be assumed that she relieved the Tuscarora about that time; but, as the Tuscarora was, in the months of November and December, cruising off Madeira; was at Gibraltar on the 31st December, 1862; at Cadiz on the 17th January, 1863; subsequently paid two, if not three, visits to Madeira; was again at Gibraltar on the 17th March,1 and completed her cruise, it is presumed at some port in the United States, on the 13th April, (See Synopsis of Orders,) she could not possibly have put the orders into execution. The name of the Tuscarora does not appear in the returns of the United States ships-of-war that visited the British Islands in the West Indies during this period. This suggested a more careful and complete investigation into her case, which has resulted in proving conclusively that, in spite of the intentions of the Navy Department, she did not on or after the 5th September, 1862, “go to the West Indies for the Alabama and Florida,” and that therefore she was not, on the 1st December, 1862, the date of Mr. Welles’s Report, in pursuit of the Alabama.

2. The Vanderbilt, a suitable vessel when supplies of coal were procurable, then cruising in the track of vessels bound to and from Europe; of her proceedings on this cruise nothing further is known.2

3. The San Jacinto, a suitable vessel, then in the West Indies; the Alabama had on the previous 18th November escaped from her at Martinique.

4. The Mohican, a suitable vessel; she could not have left the United States on the “belligerent” mission of capturing the Alabama, as on the 14th November, 1862, when applying for coals at Bermuda, to enable him to go to the eastward, her commander, Captain Glisson, assured Governor Ord that “he was not directly engaged in any belligerent operations against the Confederate States, but was proceeding to a foreign station in the performance of an ordinary duty.” (Appendix to the British Case, vol. v, p. 32.)

5. The Dacotah, a suitable vessel; she had ceased her pursuit by 17th November, (see Synopsis of Orders,) although Mr. Welles named her as being still in pursuit.

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6. Onward.

7. Sabine.

8. Ino.

9. St. Louis

{ Sailing-vessels, obviously useless in pursuing the Alabama, and whose employment on such service was condemned by the United States Ministers abroad, e.g., by Mr. Dayton (quoted in the Report of Admiralty Committee, Appendix to the British Case, vol. vii, p. 58,) by Mr. Adams in his dispatch1 to Mr. Seward, 12th May, 1864, after a conversation with Prince de Joinville on the inutility of United States sailing-ships in European waters, &c. Similar opinions were expressed by the captains of the Constellation, St. Louis, &c.

Admiral Wilkes’s dying squadron could not, from a previous mention made of its special duties in the same Report, p. vi, have been included in Mr. Welles’s “fleet.”

It is thus seen that, excepting the Tuscarora, Mohican, Dacotah, and the useless sailing-ships, Mr. Welles’s “fleet” is reduced to two vessels, although at the time he could boast of having increased the United States Navy to 427 vessels, and 28,000 men!

Turning now to the ships in pursuit when Mr. Welles made his next Report to Congress, viz, on the 7th December, 1863, the Alabama then being in the height of her career, the Synopsis of Orders gives the following ships as so engaged:

1. Vanderbilt; but on the 27th of October she had abandoned the pursuit,2 and on the 7th December was making her way back to the United States.

2. Mohican; this ship, which, as will be subsequently shown, commenced her pursuit of the Alabama on the 9th May, 1863, from the Cape de Verds, also, on the 11th December, 1863, abandoned the pursuit at the Cape of Good Hope, and turned her head westward. She was at St. Helena on the 29th December, on her way back to the United States.3 Had she remained at or near the Cape, or the Mauritius, or gone to Bourbon (where she could have coaled) for a few weeks, she would have learnt that her chase had gone to the East Indies. Instead, however, of so doing, her captain retraced his steps homeward, in spite of communications he had received when at Cape Town, and which called forth these observations from the United States consul at the Mauritius in a dispatch to Mr. Seward of the 5th February, 1864: “The narrative of these things affords another illustration of the necessity of a man-of-war in these waters. * * * * When the Mohican was at Cape Town, especially as the facts concerning the Sea Bride had been communicated by me to the consul there, and were by him laid before the captain of the Mohican, it seems unaccountable that that vessel did not extend its cruise to Madagascar and Mauritius. It is to be hoped that Captain Glisson had sufficient to justify his conduct in [Page 353] turning back. Still, I can but hope that some other vessel from our now very large navy may very soon appear in the Indian Ocean.”1

3. Onward. } The sailing-ships already disposed of.
4. Ino.
5. St. Louis.

6. Rhode Island, stationed off the Bahamas, and, like the De Soto, performing precisely the same duties as Admiral Wilkes’s flying squadron, (see post, p. 88.)

7. De Soto; the same off the Havana, (Appendix to British Case, vol. vii, p. 74.)

8. Wyoming. This ship, with the sailing-sloop Jamestown, represented the United States interests in the East Indies, China, and Japan, and had, of course, the ordinary duties of this extensive station to carry on; she was, at the very time Mr. Welles was making this Report, well placed to intercept the Alabama, being near the Straits of Sunda when the latter passed through them. The Wyoming’s further proceedings will be subsequently dealt with.

It is thus seen that, within a very few days of the date of Mr. Welles’s Report, the chase, pursuit, or search for the Alabama was practically reduced to one efficient ship, the Wyoming, and she, as will be elsewhere shown, virtually, on the 13th of the following February, gave up the pursuit, or did what, as far as any claim on account of the Alabama is concerned, amounted to an abandonment. Finding the Confederate had probably left the limits of his station, her commander conceived the orders he was then acting under did not justify him in following the Alabama beyond such limits. And yet, at this time, Mr. Welles could justly make the yet prouder boast that the United States Navy consisted of 588 vessels and 34,000 men, exclusive of officers!

From this period to the date of the Alabama’s being sunk, the chase, pursuit, or search was confined to—

1. The Sacramento, a suitable vessel, ordered, on “the 18th January, 1864, to cruise to the Cape de Verds, Brazil, Cape of Good Hope, and thence to the eastward, or to Europe, according to news of the Alabama.”

She was at Table Bay from the 29th April to the 5th May.2 Learning there, doubtless, that the Alabama had sailed on the previous March for a French port, she followed her to Europe, and was at Lisbon on the 29th of June; it has not yet been ascertained on what day she arrived there, but fifty-six days would seem to have been a very long passage for a powerful full-rigged ship like the Sacramento, with a speed under steam of 12¼ knots, to have made in time of war and in the actual pursuit of an enemy. She may, therefore, have arrived at Lisbon some time before the 29th June, or have touched at some other European port. Although probably in want of stores and supplies, she does not appear to have called at Cadiz, which was then the depot for the United States ships.

2. The Kearsarge, from the time she left Flushing till she sunk the Alabama.

3. The Wachusett, a suitable vessel, and ordered apparently to limits judiciously chosen to intercept the Alabama on her return westward. She was, however, so frequently to be found during this period in the ports of Brazil, that she could have spent but little of her time in cruising near the equator. The Alabama, on the 2d May, 1864, (having for ten days previously been on the track of the homeward-bound Pacific [Page 354] ships,) was, according to Admiral Semmes, at “our old toll-gate at the crossing of the 30° parallel, where, as our reader will recollect, we halted on our outward passage and viséd the passports of so many travelers. The poor old Alabama was not now what she had been then. Her commander, like herself, was well-nigh worn down.” (“Adventures Afloat,” p. 749.) Where was the Wachusett about this time? At Bahia on the 31st March, at Pernambuco on the 27th April, at Bahia again on the 13th May and on the 11th June. It would seem from the translation of a dispatch from Mr. Webb to the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 16th of October, 1864, given at page 142 of the first volume to the Appendix of the British Case, that her commander was then more concerned in opposing the wishes of Mr. Webb and the United States Consul at Bahia than in following up the “rebel” cruisers. The claim on this ship’s account has been considered admissible for the Arbitration, (in the sense explained in the Admiralty Report;) but it will be hereafter shown that subsequent investigation warrants the suggestion that a considerable abatement should be made from it.

4. The Niagara, a suitable vessel; but the postscript to the Admiralty Report will have shown that this ship was sent to European waters on account of the iron-clads and corvettes which were being built in France for the Confederates.1

It is therefore clearly demonstrated that, when the Alabama was sunk, the United States cruisers in actual search of her (including the Wachusett and also the Kearsarge for nine days) were only three, out of a navy which by this time must have numbered over 600 vessels.

FLORIDA.

Pursuing the same course of inquiry, and only incidentally alluding to the acts of remissness on the part of United States cruisers in regard to the Florida, viz: allowing her to get through the blockading squadron into Mobile; allowing her again to pass the blockading squadron, and get out again; it will be found that, at the date of Mr. Welles’s Report to Congress of 1862, no cruisers were in pursuit of that Confederate vessel, then blockaded in Mobile; nor, indeed, does the United States Counter Case contend that the pursuit in her ease was effective. It simply states “that it is scarcely necessary to say that the United States deny the allegations regarding the supposed negligence of their Navy.”

The Tuscarora, as already shown above, was never in the West Indies in pursuit of the Alabama or Florida, although she was ordered there for the purpose.

On her escape from Mobile, the R. R. Cuyler—a suitable vessel—was sent by Admiral Farragut in pursuit of the Florida, and continued to cruise for seventeen days. It is not known that there is any official account of her cruise published; but a letter,2 purporting to be from an officer on board, and dated 21st January, 1863, “off east coast of Yucatan,” after mentioning that they had pushed on to Cape Antonio, but had lost sight of the chase, proceeds:

“Had the Oneida accompanied us, as she was ordered to do, our chance would have been double what it was. * * * *

“There were seven vessels of us off the port, (Mobile.) We had fifteen hours’ warning, and her (the Oreto) only way out was through the main ship-channel, which, at the bar, is less than a mile wide. * *

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“Everything was done to increase our speed, but the utmost was 12½ knots. I have seen the ship go 14.

“The prime cause of her escape was neglect to prepare for her; and remembering Commander Preble’s case, I think the Department will soon decide where the fault lies.”

At the date of Mr. Welles’s next Report of Congress, on the 7th December, 1863, there was not a single vessel in special pursuit of the Florida, nor had there been any sent during the previous twelve months, except those already named.

From this date to that of the Florida’s seizure in the Port of Bahia by the Wachusett, the following were sent in pursuit of her:

1. The Ticonderoga—a suitable vessel—which appears to have been withdrawn from the protection of the Fisheries, on tidings that the Florida had re-appeared off Bermuda, in June, 1864. She touched at Barbadoes on the 8th August,1 but nothing further is known of her proceedings.

2. The Pontoosuc—a suitable vessel. She appears to have been the only vessel of those out on the 12th and 13th August, 1864, in pursuit of the Tallahassee, whose orders embraced also the Florida.

3. The Niagara—a suitable vessel—but, as already shown above, she was not sent in pursuit of the Florida; further references to the same effect will be given below.

It is thus seen, if no “great efforts” were made and no “fleet” was dispatched to capture the Alabama, still less were any serious efforts made to capture the Florida; and this assertion is advanced with a full recollection of the intermittent and fitful attempts made by the Kearsarge to blockade her in, and capture her after leaving, Brest, in the performance of the ordinary duties incidental to a state of war, and when, as shown by the synopsis and her actual proceedings, the Kearsarge was not detailed for the actual pursuit of any of the Confederate ships in Class I of the Admiralty Report.

None of the sailing-vessels are stated to have been sent expressly in pursuit of the Florida. Her escape from the Saint Louis at Madeira on the 29th February, 1864, is, however, a further apt illustration, if further proof could possibly be needed, of the utter unfitness of the sailing ships for the service of following up these vessels. “I have little hopes (said Captain Preble) of bringing her to action with my canvas wings, though I shall follow her to sea, if practicable, and try,” with what result might easily have been divined.2

GEORGIA.

The United States, in their Counter Case, sec. vii, par. 5, state that, “when Her Majesty’s Government made the statement that no serious endeavor to intercept or capture the Georgia appears to have been made on the part of the United States, it was mistaken.” No trace, however, of any such endeavor appears in the synopsis of the orders to the United States cruisers, where she is not even named; and the only ship known to have gone in pursuit of her was the Niagara, which captured her when it was notorious she had been dismantled and sold, and was chartered as a merchant-ship to the Portuguese Government.

There is no act of special remissness on the part of any United States cruisers averred in reference to the Georgia. It would seem, however, from the translation of a letter addressed on the 21st May, 1863, to Mr. [Page 356] Webb, the United States minister at Bio, by a Mr. Grebert, an “intelligent German gentlemen,”1 that the Mohican had been in sight of the Georgia off St. Vincent, but it would not appear that she followed her up. Mr. Grebert stated, “We were informed at Saint Vincent, Cape de Verds, that a few days before our arrival, a steamer had appeared in sight of the port, but had immediately disappeared. It is supposed that this steamer must have been a secessionist privateer.” Mr. Grebert had previously said that the Mohican was at Saint Vincent, and that he “there gathered information that in the neighboring waters another vessel of war was cruising, supposed to be the Vanderbilt;” but at that time the Vanderbilt was Admiral Wilkes’s flag-ship in the West Indies.

Mr. Grebert arrived at Bahia on 14th May, and there “an officer of the Georgia told me that the Georgia had been seen at Saint Vincent; but went higher up, (qy. to a higher latitude?) when she discovered the Mohican in the port of Saint Vincent.”

It is, therefore, very probable that the steamer supposed to have been the Vanderbilt was the Georgia, and that the Georgia made out the Mohican in the harbor, although the latter failed to see the Georgia.

Mr. Webb, in a letter to Mr. Seward of 23d June, 1863, showed evidently that he was not satisfied with the zeal shown on another occasion by the Mohican, though he suggested that her commander “may have been misled by some cunningly devised report.” He indulged in the hope that the converted merchant sailing-vessel Onward might be more successful than the Mohican had been in the search for the Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, all then on the coast of Brazil.2

SHENANDOAH.

“The United States, as to the Shenandoah, make the same statement which they have already made in reply to the statements of Her Majesty’s Government touching attempts to intercept or capture the Georgia.”—United States Counter Case, sec. viii, par. 5.

No mention is made, in the Synopsis of Orders, of this ship; and it is nowhere stated that any United States vessel was ever sent in search of her.

Without again going over the same ground with regard to the Niagara, Sacramento, &c., it may be confidently stated that the Iroquois was the only vessel which, it could possibly be suggested, was ever in pursuit of the Shenandoah.

Putting aside, for the moment, the fact of her orders referring to “rebel privateers” generally, a comparison of dates and a slight examination of facts will show that this ship’s actual proceedings had no reference whatever to the Shanandoah.

The Iroquois received her orders “to leave European waters, and cruise off Madeiras, Brazil, Cape of Good Hope, and to Batavia, East Indies, for rebel privateers,” about the middle of September, 1864.

These orders from the Secretary of the Navy would, therefore, probably have been dated about the 1st September. It was then known at Washington that the only Confederate cruiser at sea was the Florida, the fate of the Alabama, and the sale as a merchant-ship, though not the capture, of the Georgia, being also known to the Navy Department; her capture must, however, have been known to the Iroquois when the orders reached her.

The Iroquois left Portsmouth on the 17th September, 1864, and finally [Page 357] quitted England on the 23d September, having gone to Dover to provision.1

She was then stated by her Captain to be “about to sail for a station remote from the shores of Europe.”2

At this time nothing was known of the Sea King, or Shenandoah; no mention was made of her until six weeks afterward, when Mr. Dayton writing from Paris, informed Mr. Seward that he had advised Captain Craven, of the Niagara, not to follow the Sea King, as he had “little confidence” in the reliability of the reports from Mr. Morse, the consul in London;3 this was ten days before any communication was made respecting her by the United States Legation to Earl Russell.

The Shenandoah was commissioned at Desertas on the 20th October made several prizes off the Coast of Brazil, then proceeded, to Melbourne without touching at any port en route, and arrived there on the 25th January, 1865; she, however, called off the Island of Tristan d’Acunha, and landed some crews of prizes she had taken and destroyed.4

On the day following her arrival at Melbourne the Mail left for Europe, taking without doubt newspapers giving accounts of her arrival, as well as the reports to that effect which the United States Consul stated he then sent to Mr. Adams, and to the United States Consul at Hong-Kong.5

The Iroquois, following out her orders, was at Table Bay 9th January, 1865, and at Mauritius 29th January, 1865.6

As it could not have been known at either of these ports at the respective dates that the Shenandoah had gone to the eastward of the Cape, it is clear that, not only could the Iroquois’ orders have had up to this date no reference to the Shenandoah, but that her movements could not have been influenced by any tidings she could have heard at either of these places of that vessel’s movements.

It is true that the Iroquois is reported to have called at Tristan d’Acunha on her way from the Brazils, and taken the crews of the prizes, who had been left there by the Shenandoah, to the Cape, but it is hardly probable they were able to give the commander of the Iroquois any clue to the Shenandoah’s future proceedings, and, in fact, the Iroquois was officially reported as having left the Cape for Batavia, showing that no deviation from her orders was then contemplated in consequence of any such clue. She coaled neither at the Cape nor at the Mauritius, although three months had elapsed since she had been to a British port; hence it may be inferred she was not pressing on in actual pursuit of any particular ship, but was making her passages leisurely under sail.

It is not probable that the Iroquois, on arrival at Ceylon on the 17th February, received any special orders from the Navy Department relative to the Shenandoah, as on the 14th of the previous month Mr. Seward had officially informed Her Majesty’s Chargé d’ Affaires at Washington that “a reliable representation” had been made to the Department that the Shenandoah will be found in the neighborhood of Bermuda.”7 Again, Mr. Seward, in writing to Mr. Adams nearly a fortnight later (on the 27th) upon the subject of the Shenandoah’s captures off the coast of Brazil, made no reference to special orders being sent to any cruisers,8 [Page 358] nor is any mention made in the synopsis of further orders being sent to the Iroquois, as in other cases when the cruisers received fresh in structions.

Had she obtained any inkling from the crews of the prizes taken from Tristan d’Acunha that the Shenandoah was likely to have made the Straits of Malacca and their neighborhood her cruising-ground, it would seem to have been at once the proper and the natural course of the Commander of the Iroquois to have filled up with coals at the Cape, and pushed on forthwith to Batavia, replenished coal, and then to have proceeded to the Confederate cruiser’s expected cruising-ground, within which, in three months from leaving the Cape, he could again have coaled either at Singapore or Penang.

It will have been seen that, on arriving at Ceylon, the Iroquois would probably have heard through the newspapers of the arrival of the Shenandoah at Melbourne. It would, however, seem that she staid there eight days to take in but 150 tons of coal;1 and, instead of proceeding at once to Melbourne, to endeavor, through personal communication with the United States Consul, to get on her track, the Iroquois went to Penang, from whence, on or about the 2d March, 1865, the senior British naval officer in the Straits of Malacca reported to his commander-in-chief, Vice-Admiral Kuper, then in China, that “the United States sloop Iroquois has appeared at Penang, with the avowed intention of endeavoring to intercept the Confederate cruiser Shenandoah.”

On the 29th May, 1865, she is reported to have been at Singapore, and still in search of the Confederate steamer Shenandoah.

She was thus probably for nearly three months in the Straits of Malacca and its neighborhood—in fact, near Batavia—the destination indicated in, and therefore it may be presumed obeying, her original orders, which, as before stated, could have had no reference to the Shenandoah.

In June or July she must have quitted her station, for on the 12th August, 1865, she was at the Cape on her way back to the United States. This step of returning homeward could have had no reference to the Shenandoah.

She called at St. Helena on the 25th August, 1865. While there, her commander informed the Governor that he had taken off from Tristan d’Acunha the people landed from the Shenandoah and conveyed them to the Cape of Good Hope in the early part of that year; and, also, that “he had been to the eastward in search of the Shenandoah, and believed she had proceeded to the Pacific, where it was to be apprehended she might do some mischief among the American whalers in those regions.”2

On a full review of these facts, and with the light thrown on the Iroquois’s proceedings by this conversation of her commander with the Governor of St. Helena, it cannot be seriously contended she was ever in actual or even constructive pursuit of the Shenandoah. She left England with no such orders; it is not averred in terms that she or any other United States cruiser ever had such orders; she never deviated substantially from the orders laid down for her guidance before proceeding to her “distant station;” while on that distant station she never went far from Batavia, the final point named in her orders; and her commander avowed that he quitted the station with the belief (as was the fact) that the Shenandoah was destroying whalers in the Arctic seas. Surely no proceedings can be less unlike “pursuit” than those of the Iroquois; that her officers should, while in the Straits of Malacca, have named the Shenandoah as the then special object of their quest, [Page 359] was natural, since she was then the only “rebel privateer” known to be in existence, and they would have said so in good faith, but of course with no notion that the whole cost of their cruise was to be eventually claimed from Great Britain. If such a claim were admissible, a similar claim would be equally admissible on account of every United States ship of war of sufficient force then in commission, since, if the Shenandoah had fallen in the way of any such ship, it would have been the duty of that ship, as it was that of the Iroquois, to capture her; but this is not, cannot be, “pursuit.” It is therefore obvious, from this further investigation, that the Admiralty Committee were fully justified, on every ground, in considering as inadmissible the claim made on her account.

The claim made in the United States Case for the pursuit of the Shenandoah, the asseveration in their Counter Case that “Her Majesty’s Government is mistaken in its belief that no endeavor to intercept or capture the Shenandoah appeared to have been made by the Government of the United States,” and the large sum involved in this claim, amounting, without interest, to no less than $329,865.08, will, it is hoped, afford good and substantial grounds for thinking that the labor and research expended in the investigation of this particular case have not been fruitless.

INADEQUACY AND WANT OF CONCERT OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCE ABROAD, ETC.

The United States ministers abroad were constantly calling the attention of their Government to the inadequacy of their naval forces to arrest the career of the Confederate cruisers. Messrs. Adams, Dayton, Pike, Perry, Webb, Harvey,1 one and all at different times dwell on this theme; but when the letters on the subject (and many of the consuls made similar representations) were referred to Mr. Welles, he may be said to have acted always as if he regarded this question as wholly subordinate to that of the blockades; hence it is seen that the most suitable vessels were taken from the pursuit to re-enforce the blockading squadrons, without regard to the injury which the depredations of the Confederate cruisers were inflicting on the United States commerce. Sometimes he explained that it was want of men which prevented him from sending a greater force in pursuit;2 but with the number of seamen at his disposal, 28,000 in 1862 and 36,000 in 1863, exclusive of officers, this excuse would seem to be of little avail when the facts are sifted. However, besides this notorious inadequacy of force to compass the ends which it is submitted the United States Government ought to have had in view, and to have considered a necessary, if not the first, duty, there were other causes in operation which are disclosed sufficiently in the correspondence laid before Congress and the House of Representatives, and which tended to impair the efficiency of the small force detailed for this special service; they were—

(A.) The absence of any communication to many of the different legations of the movements of the several men-of-war in European waters, of which there are many complaints.

(B.) The fact that there was no naval head or senior officer in European waters; each ship appeared to act independently and for itself; there was a consequent absence of all concerted action.

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From these causes combined, which may be abundantly proved from the United States documents, and which were—

(a.) Insufficiency of force;

(b.) Ignorance of movements of the ships on the part of United States Ministers;

(c.) Independence of action on the part of each ship; it may fairly be inferred that the United States Government did not “actively and diligently exert their naval power” to arrest the course of the Alabama or the other Confederate cruisers.

ERRORS IN THE SYNOPSIS OF ORDERS.

Frequent reference is made in the Report of the Admiralty Committee and its Appendices, as well as in this paper, to errors in the synopsis of orders; a few fresh illustrations may not be inapt:

(a.) The Chippewa is stated to have been watching the Sumter at Algeciras to the 30th May, 1863. Now not only, as is well known, had the Sumter left Gibraltar as an unarmed ship on the previous 8th of February,1 but the Chippewa was herself with some of Admiral Wilkes’s ships in the West Indies, at Cape Haytien, on the 21st May, 1863, and at Nassau, “from St. Thomas,” on the 26th May.2 She had been at Cadiz on the 12th February, and again in March, and she was at Madeira in April; hence the synopsis must be in error in stating that she was watching the Sumter at Algeciras to the 30th May, 1863.

(b.) The Kearsarge.—In the admiralty report it has been noticed with reference to this ship’s orders of 30th September, 1862, “to capture the Rappahannock or other rebel privateers in European waters,” that the synopsis must be in error.

Mr. Welles, in his report of the 1st December, 1862, stated, at “last advices (she) was also in pursuit of the 290,” (page 23.)

In the United States Case she is stated to have been at Gibraltar with the Tuscarora, watching the Sumter, and it is implied that this was continued till that vessel’s sale.

The Kearsarge was, in fact, about the time to which Mr. Welles must have referred to, viz, on the 30th September and on 3d November, watching the Sumter at Gibraltar,3 and on the 4th November she was at Cadiz; she was certainly not in pursuit of the Alabama, which vessel was then in the West Indies.

(c.) Ino.—There is a claim on behalf of this sailing-ship for fifteen months for convoying the Aquila with the monitor Camanche on board. Now the Camanche, on the 1st February, 1863, was building at Jersey City, and on the 14th March of the following year, was at San Francisco, California.4 It seems more probable that there is a further errror in the synopsis than that this service should have taken fifteen months to perform.

(d.) Juniata.—From the synopsis of orders, the dates given, and the amount of the claim on her behalf, it would be inferred that this ship commenced her service with Admiral Wilkes’s squadron on the 4th December, 1862; whereas she did not leave the United States for nearly five months after that date. A correspondent of the New York Herald, writing on the 22d January, 1863, says that the Juniata, [Page 361] which had been under sailing orders since November, was still at Philadelphia, being detained by a defect in her machinery, (New York Herald, January 26, 1863.) She went to Fortress Monroe on the 17th March, and sailed for the Havana on the 25th April, 1863, (see New York Herald of that date.) The United States Navy Register for 1863 shows that on the 1st February, 1863, she was in Hampton Roads, and not with the West India squadron.

(e.) The Connecticut.—To cruise between Bermuda and Nassau to watch for the Sumter from 3d August, 1863, to 7th September, 1863.

This claim is made for a period when the Sumter, as admitted in the United States Case, p. 88, had changed her character, and become the Gibraltar. She sailed from Liverpool on the 3d July, 1863, as a merchant-vessel without armament, with a cargo of warlike stores for Charleston,1 and the Connecticut was doubtless employed to look out for her; but as she was then simply a blockade-runner, or a merchantship, with contraband of war on board, or both, it is clear that under no circumstances could this claim be admissible under the treaty.

(f.) Ticonderoga.—In a note in the appendix to the report of the admiralty committee,2 attention is called to the fact that between May, 1863, and June, 1864, although her cost is claimed, no service is given in the synopsis of orders for the period. This was not an omission to specify the service, but an error in the dates and charges; as within the period, for which it would otherwise be inferred she was in pursuit of Confederate cruisers, she was actually under repairs (had “work done”) at the navy-yards of Brooklyn; Charlestown, Massachusetts; Philadelphia, and Norfolk, respectively;3 and she is shown in the Navy Register for 1864 as being on the 12th of March of that year “ready for sea at Philadelphia.” Again, it is obvious that she could not have been employed in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence protecting the fisheries during the winter.

(g.) Niagara.—The claims on account of this ship and the Sacramento have been already dealt with in the admiralty report and its postscript on the grounds—

1. That they are generally inadmissible.

2. That they extend far beyond the existence, as confederate cruisers, of the vessels on account of which the claims are made.

3. That they extend to periods long after the cessation of hostilities.

But in addition to these fatal errors or objections to the claims, the following are also obvious errors:

4. Mr. Adams stated that the Niagara had left France for the United States on the 8th August, 1865;4 the claim, however, embraces a period forty-four days beyond that date, although a vessel of her speed could hardly have occupied that time in making the passage across the Atlantic.

5. The Niagara accompanied the Russian squadron, which convoyed the remains of the Czarovitch from Lisbon to the North Sea, and for which act of courtesy the Russian government expressed itself deeply sensible and grateful to that of the United States; but, through a manifest error in the synopsis and in the claims, the cost of the ship for this period is claimed against the British Government.5

(h.) Nereus.—The claims for this ship on convoy service embrace a [Page 362] period during which she was employed with the fleet at the attacks on and final capture of Fort Fisher between 24th December, 1864, and 15th January, 1865.1 She may have been employed on this service for a much longer period, an d she, as well as her consorts in convoying duty, may have been often similarly withdrawn during the periods embraced in the claims, as it is only incidentally that errors of this character can, in the absence of complete information as to the orders and the movements of the United States cruisers, be discovered.

It is thus shown that there is a sufficiently large number of patent errors in the synopsis of orders to warrant its authority on matters of fact being questioned, when other data, generally derived from. United States official documents, point to different conclusions. They are adduced with this sole object, as they generally refer to claims which have not been regarded as admissible (on the hypothesis explained in the admiralty report) under the treaty, and consequently it has not been thought necessary to give their money value.

ADMIRAL WILKES’S FLYING SQUADRON.

The total amount claimed for the services of this flying squadron, which originally consisted of one converted merchant-steamer, four second-class steam sloops, three paddle-wheel steamers, one sailing-ship, one sailing store-ship, and one sailing-ship occasionally, if not always, used as a coal-ship, is so large ($1,457,130) that it may not be thought an abundance of caution to add to the reasons which the admiralty committee justly looked on as conclusive why these claims should be considered wholly inadmissible:

1. The accounts of prizes captured by United States cruisers, which have been carefully examined, the returns of visits of United States ships-of-war to British West India Islands, and the incidental notices scattered here and there in the reports of the Secretary of the Navy to Congress, in other official papers, and in the newspapers of the day, abundantly prove that for the periods respectively claimed none of these ships, though the squadron is called “flying,” proceeded beyond the limits officially designated by Mr. Welles as the “West Indies.” When finally broken up under the command of Admiral Lardner, Admiral Wilkes’s successor, Mr. Welles spoke of it as the “West India squadron;”2 the term “flying” is an ex post facto designation.

2. The continuance of this squadron as an organization had no reference whatever to the confederate cruisers, but solely to the duration of the trade at Matamoras. Mr. Welles stated in his report of 7th December, 1863, (page viii,) that “the occupation of Rio Grande and Brownsville (13th November, 1863) has put a final termination to the lately extensive commerce of Matamoras, which is becoming as insignificant as it was before the rebellion.”

Now at that date the Alabama, Florida, and Georgia were in being as confederate cruisers, and yet so little were their proceedings heeded in reference to this “flying squadron” that, taking the dates from the synopsis of orders, when that report was written the squadron had dwindled down to—

The Tioga, a paddle-wheel steamer of 809 tons;

The sailing-vessel Gemsbok, which was frequently, if not always, used as a coal or as a store ship;

And the sailing store-ship National Guard.

[Page 363]

It cannot be supposed the Tioga was ever afterward detached from Admiral Lardner’s squadron or sent in the actual pursuit of any of the confederate cruisers, (all then on the other side of the Atlantic,) since on the 24th March, 1864, she was off Elbow Light, (Bahamas,) and it may be assumed she was within the limits assigned to her by her orders until the claim on her account ceased, viz, 27th June, 1864.1

All the other vessels stated to have composed this squadron had, at different times, been previously withdrawn, and were afterward to be found attached to blockading squadrons.

The words “stated to have composed” are used intentionally, as it is impossible to reconcile the dates given in the abstract of the claims with those given elsewhere; for instance, in the case of the Juniata, as already shown, there is an error of nearly five months; in the Navy Register for January, 1863, the Gemsbok and the Oneida are shown as attached to blockading squadrons, and in that for January, 1864, the Tioga is named as attached to the East Gulf blockading squadron—duties palpably inconsistent with the pursuit of the confederate cruisers.

The claim on account of the Oneida commences on the very day (16th January, 1860) that she allowed the Florida to escape from Mobile. It is believed that after that date she continued to be employed in the blockade of that port, as she is stated in the Navy Register for 1863 to have been attached to the West Gulf squadron on the 1st February, 1863.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES,

Not affecting the claims considered by the admiralty committee as admissible (upon the hypothesis explained by them) for arbitration.

VANDERBILT.

It should be borne in mind that, notwithstanding her superior speed and armament, the Vanderbilt was an unfit vessel to send in pursuit of the Alabama, since she was wholly dependent on her steam-power; hence, after making a passage, if she could not replenish her coal, she was powerless; this explains parts of her proceedings.

On her way to the Cape she, in obedience to her orders, went to Fernando Noronha, Pernambuco, and Rio, there coaled, and notwithstanding she was in pursuit of an enemy remained in port nineteen days.2 As a matter of fact, if she had staid there about five or six days and sailed on the 20th July direct for the Cape, (as she was ordered,) she would, instead of never meeting the Alabama, have found her in Table Bay.

From Rio she, however, went to St. Helena, there took all the coals she could get, (400 tons,) but on her arrival at Simon’s Bay (where it was not known that she had been at St. Helena) she was again allowed to coal, taking nearly 1,000 tons.3 After remaining eight days “painting ship,” (so Semmes says in “My Adventures,” page 668,) she again put to sea and went to Mauritius, where she was again allowed to coal, (though under what circumstances, or what representations her captain made to the governor, it is nowhere stated,) but there is another unaccountable delay in port of seventeen days;4 she returned to Table Bay, [Page 364] and made arrangements to coal before obtaining permission; this was of course refused, and her coaling stopped, but not until she had taken nineteen tons on board. Then hearing, doubtless, that there was coal at Angra Pequeña, her captain went there and took possession of it, saying “he must have coal,”1 and with this supply he went to St. Helena and Bahia, where doubtless he obtained a further supply, thence to Barbados and to the United States.

These facts prove:

1st. That the Vanderbilt was not fitted for the pursuit to such distant regions, where supplies of coal were limited, owing to her having no sail-power.

2d. That in addition to deviating from her orders she exhibited no haste in quitting some of the ports she touched at to carry on her pursuit.

SAN JACINTO.

Of this vessel’s proceedings there are more full details than of those of any of the other United States cruisers, given in a letter of the Secretary of the Navy of 30th August, 1871, Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, p. 345.

Semmes describes her as having a more powerful battery and double the crew, but that the Alabama had the “speed of her;” however, it may be assumed she was not an unsuitable vessel to have been sent in the pursuit; she was, as will be subsequently shown, withdrawn after being about two and one-half months on this service, and was afterward attached to the eastern blockading squadron.

If the arbitrators consider that she is proved, as stated at p. 138 of the British Counter Case, to have been remiss in allowing the Alabama to escape from Martinique, a question would then arise whether any portion of the claim, made in her behalf was admissible, and whether such claim (if any) could be carried beyond the date of the Alabama’s escape.

AUGUSTA.

Nothing is known of her cruise, which only lasted ten weeks, and consequently, though she was a suitable vessel for the service, she must necessarily have performed it in a very perfunctory manner. She does not appear to have called at Bermuda or any of the British West India Islands.

She was afterward employed in the North Atlantic blockading squadron.2

DACOTAH.

Also a suitable vessel; was withdrawn after but one month’s service, and for the same service.

NIAGARA.

It may possibly be thought unnecessary to accumulate further proofs as to what was the actual employment of this ship, since the postscript to the admiralty report, and the United States official documents therein mentioned, will, it may be considered, have proved conclusively that she [Page 365] was not sent to Europe in pursuit of any of the Confederate vessels named in the United States Case, but to watch the vessels then being constructed for the Confederates in French ports. The claim, however, for this ship is so vast in amount, ($648,234,) that it is thought better, at the risk of being prolix, to give other quotations from United States sources which have been met with, and which are very pertinent to the contention that she never was engaged in pursuing the Alabama or Florida.

True it is that on the 28th April, 1864, Mr. Adams informed Mr. Seward that the Alabama was “reported at Cape Town, and about to come to France;”1 and as the Niagara left the United States the end of the following month, it might be not unnaturally inferred that she was dispatched to Europe in consequence of these tidings, and hence that she was sent in pursuit of the Alabama; but a dispatch from Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams of the 28th May, when that of the 28th April must have been received, effectually disposes of this hypothesis. “The Niagara,” Mr. Seward stated, “will go to Europe on Wednesday next. * * * We have adopted this policy, not alone on account of the naval expeditions with which we are threatened from British ports,2 but also because we have not been able to procure entirely satisfactory assurances from the French Government,” &c., about the vessels building at Bordeaux.

Mr. Adams had, two days before, (26th,) written to Mr. Seward to this effect: “My impression is that hereafter the base will be substantially transferred, to the other side of the Channel,” and he also refers to the four vessels in process of construction in France.3

Attention has been already called by the committee to the Niagara being “without orders.” Mr. Harvey, the United States minister at Lisbon, writing to Mr. Seward on the 29th November, 1864, confirmed this curious and important fact in these terms: “In saying that I refer to the fact that the Niagara has been practically tied up for several months at Flushing, Antwerp, and the British colonies,” (query, Channel,) “and, as is understood, waiting for orders which are to regulate her further movements.”4

Can it still, in the face of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, be seriously contended that from 30th May, 1864, to the 20th September, 1865, the Niagara “was cruising in the North Atlantic in search of the Alabama and Florida?”

MONEY CLAIMS—FURTHER ABATEMENTS SUGGESTED.

Where none are suggested the cruisers are not named.

TUSCARORA.

It has been already shown that she never went to the West Indies in pursuit of the Alabama and Florida, and consequently the amounts which were considered admissible, upon the hypothesis of the admiralty report, under the belief that she had carried out her orders, should be abated as follows:

[Page 366]
Amount considered hypothetical admissible by the Committee $89,765 58
Abatements suggested on account of the Alabama $32,736 29
Abatements suggested on account of the Florida 32,736 29
65,472 58
There would still remain a sum considered hypothetically admissible, which refers to a period of six weeks before the Alabama left Liverpool, and to another of four weeks during which the Tuscarora was visiting British ports; she finally went to Cadiz on the 2d September, 1863; amounting to 24,293 00

SAN JACINTO.

Reference has already been made to a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, giving details of this ship’s proceedings; but it is by no means a full report, as no mention is made of her visit to Martinique, when the Alabama escaped from her, nor does it mention the fact that after this escape the San Jacinto was no longer employed in pursuit of the Alabama, but was attached, during a part of the period for which claims are made, to the East Gulf blockading squadron. This is shown in the Navy Register, where, on the 1st January, as well as on the 1st February, 1863, she is named as attached to this squadron, though the precise date at which she was withdrawn from the pursuit is not given. If the official Navy Register needed confirmation, it would be found in a correspondence from Key West of the 15th January, 1863, published in the New York Herald of January 27, which stated that “she (the San Jacinto) comes from St. Thomas for supplies, and will, I understand, be temporarily attached to the Eastern Gulf blockading squadron.” Taking, however, the date given in the Navy Register, viz, 1st January, 1863, as the date of her withdrawal from the pursuit, the claims on her account would stand thus:

Amount considered hypothetically admissible by the Admiralty Committee $65,421 43
Proportion now shown to be inadmissible 16,183 20
Amount that may now be considered hypothetically admissible 49,238 23

MOHICAN.

It has been already shown why this ship should be considered to have been performing the ordinary duties on a foreign station1 until the 9th May, 1863, when she left the Cape de Verdes for the Brazils, and may be assumed to have commenced her pursuit of the Alabama. She eventually arrived at Table Bay on the 11th December, 1863.2 Here, without waiting to ascertain where the Alabama had gone, which she might have done (if he could not remain at the Cape) by proceeding to Bourbon or to the Mauritius, her captain, like the commander of the Vanderbilt, gave up the pursuit, and on the 19th December turned his ship’s head homeward, where he arrived in April, 1864. Although a very suitable ship for the pursuit, and although when she arrived in the United States the Florida, Alabama, and Georgia were on the high seas, she was withdrawn from this special service, and was afterward employed on the North Atlantic blockading squadron.

It is therefore clear, on these premises, that the (hypothetically) admissible claim on account of this ship could not extend beyond the [Page 367] period embraced between the 9th May, 1863, when she may be considered to have commenced the pursuit, and the 19th December, when she abandoned it, the amount of which could not exceed—

Amount considered by the Admiralty Committee as hypothetically admissible $258,310 32
Proportion now shown to be inadmissible 151,863 76
Amount that may now he considered hypothetically admissible 106,446 56

WACHUSETT.

Second cruise:

She was, as before stated, a suitable vessel, and her cruising-ground well chosen to intercept the Alabama when returning to Europe or again going south. Although she actually captured the Florida in Bahia, the Admiralty Committee considered itself justified, by the synopsis of her orders, in considering her as in search of the Alabama only; but, on the supposition that she was cruising near the line and making only occasional visits to Brazilian ports, it was of opinion that the claim was admissible up to the 19th September, thus allowing her three months to learn the fate of the Alabama. It turns out, however, as before stated, that the Wachusett spent a large portion of her time in port. The news of the sinking of the Alabama on the 19th June, 1864, was taken to the Brazils by the French packet which left Bordeaux on the 24th June and arrived at Rio de Janeiro on the 18th July, at which date the Wachusett must have learned the news, as she arrived at Rio de Janeiro on the 7th July, and did not leave until the 3d of the following month, when she sailed for Bahia and arrived there on the 12th August. Hence the claim on her account for the pursuit of the Alabama would cease on the 18th July. The fact of her remaining in port sixteen days after the news arrived and then going on to Bahia is a further proof that the Florida was not a special object with her. The claim on account of the Wachusett would stand thus:

Amount considered hypothetically admissible by the Admiralty Committee $145,936 66
Proportion now shown to be inadmissible 38,666 98
Amount that may now be considered hypothetically admissible 107,269 68

RHODE ISLAND.

This case is precisely the same as that of the De Soto, and although she did not happen to take as many prizes as that vessel, yet her actual positions from time to time can be sufficiently traced to prove that she never went in pursuit of the Alabama, but was continuously employed on the same kind of service as Admiral Wilkes’s squadron, in the immediate vicinity of the Bahamas. In the Navy Register for 1st January, 1864, she is given as belonging to the West Indian squadron, and she was withdrawn from the service before the sinking of the Alabama, showing that her employment was not dependent on the Alabama’s career or movements.

The Rhode Island’s positions on the following days were:

12th May, 1863 Hog Island, Bahamas.
21st–23d May, 1863 Cape Haytien.
30th May, 1863 Eleuthera, Bahamas.
16th August, 1863 Latitude 27° N., longitude 76° W., (where she captured steamer Cronstadt value, $301,940.)1
[Page 368]
31st August, 1863 St. Thomas.
16th September, 1863 St. Thomas.
16th October, 1863 St. Thomas.

As she therefore never went in pursuit of the Alabama, the whole of the claim on her account is inadmissible, amounting to $177,972.66.

SACRAMENTO.

With reference to the Postscript to the Admiralty Report, it now appears, as before stated, that the Sacramento was at Lisbon on the 29th June, 1863, and must therefore on that day, if not before, either there or at some other European port, have heard of the fate of the Alabama. The (hypothetically) admissible claim on her account would consequently be subject to a further abatement of at least fourteen days, and would stand thus:

Amount originally considered hypothetically admissible by the Admiralty Committee $112,295 22
Abatement suggested by the Postscript to the Report 6,535 70
Further abatement now suggested 8,318 18
Amount that may now he considered hypothetically admissible 97,441 34

WYOMING.

Until the middle of 1863 the Wyoming was the only United States vessel of war in the East Indies, including China and Japan, (the Jamestown sailing-sloop, sent to re-inforce her, being at the Cape on the 14th March.)1 When the orders of the 26th January, 1863, were sent, as well as when they would have reached her headquarters, Macao, she had to perform the whole of the duties of this extensive station; and, in fact, in July of that year, the Wyoming attacked the batteries of Simonosaki, in consequence of an outrage upon an American ship;2 hence, it would appear, she was not able to put the orders to proceed to the Straits of Sunda to watch for the Alabama into execution until the 25th September, 1863. She was at Singapore on 1st December, having been near the Straits of Sunda when the Alabama passed through, early in November, and where she had been for some time on the lookout for the Alabama.

After leaving Singapore she went to Rhio, where she remained long enough to receive a ball from the Dutch, and give one in return; and yet the Alabama had been burning ships almost within sight of her.3

She was at Labuan between 15th and 18th December,4 “in search of the Alabama,” and it is probable, judging from the dates, that she had a fair wind up the China Seas, that she called at Manila after leaving Labuan, and was repaired at the royal dock-yard at Cavite, as she was not at Hong-Kong until the 9th February.5 Here she must have heard of the visit of the Alabama to Singapore; that she had left on the 23d December, going to the westward, and that she was off Malacca on Christmas Day. Now, the commander of the Wyoming must either, on the 9th February,

(a) Have given up the pursuit, or, (what amounts to the same thing, so far as any claim against Great Britain is concerned,)

[Page 369]

(b) Have considered that he had fulfilled his orders; for, instead of going to the southward, he re appeared at Hong-Kong on the 9th March.1 At this time he probably received his further orders of the “21st November, 1863, to continue cruising until news of the destruction of the Alabama should reach her, then to return to the United States;” as in little over nine weeks (16th May) she was at Table Bay,2 and her passage down the China Sea being against the southwest monsoon, she must have proceeded immediately on receipt of these further orders; but whatever chance there may have been, had she proceeded in February and not then practically have given up the pursuit, in March she had none. Indeed, it is abundantly clear that the Wyoming did not, when she arrived at the Cape, regard herself as in pursuit of the Alabama, but as simply homeward bound; since otherwise she would have followed the Confederate cruiser to Europe, which was known to be her destination. On the 28th April Mr. Adams (writing from London) informed Mr. Seward that the Alabama was “reported at Cape Town and about to come to France,”3 information which he doubtless received from the United States Consul at the Cape; who would also, without doubt, have imparted it to the commander of the Wyoming on his arrival there in May; but instead of following up the Alabama until he heard of her destruction, (which, at all events, might have given a color to this part of the claim, which covers the cost of the passage of the ship from her station, China, to the United States,) he, notwithstanding his positive orders to that effect, appears to have made the best of his way to the United States.

It would thus seem that the period for which a claim could be made for this ship could not extend beyond the 9th February, 1864, when she practically abandoned the pursuit of the Alabama, and consequently the amount hypothetically admissible would stand thus:

Amount considered by the Admiralty Committee to be hypothetically admissible $202,662 62
Proportion now shown to be inadmissible 110,363 14
Amount that may now be considered as hypothetically admissible 92,299 48

There are two or three noticeable and curious features connected with this claim:

1. The United States Minister at Japan seems to have had no expectation that the Wyoming would have quitted the station when she did; her doing so caused him great embarrassment.4

2. During the period for which claims are made against Great Britain, British men-of-war were assisting the Wyoming’s consort (a sailing vessel) on the station, and receiving the thanks of the United States Government; for instance:

When the Jamestown, the consort herself, was ashore near Yeddo in October, 1863;

When the Encounter took an American consular prisoner from Japan to Shanghai in January, 1864;

Her Majesty’s steamer Perseus assisting the American bark Maryland, ashore in Japan, &c.5

[Page 370]

CONCLUSIONS.

From these premises the following results are deducible:

(a.) That on the 1st December, 1862, only two suitable vessels were in the actual pursuit of the Alabama.

(b.) That on the following December the two were reduced to one.

(c.) That when she was sunk, there were only three, including the Kearsarge.

(d.) That there were never more than three effective vessels in search of the Alabama at any one time.

(e.) That during the months of February, March, and April, 1863, there was no effective vessel in pursuit.

(f.) That the average number of United States vessels in pursuit, while the Alabama was pursuing her career, was less than two.

(g.) That the United States Navy was increased from 400 to 600 vessels during this period; a considerable proportion of which were suitable vessels.

(h.) That on the 1st December, 1862, no vessels were in pursuit of the Florida.

(i.) That on the 7th December, 1863, no vessels were in pursuit of the Florida.

(j.) That on the 7th October, 1864, when captured at Bahia, two vessels were in pursuit of her, exclusive of the Wachusset.

(k.) That no United States cruiser was sent in special pursuit of the Georgia.

(l.) Nor of the Shenandoah.

(m.) That the claim for the conditional arbitration considered admissible (upon the hypothesis explained in the Admiralty Report) on account of the Alabama should be accordingly further abated by $536,104 21
(n.) On account of the Florida 32,736 29
(o) On account of the Sumter, (see Connecticut, p. 83) 26,651 00
(p.) And the hypothetically admissible amounts so corrected would stand thus:
For the four Confederates in Class I $940,460 24
For the Alabama only 891,580 82
For the Florida only 48,879 42

P. S.—With reference to the note on page 351 as to the cruise of the Vanderbilt, it would appear from announcements in the New York Herald during the months of November and December, 1862, and January, 1863, that this vessel was at least 20 days in ports of the United States during those months. The following are the dates of her arrival and departure: Sailed from New York November 6, 1862; returned November 30. Sailed again December 11, and returned to Fortress Monroe January 17, 1863, from whence she did not sail again till after the 28th of the same month, when she left with the Weehawken monitor in tow. This suggests a still further abatement of $30,000 in the claim for this vessel, reducing the total amount, hypothetically considered admissible for arbitration on account of the Alabama, to $861,580.82, and that for the four vessels Class I to $910,460.24.

  1. For the various orders given to these vessels, and alluded to in the course of this Annex, see the Synopsis of Orders given in the Appendix to the Case of the United States, vol. vii, opposite to page 120.
  2. For record of visits to Gibraltar, see Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 229. The dates of the visits of these and other vessels to foreign ports, mentioned throughout this Annex, are recorded in returns from British Consuls, Mail Agents, &c., which can he produced for the satisfaction of the Arbitrators, if so desired.
  3. It is more than probable, from indications met with in tracing out the proceedings of other United States cruisers, that, had time permitted, good reasons would have been discovered for suggesting abatements on account of this cruise, the claim for which is at the rate of nearly $1,500 a day. Indeed, it might be equally desirable to endeavor to trace out the proceedings of other vessels, which are wholly unknown, except so far as stated in the synopsis of orders, such as the Augusta, Ticonderoga, &c.; the claims on their account were necessarily treated, in the former report, as admissible in the hypothetical sense there explained, but further light might discover, as in so many other cases, errors which would justify abatements.
  4. The following is an extract from Mr. Adams’s dispatch:

    “The Prince de Joinville, who called on me the other day with a letter to yon, which I had the honor to forward by the last steamer, made some remarks on the effect of the presence of our sailing-ships in European harbors in a perfectly friendly spirit, which were not without their weight in my mind. I have a fear that these vessels entail a heavy burden of useless expense, and retain in utter inactivity a considerable number of the best class of our useful seamen. It would be quite as well for the country if they were entirely withdrawn. One steamer like the Kearsarge has more influence upon the opinion of nautical men than all the obsolete frigates remaining in the world would, put together. Three or four such, properly distributed, with good officers, would materially check the tendency to serve on board of dubious rebel ships.” Dip. Cor., 1864, Part i, p. 732.

  5. See Appendix to British Case, vol. vii, p. 70.
  6. Ibid., vol. v, p. 234.
  7. Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i., p. 250.

  8. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 228.
  9. Appendix to British Case, vol. vii, p. 110.
  10. Putnam’s Record of the Rebellion, vol. vi, p. 392.
  11. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 226.
  12. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864–’65, Part iv, p. 297.
  13. Appendix to British Case, vol. i, p. 282.
  14. Ibid., p. 287.
  15. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 224.
  16. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864–’65, Part ii, p. 302.
  17. Ibid., Part iii, p. 172.
  18. Appendix to British Case, vol. i, pp. 499, 658.
  19. Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, p. 588.
  20. Appendix to British Case, vol. v., pp. 228, 233.
  21. Ibid., vol. i, p. 498.
  22. Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. iii, p. 335.
  23. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 229.
  24. Ibid., vol. v, p. 229.
  25. 1 For instances, see Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862–’63, part ii, pp. 902, 980, 1278: 1864–’65, part iii, p. 323; part iv, pp. 275, 302, 319, 325; 1865–’66, part iii, p. 102.
  26. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864–’65, part iii, p. 42.
  27. Appendix to British Case, vol. ii, p. 57.
  28. United States Navy Report, December, 1863, p. 557; Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 225.
  29. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 229.
  30. United States Navy Registers for 1863 and 1864.
  31. Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, p. 203.
  32. Appendix to British Case, vol. vii, p. 75.
  33. United States Navy Report, December, 1864, pp. 1,005 et seq.
  34. Diplomatic correspondence, 1865–’66, part i, p. 572.
  35. Ibid., part iii, p. 127.
  36. United States Navy Report, December, 1865, pp. 28, 77.
  37. Ibid, December, 1864, p. xix.
  38. United States Navy Report, December, 1865, p. 485; Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i, p. 360.
  39. United States Navy Report, December, 1863, p. xxiv.
  40. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, pp. 228, 234.
  41. Ibid., p. 233.
  42. See “Correspondence respecting the capture of the Saxon by the United States ship Vanderbilt,” laid before Parliament, (North America, No. 2, 1864,) pp. 1, 7, 12.
  43. See Navy Register, 1863; also, Navy report, December, 1863, p. 56, and Synopsis of Orders.
  44. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864–’65, Part i, p. 641.
  45. Ibid., part ii., p. 60. At this time the only Confederate cruiser in a British port of the whole of those named in the United States Case was the Georgia, then dismantled, and known to be for sale; consequently, the “naval expeditions” which Mr. Seward was apprehensive of could not have consisted of any of the Confederate cruisers, which, by any possibility, could be considered to come within the purview of the treaty of Washington.
  46. Ibid., Part ii, p. 29.
  47. Ibid., Part iv, p. 325.
  48. That the Cape de Verdes was the foreign station to which the Mohican was proceeding in the performance of an ordinary duty when she called at Bermuda may be fairly inferred from her being there on the 21st December, 1862; 22d January, 1863; 20th February, 1863; 21st March, 1863; 22d April, 1863; leaving on the 9th May, 1863, for the Brazils.
  49. Appendix to British Case, vol, v, p. 228.
  50. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 225; United States Navy Report, December, 1863, pp. 557, 567; Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864–’65, part ii, pp. 412 et seq.
  51. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 228.
  52. United States Navy Report, December, 1863, pp. 558, 561.
  53. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, p. 708.
  54. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 232.
  55. Ibid., p. 230.
  56. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 223.
  57. Ibid., p. 228.
  58. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864–’5, Part I, p. 641.
  59. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864–’5, Part III, pp. 447, 493, 517.
  60. Ibid., Part I, p. 310; Part II, p. 197; Part III, p. 592.