No. 411.

Mr. MacVeagh to Mr. Fish.

No. 37.]

Sir: As I propose to avail myself on the 10th of the next month, June, of your kind permission to return home, unless some public necessity should arise in the mean time for my continuance at my post, and the legation after that date will be in the hands of the secretary, Mr. Brown, as chargé d’affaires, it has occurred to me that you might care to know, before I leave, the condition of political affairs now prevailing here, [Page 905] both as regards the internal condition of the empire itself and its relations to its vassal provinces. It is to the latter consideration that I intend to confine the present dispatch. With regard to the tributary provinces in Europe, the government of the Sultan ordinarily feels little concern. The relations with Montenegro are entirely nominal; they are almost equally so with Servia, and are so also with Roumania, in times of peace and internal order in these respective provinces themselves. It is only when foreign agents or native politicians succeed in creating disturbances which threaten the public peace that they become objects of interest to the Porte; and even then less from a desire for interference than from the necessity of avoiding a pretext for the interference of other powers. The bonds which unite these provinces to the suzerain authority are so light and so little felt, that no disposition is supposed to exist to cast them off in the provinces themselves; but inasmuch as they are too weak to maintain their independence, other and neighboring powers might be interested in sowing the seeds of disaffection in the hope of absorbing them after they had renounced their allegiance to the Sultan, or of an armed occupation for the maintenance of the public tranquillity, which might ripen into annexation.

A glance at the map will show what an immense temptation existed for Russia and Austria to divide Roumania between them, and what peril to the integrity of this empire existed in the continued agitation of the question of nationality among the southern sclave. Many persons here, however, affect to believe that these perils have disappeared for the present in the presence of the graver question, whether the valley of the Danube is to be German or Russian. It is not now seen how the coveted territory can be divided or the question compromised; and in that event, there may be a long postponement of it under the suzerainty of the Porte. At present there is no ground of dispute whatever between this government and any one of these provinces, and even in Roumania the party of the reigning prince has secured such a majority in the recent elections as promises the continuance of quiet and order for some time to come. The relations with the tributary provinces of Asia are not quite so satisfactory, and chiefly, I suppose, because of their Moslem population, much more sensitiveness is felt by the Porte on the subject of their loyal behavior. Indeed, “La Pargine,” which assumes to be a kind of national organ, never wearies of enforcing the duty of the Sultan to secure what it calls “The Unity of Islam” by availing himself of the repeated misconduct of the Viceroy of Egypt and the Bey of Tunis to dispossess them, and incorporate these provinces once more with the integral part of the empire. The grand chamberlain has just returned from a special mission to Cairo, to require the cessation of the building of forts and the preparation of torpedoes for the coast of Egypt and the Suez Canal, and brings the most positive assurances from the Khedive of his submission to the will of his august master. The Bey of Tunis is reported to be equally obedient in words, but, in truth, both vassals long to throw off the yoke of their vassalage, and make tentatives in that direction continually. One day it is by an attempt to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign powers directly, and the next day by contracting a loan without the sanction of the suzerain, or some other attempted exercise of sovereign authority; and while heretofore many of these acts of quasi rebellion have been overlooked, the present tendency of the Porte is that of vigilant and prompt repression of any attempt on the part of either of these provinces to overstep the limits of their delegated authority. Jealousies will thus necessarily arise from time to time, but this government seems to feel the most ample confidence [Page 906] in the ability of its army and its navy to enforce without delay the mandates of the sovereign in any of the outlying provinces of the empire. When Prince Charles threatened to abdicate and leave Roumania a prey to its intestine factions, the Porte immediately proposed an army of occupation, thirty thousand strong, under the then disguise of a camp of instruction at “Shumla,” and only needed the sanction of the protesting powers, as provided by the treaty, to exhibit its power to maintain its authority on the most northern border. When the insurrection of the Assyr tribes, on its most southern border, broke out, a well-equipped army was at once dispatched to the scene of disorder, whose rapid marches and signal victories have not only quelled all disturbances in that disaffected region, but have also taught a most useful lesson to the Khedive, who is suspected of being the real author of the rebellion. The territory has been erected into a province, with the victorious general for governor, and it is expected that a permanent force will be maintained there as a wholesome influence at once upon Egypt and Arabia. You will see, therefore, that at present and outwardly the relations between the government of the Sultan and its vassal provinces are entirely peaceful and satisfactory, and that it is only with regard to the Moslem provinces that an under-current of suspicion exists, but that, with respect to them all alike, the Porte is at present more than ever determined to maintain in their full vigor the limited relations of dependence now existing, and is also more than ever confident of its ability to do so.

Yours, &c.,

WAYNE MacVEAGH.