Mr. MacVeagh to Mr. Fish.
Sir: In view of the conference now in session at London, and the prominence which has been recently given to the restrictions affecting the navigation of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, it has occurred to me that you might desire to possess, in the convenient form of a dispatch, a statement as well of the restrictions themselves, as of the grounds on which they are rested. In any view of this question a primary consideration is the grave importance attached immemorially to the geographical peculiarities of the situation of Constantinople.
On the west the narrow Straits of the Dardanelles connect the sea of Marmora with the Greek Archipelago; on the east the narrow Straits of the Bosphorus connect the Sea of Marmora with the Black Sea. From the beginning of the one strait to the end of the other the shores on both sides belong exclusively to the Ottoman Empire; and its capital and chief city is at the meeting of the waters of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Sea of Marmora. This site is asserted to be practically incapable of defense against an attack by a naval force, except at the two entrances or straits which have been named, and it is also asserted that the absolute necessity of fortifying and defending these entrances, as the only means of securing the safety of Constantinople from attacks by sea, was recognized centuries before the conquest of the country by Ottoman Sultans; and that the same necessity has been constantly asserted and maintained ever since. In this view all the waters connecting the Greek Archipelago with the Black Sea are mare, clausum, and are only navigable by the consent of and under the restrictions imposed by the government of the Ottoman Empire.
The question of this consent, and of these restrictions, naturally divides itself, first in reference to vessels of commerce, and secondly in reference to vessels of war. As regards both these classes the Ottoman government alleges that its policy has been uniform, and as liberal as a proper regard for its own safety would allow; and that its conduct in the exercise of its undoubted rights of control over these connecting waters has often received, as it has always deserved, the cordial recognition and approval of all friendly powers.
The right of merchant-vessels to navigate these connecting waters rests upon treaties; and certainly the concessions to the commerce of other nations appear to be very liberal and comprehensive, when the treaties embodying these privileges are compared with the contemporary policies of civilized and Christian nations on the subject of foreign trade.
The earliest treaty between this empire and any western nation of which I have knowledge was concluded with France in 1535. It extended the fullest liberty of navigation to the subjects of France in all the waters of the empire, and provided that vessels coming to Constantinople, and desiring to return, should only be stopped at the Straits of the Dardanelles. The treaty also afforded to the Pope, the King of England, and the King of Scotland the option of becoming parties to it, and thereby securing the same privileges for their subjects.
In the next century—1675—the capitulations granted to Great Britain recognized the same absolute liberty of navigation as was secured by [Page 893] the treaty with France, and considerably enlarged the privileges of foreign merchants in the empire. They also expressly commanded that the old “canon of search” should be executed at the castles and in ports only, and nowhere else, the term “castles” meaning, I suppose, the fortresses at the Dardanelles. In the following century—1747—the treaty with Tuscany allowed “its merchants to enter with their vessels any of the ports subject to the Imperial Turk; to sail backwards and forwards at their pleasure; expose their goods for sale; and quit the said ports in safety and security.” It also provides that “said merchants, having obtained the usual license and certificate, shall not be detained on their voyage upon arriving at the Straits of the Hellespont, more generally known as the Dardanelles.”
The three treaties to which I have alluded are believed to be fair specimens of the numerous and lengthy commercial conventions concluded by the Ottoman Empire from the inception of treaty relations with the Christian powers to the period when the persistent efforts of Russia succeeded in annexing to her dominions a large portion of the northern coast of the empire.
Until that conquest was effected the passage of foreign merchant-vessels seems not to have been contemplated beyond Constantinople. At least I have not observed any allusion to such a contingency in any treaty of a previous date. It would seem to have been assumed that foreign merchant-vessels would come only as far as the capital and return; and in making this voyage, according to the treaty with Tuscany in 1747, they were required only to submit to examination in port, and to stop to deliver the proper license, or firman, and certificate at the Dardanelles.
The first mention of the passage of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the consequent navigation of the Black Sea occurs in the historic treaty of Kainardji—1774—whereby Russia secured the southern sea coast she had so long coveted. That treaty, called by the late Emperor Nicholas “the glorious treaty,” granted, in ample terms, the free passage of the Bosphorus to the merchant-vessels of Russia. In a convention—1779—explanatory of the treaty of Kainardji, the tonnage of the Russian vessels which are to enjoy the rights theretofore granted is regulated by the tonnage of the vessels of other nations “which come by the Sea of Marmora to Constantinople.”
In the treaty of commerce—1783—between Russia and the Porte, the liberty of navigation theretofore granted is expressed in even broader terms, and the Porte obliges itself to deliver firmans or permits to all Russian merchant-vessels going either through the Bosphorus or through the Dardanelles, to secure their unobstructed passage through those straits respectively. The navigation of the Bosphorus and the Black Sea thus accorded to the merchant-vessels of Russia was extended to those of Austria in 1784, to those of England in 1799, to those of France in 1802, and to those of Prussia in 1806; while, in 1826, in a convention with Russia explanatory of the treaty of Bucharest, the Porte agreed to accept the good offices of Russia to secure permission to enter the Black Sea for ships of friendly powers which had not yet obtained this privilege for their commerce.
This convention was, however, soon followed by war between the two empires, and the war was closed by the historic treaty of Adrianople—1829—whereby the broadest possible terms were employed to secure an absolutely free and unobstructed navigation of all the waters connecting the Greek Archipelago with the Black Sea for the merchant-vessels [Page 894] of all the world. The language employed could hardly be rendered more comprehensive by human ingenuity.
It declares “that full and entire freedom of trade” by sea and land shall not be molested nor fettered in any way, or under any pretext, nor in consequence of any regulation or measure, whether of public government or internal legislation. The Sublime Porte engages, moreover, to take especial care that the trade and navigation of the Black Sea particularly shall be impeded in no manner whatever. For this purpose it admits and declares the passage of the “Straits of Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and that of the Dardanelles,” to be “entirely free and open” to vessels under the merchant flag of any power at peace with the Porte; and it engages that such vessels shall be exposed to no hinderance or annoyance of any kind, declaring that “to this full freedom of trade and navigation not the least obstacle shall ever be opposed.” In the following year—1830—our own treaty was concluded with the Porte, securing to us all the privileges of the most favored nations, and providing that “the merchant vessels of the United States shall have liberty to pass the canal of the imperial residence, the Bosphorus, and go and come in the Black Sea.” Our treaty of commerce? 1862—contains upon this subject only the clause usually inserted in commercial treaties concluded in recent years with the Porte. “The firmans required for merchant vessels of the United States on passing through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus shall always be delivered in such manner as to occasion to such vessels the least possible delay.” It will thus be seen that the fullest liberty exists for the navigation of all these connecting waters by the merchant vessels of all nations.
Of course this liberty of navigation, however ample, is subject to proper regulations of police and of health, but the language of the treaty of Adrianople and of the common clause of recent treaties respecting firmans, which I quoted from our own treaty of 1862, affords conclusive evidence that regulations for these purposes should be framed so as to cause the slightest possible annoyance to commerce. Unfortunately such is not the case.
The regulations in force are antiquated, and unnecessarily vexatious. A merchant vessel passing from the Archipelago to the Black Sea is obliged to stop at the Dardanelles to exhibit her bill of health; to stop at Constantinople to procure a firman for the eastern passage; and to stop at the Bosphorus to deliver it. And the same vessel, upon returning, is obliged to stop at the Bosphorus to exhibit her bill of health; to stop at Constantinople to obtain another firman for the westward passage; and to stop at the Dardanelles to deliver it. As neither strait can be entered, nor either firman obtained, at night, these six stoppages would constitute a very serious detention even if they did not, in many cases, cause the loss of favorable winds, and thus entail far more serious delay. Upon some occasions, also, by reason of them, danger is added to delay. It is confidently asserted that, for all these injurious restrictions, small steamboats, stationed by day and by night at each strait and conveying an officer of police and an officer of quarantine to each vessel desiring to pass, would afford a complete substitute; that they would secure every object now attained by the Porte and with greater certainty; that they would, at the same time, obviate every reasonable ground of complaint; and that the foreign commerce of these straits would cheerfully and even gladly bear the slight additional burden necessary to defray the expenses of the proposed service. A commission to consider the whole subject was instituted by the foreign legations, and an elaborate report was presented by that commission April [Page 895] 16, 1870. It is believed that if an earnest and united support was given to the recommendation of that commission, or to any other mode of remedying existing evils, little difficulty would be experienced in securing its adoption. Unfortunately, however, unanimity is hardly attainable in the diplomatic body accredited here. It is not charitable to imagine that jealousy of the influence of other nations could influence some members of it, while a general policy of disintegration rather than of amelioration might influence others; but, in fact, agreement is not easily reached. Until it is reached, it does not seem to me to be just to hold this government responsible for inaction. No serious objection is made to the rights which the Porte claims or to the duties which it extorts. The mode of asserting and exacting them only is objectionable. Until, therefore, the representatives of the more enlightened nations interested can agree in suggesting a better mode, it is not surprising that this government, which is essentially one of motive, adheres to its ancient usages. Indeed, the conduct of the Porte, in many respects affecting foreign trade, and the uniform language of its commercial treaties, would appear to justify the assertion of Count Cavour during the conferences at Paris in 1856, that “no power possesses a commercial legislation of a more liberal character than that of Turkey.”
While, however, as we have thus seen, these connecting waters are free and open to the merchant ships of the world, subject only to regulations of police and health, with reference to the second branch of the inquiry—vessels of war—the exact contrary is the case.
In time of peace no war vessel of any nation is allowed to enter these connecting waters. On the east the fortresses of the Bosphorus, and on the west the fortresses of the Dardanelles, prohibit and deny such entrance to the war flag of any nation, however friendly to the Sublime Porte.
This prohibition is of immemorial observance, and has taken its place in public law under the name of “the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire;” and it is distinctly recognized by Mr. Wheaton in his authoritative treatise upon “International Law.”
The earliest incorporation which I have observed of “the ancient rule” in the text of a treaty occurs in the treaty of peace with Great Britain, 1809, and its presence there is probably owing to the fact that in 1807 an English fleet had forced the passage of the Dardanelles, and for the first time in the history of the empire a hostile naval flag had been visible from the walls of Stamboul.
The eleventh article of the treaty recites that it has been from all time denied to vessels of war to enter either the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles; and Great Britain promises for the future to respect this “ancient rule of the empire.” The next mention of the subject is in the secret article of the famous treaty of Albariee with Russia, called the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 1833, whereby the Porte agreed “to close the strait of the Dardanelles so as not to allow any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatever.” This treaty was the price paid for the assistance of Russia in repelling the aggressions of Mehemet Ali, and the treaty was concluded while a Russian squadron was anchored in the Bosphorus and a Russian army was encamped upon its shores.
The next allusion to the subject is in the convention of London for the pacification of the Levant—1840—wherein the four allies of the Sultan declare that their temporary protection of Constantinople and the straits in question shall in no manner derogate from the “ancient rule of the empire,” which the Sultan on his part declares it to be his firm determination to maintain intact in the future as in the past. The recently [Page 896] published life of Lord Palmerston, edited by Sir Henry Bulwer, who was formerly British embassador here, gives a very interesting account of the negotiation of this convention. Then followed, as is well known, the convention of the Dardanelles, concluded at London 13th July, 1841, whereby “the ancient rule of the Ottoman empire, prohibiting at all times ships of war of foreign powers from entering the straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus,” received in a treaty, devoted to that subject only, the formal and solemn adhesion of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia.
By the third article of the treaty the Porte reserved the right to communicate the treaty to all the powers with which it sustained friendly relations. Accordingly a circular was delivered by the Porte, March 5, 1842, to the foreign representatives of those powers at Constantinople, for transmission to their respective governments, reciting the convention and requesting the observance by each nation of “the ancient rule of the empire,” thereby confirmed. This circular was transmitted to Washington by Commodore Porter, then occupying this mission, April 16, 1842. It only remains to add that the convention of the Dardanelles was re-enacted in terms, and annexed to the treaty of Paris of 1856, and that an exception has always existed to the “ancient rule” in question in favor of armed vessels of moderate size visiting the Porte, by special permission, on missions of friendship, or attached to the service of the foreign legations at Constantinople. It will be seen, therefore, that the closing of these straits to ships of war has never been rested upon the agreement of the powers recognizing it, but always upon the undoubted rights of the Ottoman empire; and while six great powers at Paris in 1856 recognized this usage, it is not known that any power at any time has ever questioned either its propriety or its validity.
I need hardly say that I have neither aimed nor expected in this dispatch to furnish you any information you do not already possess, but simply to provide you with a convenient statement of the actual condition of these two straits, “whose waters and ports, thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war.”
I have, &c.,