Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Third Session of the Fortieth Congress

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward

No. 1549.]

Legation of the United States. London, March 7, 1868.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit a copy of the Times of this morning, containing a report of the debate in the House of Commons last night on the motion of Mr. Shaw Lefevre relative to the questions between the two governments springing from the late struggle. I add a copy of the Standard, because I learn from Mr. Forster, one of the parties to the discussion, that at least his speech is reported in essential particulars more correctly there.

Although not present myself on this occasion, I learn from several quarters that the temper manifested in it was throughout fair, and even friendly. I am inclined to believe that on the single question of the claims for damage done by the Alabama, and perhaps one or two other vessels, Parliament is almost prepared to pay whatever might be adjudged by a commission raised for the purpose, without much demur.

You will doubtless take note of the allusion made in Lord Stanley’s remarks, towards the close, to that part of your latest communication to me on the subject which I made known to him. My opinion is that the failure of the negotiation is matter of general regret. Whilst there is a strong disposition to protect the action of Lord Stanley in his construction of the terms of your dispatch of the 12th January, 1867, there is nevertheless a feeling that if he had put a construction like that of Mr. Forster’s, they would have been quite as ready to justify it.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[From the London Standard, March 7, 1868.]

The Alabama claims.

House of Commons,March 6.

On the order of the day for going into committee of supply, Mr. S. L. Lefevre rose to call attention to the failure of the negotiations with the United States government for arbitration of the Alabama claims, and moved an address for papers. The honorable gentleman said, that in bringing that subject before the house he hoped he would not be embarrassing the noble lord the secretary for foreign affairs in his diplomatic correspondence with the United States government, or adding to the complications already existing between the two countries. But it seemed to him, and others with whom he had communicated upon the subject, that some good might arise if the question were discussed with candor and under a due sense of the important consequences which it involved. He would shortly state the facts of the case. The earliest cause of complaint on the part of the United States government arose out of her Majesty’s proclamation of neutrality, which was issued on the 13th of May, 1861, upon the advice of the law officers of the Crown. The fall of Fort Sumter took place on the 14th of April in that year, and that was the commencement of the civil war in America; but long before that seven of the Confederate States had made great preparations for war, and had virtually separated themselves from the northern States. The fall of Fort Sumter was followed, two days afterwards, by the proclamation of President Lincoln calling out 75,000 men, and that was followed in its turn by the confederate government calling out 30,000 men and issuing letters of marque. On the next day President Lincoln proclaimed the blockade of the southern ports, and announced his intention of treating the crews of the privateers as pirates. These facts reached this country on the 3d of May, and were published in the English newspapers on the day following. On the 6th of May her Majesty’s government announced in that house that they would recognize the Confederate States as belligerents, and on the 13th of May, as he had already stated, the proclamation of neutrality was issued. The actual blockade was effected by the north along the southern coast by the end of April, and from that day forward there were in the prize courts numerous cases relating to the capture of English vessels. But it was not until some time afterwards that the confederate flag made its appearance. It had frequently been said that the first confederate cruisers had sailed from this country. But that was not the fact. He found there were previously four cases of confederate men-of-war which sailed from southern ports. The first of these was a vessel called the Sumter, which escaped the blockade at New Orleans, and after capturing two prizes off Cuba, put into Trinidad on the 29th of July, 1861. That was the first instance in which the confederate flag had been recognized by this country. That vessel was followed by the Nashville, and next by the Oreto, (afterwards called the Florida,) which escaped from Liverpool and went to Nassau. It seemed that a complaint had been made to the collector of customs at Liverpool with respect to that vessel; but that gentleman appears to have been always easily deceived upon these subjects. [Hear, hear.] He reported to the government that he had every reason to believe that the vessel was intended for the Italian government. She went from Nassau to Mobile, where she ran the blockade, and then commenced her career of destruction. Shortly afterwards the news of the escape of the Florida came to the knowledge of the American government, and they then complained that another vessel of the same description, called the “290,” was being built by the Messrs. Laird. Her Majesty’s government again referred to the collector of customs at Liverpool, and he reported that the latter ship was obviously a war vessel, and that her builders did not disguise that she was intended for a foreign government, but they declined to state what foreign government that was. On the 22d of July, six affidavits were laid by the American minister before the foreign office, for the purpose of showing the true character of that vessel. Those affidavits were referred to the honorable and learned member for Richmond, the then solicitor general, (Sir R. Palmer,) on the 28th, the six days’ delay in dealing with the case having been occasioned by the unfortunate illness of the Queen’s advocate, from which he never recovered. On the 29th the honorable and learned member for Richmond gave an opinion to the effect that the vessel in question, which was afterwards known as the Alabama, ought to be detained. A telegram was then sent to Liverpool for the purpose of giving effect to that opinion, but before the order could be obeyed the vessel escaped, under the pretense of taking a trial trip. She then sailed toward the Azores, where she was met by two other ships, from which she received her crew and armaments. She afterwards put into Jamaica, where she was recognized as a regular southern cruiser, and where she was hospitably received. Then began her devastations. She was intended for purposes of mere destruction, and she well performed her task. The seas were lighted up with her fires. She made no prizes, but burnt all the vessels she captured. In the course of one of the discussions which took place upon that subject in the house, an honorable member stated that he would rather have built that vessel than have made the speeches they had heard from the honorable member for Birmingham. [Hear, hear.] Now, observations of that kind had sunk deep into the hearts of the people of America, and had greatly complicated our relations with that country. He believed there were but few persons at present who would not say that those who had been connected with that vessel were among the greatest malefactors of the day. [Hear, hear.] He need hardly remind the house of the case of the two iron-clad rams which were subsequently being built in the yard of the Messrs. Laird. The government, going somewhat, perhaps, beyond their authority, had stopped the construction of these rams, and had afterwards purchased them on their own account. An attack was made upon the government by the present Lord Cairns for the course they had thus taken, but his motion was defeated by the narrow majority of five. There was also another vessel which was being built for the Confederate States at Glasgow, which the government detained until the close of the war. She was then returned to the owners, who sold her to the Chilian government, and in their service she became known as the Tornado, and was the cause of considerable difficulty between that country and Spain. There was also a vessel called the Alexandra, which were detained at Nassau, and there were two others, called the Georgia and Shenandoah. The two latter ships, one of which was fitted out in London and the other in Liverpool, pursued exactly the same course as the Alabama. These three cruisers, without having ever entered a southern port, had captured about 200 vessels. The loss they had caused to the United States was not, however, to be measured by the mere destruction of so many ships. The commerce carried on under the American flag had greatly declined in consequence of the increased rate of insurance which American ship-owners had to incur, and it appeared that while this carrying trade had fallen to one-third of what it had been before the war, the trade carried on under the English flag had more than doubled in amount. That was a reason why this country should deal generously with that question. It was right to mention that both the Georgia and Shenandoah had escaped from our shores without any information with respect to their destination having been communicated to her Majesty’s government; and it also appeared that the American minister at Lisbon complained to his own government that if he had received earlier intelligence as to the true character of the Shenandoah he might have been able to arrest her progress. Those facts seemed to show that the American authorities had been somewhat negligent in the matter, and it was very possible that if they had made better use of their own cruisers they might have prevented some of the destruction which had taken place. But the whole of those transactions had produced the strongest irritation in America, and no one who had not traveled in that country could be aware of the extent of that feeling. The depredations committed by these vessels had caused constant irritation and aggravation, and had been used detrimentally by the Fenians and others who were anxious to create a feeling against this country and United States. Every right thinking person was therefore anxious, in the interest of peace, to bring, if possible, this unfortunate dispute to a conclusion. [Cheers.] He believed that the large preponderance of the higher opinion of America was favorably disposed toward this country; but, notwithstanding this, it would be well for both parties to have all sources of contention swept away. [Hear, hear.] On both sides there was but one desire, viz, to have the difficulty brought to a satisfactory solution. Having said so much upon one branch of this subject, he wished now to point out how diplomacy had dealt with the question. And, first of all, he would advert to the matter of the recognition of the belligerency. Mr. Adams arrived in this country on the very day the proclamation of neutrality was issued. His first task was to communicate with Earl Russell, and protest against the course adopted by the British government. He expressed great regret at the decision of her Majesty’s ministry, and said that there could be no doubt that the effect of the proclamation would be disastrous. Earl Russell replied to this that in recognizing the south as belligerents no opinion whatever was expressed upon the merits of the American war. Mr. Adams answered that the proclamation of neutrality was a little more rapid than was actually called for by the occasion. With the exception of these two conversations which passed between Earl Russell and Mr. Adams, no protest or claim was made on behalf of the American government till within a very recent period. Such, however, had not been the case with respect to the confederate cruisers. No sooner was it ascertained that the Alabama was burning ships upon the ocean than Mr. Adams made a claim on our government for loss and damage done to the property of American citizens by vessels which had been allowed to escape from English ports. That was in November, 1862. In October, 1863, Mr. Adams received further information respecting other ships which had been burned by the Alabama; and in the course of the correspondence which followed he spoke for the first time of arbitration. On that subject he said the United States government were sincerely desirous of perserving peace and amity between the two nations, and that in case it was found impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion they would be perfectly willing to submit to any fair or convenient arbitration. Now, so far as he had been able to discover, Earl Russell upon that occasion took no notice of the question of arbitration. He simply denied the justness of the claims made by Mr. Adams. From that time the matter lay dormant for about two years, and in the mean time the other vessels to which he had alluded were burning and destroying. The complaints were, however, again renewed in the case of the Shenandoah, and then, for the first time, the question of the recognition of the belligerents of the south was brought forward, and we were charged with a breach of neutrality in permitting the cruisers to escape from our ports. On that occasion Mr. Adams said that the whole evil had practically its origin in this country recognizing the south as a belligerent power before they had a single vessel floating upon the ocean. In the course of the correspondence that followed, Earl Russell adverted to the claims between the Portuguese and the United States in 1824, which were similar to those between England and America, and pointed out that the American government had adopted the same line of defense upon that occasion as the English government adopted now. Alluding to the matter of arbitration, his lordship detailed his reasons for declining it, and said there should only be two questions for arbitration: first, whether the British government acted with good faith and honesty in the maintenance of neutrality; and secondly, whether the law officers of the Crown properly understood the foreign enlistment act when they declined to counsel the English government to detain the Alabama. Neither of these questions, his lordship held, could be referred to the arbitration of a foreign power, with due regard to the honor and character of the British nation, and he therefore declined to refer them. With this dispatch the correspondence closed for some time, although the refusal to submit to arbitration was commented upon in a dignified and prudent manner in the message of President Johnson in 1865. Papers relative to the dispute were laid before the country in the autumn of 1865. When Parliament met in 1866, Lord Derby stated that he fully approved of Earl Russell’s correspondence and the arguments with which he had supported the cause of England, and in the lower house no objection Was urged to the course adopted by the late government, except by one or two members, who expressed regret that the offer for arbitration had not been acceded to. He was one who had been in favor of that policy being pursued, and he framed a motion with the view of bringing it before the house, but upon consulting with other members, and finding that the resolution would not meet with general support, he abandoned his intention. The change of government which took place brought with it a sense of responsibility winch was not previously apparent. The first symptom of the change was to be found in the correspendence between Mr. Seward and Mr. Adams, in which the latter gave an account of an interview which he had with the noble lord the head of the foreign office. Mr. Adams’s account of what Lord Stanley said was, “His lordship, in welcoming me, remarked that he presumed his sentiments towards the United States were well known to me. He had always favored the cultivation of friendly relations with us, and regretted that these should have been at all endangered during the late struggle by inconsiderate speeches in Parliament.” [Hear, hear.] He (Mr. Lefevre) could only regret that the noble lord had not used his great influence for the purpose of preventing some of these ill-considered speeches, or, at all events, in mitigating their effect. Some time after the noble lord came into office the negotiations respecting the Alabama and her sister vessels were again renewed, and upon this occasion, for the first time, the question of the recognition of the belligerency, which had formerly been treated as a subordinate matter or not mentioned at all, became the principal cause of complaint. The claim was put forward in this manner: “While yet the civil war was undeveloped, and the insurgents were without any organized military force or a treasury, and long before they pretended to have a flag, or to put either an armed ship or a merchant vessel upon the sea, her Majesty’s government, acting precipitately, proclaimed the insurgents a belligerent power, and conceded to them the advantages and privileges of that character, and thus raised them, in regard to the prosecution of an unlawful armed insurrection, to an equality with the United States. This government has not denied that it was within the sovereign authority of Great Britain to assume this attitude, but on the other hand it insisted in the beginning, and has continually insisted, that the assumption of that attitude would be an injurious proceeding, for which Great Britain would immediately come under a full responsibility to justify it, or to render redress and indemnity.” The noble lord, the foreign secretary,, in writing to Sir F. Bruce on the 30th of November, 1886, said, “On the other hand, they are fully alive to the inconvenience which arises from the existence of unsettled claims of this character between two powerful and friendly governments. They would be glad to settle this question if they could do so consistently with justice and national self-respect; and with this view they will not be disinclined to adopt the principle of arbitration, provided that a fitting arbitrator can be found, and if an agreement can be come to as to the points to which an arbitration shall apply.” The United States government, however, wished to refer the whole controversy as it stood in the correspondence which had taken place between the two countries, with such further evidence as could be procured, without imposing restrictions on the umpire. The noble lord, in reply, said, “With regard to to the ground of complaint, on which most stress is laid in Mr. Seward’s dispatch, viz., the alleged premature recognition of the Confederate States as a belligerent power, it is clear that no reference to arbitration is possible. The act complained of, while it bears very remotely on the claims in question, is one of which every state must be held to be the sole judge of its duty. There is, so far as I am aware, no precedent for any government consenting to submit to the judgment of a foreign power or to an international commission the question whether its policy has or has not been suitable to the circumstances in which it was placed.” The answer which Mr. Seward made to this dispatch appeared to have been a letter written by him to Mr. Adams, which letter was read by the latter to Lord Stanley, but was not left with his lordship. That letter was consequently not included in the published correspondence. It had, however, been given at length in the American papers, the substance of it being that the President hoped the explanations which had been given would remove all difficulties, and allow both parties to bring the dispute to a satisfactory conclusion. Lord Stanley, on the 16th December, replied that her Majesty’s government could not depart from their decision of refusing to refer the question of the recognition of the belligerency to arbitration, and Mr. Seward declined to accept arbitration upon such terms. Any one would admit from the last of these letters that a very considerable change was observable in the course of this correspondence in the position of Mr. Seward. At the commencement of this correspondence he put the whole claim on the recognition of belligerency, and at the close he, in fact, assented to the terms proposed by the noble lord. There were three stages in the correspondence—the first in which the whole question was put on recognition of belligerency, all other questions being considered as incidental and unimportant; the second, in which Mr. Seward offered to refer the whole correspondence as it then stood to an arbitrator; and the third, that in which he accepted the proposition put by the noble lord—namely, whether we were morally responsible for the damages occasioned by the Alabama, and stated that that was sufficiently comprehensive for his purpose. The difference in these last stages was very great; and he (Mr. Lefevre) could not but regret that the noble lord had not left the matter there, but had thought it his duty to make special exception of the question of the recognition which induced Mr. Seward to withdraw from further negotiation in the matter. It was one thing to refer the question itself to an arbitrator, and another to make a special exception from the arbitration of another subject, and which might be introduced as an incidental topic bearing upon the question at issue. If the special exception were not made it would be open to the other side to introduce the subject as an argument, but it would be equally open to us to object to its introduction as irrelevant. In view of the nature of the whole question between the two countries he could not but regard it as a mistake on the part of the noble lord to expect a total withdrawal by Mr. Seward and the American people from what he (Mr. Lefevre) considered a bad and a false position. The noble lord might have been satisfied by the concession already made in the course of the correspondence, and it was a mistake to break in upon Mr. Seward with a special exception, which he must have known would lead to the failure of the whole negotiation. Looking at the whole tone of the correspondence, he could not but think that it was the intention of the noble lord to bring the question to a common ground, in which it was possible that arbitration might be admitted on both sides, and at the last moment he was frightened at the position at which he had arrived, and then made the special exception. The noble lord had put the question for arbitration—whether we were morally responsible for the damages caused by the Alabama. What was the meaning of the word morally? It needed some explanation. Was the arbitrator to go beyond the ordinary strict rules and usages of international law, and into the more vague regions of morality? If so, on what ground were we specially to except a branch of the subject which the Americans thought bore upon the morality of the question? If the morality of the whole question was to come under consideration, he was not sure that it might not be for our advantage that the inquiry should be extended. But he did not wish to express any opinion on the main question. He had ventured, within the last two or three years, to differ from the opinion of some learned authorities as to what our international obligations were, and he should be silent on that occasion. He should not enter upon that question. There were two classes of objection raised, but he should confine himself to the point he advocated—first, that the question of the recognition of belligerency was so certain that it was not only not right to allow it to form the subject of arbitration, but that it ought to be specially excepted from arbitration; and, secondly, that the dignity of this country would not permit that question to be raised. No one could be more certain than he was as to the strength of our position with regard to the question of belligerency. He believed that war actually did exist at the time of our proclamation of neutrality, and if we wanted proof of the soundness of our position we might refer to Mr. Seward’s dispatches, and to decisions of American law courts upon numerous cases of vessels captured on the seas or breaking the blockade as property of the citizens of the Confederate States, in which cases the Supreme Court held that the proclamation of blockade was in the nature of a proclamation of war, and that, in fact, the northern States were exercising belligerent rights. But, however certain we might be upon the point, there were people on the other side of the Atlantic who were equally certain that we were wrong in issuing the proclamation, and that that error had a bearing in some way or other upon the more important question at issue. After all, the main object of the arbitration was to remove serious grounds of dispute which had existed between the two countries, and it would be unfortunate if, by the special exception of this one branch of the subject, there should remain any cause of irritation after the main question had been decided. Then as to the question of dignity. The American government did not desire that the proclamation of neutrality should be actually a question of arbitration, but only that it should be a topic for discussion, and he could not understand how the dignity of this country could be compromised more by this question than by the more important question being brought before the arbitrator. He did not advance these views with any exaggerated feeling of alarm, either for the present or the future. He did not believe that war would result from these claims, though no doubt they might remain a source of irritation which might render it difficult to settle other matters of difference which might arise between the two countries. There were persons who said that Mr. Seward had raised this difficulty merely for the purpose of deferring the settlement, and that the Americans would be only too glad to find us at war, in order that they might seize our vessels. He did not altogether share in that opinion. It was quite true that in a moment of irritation the lower house of Congress had passed a bill to bring their foreign enlistment act into accord with the legal interpretation which our lawyers had put upon ours; but the better sense of the country came to the rescue, and pointed out that in many respects our foreign enlistment act was better than theirs, and altogether more strict and more adverse to such enterprises. He had no doubt that in the event of our finding ourselves at war the American government would do their best to preserve their neutrality; but, at the same time, a government could do nothing except supported by public opinion, and so long as these claims were left in an unsettled state there would, if this country were engaged in war, be many persons in America who would be ready to enter upon enterprises which they now professed to condemn. It was the duty of this country to remove all causes of irritation, to take one great step in advance towards carrying out the policy of arbitration recommended at Paris; and, above all, it was our duty to act in a spirit of friendliness and conciliation towards a country like America, with the people of which we had so many ties of religion, of blood, and of history. He concluded by submitting the motion of which he had given notice.

Lord Stanley. It is only bare justice to the honorable member who has brought this whole subject before us in so clear and comprehensive a manner to say that he has stated nothing which is calculated to increase any feeling of international irritation that may still remain, or to aggravate those diplomatic complications which have arisen. [Hear, hear.] I cordially agree in one expression used by the honorable gentleman—I mean in the tribute which he has paid to the high character and accomplishments of the existing United States minister in this country, whose services, unfortunately, we are so soon to lose. [Cheers.] No man has ever had a more difficult part to play than Mr. Adams, and no man, as far as I am enabled to judge, could have played it with greater judgment, temper, and discretion. [Cheers.] It is not my duty or my wish to follow the honorable gentleman into his criticism upon the policy of Lord Russell and his colleagues. Lord Russell had great difficulties to deal with, and he has many friends and representatives in this house who will be prepared to vindicate any steps taken by him. My business is with the present aspect of the controversy, rather than with past policy. There was only one remark in the speech of the honorable member which I regret, and that is where for a moment he introduced the character of partisanship into his speech. He spoke of it as an extraordinary thing that a conservative government should have consented to refer this question to arbitration, and seemed to think that on our part change of opinion had followed change of position. Upon that point I must say, though I do not want to revive personal controversy, that I think it would be difficult to point out in the speeches of either my right honorable friend, the first lord of the treasury, or of myself, one word which could prejudge the issue to be raised before the arbitrator. I do not put myself forward as having been in this contest a partisan of the northern cause. I have always thought that it was not our duty to throw ourselves in a partisan spirit into the internal disputes of foreign countries. I hold that we are hound to give both sides fair play—to apply, as far as possible, the same rule of international law to both; that we are bound to do that, and, having done that, we are bound to do nothing more. I suppose it is unnecessary for any person occupying the position I hold to make professions of his desire to settle the controversy if possible. England can have nothing to gain toy keeping it open, and has a great deal to gain by closing it. [Hear, hear.] We have vast commercial relations with the United States; we have a long line of conterminous frontier; we come across one another, so to speak, in every quarter of the globe; we have on tooth sides an enormous load of debt, which probably neither desires to see increased; [hear, hear, and a laugh;] and it is equally the interest of both sides that we should remain on good terms. I need not say, therefore, that we wish to arrange the matter if we can, and I do not think that in the present state of the case any difficulty arises from the popular feeling in this country. So far from that, undoubtedly the change from the predominant sentiment in the years between 1860 and 1864 was so strong that, if I might venture to say so, I think I have detected a tendency on our part to be almost too ready to accuse ourselves of faults which we have not committed, and take for granted that every point which is doubtful ought to be decided against us. [Hear, hear.] I do not deny that as the world goes, that is an error on the right side. Indiscriminate resistance to unreasonable demands is mere folly and mischief, tout indiscriminate concession to all demands, merely because they are strongly urged, whether they will bear the test of argument or not, is a course equally likely to lead to mischief. What we have to do is to try to find out what are the strict rights of the ease, to state the case temperately and fairly, endeavor to do justice as far as we are concerned, and, having done that, to appeal frankly and confidently to the existence of a corresponding spirit in those with whom wo have to deal. I think there never was a case in which it was more desirable to define accurately what are the points to be settled than that with which we are now dealing; because upon the other side of the water, and perhaps upon this also, the question has been complicated by all sorts of grievances, to the nature of which the honorable gentleman slightly referred—grievances which I will not call unreal, which I do not say are unfounded, but which still are grievances of so vague and general a character that we shall find it very difficult to define them. I do not complain of that; it is most natural: and I do not doubt that if we were in the position of the North Americans we should feel very much as they do. Men who have emerged from a civil war in which they have incurred £500,000,000 and sacrificed 1,000,000 of lives will not be for some time to come in a position to appreciate with perfect coolness the conduct of those who were in the position of critics and lookers-on in the quarrel. [Hear, hear.] I am not now saying whether in my judgment our course was one in every respect of strict neutrality. That is the very question which we are endeavoring to ascertain by arbitration. [Hear, hear.] But if our neutrality had been the most rigid and absolute, it is possible to conceive that it would have fallen short of the expectations that existed among a large portion of the people of the north. [Hear, hear.] What they expected from us at the beginning of the contest was not neutrality, pure and simple, but neutrality so far as all material assistance was concerned, coupled, however, with a strong moral sympathy and support. [Hear, hear.] And when such a feeling exists and is disappointed, as it certainly was in this case, we cannot expect that the disappointment so produced should not find a vent in some quarter or other. I mention this because it is the key to a good deal of the exaggerated tone of writing and speaking which was observable on the other side in the earlier stages of the controversy; and from that point of view I do not at all regret the time that has passed. On tooth sides we can discuss the matter much more calmly in 1868 than we could in 1864. The passion of the moment has passed away, and only the facts and the arguments remain; and happily, as the case now stands, the controversy, though still pending, is reduced comparatively within the narrowest possible limits. Upon those doubtful questions of fact and law—questions upon which it was not likely, if possible, that the two governments could come to an agreement—we are of one mind so far as this, that we know we cannot agree, and therefore we are prepared to abide by the decision of a third and presumably impartial power. The principle of arbitration, so far as we are concerned, is accepted. They say that it is accepted on both sides, except upon a point of detail. That is a very important step gained. [Hear, hear.] I am not finding fault that this step was not gained before, because I recognize most fully that in a case of this kind time makes many things easy which were not so at first. [Hear.] We have conceded almost everything that was asked for when this dispute began. I think I am right in saying that if it had been possible to grant a limited arbitration, such as is now proposed, when it was first asked for, the question of the alleged premature recognition would never have made its appearance. It was incidentally mentioned, but that was all; but by a peculiar process, which I do not propose altogether to explain, that grievance, whatever its value may be, seems to be gaining importance in the minds of American statesmen and of the American people just in proportion as onthisside of the water has grown up a feeling to remove all causes of dispute. The whole point unsettled between us is this: you agree to refer to arbitration the question of the Alabama and other kindred vessels, but are you willing to include, as a point of reference, whether you were right or wrong in recognizing the Confederate States when you did? That is the whole matter in dispute between us. After all the consideration I can give to the question, as at present advised, I cannot see what bearing the two things have the one upon the other. The practical bearing of the point is whether with respect to the events of 1862 we were right or wrong. I dare say some persons do not accede to that view of the case, and therefore I will endeavor to explain what is my view of the question. I suppose no human being would pretend that at no time during that prolonged struggle of four years had the confederates become entitled to the position of belligerents. Well, but if they were belligerents at some period and were not belligerents at the time we recognized them as such, what was the time when they became properly invested with that character? I will take a date that will bring the matter to issue. If. ever they were belligerents I suppose it was after the military events of July, 1861. At that time they had an immense force, they had gained a temporary but an important numerical superiority, and their army was actually threatening Washington. Suppose we had recognized the confederates after the battle of Bull Run; could any human being have found fault with us? If so, how would this have affected the Alabama question? The Alabama escaped in April, 1862, and the battle of Bull Run was fought in July, 1861.

If I had chosen to adopt that line of argument I might have grounded it upon these facts. I grant, for argument’s sake, that we were wrong in recognizing the confederates when we did so. I grant, for the sake of argument, that we were in a hurry; that we did it six months too soon. I grant that we ought to have recognized them in August; but, admitting this, how would the case respecting the Alabama have been affected if we had made that recognition six months instead of eleven months before the Alabama sailed? [Hear, hear.] It is upon that ground of irrelevancy that I rest the argument. But there is another objection to compliance with the demands of Mr. Seward as made in his dispatch, that this question of recognition should be referred to arbitration. The arbitration we proposed was perfectly simple in its character and not difficult to deal with. Given two belligerents, given a neutral power, the problem to solve is, “has that neutral power fulfilled effectually and faithfully the obligations imposed by international law?” Granting that international law is sometimes vague and uncertain; granting that new circumstances occur not met by precedents; still the question, as I have stated it, is one in the main governed by recognized international principles, and one upon which a friendly government would not be unable and probably not unwilling to give a decision. [Hear, hear.] But if you complicate the matter by bringing in a question of a totally different character; if you raise the question whether a certain political act was or was not suitable under the circumstances in which the government of the day was placed, how is the arbitrator to come to a decision? Were you to make this—for which you have no precedents—a matter of moral justice or of political consideration? No one will deny that this was a matter affecting us as an independent state, and that we were bound by the necessity of the case to use our own discretion. That doctrine of freedom in such matters has been urged, curiously enough, by no persons more strongly than by the government of the United States. I will cite only two cases. In 1849 the United States government proposed to recognize Hungary as an independent state, not merely as a belligerent, but to recognize the revolutionary government of Hungary as an independent state. [Hear, hear.] The Austrian government complained, as was only natural, and a correspondence ensued. It was conducted on the American side by Mr. Webster, certainly not the least able or eminent of American statesmen, and Mr. Webster used this argument: That if they had done so, though the step would have been precipitate, and one from which no benefit resulted, it would, nevertheless, not have been an act against the law of nations, provided they took no part in the contest. I say that that goes immeasurably further than our conduct in this case. [Hear, hear.] Such is the doctrine distinctly put forth by a distinguished American statesman. I will take another case. In 1857 Texas was fighting for independence against the republic of Mexico. A question arose about the entrance into New York harbor of vessels bearing the Texan flag. The United States government defended the admission of such vessels, and in the course of the argument the foreign minister of the United States government contended that it had never been held necessary as a preliminary to the extension of the rights of hospitality to either party —meaning, of course, the admission of ships of war to the rights of belligerents—that the chances of the war should be balanced and the probability of eventual success determined. For this purpose it had been deemed sufficient that the party had declared its independence and was at the time armed for the purpose of defending it. Will any one declare that, at the time in question, the South had not declared its independence? In the face of the principles put forward by the United States government with respect to this absolute freedom of action in these matters, I confess I do not see how an independent state can contend that another independent state should be compelled to pay a fine, even if it had not exercised its discretion aright. Suppose we had not recognized the South at the time we did; suppose that fortune had turned in their favor and that they had succeeded in establishing their independence; would you say that they were entitled to call us to account for not recognizing them soon enough, and by such delay injuring their prospects? Putting it in that way, the question seems almost absurd; and yet it is not very easy to prove that if we were not responsible in one way we were not responsible in the other. [Hear, hear.] I cannot see how-you can argue that damages are not equally due for a too tardy recognition as for a too hasty one. In what position is a neutral power placed when war breaks out? It is a question of general international law; it is a question which will create a precedent, and we were bound to consider not merely what was convenient for the moment, but to regard the rights and duties of nations in general towards one another. [Hear, hear.] The ground I rest it upon in limiting the arbitration as I propose, was, first of all, that the question respecting the recognition of the South was irrelevant to the issue; secondly, that it was a question of statesmanship and policy, and not of mutual obligation, and therefore incapable of receiving legal solution; thirdly, that the United States, in parallel cases, had absolutely refused to admit any responsibility for adopting a similar course; and lastly, I believe no arbitrator would take any reference so vague. I do not propose now to argue the case of the recognition of the South on its merits, for this reason— because I quite agree with the honorable member who brought forward the motion, that in recognizing the confederacy as belligerents at the time we did we were simply declaring on May 13 that a certain state of things was a state of civil war, not on a hasty note, but on four official precedents laid before Congress by Mr. Seward nine, twelve, and sixteen days before the Queen’s proclamation was issued. [Hear, hear.] On May 4, nine days before the issue of the proclamation of neutrality, Mr. Seward wrote that the insurgents had instituted a revolution with open, flagrant, deadly war, to compel the United States to assent to dismemberment, and the United States had accepted this civil war as inevitable. I should be sorry to say anything that would bear hardly upon so eminent and accomplished a statesman as Mr. Seward; but really, if it were a question which we could discuss face to face, I should venture to ask him how, with a grave face, he could ask me to call in some neutral and third party to determine whether a British government had a right to call that civil war which, on May 4, Mr. Seward himself called by that name. [Loud cheers.] I will notice in passing that the highest court of law in the United States declared that the state of things which existed was civil war; and I am glad to say that I have no doubt that there has been a change in the feeling here in a few years, and on the other side of the water a corresponding change has taken place. I saw a very remarkable article the other day, quoted from one of the leading journals of the United States—it was from the New York World of February 18—and it lays down, first, that no arbitrators likely to be chosen would say that the Queen’s proclamation was a wrongful act; secondly, that it was incapable of being made the subject of arbitration; and, thirdly, that it had nothing to do with the Alabama claims. I think it remarkable that such a declaration should appear in the columns of one of the leading newspapers of a country which more than any other is governed by public opinion. [Hear, hear.] I hope I have said enough to show that the proposed limitation is not arbitrary or capricious; still less is it a mere device to avoid bringing the matter to arbitration, but is founded on an intelligent and sound principle. If the negotiations had for a time been, I will not say broken off, but suspended, the house must acknowledge that the rupture or the suspension did not come from our side. We have made an offer which has been declined, and it is for the complaining party to state their counter proposition. I have heard it said, “You ought to settle this matter at once, or you will be in danger of war with America.” I am as anxious to settle the matter as any man in the house, [hear, hear,] but I do not fear that result. I have never concealed my opinion that the Americans, in case of reference, are not unlikely to make out their ease to some extent. The money part of the question is one inappreciably small, more especially as we have claims on our side which, if only a portion of them hold water, will arrive at a considerable amount, and will form a not inconsiderable set-off to the claims against us; but in any case, if the matter be fairly investigated, and the decision went against us, we should not be disposed to grudge the payment. [Hear, hear.] If, therefore, the Alabama claims were for a moment kept out of sight, I think it ought to be understood that it is not by the act of our government that this has been done. I know that political feeling runs high in the United States, but I do not think any parties would be so insensible to the interests of their own country as to engage in a quarrel which might lead to a great and costly war for the sake of enforcing in one particular way a claim which it is in their power to settle, and not improbably in their favor, without having recourse to violence. [Hear, hear.] I cannot but think that in some way, indirectly if not directly—and I am not inclined to be very fastidious about the form [cheers]—the United States government may be induced to join in measures which may lead to an arrangement. If they decline, it only remains to be seen whether any other solution of the dispute can be found. Mr. Seward, through Mr. Adams, has more than once thrown out hints respecting something in the nature of a commission to deal with all outstanding disputes between the two countries. I have, through Mr. Adams, suggested that he should develop that idea. I think international questions are better settled one by one, hut I am not disposed to reject any reasonable mode of bringing about a settlement, and if we can agree upon any mode of bringing about a solution, I do not think that either the government, or the house, or the country, would be disposed to quarrel on a mere matter of form. [Hear, hear.] I may say before I sit down that the reception of the new British minister at Washington has been not only friendly, but cordial, and I think I may say that the feeling towards England is increasingly friendly. [Hear, hear.] I have stated the facts of this case as briefly as I could, and I shall leave our action in this case not merely to the judgment of the house, of the public, and of the country, but to that of all fair and impartial persons on both sides of the Atlantic. [The noble lord sat down amid loud and general cheering.]

Mr. W. E. Forster thanked the noble lord for the anxiety he had shown to produce a better feeling between this country and America; but he believed that the difficulties which existed were not so great as had been imagined. The honorable member for Reading (Mr. Lefevre) made use of too strong an expression when he said that the negotiations had failed. If that had been so, he (Mr. W. E. Forster) should have deeply regretted it, as he wished to see the principle of arbitration carried out, and he thought that a precedent for it might have been established in the present case. He sympathized with the noble lord in the difficulties he had been called upon to contend with in dealing with this question. The state of things was simply this, that Mr. Seward wished to bring on the question of premature recognition, and the noble lord said that he should not allow him to do so. He (Mr. Forster) did not for a moment sympathize with the American government in their claims against this country on account of what they called the premature recognition; but he must say that he did not think that the ground upon which they based their claim was precisely that stated by the noble lord. He did not think that the American government said anything so absurd as that there was no civil war existing at the time of our recognition, but what they said was that though there was war going on in America, there was no war raging at sea, and that it was not our business, as a neutral power, to take notice of what had happened upon land, and by proclaiming our neutrality hasten the time at which a naval war would be carried on. This was nowhere so well stated as in the first official dispatch relating to recognition which passed between the two governments. It was quite true that, though Mr. Adams, in his first intercourse with Earl Russell, protested against recognition, yet in his first official dispatch, in April, 1865, the ground upon which he put the matter was that it was wrong to acknowledge the South as a belligerent “before they had a single vessel of their own afloat.” It was necessary this should be borne in mind, because he was quite sure that this country wished to understand the position taken by Mr. Seward. He thought that he could give, from his own personal experience, some little ground for believing that the United States government were mistaken in the position that they assumed. At the time that the neutrality proclamation was issued by our government he personally was very much interested on behalf of the North. He felt that a war was beginning upon which would depend whether slavery should be extended all over the American continent or should receive its death-blow. [Hear, hear.] He was not ashamed to acknowledge that in that war he was a partisan of the North. Having that feeling, he heard that letters of marque had been sent by Mr. Davis to this country, and the question arose how British subjects could be prevented from having anything to do with these letters of marque. He took legal advice, and was told, first, that vessels sailing under these letters of marque would be pirates, and he believed that 50 years ago they would have been so, and would have been so treated by England. He then referred to Wheaton, the great American authority upon international war, and he found that in his book the law was stated in most distinct terms. He said, “Until a revolution is consummated and while the civil war continues, any neutral government that wishes not to help either of the parties must treat the government de facto as a state entitled to the rights of war.” Upon reading this, he felt; that if he had come down to the house and said that these vessels should be treated as pirates, he should be at once met with the authority of Wheaton for saying that they were entitled to belligerent rights. Still, there was the question how vessels under letters of marque were to be prevented from leaving our shores; and he himself asked the government what steps would be taken to prevent the infringement of the law by British subjects. It was in answer to this question that Sir G. Lewis for the first time stated that a proclamation of neutrality would be at once issued, and that that would set forth the law, which, in general terms, was that no British subject should take part in such a war. This proclamation was not intended in the minds of many people to be considered as unfriendly towards the United States, but rather that it was the only way in which British subjects could be prevented from entering into the war. [Hear, hear.] But whilst he by no means sympathized with the convictions of Mr. Seward in reference to the proclamation, yet he could not but think that the noble lord had somewhat misunderstood Mr. Seward’s position. In his closing dispatch on the 9th November, 1867, he said that “We are distinctly informed by Lord Stanley that the limited reference of the Alabama claims is founded upon the condition that the United States shall waive before the arbitrator the position they have maintained, that the granting of belligerent rights was not justified on any ground of necessity or moral right. This condition being inadmissible, the proposed limited reference is declined.” He did not understand Mr. Seward’s position to be that the question whether what had been done was according to the law of nations should be referred; but to complain that before entering upon the arbitration he was to be compelled to waive his conviction, repeatedly expressed, that the proclamation was premature and contrary to international law. He could not but think that it was too much for the noble lord to expect that Mr. Seward should give up his opinion on that matter, and record his having done so. If he had said, “I refer the question whether there is any money due in reference to the Alabama ships, and whether we broke the law by granting belligerent rights,” it would have been open to us to say, “We will not refer that;” but what the noble lord said was, “We will not refer unless you acknowledge yourself to be wrong in reference to the ground that you have been constantly taking.”

Lord Stanley. No; only that the right should not be questioned before the arbitrator.

Mr. Forster believed that Mr. Seward thought that if he entered upon the arbitration he must acknowledge that the assumption that he had made that the proclamation was not called for was a wrong one, and that the noble lord should not have enforced any such conditions. He did not know why we should have refused arbitration upon Mr. Seward’s terms, for we had the strongest possible case, and all the noble lord’s arguments might have been brought before the arbitrator instead of as reasons why the arbitration should not be assented to. If the arbitration were meant in the spirit of the treaty of Paris—that of an attempt to decide a question between two nations by means of the decision of a third party rather than by war or a threat of war—then the fact that we were confident as to what our right was was no ground for not arbitrating, and consequently if Mr. Seward desired to refer this question, he (Mr. Forster) did not see why his wish should not have been admitted. But Mr. Seward did not ask for this, and it was right that his last dispatch bore a different meaning from his first one. He said first that the whole subject must be referred, and that this included the question of recognition; but after the noble lord’s letter Mr. Seward took different ground, or so defined his first statement that it bore a different interpretation. He said that he must be at liberty to contend before the arbitrator that the act of the British government was not right; that this must be among the matters complained of. He thought that what Mr. Seward meant was that he should have the right to use the fact of recognition as an argument in favor of the claims made; and he (Mr. Forster) could not see why he should not be allowed to do so. He thought that Mr. Seward’s argument would be a very bad one; and if the noble lord’s representative at the arbitration should say that the argument was not relevant it would not be used. He believed that the representative of the United States at the arbitration would have felt that the argument was so bad that we should never have heard of it again. It was very much to be regretted that Mr. Seward had taken the position that he was called on by the noble lord to eat his own words, but after all he hoped that what had happened was only a hitch in the settlement, for he could not but believe that some means of settlement would be found. Everybody in England, and the large body of influential persons in the United States, also desired that the matter should be settled. He believed that there was no party in the United States that did not desire this except the Fenians. If it should turn out that he was right in the supposition that the American government only wanted to make use before the arbitrator of certain arguments, he hoped that the noble lord would not object to their doing so. They should further consider whether arbitration was the only means of settling the matter. [Hear, hear.] There had been tremendous injury inflicted upon American shipping, and there was great reason to believe that if the law remained as it now was, then in future wars great injury would also be inflicted upon English shipping. What naturally came forward under these circumstances was the wish that international law should be so arranged that the inhabitants of both countries should be prevented from carrying on private war. And if America should say, in answer to that proposition, “You must first make recompense for what has passed,” why should not that matter be considered? He did not think that it would be inconsistent with our interest if the two governments agreed that the international or the municipal law of both countries should be so altered as to prevent the escape from the ports of either of pirate ships for the future. Such an alteration would do great good. [Hear, hear.] There was another possible means of settling the matter. There were several questions in dispute between the two governments, and he could not but think that, with the willingness of both governments to settle disputes, if some statesmen high in position in this country were sent out by the noble lord, the whole of these questions could be settled. He repeated that there was no party in England that did not wish for a settlement, and he believed that there was no such party in America except those irreconcilable enemies of ours whose only hope lay in such questions remaining unsettled; and if we could get rid of these questions we should strike a greater blow at Fenianism than by anything else which we could do. [Hear.]

Sir G. Bowyer observed that the honorable gentleman had assumed that the Alabama case involved the question of carrying on private war by the subjects of one country against those of another. It seemed, however, to him that there was no connection between the two things. His object in rising was to call attention to the doctrine of international law in reference to contraband of war, as it bore upon the Alabama case. Some persons thought that the doctrine as to contraband of war involved what was called “conflicting rights,” because private persons were allowed to deal in contraband of war, and belligerents had a right to seize it. You might, however, as well talk to a jurist of “conflicting rights” as to a mathematician of a triangle of which one angle was greater than another. The principle of international law in reference to contraband of war was clear. It was this, that no government should be held responsible for the ordinary trade of its subjects, when carried on with belligerents. If this were not so, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to maintain neutrality. If a government were made responsible for contraband of war sold to a belligerent, then the sale of a stand of arms, or a barrel of gunpowder, might compromise the neutrality of a country, and it would be necessary for a government to exercise a direct surveillance over the whole trade of its subjects; and this would be a state of things which it would be almost impossible to carry out. Vattel, in book 3, chapter 7, said: “If a nation trades in arms, timber, ships, or muniments of war, I cannot complain if it furnishes these things to my enemy, provided it does not refuse to sell these articles to me at a reasonable price. It exercises its traffic without any intention to injure me, and by continuing that traffic as if I were not at war it gives me no just cause of complaint.” Let them apply these clear principles of international law to the case of the Alabama. The southern States being at war, sent to eminent ship-builders at Liverpool to build them ships according to specifications. No doubt these specifications indicated that these ships were to be used for a warlike purpose; but this was a case contemplated by Vattel. It was not for the ship-builders to consider whether the ships were intended for commerce or for war; but the remedy of the United States government was to capture them, and condemn them as contraband of war. It was only by her impartial conduct that England expected to keep her neutrality. There was not a tittle of sound legal argument to support the assumption that the foreign enlistment act made any alteration in the position of England in reference to international law. No country could be bound at the dictation of another country to enforce its own municipal laws; and the difference between a municipal law and a treaty was this, that if the foreign enlistment act had formed a treaty the American government might have enforced its provisions. But with regard to municipal law it was right of every sovereign state to consider with reference to its own interest, and not in any particular instance, whether it would enforce any of its municipal laws. The foreign enlistment act was one of those laws which could not be enforced at the instance of the government, but it could be done at any time in any of our courts by a British subject or a foreigner. The power of the principal custom-house officers to detain a vessel did not in any manner impair the effects of the law as he had laid it down, because what they did in that respect was purely ministerial, and in obedience to a warrant issued by a competent authority. The government of the day ought to have said to the American government: “We do not wish to take unlimited responsibility in this matter; you lay your information before a magistrate and it shall be put in force by the executive.” But the government of the day made a great error when they telegraphed to Liverpool to stop the ship, because by so doing they gave the appearance of being themselves responsible. Although he considered it was a mistake their interfering, he was far from thinking that it really altered the merits of the case. It was an act of supererogation on their part, and it was now sought to make this government responsible for the slip or failure that had occurred in doing what the law did not peremptorily require of them. It was an unfortunate circumstance, the escape of the Alabama. It was an accident, and the government stood harmless with regard to it. He was unable to see what fair or reasonable grounds of complaint the United States government had in the matter, and ho had laid his argument before the house because that part of the question had not been sufficiently ventilated. He agreed with the honorable member for Reading that a quiet and temperate discussion of the matter might tend to the solution of the difficulty. The feeling of that house, and the people of the country, was friendly towards the United States, [hear, hear,] and he thought the honorable member was wrong in supposing that the conservative party was not friendly towards the north. [Hear, hear.] The recognition of the south as belligerents by the north was a matter more for the consideration of the government than of the House of Commons. It was, in fact, a question of policy, which depended on a great number of circumstances and facts which were better known to the government than they could be to the house, and he thought the house would act unwisely in expressing an opinion on either side. If, however, the question of recognition of the south was sent to arbitration, he thought it would be decided in favor of this country. He could not give his entire assent to all the arguments that had been used upon the question by either side. What had been said with regard to a blockade was a mistake, because there was such a thing as unilateral war, in which one side used all the rights of belligerents, without conceding those rights to others. It existed and would be urged if they went to arbitration on the point of recognition. [Hear, heat.] It was a doctrine of father a subtle nature, [hear, and laughter,] but it was well known to those who had given attention to the subject of municipal law.

Mr. Sandford concurred in what had been expressed as to the kindly feeling that should be preserved between this country and the United States, and that everything should be done consistent with national honor. The honorable member for Bradford had spoken of the future, but he (Mr. Sandford) hoped that when they considered their future relations with America it would not be by themselves and America only, but by a congress of all the maritime nations, when the maritime laws should be determined in accordance with the principles there laid down. He should not have risen, only that it appeared to him that the honorable and learned gentleman who had raised the discussion did not appear to be aware of the grounds upon which the case on the part of the United States could be urged. The honorable and learned gentleman appeared to think that the sending forth the Alabama was a violation of the municipal laws; but that was not so, for any citizen had a right to send out an armed vessel for the south as for the north, but it was subject to be captured as contraband of war. [Hear.] The only possible ground upon which the United States could Urge the question was the violation of the municipal law, but to be able to do that successfully America must be able to prove mala fides, or a lax administration of the law on the part of England. He supposed they would urge the latter; but if the Alabama had been seized when she started it would only have been the case of the Alexandra over again. The judges of any violation of the law were the officers of the Crown. That was the principle laid down by Earl Russell and adopted by the noble lord the member for King’s Lynn when he came into office. He had no wish to find fault with the noble lord’s policy because he was guided by the feeling of wishing to maintain friendly relations with the United States; but the noble lord had taken upon himself a heavy responsibility by submitting to arbitration the lax administration of the law by the executive, which was a new principle with regard to international law. Some years since the Austrian government called attention to the fact that a fabrication of Hungarian notes was going on in this country, but we interfered too late, and according to the principle now sought to be laid down, the Austrian government had a claim against us for the lax administration of the law by the executive to the extent of the loss sustained by that country. He had lately met with a large number of Americans. They seemed animated with a good feeling towards England, and they were perfectly reasonable on every other subject but that of the Alabama, and the moment that was mentioned they gave way to the greatest excitement, and he quoted it to show how deeply rooted the feeling of injustice must be on the part of the Americans. [Hear, hear.] He was unable to say if these negotiations would be resumed, but if they should be, and revived in a calmer spirit, he would venture to suggest to the noble lord the foreign secretary the name of a negotiator. Many names had been mentioned, but the Americans were not such flunkeys as many supposed, nor one-tenth so guilty as ourselves. The name of the person he should suggest was a household word in every part of the United States, viz., the honorable member for Birmingham. [Hear, hear, and laughter.] The honorable gentleman who laughed had not properly considered the question. [Laughter.] His object in appointing a negotiator was to arrive at a speedy and successful termination, and he knew no one more likely to conciliate our opponents than the honorable member for Birmingham. The suggestion might not find much favor in that house, but it would in the country and in America. The appointment of that gentleman would go far to remove the feeling of injustice under which America was now laboring with regard to England and the Alabama, and if any man could conduct the negotiations to a successful and peaceful termination it was the honorable member for Birmingham. [Hear, hear.]

Mr. Mill said no one could have listened to this debate without being ready to admit that it had elicited much of an exceedingly gratifying and satisfactory nature, and it might have been hoped approaching to a greater degree of unanimity in the essentials of the question, if not for the speeches of the two honorable members who had immediately preceded him in the debate, [hear, hear,] who had referred to points of international law chiefly involved in the dispute in a manner which would almost lead one to believe they had not read very attentively the discussions that had taken place upon the subject. He said it with more regret because no fault whatever was to be found with the tone or feeling they had displayed, and in the case of the honorable member for Maldon, on the contrary, an amount of good feeling towards America had been displayed, which perhaps surprised some on the opposition side of the house, but which did not surprise him, (Mr. Mill.) It appeared to him that in reviewing the question of international law both those gentlemen had ignored the distinct and fundamental ground on which the discussion had turned, viz., the broad distinction which the law recognized between trade and contraband articles and the use of a neutral country as the base of military or naval operations. [Hear, hear.] It had never been denied that a ship of war might have been supplied to either of the belligerents with no more objection or violation of the municipal laws than the export of military stores; but then on condition that the ship should have gone direct to the port of the belligerent to whom she was sold before she went forth to make war on the commerce of the other belligerent. [Hear, hear.] But the case of the Alabama was a totally different thing. An emissary was sent by the Confederate States to make arrangements for fitting out in this country a naval expedition, with which to make war on the commerce of the north. The honorable and learned member for Dundalk had said it was fair if allowed to both parties equally, but the first tiling to be considered was that practically it never benefited both equally, and although the liberty might be essentially the same, the party who needed it was benefited, and the other was not. If, therefore, a neutral country lends its country as a place from whence a hostile expedition sets forth, it permitted those things to be done in a place which the opposite party was not allowed to get at, and consequently could not obstruct the other. If the Alabama had been fitted out in one of the ports belonging to the Confederate States, it would have been in the power of the north to have obstructed the operations, either by shutting up the ship, or, by bombarding the dock-yard, have destroyed it. Whatever information the north might have had with regard to the Alabama in this country they could not do that, and consequently this country had committed a breach of the neutrality laws by giving its protection to one of the belligerents against the other. With regard to the point that a country could not be required to enforce its own municipal laws, the honorable member for Maldon had gone so far as to blame the secretary of state for foreign affairs for having consented to refer that question to arbitration. Whether we had or had not allowed our municipal laws to be violated, the foreign secretary had consented to no such thing, because a foreign country had nothing to do with the violation of those laws. The right a country had against England was that we should make municipal laws to enforce our municipal duties, [hear, hear,] and on that ground alone could action be taken. If we had enforced them, and they had been found insufficient for the discharge of our municipal duties, we should still have given a right of complaint to the United States. The question, therefore, to be referred had nothing to do with what our municipal laws might have been; but were we bound by international law to prevent certain things from being done, and being so bound, if we were so, did we do all we could to fulfill that duty? It might be that we were under an obligation to make fresh municipal laws if those in existence were not sufficient to fulfill our international duties. [Hear, hear.] He thought he might congratulate the house and the country on the fact that the point at issue between this country and the United States was but an exceedingly small one. But if a very small point prevented the settlement of a very great question, the greater the reason for lamentation. He did not think there was room for blame in any quarter, for it appeared that the two parties had not thoroughly understood one another. It was said that it was an unfriendly, nay that it was a precipitate, an unprecedented act of which we had been guilty in extending to the southern States of North America the character of belligerents. But, however unfriendly, however precipitate, however unprecedented the act might have been, the Americans had never charged us with committing the violation of international law for which they demanded reparation. What he apprehended the Americans claimed was, that they should be permitted to use the early recognition as an argument to convince an arbitrator that the depredations of the Alabama would not have taken place at all, or, at all events, would not have taken place so very early, but for this act of ours. But, surely, any person who was capable of arbitrating between two great countries was competent to decide what argument was relevant to the question at issue and what was not relevant, [Hear, hear.] He could not help saying how cordially he welcomed the hints which had been thrown out by the noble lord and by the honorable member for Bradford as to the possibility of settling the question. [Hear, hear.] He believed there were very few persons in the country who were not now quite disposed to believe that we owed some reparation to the United States, [hear, hear;] and, if so, we did not want an arbitrator to tell us whether we owed anything, but only what amount we owed. [Hear, hear.] The best thing to appoint would, then, be a mixed commission, to say what were the real damages which the United States sustained from the act of negligence of the British nation in allowing the fitting up and departure of the Alabama. There were people who did not think that an arbitrator would decide against us, but that it would be for the convenience of the country that he should. If some such person should be sent—he would not say whether it should be his honorable friend the member for Birmingham—but if negotiations should be reopened commencing with an admission that we owed the United States something, he could not see that there would be any serious difficulty in getting the question, what we had to pay, fairly settled. [Hear, hear.]

Mr. Gladstone said the observations which he had to make would be very few. He could not allow the debate to close without expressing his obligations to the honorable member for Heading for the candid spirit in which he had dealt with the question; and also to the noble lord the secretary of state for foreign affairs for the spirit in which the whole affair had been conducted. That was a spirit of the most perfect equity, both towards those who preceded him in office and to those with whom he had been in contact. With regard to Lord Russell, the noble lord had said that he was well aware of the difference made by times and circumstances in the way of handling the same proposal from the same parties; and bearing this in mind he (Mr. Gladstone) admitted that the noble lord, when he determined to make the proposal of arbitration with the United States, exercised a sound discretion in taking a step which was likely to lead to a settlement. [Hear, hear.] He had listened with great respect to the speech of the honorable member for Westminister, but he had felt unable to glean the precise point at which the negotiations came to a close. If the effect of the speech of the noble lord had been to show that there was no prospect of a practical resumption of the negotiations, he would have regarded it, with very great pain, as an ambiguity beyond any solution. But the last speaker might be right. If they looked narrowly at the words of Mr. Seward in his letters of the 29th of November last, all that he there refused to do was to waive, by a preliminary point of belligerency, his right to maintain that the Queen’s proclamation was not necessary. And so far he might proceed in safety and congratulate the noble lord on the effect which he had produced on the mind of Mr. Seward. He was bound, however, to say that in one opinion of the last speaker he was not able to concur, simply because he did not think it desirable that a misunderstanding should exist on a point of fact. He understood the last speaker to say that there were few members of the house who would hesitate to admit that redress in some form or other was due from us to America on account of the Alabama. He (Mr. Gladstone) did not so understand the speech of the noble lord; and he frankly owned that, if this were so, he would suggest that England should at once tender reparation. He was, also, afraid that his honorable friend was over-sanguine in his assumption that, by admitting the claim of the United States to reparation and compensation, he would secure the settlement of other controverted questions. They had all heard with the greatest satisfaction the closing sentence of the speech of the noble lord. They learned from this that, although the correspondence had dropped, yet that a friendly and amicable prosecution of the subject was still going on, and that there was now in the hands of the government a communication which was likely to be developed into further stages for the settlement of the question. [Hear, hear.] If that were so, he could only say that while, on the one hand, there was every reason to believe that the honor and the interests of this country would be safe in the hands of the noble lord; on the other, he might rely with confidence that, in every part of the House of Commons, as well as in every part of the country, there would be a disposition to strengthen his hands, so as to enable him to perform the arduous and difficult task of settling this question, which, if not properly arranged, might lead to most disastrous results. [Hear, hear.]

The motion was then withdrawn.