His last official act here was the uniting in the demand made for
reparation for the attack on the foreign community, on the 4th instant,
which he signed previous to his departure.
In announcing to his colleagues this intention, which surprised us all,
he remarked that the reasons were personal to himself; that he had been
a warm supporter of the Tycoon, and that having been driven from this
part of the country, and pronounced in rebellion by the Mikado, he felt
it his duty to return to France and make his explanations to his
government in person; that in leaving Baron Brin as chargé d’affaires,
he gave him instructions to act in concert with his colleagues, and that
our conferences hereafter would be as unanimous as heretofore.
Our official and personal relations had been pleasant, and in no one
instance that I am aware of did he fail to unite with his colleagues in
those resolutions which we deemed to be just and necessary.
Two days before his departure he furnished to each of his colleagues a
memorandum of his views of the situation of affairs in Japan, a copy
translation of which I inclose, marked No. 1.
He undoubtedly desired to sustain the Tycoon, but since the demand made
by the foreign powers for the ratification of the treaties by the
Mikado, and their ratification by him in 1865, we have certainly
recognized his supreme authority, and held the Tycoon only as
subordinate. We cannot close our eyes to the fact which is now well
understood, that the Tycoon was the creature of the Mikado, and subject
to his orders, receiving from him his position and power, and
subsequently resigning that position and power to him. I believe we have
nothing politically to do with the several Daimios of the country, but
must look to the government.
I believe, also, that it would be impolitic to ask for the opening of
more new ports at present. We may be asked to accept them. It may, and
probably will be necessary, under the circumstances, the difficulties by
which we are at present surrounded. The trouble of protecting our
countrymen in the midst of a war, the duration of which it is now
impossible to tell, to postpone the opening of Yedo and Ne-egata for a
time, the advent of foreigners at these places, in the present excited
and disturbed state of affairs, would but complicate our troubles.
To the conclusion of this memorandum I assent, and have acted upon it,
providing only for the security of our rights and interests under the
treaties, holding communication with the government de
facto, at the open ports, and observing so far as is possible
the same rules that would be observed in any other country.
This statement upon the part of Mr. Roches was elicited by the production
by the Prussian chargé d’affaires, Mr. Von Brandt, at our conference on
the 6th instant, of a paper, a copy of which I inclose marked No. 2.
This paper, however, was not signed by the representatives, although we
all assented to the general principles and conditions therein contained,
and have unitedly acted upon them since.
I inclose, marked No. 3, Mr. Roches’s letter addressed to me announcing
the appointment of Baron Brin; No. 4, copy of his instructions left with
the baron as charge d’affaires ad interim; and
No. 5, copy of my letter in answer to such communication.
Memorandum addressed to his honorable colleagues
by Mr. Leon Roches, minister of France in Japan.
After the events which have happened under our eyes, there is every
reason to examine, first, what is at this moment the political
situation of Japan; second, what position has been created by these
events to the foreign powers represented in Japan; and third, what
conduct they may and ought to hold. It is with the intention of
helping to throw some light on these questions that the undersigned
has the honor to address to his honorable colleagues an official
document in which he expresses his personal opinion.
ACTUAL SITUATION.
The troops of the Tycoon have been defeated. After what has happened,
the government of this prince does not appear to be in a situation
to resist the violent attack which has forced it to evacuate Osaka
in haste. This government is withdrawing itself into another part of
Japan, to Yedo, seat of the power of the Tycoon, the only one which
foreigners have known regularly till now. As far as we know, the
attack in question comes from some Daimios, known by their hostility
towards the government of the Tycoon. These Daimios pretend to act
in the name of the Mikado, the theoretical Emperor of Japan; but we
know also that the present war has been preceded by a palace
revolution at the court of Kioto, which renders at least doubtful
the legitimacy of the motives put forward by them.
We do not know, however, how far the war will be pushed. Will the
Quanto be invaded and the Tycoon deprived of his own dominions and
his capital, or will the war cease for the moment with the
advantages already obtained, and not attack the Quanto or Yedo? The
future will solve these questions.
The means which remain to the Tycoon appear to be sufficient, if well
employed, to defend the Quanto, and it is probable that the prince
will content himself to employ them in such defense on account of
the little moral solidity which has been shown during these last
events by most of the men who have acted, or ought to have acted, in
the name of the government of the Tycoon.
But as war in every country has its vicissitudes, we ought to admit
also, especially in a country like this, the possibility of a
favorable chance to the Tycoon, and of a favorable turn in the
present state of affairs.
SITUATION OF THE FOREIGN POWERS UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.
In the middle of these events what is the position created to the
foreign powers, admitted into Japan, not to intervene in the
interior questions of this country, but to protect the rights and
the positions which result to them from treaties relatively old, and
which nothing regular has either annulled or even put in
question?
In the first place, their flags and their countrymen have been
obliged, not without losses, to abandon a residence occupied by
right, what they would not have done if they had not had serious
reasons to suspect the dispositions of the victors with regard to
them.
And what confirms this opinion is the incomprehensible outrage of
which Hiogo has been the theater in full daylight, in the middle of
peace and in presence of the foreign flags.
In the second place, they have passed abruptly from a state of
comparative security and prosperity to a situation full of trouble
and incertitude. They have lost in reality, by a quarrel which did
not concern them, all the guarantees which the solemn engagements of
the Tycoon, his power, and his great dominions, whose revenues
amounted to eight millions of kokus, afforded to them for the
execution of the treaties and the peaceful and progressive extension
of the commerce over the whole of Japan.
They have nothing now to look for which could take the place of these
guarantees. The Mikado, possessing neither power nor revenues
belonging to him, could only offer to us as guarantees for the
engagements he would enter into with regard to the foreign powers
the dominions of the Daimios, who pretend to form a government in
his name. But these Daimios, one may fairly believe, who have acted
together to overthrow the power of the Tycoon, will refuse to accept
a responsibility which would engage them personally and impose upon
them the charge of solidarity. But without such responsibility and
solidarity clearly established, one would search in vain what
guarantees and what pledge the new state of things could offer; and
admitting even that the Daimios, chiefs of the revolution, consented
to devote themselves to this necessity, how much time and how much
work would not be necessary to offer to us a pledge as real and as
secure as that they have deprived us of.
We would, therefore, have in place of a reality nothing but a shadow
of responsibility.
[Page 667]
CONDUCT TO BE OBSERVED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES.
It is therefore the duty of the representatives of the foreign powers
to examine seriously what conduct they have to observe from this
moment as well with regard to the adversaries of the Tycoon as with
regard to the Tycoon himself.
What may be the so-called titles or interests of the parties in arms,
there can be no doubt that the conflict bears all the characteristic
signs of an interior discussion confined to Japan. This present war,
therefore, is to be considered as a civil one.
The presence, however, of the foreign flags in the contested
territories authorized the representatives to suppose at least that
the party hostile to the Tycoon would make known in some direct way
to the representatives of these powers their pretensions or their
intentions, and that they would especially abstain carefully from
every act of a nature to wound the dignity or “the interests of
these countries.
In the absence of notifications or other measures, the acts of these
Daimios ought to have borne a testimony for their characters and for
their intentions.
There have, however, no notifications or other steps been made, while
on the other side hostile acts and offensive demonstrations have not
been wanting. These acts and these demonstrations have perhaps not
had for apparent or official authors those who pretend to represent
the Mikado, but they have been visibly inspired by them; and they
cannot be passed in silence, if one does not admit that there might
be, besides the international law and the diplomatic relations, a
vague and indefinite sphere where what happens remains without
responsibility, and where the parties, legitimate or not, can act
freely without rendering an account of their acts, under pretext
that there is no official signature attached to what is done. The
history of the relations of the foreign powers with the far east
abounds with examples absolutely contrary to this theory, which,
besides, has never been put forward by any publicist.
This same history proves, on the contrary, that generally it has been
preferred to punish indiscriminately rather than to leave an offense
unpunished. If, therefore, we only consider the precedents, the
adversaries of the Tycoon cannot be considered, for the moment at
least, as the representatives of a regular government, and one can
only see in what happens the more or less disastrous results of a
civil war by which the foreigners have suffered, and of which they
have a right to repulse the attacks.
There are certainly examples of relations entered into for the
benefit of countrymen with an insurrectional government or a
victorious party, but only provisionally, and in so far as such
government or party did not declare itself the enemy of the
foreigners established peacefully in the country by virtue of
anterior conventions.
It would, therefore, only be in consequence of a reparation for the
outrages and damages committed, and of a clear and precise
declaration putting forward the amicable intentions of the
adversaries of the Tycoon: it could only be under these conditions
that the representatives of the foreign powers could examine if, and
how far, it might be convenient to them to enter into any relations
with the adversaries of the Tycoon.
Without the fulfillment of these conditions it appears impossible
that these representatives could consent to lend their ears to any
proposal, and to see anything else in the adversaries of the
government, recognized as such till now, but enemies which,
according to common law, in default of a government, the powers
ought to restrain themselves and punish with such forces as they
have at their disposal.
So much for the present. With regard to the future, there are two
cases in which the representatives might and ought perhaps to adopt
another line of policy, as that which results from the preceding
considerations.
The first of these cases is that in which the chief of the
government, recognized till now, renounced officially the character
he has expressly declared to conserye with regard to the
foreigners.
The second would be that when by inexcusable facts, such as attest a
revolution or a change of dynasty accepted by an entire country, the
representatives were brought to see that, in fact, the government of
the Tycoon had ceased to exist, at least so far as the relations and
the interests of the foreigners in this country are regarded. In the
first of these cases, the conduct to be observed by the
representatives would be perfectly clear, and it does therefore not
appear necessary, for the present, to take it into
consideration.
The second, on the contrary, gives sufficient matter for discussion,
because, although precise in theory, it happens rarely in practice
to be exactly realized. This case ought to be especially examined in
a country relatively little known, and where the first manifestation
of the national will, which prepared itself under the eyes of the
foreigners, has been suddenly prevented by force. The
representatives had been officially informed by the government of
the Tycoon that a council of Daimios, called together in the regular
way, was to be held at Kioto, and they could, in the absence of any
other known and authorized organ of the national will, consider this
council as representing sufficiently this will in Japan.
They have learned since for what reasons this council has not taken
place.
From between the Daimios few had, it is true, acted in conformity
with their words,
[Page 668]
and lent
the assistance they had promised to the Tycoon, but the majority had
protested against what had been done at Kioto by ruse and by
violence, and therefore the representatives are authorized to say
that the present coalition bears not the character of a national
manifestation.
Therefore, not only has the nation, as far as such an expression may
be used in Japan, not pronounced itself either for or against the
Tycoon, but one could not even say that it had abstained itself,
because the occasion to do so or to pronounce itself has been taken
from it.
What way remains, therefore, to the foreigners to discern on which
side the nation is? None which would not be suspected of a
preconceived notion or of private motives.
If the foreigners were in Japan without rights or interests, simple
lookers-on in the strife, and protected against all consequences
which it may have, they might perhaps await what was called in.
ancient times the judgment of God, and recognize the right where the
force was.
But even in abstaining themselves from any interference in the strife
of parties they cannot abstain themselves from having an opinion on
the theoretical value of each of the parties, if it were only for
the reason that they are accredited with one of them, and that they
have to watch over interests which every party may compromise or
serve.
It is, therefore, on the field of positive facts and diplomatic
stipulations rather than in discussions on the historical right,
particularly in Japan, that they can discern the road to follow at
this moment.
Which, then, is the inference which can be drawn from these two
trains of ideas?
The facts teach us that Japan, taken all together, is so little
prepared for the introduction of foreigners, that even under a
friendly government, recent proofs of hostility, or rather of
hatred, have produced themselves against foreigners. Considering the
spirit reigning in the rabble of certain large towns and the
situation itself of the towns of Osaka and Yedo, one would be led to
suppose that the moment had not yet come to penetrate into them as
into places perfectly secure.
Nevertheless at the special demand of the foreigners have these towns
either been opened or will be opened, and one can even prove that on
the part of a certain number of European merchants the desire exists
to see new ports opened in the dominions of some Daimios. But it is
not the duty of the representatives to ask themselves if it be
to-day in the interest of the foreigners, and in the interest or in
the means of their respective governments, still to augment the
number of the open towns; to hazard themselves into other
territories; to have to do with many princes instead of with one; to
multiply their naval stations and the consular posts; to offer, in
one word, more opportunity for the ill-feeling to show itself, and
more occasion for difficulties.
Why should we give the Daimios credit for more loyalty, more sincere
amity, a larger understanding or a more open one to progress, than
the present Tycoon has shown? This prince was, so it is said, unable
to protect sufficiently the foreigners in his dominions, and
therefore cannot be recognized as the real sovereign of Japan. But
who will be it more than he is? And what guarantee does exist that
what he has not been able to do others will do and can do? Do we not
know, on the contrary, that most of the insults and attacks of which
the foreigners have been the victims, have had for authors the great
and small adversaries of the Tycoon; that it were precisely the
liberties and franchises of the Daimios which prevented the Tycoon
from punishing acts he nevertheless had to pay for very dearly?
Do we ignore that these attacks, some of them at least, may have been
made less with the intention to murder a foreigner, than to create
difficulties between the Tycoon and the foreigners? If to-day, in
consequence of the present events, the adversaries of the government
offer to us, and if we agree to establish ourselves in new towns and
provinces, will we find there more security than in the possessions
of the Tycoon? It would be at least singular to pretend that each of
these Daimios would be in his possessions a better protector than
the Tycoon in his possessions, and that the same princes by which
the attacks and insults were directed against us will be for us,
when we are with them, sincere and sufficient protectors. They would
have selected at least quite novel means to attract us to them, and
means, until now, little used in human affairs.
Considered from this point of view, the question only offers
apprehensions, or at least incertitudes, and it is rather probable
that the foreigners which have come to Japan to transact commercial
affairs peacefully would bitterly regret to have risked themselves
outside the known dominions. To push still further the consequence
of such a decision, if it was taken, no clear-sighted Japanese would
hesitate to believe that it was precisely to divide still more their
country and to search for an opportunity to take possession of some
part of it, by the aid of inevitable difficulties, that the
foreigners had so acted. Such would be in every probability, in the
nearest future, the consequence of such a resolution.
But it cannot be supposed that such be the intention of any of the
powers represented in Japan, because such a way of acting, in itself
little honorable, would be contrary to all declarations made till
now, and would provoke immediately from the other powers just
reclamations, or analogous proceedings. Japan would be submitted but
to more
[Page 669]
than one power,
which instead of acting together, as they have done till now, for
the general benefit of the country, and the progress profitable to
all, would only occupy themselves with watching and restraining each
other.
But as it is not possible, to repeat it once more, to suppose such
designs to any one of the powers, it remains only to hold on
provisionally to the existing treaties, save to draw from the events
such advantages as the circumstances will allow, and as might be
obtained together by the powers for the common benefit.
So one is brought back to the daylight of the diplomatic dominion,
and to the logic of the clear situation.
The foreigners exist in Japan by virtue of international conventions,
which have been more than once amply and sincerely confirmed by the
government with which they had been concluded, and especially by the
present Tycoon. The representatives of the powers have solemnly
recognized the loyalty of this prince and the spirit which his
government brought to the execution of these treaties. The Tycoon
has neither renounced to govern nor to execute the treaties. Far
from this, one could rather believe that he would be ready to extend
them, and to put himself at the head of the foreign party.
And then in the part of Japan which will obey the authority of the
Tycoon, the foreigners would be certain, without it being necessary
to make new stipulations, to find complete security.
Are we assured of the same advantages with the adversaries of the
Tycoon?
It results evidently from what precedes, that it would be hazardous
to have faith in the first declarations which they certainly will
not fail to make to us.
En resumé, therefore, and for the moment the right and the duty of
the powers appear to be exclusively to
provide, if necessary by force, for the security of the foreigners,
and for the maintenance of the treaties, without changing anything
in the diplomatic situation, until the events have by themselves and
without any intervention, either open or secret, disengaged the
representatives from the obligations they would observe in every
other country, and from which they cannot depart here without
causing serious damages to the honor and perhaps to the interest of
the country which every one of them represent.
LEON ROCHES.
Kobé,
February 6,
1868.
