Mr. Dix to Mr. Seward

No. 91.]

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a translation of a note which I have received from the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Brazil at Paris addressed to me, and a copy of a note addressed by him to the Marquis de Moustier on the 12th instant, in reply to the notes received from the chargé d’affaires of Paraguay and transmitted at his request to you by my despatch No. 90.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN A. DIX.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[Translation.]

Mr. Macedo to Mr. Dix

Monsieur le Ministre: The chargé d’affaires of Paraguay, Mr. Bareiro, having communicated to you printed copies of the note which he addressed, together with three documents, to the governments of France and Great Britain, I have the honor on my part to transmit you, herewith enclosed, two copies of the note which I have presented to the Marquis de Moustier in answer to the Paraguayan allegations, and I respectfully request that you may forward one to your government.

I profit with pleasure of this opportunity to renew the assurance of my high consideration.

S. DE MACEDO.

His Excellency General Dix, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

[Translation.]

[Note addressed by the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil to his excellency the Marquis de Moustier, secretary of state of his Majesty the Emperor of the French.]

Monsieur le Ministre: I owe to the kindness of some of my colleagues the notice of a circulai dated the 5th and received by them the 8th instant, with which the chargé d’affaires of the republic of Paraguay, Mr. Bareiro, transmits to them printed copies of a note addressed by him to the governments of France and England; of another note addressed by the minister for foreign affairs of Paraguay, Mr. Bergés, to the minister resident of the United States of America at Asuncion, Mr. Washburn; and still another note of the latter to the Marshal Marquis de Caxias.

The communication of these documents by the legation of Paraguay is caused by the non acceptation on the part of Brazil and her allies of the friendly offer of good offices which the sentiments of humanity have inspired the government of the United States of America to propose for a peace negotiation with the President of Paraguay, the Marshal Lopez.

I should like to spare your excellency the trouble of reading a refutation, perhaps useless, of documents and allegations which bear in themselves evidence of their falsity and the injustice of the cause which they pretend to serve. I deem myself nevertheless obliged to [Page 247] submit to you some observations, and prefer to expose myself to the charge of importunity, rather than to neglect an opportunity to show the value which the government of the Emperor, my sovereign, attaches to the good opinion of enlightened and friendly governments, among which it places in the first rank that of his Majesty the Emperor of the French.

It is well proved and fully acknowledged in the documents of Paraguayans, that their troops and men-of-war have invaded two Brazilian and one Argentine provinces, all three found without any means prepared for defence, and have taken in the waters of Paraguay a Brazilian mail-packet, and in the port of Corrientes (which they bombarded) two Argentine war steamers which were there peacefully anchored.

Surely the invaded provinces would not have been found so entirely unprovided for defence, exposed to the razzias of Paraguay, nor the steamers in the waters where the Paraguayans surprised them, if the Brazilian and Argentine governments could have suspected the existence of any motive for a war against them by Paraguay.

Notwithstanding, the Paraguayan documents maintain that a declaration of war was made in time.

According to them, the declaration of war to Brazil is contained in a note, or protest, addressed to the minister of Brazil at Asuncion, dated the 31st of August, 1864. The subject of that note was the claims, differences, or hostilities between the governments of Brazil and the republic of Uruguay, in which the government of Paraguay had no interest, since, from, the admission of Mr. Bergès, (page 5 of his note,) it did not and does not now have any bond of alliance with Uruguay. That note or protest was so far from being a declaration of war, that the minister of Brazil accredited at Asuncion continued to perform peaceably his functions.

As regards the Argentine Republic, there can be no further discussion after Mr. Berges’ declaration (page 12 of his note) that the hostilities against the port and city of Corrientes took place the 13th of April and after Mr. Bareiro (page 2 of his note) declares that on the 1st of May it was scarcely 15 days since the Argentine government had notice of the acts of war of Paraguay, that is to say, that until the 17th of April, it had not the slightest suspicion of the existence of either the decree declaring war against it, or of the hostilities which had already begun the 13th.

Besides, there is the impartial testimony of Mr. Thornton, her Britannic Majesty’s minister near the Argentine republic, who, in a report to his government, communicated to Parliament and published, dated from Buenos Ayres the 6th May, 1865, states that “the Paraguayan note addressed by Mr, Bergès the 29th of March to the minister for foreign affairs at Buenos Ayres, Mr. Elisalde, did not come to the knowledge of the Argentine government until the 1st of May, by means of the Paraguayan paper Semanario, in which it was published. The original at length reached it the 3d, 19 days after the city of Corrientes had been occupied by the Paraguayan forces.”

It is therefore well established, however much the agents of the President of Paraguay will deny it, that the resort to acts of war and that hostilities took place before the existence, not only of a declaration of war in form, but also of any documents or facts which could have conveyed the suspicion that the war was to be waged.

I pass to the motives alleged by the agents of the President of Paraguay for waging this war.

As regards the Argentine Republic, the English report already referred to sets forth the four reasons alleged in the Paraguayan declaration of war, and defines their value and truth in the opinion of this impartial diplomat, whose words I transcribe:

“The reasons,” says Mr. Thornton, “alleged in this document as a justification of the extreme measure of war, are—

“1. The refusal on the part of the Argentine government to grant a passage to the Paraguayan forces across the province of Corrientes.

“2. The refusal to recognize the right of Paraguay to the territory of the Missionès between the Parana and the Uruguay.

“3. The suffering, on the part of the Argentine government, of the enlistment of soldiers at Buenos Ayres, to be employed against Paraguay.

“4. The support given by the official press of Buenos Ayres to the cause of Brazil against Paraguay.

“Concerning the first argument, I think that few persons will deny that that republic had a plain right to refuse the passage across its territory, as well to the Brazilians as to the Paraguayans.

“The Argentine government has always refused to recognize the right of Paraguay to the territory of the Missionès, but has, notwithstanding, never taken any active measures to prevent the occupation of that territory by the Paraguayans.

“As to the enlistment of soldiers at Buenos Ayres for the service of Brazil against Paraguay, I can only say that I have never been able to discover that anything of the sort transpired.

“There is no such a thing as a truly official press in that country. The government has so little control over it that the liberty which it enjoys often approaches licentiousness. There may be some paper the editor of which stands in friendly relations with the members of the government, and who writes in conformity with their views, but it is certain that they can [Page 248] never be confident that this same paper will not criticize their measures with the greatest severity.”

In the note of Mr. Bergès (page 9) is contained an additional motive for war, added to the four which Mr. Thornton has so well set forth and judged. In 1856 some forgers at Buenos Ayres counterfeited public bills of credit of Paraguay.

Such are the causes by which it is attempted to justify so much ravage and shedding of blood !

As regards Brazil, Mr. Bergès (page 7 of his note) expresses himself in this manner: “Brazil itself hastened not only to recognize our independence, but also to fortify it.” A little further, on the same page, are to be found these words: “Paraguay, the disinterested and grateful friend of Brazil, for the good offices which it had received from the latter.” * * In order to know that Paraguay ought to be gratefully friendly to Brazil, it was not necessary for you, M. le Marquis, to read this confession of Mr. Bergès. There are documents in your department, of a date previous to 1845, to evidence the good offices of Brazil towards that republic, then feeble, menaced, and abandoned by the whole world.

Now, I would beg your excellency to cause to be examined most carefully the notes of Mr. Bergès and Mr. Bareiro, and to discover the allegation of a single fact, of a single offence, of a single small grievance which could have caused to change suddenly this friendship into rancor, this gratefulness into ferocious hostility.

The government of Paraguay had, I repeat it, nothing to do with the contentions of Brazil with Paraguay, since it did not have a single bond of alliance with that republic, and, on the other hand, owed friendship and gratitude to Brazil.

If the independence of Uruguay was threatened, according to his gratuitous assertion, he knew, and Messrs, Bergès and Bareiro repeat it in their notes, that there are stipulations between the governments of Brazil, of the Argentine Republic, of France, and of England, concerning that independence; he had, therefore, only to address himself to those governments, and to rouse them if he thought them asleep.

For Paraguay, who was bound by no engagement whatever, it was already a peculiar position to see that which enlightened and so well served governments failed to perceive.

Mr. Bergès and Mr. Bareiro speak vaguely of projects of absorption, of traditional pretensions, and the encroaching policy of Brazil. Proofs ought to have been adduced of these assertions. The proofs which attest the moderation and the pacific character of the government of the Emperor of Brazil are before the eyes of the whole world.

The person, the effects and papers of Colonel Carneiro de Campos, president (civil governor) of the province of Matto Grosso, fell into the power of the government of Paraguay. If it had found instructions to prepare in that border province the least attempt against the interests of Paraguay, it is not to be supposed that that government, which is seeking by so many sophisms and false allegations to justify its aggression, would have preserved these proofs a secret to this moment.

Did the Paraguayan armies, in invading Matto Grosso and Rio Grande, find battalions and squadrons ready to open hostilities against Paraguay—to extend the frontiers, to undertake anything whatever against that republic? Those armies did not even find an organized defence. One hundred and twenty men, composing the garrison of the dilapidated Fort Coimbra at Matto Grosso, and a few squadrons of the national guard collected hastily before S. Borja de Rio Grande, are the only forces they encountered.

It is known to the whole world that Brazil, when it saw two of her provinces invaded by the troops of Paraguay, had only 14,000 soldiers of all arms scattered in small detachments over the 20 provinces of the empire; that her arsenals were empty; that even her provinces bordering on Paraguay were unprotected; that the forts, which serve her more as landmarks than for defence, were dilapidated, poorly armed, and dismantled; that her fleet was composed only of the vessels always employed for the coast service; that she had not any war vessels drawing the proper depth for a war upon water; that she possessed neither the vessels nor the cannon necessary for an attack on fortresses such as that of Humaita.

The determination of the land and naval forces had undergone in the chambers the annual discussion. Nobody had proposed an increase; on the contrary, a reduction was proposed with a view to economy, and this same president of Matto Grosso, victim to the surprise of Paraguay, is one of the deputies who insisted upon a reduction of that insignificant army of 14,000 men.

The single indication which Mr. Bareiro advances to prove that there had been for a long time on the part of Brazil and the Argentine Republic an intention to make war on Paraguay, is that four months and a half after Brazil had been attacked, and fifteen days after it was known at Buenos Ayres that the Argentine Republic was equally exposed to hostilities, their plenipotentiaries signed in that city a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. Not only is nothing more natural than to suppose that the Brazilian plenipotentiary had instructions to induce the Argentine Republic to an alliance, but fifteen days are more than sufficient to draw up a treaty, to send it from Buenos Ayres to Rio de Janeiro, and to receive the answer.

It is thus, however, the agents of Paraguay, destitute of the slightest proof, in making much ado about the encroaching policy of Brazil, attempt to make believe that Paraguay attacked the latter because she expected to be attacked herself. Mr. Bareiro says, (page 6 [Page 249] of Ms note:) “Who would account it a crime in him whose life is threatened to anticipate his aggressors?”

That Brazil had not a single means of aggression has just been stated, and is known to the whole world. Permit me now, M. le Marquis, to enumerate those which since several years the government of Paraguay had collected.

It has been solely occupied in training soldiers and acquiring instruments and munitions of war. Its army was the most numerous which South America had ever seen. It gave the greatest dimensions to the fortress, already formidable, of Humaita. It possessed the best and most numerous artillery which this part of the world has ever seen.

The loss which it has suffered in men and munitions in the past two years can only give an idea of what it possessed. The president of Paraguay threw 9,000 men into Matto Grosso, a greater portion of whom are there still. He lost 7,000 men, made prisoners at Uruguayana; 4,000 dead at the battle of Yatay; 2,000 at that of Reachuelo. In all the defeats which he has suffered since the invasion of his territory to the moment when he retired to his fortresses, he has lost a very considerable proportion of soldiers, the number of which is not known. Sickness has made ravages in his ranks, as in those of the allies. Notwithstanding, he has still behind his walls numerous soldiers worthy, from their courage, to serve a better cause. Since two years he has been blockaded by land and by water. The country does not furnish the necessary material for the manufacture of munitions of war. All the losses of men of which I have just been speaking were accompanied by the loss of their arms. Bombardments and musketry have scarcely ever ceased, and nevertheless he has still munitions.

And it is a government thus prepared for attack and defence that says in the face of a civilized world, and of governments which have agents and representatives in those regions, that it anticipated its aggressors! It accuses of projects Of violence and conquest, governments which by the carelessness shown in the defence of their territory, and by the entire want of an army, have shown clearly the confidence of their consciences, and the most complete absence of the most distant project of ambition or encroachment !

It is the second time that the president of Paraguay has made in an official document the declaration which is contained on the 13th page of the note of Mr. Bergès, namely: that the blood spilled to the present moment is more than sufficient, in his eyes, to wash away the offences alleged on the one and the other part by the belligerents; so that, according to a new moral which he desires to establish between the nations when one of them has received injuries, it has only to collect a certain number of soldiers, shed an amount of blood, and that sacrifice made, all is ended.

A neighboring potentate having succeeded, thanks to the docility of his people, in procuring for himself an unlimited power, employs ten years to accumulate means of aggression. At a moment which seems to him propitious, he falls upon his neighbors, and when he begins to fear that his resources will give out, when he finds himself surrounded and invested in his strongholds, he simply says to the world, the blood shed is sufficient for me, and he thinks that the war should cease which he alone has kindled.

The government of Brazil leaves it to all just men to decide whether it is justified in leaving this germ of trouble and disquietude in the condition in which it commenced its ravages.

It behooves the nations of America to employ their activity and their treasures for different objects than that of maintaining large standing armies.

A neighbor, who by his ambition and his caprices has just destroyed so much treasure and spilled so much blood, would be a perpetual cause of alarm and of sacrifices of all sorts. The allies cannot, therefore, lay down their arms until they have obtained guarantees for the future.

The novel principle of public law by which it is attempted to deny nations the right to depose from power a chief who has abused it, and who has become a perpetual menace to his neighbors, is a principle contrary to the constant practice of civilized nations of all ages. But if it is intended to declaim against this sacred right, which proceeds from that of self-preservation, a different theatre and a different subject ought to be selected than Paraguay or her present chief; for Mr. Bergès himself (page 8 of his note) speaks of the alliance into which Paraguay entered to depose the dictatorship of General Rosas.

I cannot enter upon a recital of the plans of my government and of its allies for obtaining guarantees of peace and tranquillity. I am, however, instructed to declare on all occasions that it is their firm intention to maintain the independence of the republic of Paraguay, to leave it the choice of a national government, and of such institutions as it may wish to select.

I have been careful to confine myself to the limit of discussion traced out by the notes which the chargé d’affaires of Paraguay has placed under the eyes of the friendly governments of the Crown of Brazil. I refrain from speaking of the manner in which the war was conducted on the part of Paraguay.

On the banks of the Paraguay and the Parana, justice is opposed to the spirit of usurpation and of conquest. That wise policy which gives life to commerce, to industry, and to the progress of nations, no matter under what form of government, is opposed to the most absurd system of commercial restriction and monopoly. In short, civilization is opposed to tendencies towards barbarism.

The triumph of one of the two principles will be decided by arms. God, who has eternity in the mystery of his designs, does not always give the victory to the cause of justice. The [Page 250] most superior combinations of human prudence and wisdom are doomed to failure every day We trust, however, with confidence in the divine protection, in the valor of our soldiers, and in the intelligence of our military chiefs, that this sanguinary contest will be finished very soon by the triumph of justice.

I embrace, Monsieur le Ministre, this occasion to beg of you to accept the renewed assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

S. DE MACEDO.