Mr. Seward to Mr. Bigelow
Sir: I have just now received your confidential note of the 27th of April, which treats of the relations of the United States and France with Mexico.
On the 12th of February last I addressed a note to the Marquis de Montholon in which, by the President’s direction, I submitted for the consideration of the Emperor the views of this government concerning the state of the French intervention. On the 5th of April Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys replied to that communication, and gave us to understand that the Emperor would withdraw the French troops from Mexico in three parts, the first to leave that country in November, 1866, the second in March, 1867, and the third in November, 1867. On the 25th of April I had the honor to reply through the Marquis de Montholon, accepting that assurance.
The President has supposed that with the definitive conclusion of the arrangement for evacuation which was thus made in that correspondence, the anxiety prevailing in this country with regard to the French intervention in Mexico was brought to an end, and that, practically, the two governments might come at once into a condition of harmony upon that heretofore embarrassing subject. Recent events, however, not especially significant in themselves, have reawakened the concern which was thus supposed to have been put at rest. The journals published at Havana and at St. Thomas speak of the passage of steamers with 1,200 fresh troops from France, by the way of those ports, to Vera Cruz. From a creditable source, also, we hear of the departure of 300 troops of the so called ‘‘foreign legion’’ from St. Nazaire, on the 16th of April, for Vera Cruz.
These transactions are seized upon in the United States as showing that the determination of France to evacuate Mexico is not fixed, and that it is unsafe for this government to rely upon the assurances it has received in that respect. It becomes my duty, therefore, to inform you that, without important exceptations, the whole American people are. in such a condition of disquiet with regard to the subject, that it would not be a matter of surprise to the President if Congress should adopt some proceeding which might entirely change the attitude of this government in regard to the war between France and Mexico.
It is hardly necessary to refer you to the fact, that although the public mind was at the moment reconciled to the acceptance of the engagement between France and this government, yet, it was, nevertheless, so reconciled only by the| assurance that Austria would not be regarded by us as neutral, if she should now send military forces, or permit them to be sent to Mexico, to replace the retiring French army. Nor is it necessary to say that the President confides in the loyalty of France, and does not for a moment allow himself to apprehend that the Emperor, by sending or permitting new troops to go forward to Mexico, intends the least departure from the spirit of the existing engagement. You perceive, therefore, that there is a necessity on our part for having such explanations as will enable us to relieve the subject from all uncertainty, and so far possible from public misapprehension, with as little delay as convenient.
You will see Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, and in the first instance, at least without a formal note, ask his attention to the situation of the Mexican question, as I have herein presented it. To render your task more easy, I give a copy of this note to the Marquis de Montholon, who may perhaps write upon the subject to his government.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
John Bigelow, Esq., &c., &c., &c.