Mr. Seward to Mr
Adams
No. 1256.]
Department of State. Washington,
January 30, 1865.
Sir. I have the honor to acknowledge the
receipt of your despatch of the 12th of January.
I have read with much interest the letter of “Historicus,” in the Times,
to which you have directed my attention. The publication clears up a
mystery which I had found insoluble, and which for that reason was
giving me some un easiness.
I give you herewith a copy of two pretended despatches of John Slidell,
at Paris, to Judah P. Benjamin, in Bichmond, which was written on the
28th of November and on the 13th of December, respectively. In the first
the emissary writes to the conspirator that in consequence of the
absence of Lord Cowley, M. Drouyn de Lbuys has had no opportunity to
speak to him on the subject of a certain communication of Benjamin,
described as No. 42. Slidell adds, however, that as Lord Cowley has now
returned to Paris, and as both he and M. Drouyn de Lhuys are invited
guests of the Emperor at Compéigne during this week, Slidell thinks that
the subject will be broached then. At least, (so he says,) “such is the
opinion of my friend at the Affaires Étrangers.” Slidell, communicating
the subject, says to Benjamin: Mr. Hotze will have informed you that,
after diligent inquiry, he cannot find that any instructions relating to
our cruisers or their prizes have recently issued from the admiralty.
When the minister of foreign affairs returns to Paris, I will, I doubt
not, be able to ascertain whether anything has been said or done by him
in the matter.
Renewing the subject in the paper of the 13th of December, Slidell
informs Benjamin that, for some reason or other, Lord Cowley did not
avail himself of his invitation to Compéigne, (before mentioned,) and
only returned from London a few days since. But Slidell adds, that
during Lord Cowley’s-absence, M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not neglected to
call the attention of the British government, as he had before promised,
to the subject of Benjamin’s despatch, described as No. 43, as will
appear by the following extract from à letter which Slidell had received
from his friend at the Foreign Office. The extract is in the following
words:
“M. Drouyn de Lhuys has written to our ambassador in London about the
proposal of your government relative to neutral goods on board enemies’
vessels, and wishes to know the opinion of the English cabinet on that
subject. He also, in conversation with the ministers of the marine and
commerce, expressed the opinion that the proposal would be very
acceptable. He is waiting for an answer, which I will not fail to, ask
him to communicate to me,”
Slidell closes up the subject with the remark, that he expects soon to
learn the secret of this overture to the British government.
The mystery which I have mentioned arose out of our ignorance of the
contents of Benjamin’s so-called despatch No. 43, which was the basis of
an intrigue carried on by an emissary at Paris, through the agency of a
spy in the French Foreign Office, with the expected, but withheld,
co-operation of the British ambassador at the imperial court. I now
learn the character of that proposition from the publication of “
Historicus,” in the Times. Benjamin proposes to France and England
modifications of their practice in regard to captures by rebel cruisers,
as follows:
First, in the case of a vessel under enemy’s flag, with, cargo wholly or
in part belonging to neutrals, Mr. Benjamin says that, under ordinary
circumstances, this case would present no embarrassment. The captured
vessel would be taken into a port of the captors, or of a neutral
country, the portion of the cargo belonging to the neutral would be
delivered to the owners, and the vessel, with such portion of the cargo
as belongs to the enemy, would be condemned as prize.
[Page 107]
Benjamin then proceeds thus: “The action of neutral governments has
placed serious obstacles in the way of doing justice to their own
people. They have closed their ports to the admission of captured
vessels, and have thus rendered it impossible to make delivery in their
own ports of the property of their own subjects, found on board of
vessels of our enemies, while it would be exposing those vessels to
almost certain recapture to attempt to “bring them into our ports, for
the captured vessels are almost invariably sailing vessels, and the
enemy’s cruisers off our ports are steamers Mr. Benjamin, after thus
presenting the case, concludes upon it as follows: If, for instance,
Great Britain will not permit a captured enemy’s vessel to be carried
into one of her ports for the purpose of their delivery to a British
subject of his goods found on board, she would certainly have no just
ground of complaint that the goods were not restored to their owner. If,
therefore, on the renewed representations we are about to make, we find
neutral nations persist In refusing to receive the property of their
subjects in their own ports, when captured by us on enemy’s vessels, it
will become necessary to instruct our cruisers to destroy such property
whenever they are unable to bring the prize into our ports. Benjamin, by
way of stimulating her Majesty’s government to prompt compliance with
these insurgent demands, complacently assumes that the commanders of our
national cruisers should be instructed to continue their former practice
of allowing the enemy to ransom his vessel in cases where the neutral
property on board is of large value, or bears any considerable
proportion to that of the enemy. But if a ransom bond is refused, or if
the proportion of neutral property is small compared with the value of
the vessel and the hostile cargo, the whole should be destroyed whenever
the prize cannot be brought into a port of our own or a neutral
country.
Having thus, in this manner, disposed of the first assumed case, he
proceeds to state a second one, namely: a vessel really neutral, with
cargo wholly or in part belonging to the enemy. Benjamin then states the
rebel practice upon the case thus assumed, as follows: “The cruisers of
the confederacy will therefore allow vessels of neutrals to pass free,
unless laden with goods contraband of war; the contraband goods, if not
the property of the owner of the vessel, are to be taken out if
practicable, and transshipped or destroyed, and she is to be allowed to
continue her voyage. But if the owner of the vessel has put on board
contraband goods belonging to himself, destined for the enemy’s country,
he thereby forfeits the neutral character, and the ship is to be
considered an enemy’s vessel, and to be dealt with as such. No conflict
with neutral powers on this subject is apprehended, as they have with
entire unanimity issued proclamations forbidding their vessels, during
the present war, from engaging in contraband trade, under penalty of
forfeiture of national protection.
Benjamin then draws under review a third case, namely: a vessel
ostensibly neutral, but really hostile, fraudulently placed under a
neutral flag, and furnished with fraudulent papers, to protect her from
capture.
In regard to this case, Benjamin avows this to be, the practice of the
rebels: “The captain (of the cruiser) should in any case make rigid
examination of the papers and documents of every vessel sailing under a
neutral flag, known to have belonged to the enemy at the commencement of
the war. He should take into consideration the nature of the trade in
which the vessel is engaged, the national character of the master, the
papers found on board, the place at which the alleged sale to the
neutral took effect, by delivery of the vessel, and every other
circumstance tending to establish the true nature of the transfer, and
to satisfy his mind whether the vessel be really neutral, or merely
disguised as such. If the captured vessel has double sets of papers, or
if papers have been destroyed or subducted by her master during the
chase, or if she has continued in the same course of trade and under the
same master since the alleged sale to the neutral, it may be safely
concluded that the property is still hostile, and covered by fraudulent
use of neutral flag. In these and all other cases where
[Page 108]
there is great and decided preponderance
of evidence to show that the vessel is really enemy’s property, the
cruiser must act on his conviction and treat her as such, leaving to his
government the responsibility of satisfying any neutral claim for her
value. But when the commander has serious doubts as to the true
character of the transfer, it will be proper rather to dismiss the
vessel, if she cannot be brought into port, than to exercise a harsh and
doubtful right.”
These are the new positions assumed by the rebels of the United States,
recognized as a belligerent by the principal maritime powers of Europe,
in derogation of the sovereignty of the United States. The positions
dispense in every case with the necessity of ports and courts, and
substitute the deck of the captor for the one, and the will of the
captain for the other. The United States have no direct interest in the
question, whether the other maritime powers shall acquiesce in the rebel
claim thus made, because they are now at open war with the claimants.
But they are indirectly interested, because it is presumed that the
maritime powers will not expect the United States as a belligerent to
concede to these persons any rights, privileges or advantages, which
these powers may consent to waive in favor of the other so-called
belligerent. You will, therefore, apply to Earl Russell for
information.
Not having been made acquainted by the two maritime powers with the grave
questions which have been submitted to them by the conspiracy at
Richmond, it would not become us to intervene in the discussion of them.
Otherwise, it might not be altogether improper for us to suggest, as a
simple and effective mode of meeting these questions, that, Great
Britain should concede no belligerent privilege to any cruiser that is
exclusively manned, equipped, and despatched from British ports, in
violation of British laws and of the law of nations. The insurgents do
not even pretend to have any cruisers, except those which were so
manned, equipped, and despatched. I think that we may not unreasonably
hope for such a decision on the part of the British government as well
as the French government. Certainly it would be a very peculiar result
of the British policy in regard to this war, if, while lawful British
commerce is respected by the United States, it should be embarrassed or
destroyed by vessels issuing from her own ports in aid of the
insurgents. But this is a matter which may wisely be left to the
exclusive consideration of the British government.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
Charles Francis Adams. Esq., &c., &c., &c.
(Same to Mr. Bigelow, (No. 28,) mutatis
mutandis.)
Mr. Slidell to Mr. Benjamin
No. 75.]
Paris.
November,28, 1864.
Sir: As I am still without the despatch
referred to in your No. 42 I fear that it has miscarried, and beg
leave to suggest the transmission of a duplicate. I have to thank
you for the copies of the State Map of Virginia; one of them I have
presented to our excellent friend the Duke de Persigny. I have been
prevented from placing a second in the hands of the Emperor by the
serious illness of Mr. Marquand, who, I trust, will soon be able to
resume his functions.
In conformity with the intention of which I had the honor to advise
you in my last despatch of 35th instant, the joint notes to the
different European powers have all been forwarded through the
several legations at this court, with the exception of that to
Russia; as I had reason to suppose that some objection might be made
in that case, I have sent the documents by mail to St. Petersburg,
directed to the minister of foreign affairs,
The note for Rome was sent by Mr. James T. Soutter, of Virginia, to
Bishop Lynch, with a request that, should the latter be absent, he,
Mr. S., should hand it in person to Cardinal Antonelli. The
accompanying copy of a letter from Mr. S. will inform you of the
very gratifying manner in which it was received by his eminence.
The President’s message has’ just reached us; its frank and manly
tone commands universal admiration; copious extracts from it have
been published in nearly all the Paris journals, and are producing a
very marked and salutary effect on public opinion. It appears
[Page 109]
at a very favorable
moment, as the Italian question has ceased to occupy the press,
which it had almost monopolized for the past two or three months;
for this reason, and the absence of any apparent cause to apprehend
European difficulties, our affairs have to a certain extent taken
its place, and I believe that an impulse in that direction has been
given to the semiofficial journals from high quarters.
In consequence of the absence of Lord Cowley, Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys has
had no opportunity to speak to him on the subject of your No. 42,
but so he has returned, and they are both guests of the Emperor at
Compeigne during this week. I think that the subject will be
broached there; at least such is the opinion of my friend at the
Affaires Étrangères. Mr. Hotze will have informed you that, after
diligent inquiry, he cannot find that any instructions relating to
our cruisers or their prizes’ have recently issued from the
admiralty. When the minister, of foreign affairs returns to Paris I
will, I doubt not, be able to ascertain whether anything has been
said or done by him in the matter.
Since my No. 71, of 13th September, but £9,500 of the 7 per cent,
cotton loan has been converted. The last certificate issued bears
date 19th October, and as a considerable amount of these
certificates is said to be in the market, it is to be presumed that
no further conversions will be made for same time to come. This
check of the process of absorption of the bonds which was going on
so healthily, can only be attributed to the cessation of the
facilities heretofore afforded for the delivery of cotton to the
holders of certificates, I take it for granted that this cessation
has been caused by stringent military exigencies, and hope that it
may not be of long duration. In the mean while it has seriously
affected the price of the bonds, which, in view of our late military
successes, would otherwise have shown a considerable advance. The
agent of the Albion Trading Company especially complains that the
ships of the company despatched under the contract made with Mr.
McRae and me have been compelled to load one-half of their cargoes
on government account; as this contract, when made, was considered
highly advantageous to our interests, it would seriously affect the
credit of the confederacy if any change in our policy in regard to
the shipment of cotton should interfere with its execution.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient
servant,
Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of
State.
P. S.—I have this moment an answer from Earl Russell to the joint
note, and annex a copy. The answer came through Mr. Grey,
secretary of the British embassy, (and acting chargé d’affaires
in the absence of Lord Cowley,) who had received Mr. Eustis very
courteously when he handed him the joint note to be forwarded on
the 20th.
Lord Russell to Messrs. Slidell, &c., &c
Foreign Office.
November 25, 1864.
Gentlemen. I have had the honor to receive
the copy which you have sent me of the manifesto issued by the
Congress of the so called Confederate States of America.
Her Majesty’s government deeply lament the protracted nature of the
-struggle between the northern and southern States of the formerly
united republic of North America.
Great Britain has, since 1783, remained, with the exception of a
short period, connected by friendly relations with both the northern
and southern States. Since the commencement of the civil war, which
broke out in 1861, her Majesty’s government have continued to
entertain sentiments of friendship equally for the north and for the
south. Of the causes of the rupture her Majesty’s government have
never presumed to judge. They deplore the commencement of this
sanguinary struggle, and anxiously look forward to the period of its
termination. In the mean time they are convinced that they best
consult the interests of peace, and respect the rights of all
parties, by observing a strict and impartial neutrality.
Such a neutrality her Majesty has faithfully maintained, and will
continue to maintain.
I request you, gentlemen, to accept the assurances of the very high
consideration with which I have tire honor to be, gentlemen, your
most obedient, humble servant,
Mr. Slidell to Mr. Benjamin
No. 76.]
Paris.
December 13th, 1864.
Sir. Since I last had the honor of
addressing you, your missing despatch, No. 42, of 20th September,
has come safely to hand. You will have seen by my recent despatches
that my views of the course of the government are almost identical
with your own, and that I have been so fortunate as to have adopted
in advance the line of conduct which you have pointed out to me.
There is one point, however, in regard to which it is proper that I
should remove
[Page 110]
false
impressions, viz: that of this government “having refused permission
to finiscine ves sels for delivery to us, after the restoration of
peace, and actually forced the builders to sell them to third
parties.” I do not think that there would have been any difficulty
about finishing the vessels for delivery to us after the restoration
of peace; I am sure that the builders were never forced to sell them
to third parties; and that no pressure for that object was ever
exercised towards them by the government, The builder of the
Bordeaux ships did, as lam informed, make assertions to that’
effect, but I am fully convinced that they were pure fictions,
gotten up to subserve his own views, he being deeply interested in
finding purchasers to whom the ships could be delivered and their
entire price paid; while, under his contract with Cap-tain Bullock,
full payment was only to be made when the actual delivery of the
ships should have been made to him, and such delivery would not have
been permitted. I am happy to say that the conduct of Mr. Vorhees,
the builder of the corvettes at Nantes, is in strong contrast with
that of Mr. Armand.
In my last despatch I referred to the complaints of Mr. T. S. Bigbee,
agent of the Albion Trading Company, of the refusal to deliver
cotton in exchange for certificates, in compliance with the
stipulations of the contract made with Mr. McRae and myself. I have
since received from Messrs. Schroeder & Co., agents in London of
the seven pei cent cotton loan, a letter on that subject of which I
send you a copy. I suggest the propriety of transmitting it either
to the secretary of the treasury, or to the secretary of war, as I
am in doubt to which of these departments the subject more
appropriately belongs.
Lord Cowley, for some reason or other, did not avail himself of his
invitation to Compiegne, of which I spoke in my last despatch, and
only returned from London a few days since; but during his absence
Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys did not neglect to call, as he had promised, the
attention of the British government. to the subject of your No. 43,
as will appear by the following extract from a letter from my friend
at the Foreign Office:
“M. Drouyn de Lhuys, a ecrit a notre ambassadeur à Londres, au sujet
de la proposition de votre gouvernement relative aux marchandises,
neutres, à vere des bâtiments ennemis et pour connaitre I’ opinion
du cabinet Anglais a cet égard. Il en a également entretenu les
ministres de la marine et des commerce, en exprimant l’avis que la
preposition seraib fût acceptable. Il attend une réponse dont je
d’omettrai pas de le prier de rue faire part.”
I expect soon to hear the result of this overture to the British
government.
I have received the answer of the Holy See to the joint note of 11th
November; I annex copy of Cardinal Antonelli’s letter, with a
translation. As I feel it less decided in its tone than the letter
of 3d December last of his Holiness to the President, I do not think
it expedient to publish it, and have so said to Messrs. Mason and
Mann. Should they, however, entertain a different opinion, I will
cheerfully yield to it. I send you an interesting account from Mr.
Soutter of his presentation to the Pope.
Our joint note was not of a nature to call for a reply from the
government to which it was addressed, nor did I expect any—less,
indeed, from Great Britain than from any other power. The letter of
Earl Russell, on which I had not time to comment in my No. 75, has
for me a greater significance on that account, as his lordship
voluntarily went out of his way to say the most disagreeable things
possible to the northern government; his reference to the treaty of
‘83 will, I think, be especially distasteful to them, placed in
connexion with his twice-re-peated recognition of the separate
existence of the north and south—as never merged in a single
nationality. I should be much surprised if this letter does not Call
forth a universal howl against his lordship from the northern
press.
I learn from Mr. Carvalho de Moreira that the Brazilian diplomatic
agents in Europe have received no instructions to invoke the good
offices of the neutral powers in the case of the’ Florida, but he
informs me that he has seen the instructions given to the minister
at Wash-ington. He is to demand an amplo apology; the delivery of
the Florida, in good order, with her officers, crew, and armament,
at Bahia; and the exemplary punishment of the commander of the
Wachusett.
The return of the Florida being rendered impossible by the scurvy
trick of sinking her in port as if by accident, I presume that the
Brazilian government will demand that she be replaced by another
Vessel of a similar character and armament. Mr. C, de Moreira says
that the Emperor of Brazil is incensed to the highest degree by the
outrage, and, being a man of great firmness, will not be satisfied
with anything short of the most ample reparation.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient
servant,
Hon. J. P. Benjamin. Secretary of State.
