Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

Earl Russell to Mr. Adams

Foreign Office, November 2, 1865.

Sir: Her Majesty’s government have duly considered your letter of the 18th of September, and, however unwilling I may be to prolong this discussion, I find it absolutely necessary to clear up some misconceptions as to the course and conduct of Great Britain” during the recent contest in America.

I do not consider it incumbent upon me, however, to repeat or enlarge upon my arguments in reference to the alleged precipitate recognition of belligerent rights, or the contrast you draw between the conduct of her Majesty’s government in the late civil war and that of France during the American war of independence.

The existence of belligerent rights is, Mr. Canning said, a question of fact rather than of opinion; and if the fact of a vast insurrection is developed suddenly, rapidly, and completely, the case must, I conceive, be treated by other nations in a different manner from the case of a rebellion breaking out partially, slowly, and gradually. Nor do I conceive it is necessary to point out the difference between the conduct of France acknowledging the United States of America as an independent state, and forming treaties with the government of that state within two years of the declaration of independence, and the patient neutrality of Great Britain, notwithstanding the interruption of her commerce and the immense losses suffered by her people during four years, and until victory had declared in favor of the government against which the insurrection was directed. I cannot forbear, however, to express some surprise at the apparent confidence you express that her Majesty’s government will acquiesce in a doctrine which the United States during more than thirty years declared to be opposed to the law and practice of nations, and that her Majesty’s government will grant reparation on grounds which, when urged by Portugal in a similar case, the United States positively, constantly, and solemnly rejected.

Thus I find that in November, 1850, the Portuguese minister at Washington, in an able summary of the Portuguese claims, after relating that upwards of sixty Portuguese vessels had been captured or plundered; that the fitting out at Baltimore of the privateers which effected their capture was notorious; and that many leading citizens of Baltimore, including the sheriff and postmaster, were summoned before the courts as interested in those privateers, adds:

“The undersigned begs leave to say, and he submits, that it was the duty of the United States government to exercise a reasonable degree of diligence to prevent these proceedings of its citizens, and that having failed to do so, a just claim exists on the part of the government of Portugal, in behalf of its despoiled subjects, against the United States for the amount of the losses sustained by reason thereof.”

But did the United States admit the claim thus courteously preferred ? I cannot find that even any reply was returned to the Portuguese minister.

Probably the United States government relied on the answers which, from 1816 to 1822, and from 1822 to 1828, had been given to the ministers of Portugal.

These answers were, in substance, that prosecutions would be instituted if evidence were forthcoming. Thus, in reply to a letter of the Portuguese minister of December 11, 1818, respecting John Daniels, the supposed commander of a privateer, Mr. John Quincy Adams says:

“The attorney of the United States for the district of Maryland, under instructions from this department, will commence a prosecution against him, if evidence shall appear sufficient for convicting him of having violated the laws of the United States, by outrages committed upon any of the subjects of Portugal.

“I have the honor of giving you this notice in reference to your letter above mentioned, and [Page 633] of requesting you to give directions that any testimony which may be material for the commencement of a prosecution, and which it may be in your power to indicate, may be made known to Elias Glenn, the district attorney of the United States at Baltimore, who is directed to prosecute conformably to the laws any persons against whom the evidence obtainable shall be sufficient to warrant his conviction.”

Exactly similar to this conduct, on the part of your government, has been the conduct of her Majesty’s government in the late war. In the case of the Alabama I asked for evidence sufficient to obtain a verdict, and as I could not myself judge of the sufficiency of the evidence you tendered, I referred the question to the law officers of the Crown.

If it is asserted that I did not use reasonable diligence, or that the late or the present attorney general were either ignorant of the law, or purposely misstated it, I can only respectfully but decidedly repel any such charge, both for myself and for the law officers of the Crown

Yet, although our conduct has been precisely similar to that of your own government to Portugal, you now draw an alarming picture of the consequences which may arise from such conduct; for you say, “If it be once fairly established as a principle of the international code, that a neutral power is the sole judge of the degree to which it has done its duty, under a code of its own making, for the prevention of gross and flagrant outrages initiated in its own ports by the agents of one belligerent in co-operation with numbers of its own subjects, and perpetrated upon the commerce of the other on the high seas; if it be conceded that the neutral, upon reclamation made for the injuries thus done by reason of the manifest inefficacy of its means of repression, which it has at all times the power to improve at will, can deliberately decline to respond to any such appeal, fall back upon the little that it has attempted as an excuse, and thenceforward claim with justice to be released from the inevitable consequences that must ensue from its inaction, then it must surely follow that the only competition between neutral powers hereafter will be, not which shall do the most, but which shall do the least to fulfil its obligations of interdiction of the industry and enterprise of its people in promoting the conflicts that take place between belligerents on the ocean.”

Yet, as far as I can judge, your Secretaries of State always maintained that the United States, as a neutral power, were “the sole judges of the degree in which it had done its duty under a code of its own making.”

But now, as to the code, I fully admit that the laws of Congress of 1817 and 1818 differ from the act of 1794. The chief difference appears to me to lie in the provision that, besides princes and states specified in the act of 1794, the act of 1818 extends to colony, district, or people.

But so does, in other words, our act of 1819. There are other differences, however, and to those I suppose you allude.

But for the reasons which I proceed to state, those other differences (of which I did not lose sight, while stating in my former letter that the main provisions of the act of Congress of 1818 had been adopted in our legislation of 1819, so far as they were considered applicable to the circumstances of this country,) have never appeared to her Majesty’s government to be of any material importance.

The tenth section of the act of Congress of April 20, 1818, requires bonds to bo given “by the owners or consignees of every armed ship or vessel sailing out of the ports of the United States, belonging wholly or in part to citizens thereof,” in double the value of the ship and cargo, against the employment of such ship or vessel, “by such owners” to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, &c., of any province or state with whom the United States are at peace.

The eleventh section is in these words: “And be it further enacted, that the collectors of the customs be, and they are hereby, respectfully authorized and required to detain any vessel, manifestly built for warlike purposes, and about to depart the United States, of which the cargo shall principally consist of arms and munitions of war, when the number of men shipped on board, or other circumstances, shall render it probable that such vessel is intended to be employed by the owner or owners to cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects, citizens, or property, of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace, until the decision of the President be had thereon, or until the owner or owners shall give such bond and security as is required of the owners of armed ships by the preceding section of this act.”

Now, I contend, first, that for ten years these provisions proved utterly inefficacious to prevent the fitting out of privateers at Baltimore, as shown by the fact that the complaints of the Portuguese ministers of captures and plundering by American privateers were more frequent, and extended to a larger amount of property after 1818 than they had done from 1816 to 1818.

But, secondly, I observe that the tenth section applies only to vessels which are already armed before they sail out of the ports of the United States, and which belong (wholly or in part) to United States citizens; and the security taken under this section is only against their employment “by such owners” to cruise, &c., leaving those owners at liberty, without forfeiting their bonds, to transfer the vessels to others who might afterwards so employ them.

The eleventh section applies only to vessels “manifestly built for warlike purposes, and of which the cargo shall principally consist of arms and munitions of war;” and I think it [Page 634] is quite clear that had we so amended our law, and had it been found applicable in any cases, the owners of the vessels might easily have given the bonds required, and might as easily have sent their vessels to sea, forfeiting (or not forfeiting, as the event might nave turned out) the amount of their bonds. The great armies equipped and fed by the confederates— their vast magazines—the money advanced for the Birkenhead rams, show conclusively that if her Majesty’s government had relied on such provisions as the tenth and eleventh sections of the act of Congress, many vessels, probably including the rams at Birkenhead, would have escaped and have been employed in breaking the blockade of Charleston and other southern ports. Be that as it may, however, these provisions of the act of Congress clearly would not be applicable to the Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Shenandoah, and vessels of that class, none of which, when they left this country, were either “armed ships or vessels,” or had on board any cargo consisting “principally” (or at all) “of arms and munitions of war,” neither would they have been applicable to the ships which carried out arms, &c., to those vessels, but which were themselves neither armed nor “intended to be employed by the owner or owners to cruise or commit hostilities.”

If, therefore, such provisions had been contained in the British statute, they would have proved simply nugatory, and would have added nothing, in any of the cases which have actually happened, to the powers of prevention given by the act as it stands. In that case, what would have been our position ? We should have been reproached more than ever in America for the insincerity of our proceeding, and our inactivity in executing our own law. Results would have been appealed to, as you appeal to them in the letter to which I am now giving an answer.

In the case of the “Birkenhead rams,” we had first the evidence in their construction itself, that they were built for warlike purposes; next, a copy of the contract by which Mr. Bullock, the confederate agent, agreed to sell these vessels to Mr. Bravay; next, the proof that their Egyptian names, &c., were only a fiction, the viceroy of Egypt having positively refused to buy them.

These and other circumstances amounted to a presumptive proof that those formidable vessels were intended for the purpose of making war on the United States; and you are already aware of the conduct of the government when they had, as in this instance, a case upon which they could proceed,

On the other side, take the case of the Sea King. She was a merchant ship, unarmed, which went from the Thames to a foreign port. Our foreign enlistment act, like yours, requires two things to be proved: First, that the vessel is fitted out, armed or equipped for warlike purposes; but secondly, it is not enough to prove that the vessel is fitted out, armed or equipped for purposes of war. The warlike intent must be directed against some prince or state in friendly relations with the Crown of Great Britain. Now, on neither of these points did you furnish us, nor did we possess, a title of evidence against the Sea King, yet you hold us responsible for all the depredations she may have committed on the high seas.

It must not be forgotten, that in a free country the Crown cannot act upon mere vague suspicion, without some evidence to submit to a jury; and that trial by jury affords to British subjects the same protection which, in an ordinary state of peace, American citizens enjoy in your own country.

Her Majesty’s government desires to be on the most friendly terms with the United States, but are not prepared to accede to any demand which aims at the diminution of our freedom, or which assume (without warrant from any previously recognized authority or practice) the existence of an extent of obligation on the part of neutrals towards belligerents, going beyond any which the government of a free country could have power, though acting with entire good faith, punctually to fulfil.

Yet it appears to me, I confess, that as neither the law of the United States nor our own foreign enlistment act have proved upon trial completely efficacious, it is worth consideration whether improvements may not be made in the statutes of both nations, so that for the future each government may have in its own territory as much security as our free institutions will permit against those who act in defiance of the intention of the sovereign, and evade the letter of its laws.

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum in regard to our own conduct during the American war in reference to a passage in your letter, (enclosure No. 1,) and a second memorandum, showing in what manner your various complaints during the recent civil war have been disposed of, (enclosure No. 2.)

I have in conclusion only to repeat, in this the last letter which I shall have the honor to address to you on this subject, my sincere and earnest hopes that our two countries, now both relieved from the stain and guilt of slavery, may perform their part in the world in peace and good will.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c.,&c.,&c.

[Document referred to in Mr. Adams’s despatch No. 1081.]

Memorandum respecting representations made by Mr. Adams of breaches of neutrality during the civil war.

1. Bermuda.—August 15, 1861.

Letter acknowledged and referred to treasury August 15.

Steamer said to be fitting out for confederates at Hartlepool. Not a case for interference. Proved to be a blockade-runner.

2. Sumter.—September 30,1861.

Complaint of the Sumter having been acknowledged as a ship-of-war at Trinidad by the governor and the captain of her Majesty’s ship Cadmus.

The circumstances had been already reported, and the opinion of the law officers taken, (September 16,) who decided that no irregularity had been committed. Mr. Adams was informed accordingly.

The Sumter had run the blockade of the Mississippi, whence she went to Puerto Cabello, and then to Trinidad. She was afterwards laid up at Gibraltar, where she was watched by the United States steamer Tuscarora. While at Gibraltar the captain was assassinated by the lieutenant. The ship was dismantled and sold to a British firm in December, 1862, and came to Liverpool. Her proceedings there occasioned a subsequent correspondence.

3. Establishment of a confederate depot at Nassau.—October 1, 1861.

Letter acknowledged and referred to colonial office October 8.

The allegations in Mr. Adams’s letter were denied by Mr. H. Adderley, the person who was stated to have the shipment of the supplies, and Mr. Adams expressed his satisfaction at the denial.(Mr. Adams, January 10, 1862.)

4. Nashville.—November 22, 1861.

Acknowledged and referred to law officers November 23.

This was a complaint of the confederate steamer Nashville having been permitted to enter Southampton after having destroyed the American bark Harvey Birch.

The Nashville, which had escaped from Charleston, proved to be regularly commissioned as a ship-of-war, and was, under the advice of the law officers, acknowledged accordingly.

For correspondence as to the proceedings of the Nashville and United States steamer Tuscarora at Southampton, see Parliamentary papers, presented 1862.

5. Oreto, or Florida,—February 18, 1862.

Acknowledged and referred to treasury February 18.

Alleged to be fitting at Liverpool for the confederate service.

The customs officers reported that she was intended for a merchant vessel, and was stated to be going to Italy. No proof was forthcoming of her equipment, and she sailed, March 22, without any armament on board. On arriving at Nassau she was seized by her Majesty’s ship Greyhound for violation of foreign enlistment act. The case was tried in the vice-admiralty court, and the ship released, August 2, 1862. She then ran the blockade at Mobile, and, having armed there, escaped again as the Florida ship-of-war, under the command of Captain Maffit.

Her career continued until her seizure in the harbor of Bahia by the United States ship Wachusetts, in October, 1864.

Reference to foreign enlistment act.—In the second representation made by Mr. Adams, March 25, 1862, the following passage occurs, which, as being the first reference to the operation of the foreign enlistment act, may be worthy of remark:

“It is with the deepest regret that the President directs me to submit to her Majesty’s government a representation of the unfortunate effect produced upon the minds of the people of the United States from the conviction that nearly all of the assistance that is now obtained from abroad by the persons still in arms against their government, and which enables them to continue the struggle, comes from the kingdom of Great Britain and its dependencies. Neither is this impression relieved by the information that the existing municipal laws are found to be insufficient, and do not furnish means of prevention adequate to the emergency.”

6. Blockade-runners laden in England.—March 10, 1862.

Letter acknowledged March 13. Referred to law officers March 12, who decided (March 22) that her Majesty’s government could not interfere.

7. Emily St. Pierre.—April 24, 1862.

Acknowledged and referred to law officers April 24.

A blockade-runner, which, after capture, was rescued by her master and two men from the prize crew and brought to Liverpool. Under advice of law officers her Majesty’s government refused to interfere.

8. Alabama.—June 23, 1862.

Acknowledged, referred to treasury and law officers June 25.

A vessel known as the No. 290, building by Messrs. Laird at Liverpool. Law officers reported (June 30) that there was not sufficient evidence to proceed on, but that the vessel [Page 636] should be watched. The reports received from the customs were sent to Mr. Adams, (July 4, ) with a suggestion that the United States consul at Liverpool should procure further proofs of equipment, &c. Mr. Adams acknowledged, and promised to act on, this suggestion (July 7. ) He sent further depositions accordingly, (July 22 and 24, ) and accompanied the latter letter by an opinion of Mr. Collier in favor of seizure. The law officers reported (July 29) that she should be seized; but, on the morning of the 29th, she had sailed from the Mersey, under pretext of a trial trip. A copy of the law officers’ opinion was sent to the Bahamas in case of the Alabama going there. She, however, proceeded to Angra Bay, Azores, where she met the Bahama and Agrippina, with her armament, her commander, Captain Semmes, and forty-two seamen. She then hoisted the confederate flag, and sailed for Port Royal, Martinique; next to Blanco island, (belonging to Venezuela, ) where she coaled; then to Areas Keyes; then destroyed the United States ship Hatteras off Galveston, and afterwards to Jamaica, where she was received and recognized as a regularly commissioned ship-of-war.

She continued her depredations at the Cape of Good Hope and elsewhere, until she was, finally sunk by the United States ship Kearsarge, off Cherbourg, June 19, 1864.

Naval reserve men dismissed for engaging on board Alabama.—It having been found tha four naval reserve men had sailed in the Alabama on her first start, their names were erased from the naval reserve list.—(Admiralty, February 27, 1863.)

9. Hector.—November 17, 1862.

Referred to admiralty November 18.

This was an inquiry whether the Hector was building for her Majesty’s government; and, after reference to the admiralty, was answered in the affirmative.

10. The Georgiana.—January 16, 1863.

Acknowledged and referred to treasury and home office January 17.

Said to be fitting at Liverpool for confederates, though Mr. Adams could not divulge the authority on which the statement was made.

The reports from the customs sent to Mr. Adams on the 18th, 19th, and 27th January, went to show that the vessel was not for war purposes.

She sailed on the 21st January for Nassau, and was wrecked in attempting to enter Charleston March 19, 1863.

11. Confederate agency in England.—February 9, 1863.

Acknowledged February 12; referred to law officers, treasury, and home office February 23. This was the case of the intercepted correspondence. Answered March 9; no cause to interfere.

12. Sumter, or Gibraltar, at Liverpool.—February 16, 1863.

Referred to law officers February 17.

After her sale at Gibraltar, (see No. 2,) the Sumter’s name was changed to the Gibraltar. Mr. Adams complained of her being refitted for confederate service. The law officers reported March 3, and Mr. Adams was informed March 9 that there was no case for interference.

It appeared that guns were shipped on board the Gibraltar, but they proved to be siege guns. She was wrecked in attempting to enter Charleston in July.

13. Payment of the men, late of the Alabama, in England. Messrs. Klingender’s agency.—March 4, 1863.

Acknowledged and referred to law officers March 12, 1863, who decided that no offence had been committed.

14. Phantom and Southerner.—March 26, 1863.

Acknowledged and referred to treasury and home office March 27, law officers June 2. Phantom, fitting at Liverpool; Southerner, at Stockton-on-Tees. Mr. Adams informed that there was no ground for interference, July 3. Both vessels proved to be intended for blockade-runners.

15. Alexandra.—March 30, 1863.

Acknowledged and referred to law officers, treasury, and home office March 31, 1863.

Reports were received from the treasury on the 31st, and home office April 1. On the 4th of April the law officers advised seizure.

The trial ended in the discharge of the vessel, and the costs and damages having been compromised for £3,700, she was delivered to the owners. She was then sent to Nassau, where she was again tried on a similar charge of the violation of foreign enlistment act, and again acquitted. She has remained there ever since, and is now known as the Mary.

16. The Virginia, or Japan.—April 8, 1863.

Acknowledged and referred to home office and treasury April 8.

When Mr. Adams complained, this vessel had already sailed from Greenock on the 2d of April for Alderney. Instructions were sent to the governor of Guernsey to have her watched. She did not, however, go to the Channel islands, but went to the coast of France, where she met a small steamer, the Alar, of Newhaven, off Morlaix, and took from her her crew and equipment. She then apparently went into Cherbourg.

An explanation was furnished to Mr. Adams April 21, and on the 30th of April the law officers reported that no offence under the foreign enlistment act had been committed by the [Page 637] Alar. The Virginia was subsequently known as the Georgia, and her arrival in Liverpool in 1864 occasioned a further correspondence.

17. Iron-clads at Liverpool.—July 11, 1863.

Acknowledged, and referred to treasury, home office, and law officers, July 13.

These vessels, known as the El Mounassir and El Toussoon, and said to have been ordered of Messrs. Laird of Birkenhead by M. Bravay for the Egyptian government, were seized and eventually purchased for her Majesty’s service.

18. Canton, or Pampero.—October 17, 1863.

Acknowledged, and referred to treasury, home office, and admiralty, October 19.

This vessel, which was being constructed in the Clyde, nominally as a merchant ship for the China trade, was, after inquiry, and under the advice of the lord advocate, seized and tried. The Crown took judgment by default, the case being undefended, and the vessel remained under seizure until the close of the war.—(Lord Advocate, October 19, 1865.)

19. Alleged confederate depot at Bermuda.—November 3, 1863.

Acknowledged, and referred to law officers, November 5, who reported (November 12) that there was no case for interference. Mr. Adams informed accordingly, November 27.

20. Rappahannock.—November 28, 1863.

Acknowledged November 30; referred to home office, admiralty, treasury, and law officers, November 29.

This vessel, formerly her Majesty’s ship Victor, had been sold by the admiralty to Messrs. Coleman in October, but without masts or sails.—(From Admiralty, October24, to Admiralty, October 24.)

She sailed from Sherness on the morning of the 25th of November in a very incomplete state, the riggers being still on board, and arrived at Calais on the 26th. These circumstances had already been reported when Mr. Adams’s representation was received.

Prosecution of Mr. Rumball.—Mr. Rumball, the head of the outfitting or rigging department at Sheerness dock-yard, was prosecuted for his share in the transaction, but was acquitted on trial at the Queen’s Bench on the 4th of February, 1865. He was, however, placed on half-pay.—(To Mr. A dams, March 8, 1865.)

Intended prosecution of Messrs. Anson and Brown.—It was also intended to prosecute two other persons, seamen, for engaging men to serve in the Rappahannock, under the name of the Scylla, but the prosecution was not carried out, the men having, it is believed, absconded.

The Rappahannock remained at Calais until the conclusion of the war, when she was sold to a British firm and brought to England.

21. Confederate agency at Liverpool.—December 7, 1863.

Acknowledged December 9, referred to law officers December 9.

This was the case of Jones & Co., accused of enlisting men for confederate service.

The law officers advised that J. Jones and R. Highat and their clerk, Wilding, and another person named Maltman, should be proceeded against.—(Law officers, December 12, 1863.)

The home office accordingly proceeded against the two principals at the spring assizes; the case was removed by writ of certiorari to the Queen’s Bench, where they were both convicted; but certain points were reserved for argument at the next term, and on the 23d of November, 1864, they were condemned to pay a fine of £50 each.

22. Captain Cator.—December 29, 1863.

Acknowledged and referred to admiralty December 30, 1863.

This was a complaint that an officer in her Majesty’s navy had been engaged in running the blockade. The admiralty reported that they had no knowledge of it, and could not interfere.—(December 31, 1863.)

23. Naval reserve men enlisted for Florida and Georgia.—January 11, 1864.

Acknowledged January 13; referred to home office January 13.

Three naval reserve men who were traced were struck off the list.—(Admiralty, January 21.)

24. Naval reserve men in Alabama.—January 13, 1864.

Acknowledged and referred to home office January 14.

Mr. Adams sent a list of nineteen men said to belong to naval reserve; but of this number, only three could be traced as actually belonging to it.—(Admiralty, January 29, February 18.)

25. Will-o’-the-Wisp.— February 22, 1864.

Acknowledged and referred to colonial office February 25.

This vessel was said to be going to Bermuda to convey stores to the confederate government.

No case appeared for interference.—(Colonial Office, May 16, 1864.)

26. Amphion.—March 18, 1864.

Acknowledged and referred to home office March 18.

Said to be equipping for confederates.

Law officers reported that no case was made out.—(Law officers, March 31.)

She was eventually sent to Copenhagen for sale as a merchant ship.

[Page 638]

27. Hawk.—April 16, 1864.

Acknowledged and referred to home office, lord advocate, and treasury, April 18.

Supposed to be building at Renfrew for confederates; nominal owner, Mr. Begbie.

The case had been already reported on by customs, (Treasury, April 4,) and the papers sent to the lord advocate. On the 13th of April she left the Clyde without a register, and came to Greenhithe. The law officers decided (April 26) that there was not evidence to warrant detention, and the treasury were so informed May 6.

She proved to be a blockade-runner.—(Home Office, January 19, 1865.)

28. Enlistments for the Rappahannock.—April 16, 1864.

Referred to law officers April 18.

Four persons were charged with these enlistments, viz: Seymour, Cunningham, Buchanan, and Bradshaw. The law officers recommended they should be prosecuted.—(Law officers, April 28.)

The three first were proceeded against by home office, (Home Office, July 18, 1864, August 16, 1864.) Seymour pleaded guilty, and was discharged on recognizances to appear when called upon; Cunningham was tried and convicted, and similarly discharged on recognizances of £150; Buchanan pleaded guilty, and was similarly sentenced; Bradshaw was not prosecuted.

29. Georgia at Liverpool.—May 9, 1864.

Acknowledged and referred to law officers May 10.

This vessel, formerly the Virginia or Japan, (see No. 16,) arrived at Liverpool under confederate colors, and Mr. Adams complained of her reception in the character of a ship-of-war. It was, however, decided that she should be thus received. Soon afterwards she was dismantled and sold to the British firm of Bates & Co. as a merchant ship. Mr. Adams again complained, July 27, 1864, of her being refitted as a ship-of-war. This proved to be unfounded. Messrs. Bates sent her out to Portugal, but she was captured by the United States ship Niagara, off Lisbon, and taken to the United States as a prize.

Customs notification against dismantling or selling belligerent ships in British ports.—The circumstances of this case gave rise to the customs notification of the 11th August, forbidding the ships-of-war of the belligerents in America from being dismantled or sold in British ports.

30. Enlistments for Georgia.—May 28, 1864.

Acknowledged June 1, and referred to home office June 1.

Prosecution of Campbell.—This was a complaint against a person named Campbell, of Liverpool. Under advice of law officers, he was prosecuted by home office (Home Office, June 16, 1864) and pleaded guilty, and was discharged on recognizances of £150 to appear when called upon.

31. Shenandoah, or Sea King.—November 18, 1864.

Acknowledged November 19.

The case of this vessel had already been reported by her Majesty’s consul at Teneriffe. The Sea King, a merchant vessel of an Indian trading company, was sent to Funchal, where she was met at Desertas, off Funchal, on the 20th of October, by the Laurel, Captain Corbett, with armament and crew. The transshipment took place there, and the Laurel returned to England, having touched at Funchal, on the 30th of October.

Prosecution of Captain Corbett.-—The law officers recommended the prosecution of Captain Corbett for his share in inducing men to ship on board the Shenandoah. The home office instituted proceedings accordingly, (Home Office, December 2, 1864,) and the case stands for trial next term.

32. City of Richmond.—January 14, 1865.

Acknowledged January 16; referred to home office January 15, and to law officers January 19.

This vessel was engaged, as was stated, to carry the crew of the Florida, who had come to England from Brazil, from London to Nassau. The law officers reported that no case was made out.—(Law officers, January 20, 1865.)

33. Virginia and Louisa Ann Fanny.—January 30, 1865.

Acknowledged and referred to treasury February 1, 1865.

Vessel said to be in cource of equipment at London.

No case was established, and they both proved to be blockade-runners, as reported by the governor of the Bahamas, who had been instructed to watch their proceedings.—(Colonial Office, April 19 and May 11, 1865.)

34. Hercules and Ajax.—February 7, 1865.

Acknowledged and referred to treasury and home office February 8 and 9.

Both vessels built in the Clyde.

Ajax first proceeded to Ireland, and was detained at Queenstown by the mutiny of some of the crew, who declared she was for the confederate service. She was accordingly searched, but proved to be only fitted as a merchant ship. The governor of the Bahamas was instructed to watch her at Nassau. On her arrival there she was again overhauled,but [Page 639] nothing suspicious discovered, and the governor reported that she was adapted and, he believed, intended for a tug-boat.

The Hercules being still in the Clyde, inquiries were made by the customs there, who reported that she was undoubtedly a tug-boat and the sister ship to the Ajax.

Upon receiving this report, it was proposed to prosecute the informant, Smith, for perjury, but it was found necessary for that purpose to produce the original affidavit, of which Mr. Adams had only sent a copy. Mr. Adams was, accordingly, written to for it on the 28th of June last, but nothing has since been done in the matter.

Mr. Adams’s representations may be divided into four classes:

1. Outfit of vessels for the confederate navy in British ports.

2. Reception of confederate war-vessels in British ports.

3. Enlistments for the confederate service.

4. Miscellaneous.

1.Outfit of vessels for the confederate navy in British ports.

It will be seen from the foregoing statement that Mr. Adams complained of no less than nineteen vessels, viz:

1. Bermuda.	11. Canton, or Pampero.
2. Oreto, or Florida.	12. Rappahannock.
3. Alabama.	13. Amphion.
4. Georgiana.	14. Hawk.
5. Phantom.	15. Shenandoah, or Sea King.
6. Southerner.	16. Louisa Ann Fanny.
7. Alexandra.	17. Virginia.
8. Virginia, or Japan, (Georgia.)	18. Hercules.
9. 10. Iron-clads.	19. Ajax.

Of these, five subsequently hoisted the confederate ensign:

Oreto, or Florida.	Rappahannock.
Alabama.	Shenandoah.
Virginia, or Japan.

The Oreto, or Florida, besides having been watched by the customs previously to her leaving England, was seized and tried at Nassau, and acquitted. She then ran into Mobile, took her armament on board, and through the negligence of the blockading ship, United States ship Oneida, (whose captain, Captain Preble, was dismissed the service in consequence,) succeeded in escaping, and issued on her career as a regularly commissioned ship-of-war, the Florida. This vessel, therefore, cannot be said to have been equipped or fitted out in a British port, nor can the British home or colonial authorities be accused of any want of activity with regard to her.

The Alabama, it is true, succeeded in escaping by a trick on the morning of the very day on which she would have been seized. Her armament was taken, on board off Terceira, and her first recognition as a confederate war-vessel was in a French (Port Royal, Martinique) and not a British port.

Virginia, or Japan. This vessel, it will have been observed, sailed before any information of her character had reached her Majesty’s government, and was, in fact, taking in her armament in French waters on the very day on which Mr. Adams’s representation was dated.

The same thing occurred with regard to the Rappahannock, which was at Calais on the 26th of November, 1863, Mr. Adams’s representation not being received until the 28th. In this case, however, the precipitancy with which the vessel was despatched, in an incomplete state, to avoid detention, prevented her ever being available for service, and although she had the confederate flag flying when she entered Calais, she had neither guns nor ammunition on board.

The Shenandoah, or Sea King, escaped in a similar manner to the Virginia and Rappahannock; and the first intimation that was received of her proceedings was from her Majesty’s consul at Teneriffe, reporting the transfer of crew and armament to her from the Laurel, at the Desertas, off Funchal. In this case, indeed, had information been received in time, it is not probable that she could have been detained, as she was a regular trading vessel, well known as the Sea King in the East India trade.

In fact, as regards all these five vessels, the case may be shortly stated that, in three instances, information was not received in time for her Majesty’s government to take any measures of prevention; in one instance the vessel was equipped and armed in a confederate port, and in the remaining one the ship succeeded in baffling the vigilance of the authorities at the very moment of her intended seizure. The Virginia (Georgia,) the Alabama, and the Shenandoah were alike armed and manned in foreign waters.

During the four years of the civil war, from 1861 to 1865, not a single armed ship for the confederate service was despatched from any port either of Great Britain or the British colonies; and only one vessel, the Alabama, which it could have been possible to detain, escaped for conversion into a cruiser.

[Page 640]

On the other hand, in looking at the preceding list, we see that four vessels were proceeded against in England, and thereby prevented from entering the confederate service, viz: the Alexandra, the two iron-clads, and the Canton, or Pampero. Although the prosecution of the first of these was not successful, it served to detain her for a long period; and a second prosecution, which was instituted at Nassau, has kept her under seizure until the end of the war; the iron-clads, the most formidable of all the intended cruisers, were thus similarly detained, and eventually purchased to avoid further litigation; while the Canton, or Pampero, was condemned and remained in the hands of the Crown until the occasion for her seizure had passed.

The remaining ten vessels denounced by Mr. Adams proved to be ordinary merchantmen, intended chiefly for running the blockade, which is not an offence amenable to the law. To these cases may be added the alleged refit of the Sumter at Liverpool, the report of which proved unfounded.

The list includes all the suspected vessels in British ports, with the exception of two—the Almandares and Pinero, which were alleged, though not by Mr. Adams, to be equipping at Montreal. No case was made out.(Colonial Office, February 6, 1865.)

When the delay in seizing the Alabama is so severely criticised by Mr. Adams, it must be remembered that in the two preceding representations his information had proved to be erroneous, the Bermuda being evidently not intended for a ship-of-war, and the Oreto having been found innocent in a court of law. The latter was subsequently converted into a cruiser, but the readiness with which a merchant vessel can be made available for belligerent pur poses has been shown by the fact that the most efficient blockading ships in the federal navy were captured blockade-runners.

2. Reception of confederate vessels-of-war in British ports.

Sumter. This vessel, the first that appeared in European waters, was, as stated in the memorandum, regularly commissioned and equipped, and sailed from the Mississippi. The Nashville was likewise of American origin, having sailed from Charleston. She had been intended to bring the confederate commissioners to England, but it appearing doubtful whether her tonnage would admit of her crossing Charleston bar, they proceeded by another route. The first case of the destruction of a ship at sea, which was represented by Mr. Adams, arose out of the destruction of the Harvey Birch by the Nashville. He adduced it as a reason for her not being received in a British port.

Besides these two cruisers, the confederate government owned the Tuscaloosa, a prize of the Alabama, which was equipped and commissioned from the Albania, and with regard to which a correspondence took place at the Cape of Good Hope. The Tallahassee, which escaped from Wilmington, and on her first cruise in six days is said to have destroyed fifty-four vessels. The Tallahassee was originally the blockade-runner Atlanta, and ended her career by being reconverted into a merchantman, the Chameleon, and brought to Liverpool. The Chickamauga, formerly the blockade-runner Edith, (Colonial Office, December 31, 1864,) whose history is obscure, as it does not appear where she sailed from or what became of her. Besides these, there were one or two other small vessels, such as the Etta or Retribution, which made short cruises from blockaded ports to the Bahamas and West India islands.

There was also the Olinde, or Stonewall, which sailed from Bordeaux, and which, had she been able to enter on her career as a cruiser, would have been a most dangerous adversary.

It will be seen, therefore, that the principal confederate cruisers were not all of English origin; four of them having been regularly commissioned in confederate ports—Sumter, Nashville, Florida, and Tallahassee—and one, Stonewall, having sailed from a French port.

3. Engagement of men for the confederate service.

In each of these cases where evidence could be procured prosecutions were instituted, and where men of the Naval Reserve could be traced their names were erased from the Naval Reserve list. The cases represented were the following: Jones & Co., engagement of Naval Reserve men on board the Florida, Georgia, and Alabama; Campbell, of Liverpool; and enlistments for the Rappahannock.

4. Miscellaneous,

Under this head come the representations respecting the alleged confederate depots at Nassau and Bermuda; the proceedings of confederate agents in England; the lading of blockade-runners in England; Emily St. Pierre; confederate agency; payment of Alabama seamen; Captain Cator’s employment in blockade-running; the shipment of stores for the confederate government in the Will-o’-the-Wisp; the conveyance of the Florida seamen to Nassau, in the City of Richmond; the reception of the converted Sumter or Gibraltar at Liver pool; and the sale and conversion of the Georgia there.

In none of these cases could her Majesty’s government interfere.

[Page 641]

SUMMARY OF STEPS TAKEN BY HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT.

The following is a summary of the steps taken by her Majesty’s government to prevent or punish breaches of the Q ueen’s neutrality:

Proceedings taken with regard to vessels.

Five prosecuted—

1. Oreto, at Nassau.

2. Alexandra, in England and at Nassau.

3, 4. Iron-clads.

5. Canton, or Pampero.

Also orders given to detain the Alabama had she touched at Queenstown or Nassau after her evasion from Liverpool. The governor of the Bahamas was likewise instructed to watch other vessels, regarding which representations had been made, as the Louisa Ann Fanny, &c.

Prosecutions for engagement of men for confederate service.

1. Mr. Rumball, (Rappahannock,) acquitted.

2. Jones and Highat, (Georgia and Florida,) convicted.

3. Campbell, (Georgia,) convicted.

4. Seymour, Cunningham, and Buchanan, (Rappahannock,) convicted.

5. Captain Corbett, Shenandoah, case pending.

When it was found that such vessels as the Rappahannock and Amphion, although use less to her Majesty’s navy, might be reconverted into confederate cruisers, instructions were given that no more ships should be sold out of her Majesty’s navy.

Moreover, when Captain Osborne’s fleet returned from China, and it was feared that the vessels composing it might fall into confederate hands, her Majesty’s government interposed both in India and in England to prevent their sale.

When the sale and conversion of the Georgia was complained of, a customs notification was published forbidding vessels-of-war to be sold and dismantled in British ports.

Finally, as will have been shown by the preceding statement, every representation of Mr. Adams was considered immediately on its receipt, and referred, when requisite, to the law officers or other departments of her Majesty’s government, without even a day’s delay.

Foreign Office, October 30, 1865.

Memorandum relative to the measures of coercion adopted by Great Britain during her contest with the North American Colonies; and also regarding the policy of foreign powers.

Extract from letter from Mr. Adams to Earl Russell of September 18, 1865.

“In respect to this, may I be permitted to beg your attention to the fact that, with perhaps the exception of the gross number of the people engaged, I do think myself able to furnish an example of an insurrection in every particular corresponding to your description, which has occurred within the last century. I do not doubt that my allusion will at once be understood by your lordship without another word.

“Yet, notwithstanding all the points of identity in that case, I cannot find that her Majesty’s government was met at the outset in 1774 with any announcement,, by a foreign power in amity with Great Britain, of a necessity immediately to recognize the insurgents as a belligerent power, because of the magnitude of the struggle, or for any other cause. Neither is there the smallest ground for believing that it would have tolerated the proceeding for one moment, if it had been.

“Her Majesty’s government at once resorted without scruple or hesitation to every right ordinarily exercised by a belligerent in a war with a strong power, and was met with a degree of resistance more effective and enduring than any manifested in the late struggle. That resistance, too, was carried out on the ocean, where alone the interests of distant neutral states are liable to be seriously affected by the domestic strife of any nation, in a manner far more extensive than the late insurgents by their unaided efforts ever could have attempted. Yet a length of time elapsed before any foreign power, however much inclined, ventured to find in this state of things any reason for considering the people waging such a war as a belligerent power. It furthermore is certain, that if at any time the smallest indication of a leaning that way manifested itself in any of the commercial powers, it was immediately noted by the British government for remonstrance and reclamation.

“Your lordship has been pleased to review the conduct of France in this emergency; and to endeavor to set aside the parallel which I attempted in my note, on the ground that that country was animated by a policy decidedly hostile to Great Britain. The fact is doubtless so. But it so happens that this only bears with the more force in my favor on the present [Page 642] argument. Had France, being inclined to injure Great Britain, decided to recognize the insurgents as a belligerent, it would, according to the doctrine now avowed by her Majesty’s government, have been doing no more than was absolutely necessary and altogether justifiable. Why did it not take this step at once ? Unhappily for the example, Great Britain at the outset insisted upon considering her as a friendly power, and called upon her solemnly to desist from any attempt whatever to recognize the presence of the insurgent force. In proof of this, I beg permission to quote a brief extract from an historical writer well known to have drawn his statements from official sources. Mr. Adolphus says, that in April, 1775, that is, one year after the outbreak of the insurrection, ‘the friendly disposition of the French government towards Great Britain has been unequivocally demonstrated; and the expectation that succor would be afforded to the Americans was suppressed by an edict prohibiting all intercourse with them.’

“It thus appears that no idea was at that early period entertained by the British authorities of any unfriendly disposition on the part of France. So far from being inclined, as your lordship supposes it might have been, to give aid to the insurrection, which since 1774 had been developing its great proportions, by any recognition of it as a belligerent, the French sovereign frankly responded to an appeal made by Great Britain, by interdicting his people from all relations whatever with the Americans. In other words, the example shows that, on both sides, there wa| not the remotest conception that a recognition of insurgents as a belligerent, immediately upon the breaking out of the insurrection, could be considered as a justifiable act on the part of a friendly power.”

In March, 1774, news arrived in England of the destruction, on the 18th December, 1773 of the tea contained in the ships lying in Boston harbor. This intelligence occasioned a message from the Throne to both houses of Parliament, in which they were informed that in consequence of the unwarrantable practices carried on in North America, and particularly of the violent and outrageous proceedings at the town and port of Boston, with a view of obstructing the commerce of this kingdom, and upon grounds and pretences immediately subversive of its constitution, it was thought fit to lay the whole matter before Parliament, fully confiding, as well in their zeal for the maintenance of his Majesty’s authority as in their attachment to the common interest and welfare of all his dominions, that they would not only enable him effectually to take such measures as might most likely put an immediate stop to those disorders, but would also take into their most serious consideration what further regulations and permanent provisions might be necessary to establish, for better securing the execution of the laws, and the just dependence of the colonies upon the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain.

The first measure of coercion adopted by the government was by the authority of an act of Parliament, which received the royal assent on the 31st of March, 1774. By this act the government was empowered to withdraw from the town and port of Boston all officers concerned in the collection of customs, “and to discontinue the landing and discharging, lading and shipping of goods, wares and merchandise, at the said town of Boston, or within the harbor thereof.”

This measure was shortly followed by the passing of a further act (11th May, 1774) “for the better regulating the government in the province of Massachusetts Bay.” The intention of the act was to alter the constitution of that province as it stood upon the charter of King William; to take the whole executive power out of the hands of the democratic party, and to vest the nomination of counsellors, judges, and magistrates of all kinds, including sheriffs, in the Crown, and in some cases in the King’s governor, and all to be removable at the pleasure of the Crown.

On the 6th of May, 1774, “A bill for the impartial administration of justice in the cases of persons questioned for any acts done by them in the execution of the laws, or for the suppression of riots and tumults in the province of Massachusetts Bay, in New England,” passed the House of Commons.

The first of these acts, regarding trade with the town and harbor of Boston, virtually prohibited trade with that port, one of the clauses enacting—.

“That if any ship or vessel shall be moored or lie at anchor, or be seen hovering within the bay, or within one league from the said bay, it shall and may be lawful for any admiral, chief, commander, &c., of his Majesty’s fleet or ships-of-war, or for any officer of his Majesty’s customs, to compel such ship or vessel to depart to some other port, or to such station as the officer shall appoint, and to use such force for that purpose as shall be found necessary; and if such ship or vessel shall not depart within six hours after notice for that purpose given, such ship or vessel, with all the goods laden on board, and all the guns, tackle, and furniture, shall be forfeited, whether bulks shall have been broken or not.”

Contrary to the expectations of the British government these measures tended only to the adoption of a determined and united feeling of resistance on the part of the colonists. On the 13th May, 1774, General Gage arrived at Boston to administer the province of Massachusetts Bay. On the arrival of the Boston port bill public meetings were held in the various colonies, which subsequently led to an agreement being framed by the committee of correspondence at Boston, entitled a solemn league and covenant, wherein the subscribers bound themselves in the most solemn manner, and in the presence of God, to suspend all commercial [Page 643] intercourse with Great Britain from the last day of the ensuing month of August until the Boston port bill and the other late obnoxious laws were repealed, and the colony of Massachusetts Bay fully restored to its chartered rights. This agreement led to the issue of a proclamation by General Gage, in which it was styled an “unlawful, hostile, and traitorous combination, contrary to the allegiance due to the King,” &c.

Measures were also adopted by the colonists for holding a general Congress at Philadelphia, which was opened on the 5th September, 1774, the first public act of which was a declaratory resolution expressive of their disposition with respect to the colony of Massachusetts Bay, and immediately intended to confirm and encourage that people, and to approve of the wisdom and fortitude with which their opposition to the measures adopted by government had hitherto been conducted.

On the 30th November, 1774, a new Parliament met in Great Britain, and in the speech from the Throne the two houses were informed that a most daring spirit of resistance and disobedience to the law still existed in the province of Massachusetts Bay, and had in divers parts of it broke forth in fresh violences of a very criminal nature; that these proceedings had been countenanced and encouraged in others of the colonies, and unwarrantable attempts made to obstruct the commerce of this Kingdom.

On the 9th February, 1775, a humble address was presented to the King by Parliament, in reply to the royal speech.

In this address the Parliament stated that “we have taken them (the papers relating to American affairs) into our most serious consideration, and we find that a part of your Majesty’s subjects in the province of Massachusetts Bay have proceeded so far as to resist the authority of the supreme legislature; that a rebellion at the* time actually existed within the said province; and that they saw, with the utmost concern, that they had been countenanced and encouraged by unlawful combinations and engagements entered into by his Majesty’s subjects in several of the other colonies. * * * * * * We can never, “continued the address, “so far desert the trust reposed in us as to relinquish any part of the sovereign authority over all your Majesty’s dominions which, by law, is vested in your Majesty and the two houses of Parliament; and the conduct of many persons in several of the colonies, during the late disturbances, is alone sufficient to convince us how necessary this power is lor the protection of the lives and fortunes of your Majesty’s subjects. * * * * * * At the same time we consider it as our indispensable duty humbly to beseech your Majesty that you will take the most effectual measures to enforce due obedience to the laws and authority of the supreme legislature; and we beg leave, in the most solemn manner, to assure your Majesty that it is our fixed resolution, at the hazard of our lives and properties, to stand by your Majesty against all rebellious attempts in the maintenance of the just rights of your Majesty and the two houses of Parliament.”

In consequence of this address, military preparations were made to coerce the colonists; and on the 10th February, 1775, a bill was also introduced into Parliament, and, after along debate, received the royal assent, on the 30th March, 1775, (15 Geo-III, cap. 10.) The title of the act was, “An act to restrain the trade and commerce of the provinces of Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire, and colonies of Connecticut, &c., in North America, to Great Britain, Ireland, and the British islands in the West Indies, &c.”

The minister, in proposing the bill, stated that he supported it on the grounds that, as the Americans had refused to trade with Great Britain, it was but just that Great Britain should not suffer them to trade with any other nation. By a further act these restrictions were exterided to several other colonies in North America, which had been omitted in the first act.

By the terms of this act, all vessels trading with the colonies were to be furnished with certificates, without which they were liable to seizure by British ships-of-war and officers of the customs.

On the 20th of May, 1775, articles of confederation and perpetual union were entered into by the delegates of the several colonies of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, &c. A resolution was at the same time passed, that after the expiration of six months (from the 20th July, 1775, ) all the ports of the said colonies were declared to be thenceforth open to the ships of every state in Europe that would admit and protect the commerce of the

Although by the above articles the colonists usurped the rights of sovereignty with regard to peace and war, the entering into alliances, the appointment of civil and military officers, &c., still their connexion with Great Britain was maintained, and no de facto independent government was established.

On the 12th June, 1775, General Gage issued a proclamation, by which a pardon was offered in the Kind’s name to all those who should forthwith lay down their arms, threatening the treatment of rebels and traitors to all those who did not accept the proffered pardon. This proclamation was looked upon as the preliminary to immediate action, and on the 17th June hostilities commenced between the colonists and royal troops in the neighborhood of Charles-town.

In July, 1775, the confederacy assumed the appellation of the Thirteen United Colonies, and General Washington was appointed to the command of the army of the confederation. [Page 644] Hostilities were carried on, not only in the colonies, but Canada was also invaded by the colonial forces.

The first act of the Congress for the formation of a navy was promulgated on the 13th October, 1775, when two vessels were ordered to be armed, and on the 30th of the same month two more armed vessels were ordered to be fitted for sea. On the 25th November, 1775, resolutions were passed, directing seizures and capture under commissions obtained from the Congress, together with the condemnation of British vessels employed in a hostile manner against the colonies; the mode of trial and of condemnation was pointed out, and the shares of the prizes were apportioned. On the 28th November, 1775, Congress adopted rules for the regulation of the navy of the United Colonies. On the 13th December, a report was sanctioned for fitting out a naval armament, to consist in the whole of thirteen ships. On the 22d December, officers were appointed to command the armed vessels.

On the 6th January, 1776, a regulation was adopted relative to the division of prizes and prize money taken by armed vessels.

On the 23d March, 1776, resolutions were adopted authorizing the fitting out-of private armed vessels, to cruise against the enemies of the United Colonies.

On the 2d April, 1776, the form of a commission for private armed vessels was agreed upon, and on the 3d April, instructions to the commanders of private armed versels were considered and adopted. They authorized the capture of all ships and other vessels belonging to the inhabitants of Great Britain on the high seas, or between high-water and low-water marks, except vessels bringing persons who intended to reside and settle in the United Colonies.

The whole of these laws were promulgated previously to the final Declaration of independence issued on the 4th July, 1776.

In the mean time the different powers of Europe, notwithstanding their declarations of neutrality in the conflict between Great Britain and her colonies, more particularly France, Spain, and Holland, almost openly expressed their sympathy with the cause of colonists, and aided them with arms and money, and allowed the fitting out of ships, the repairs and armaments of privateers in their ports, even previously to the receipt of the Declaration of Independence of the colonies, signed on the 4th July, 1776; the letter from the American committee of secret correspondence to Mr. Silas Deane, their agent in Paris, enclosing the declaration of independency, with instructions to make it known to the powers of Europe, not being received until the 7th of November, 1776.

In March, 1776, Mr. S. Deane had been sent to France by the committee of secret correspondence of America* with instructions to communicate in the character of a merchant with M. de Vergennes, the French minister for foreign affairs, and to procure through the assistance of that government a supply of clothing and arms for 25,000 men. Mr. Deane was provided with letters of introduction addressed to various French subjects interested in the success of the colonists. Already, previously to the arrival of Mr. Deane, the French minister for foreign affairs had obtained authority from the King to furnish “un million de livres pour le service des colonies Anglaises.” A. M. de Beaumarchais was secretly charged with the disposal of this money for the benefit of the colonies.

The following particulars regarding the movements of the American ships-of-war subsequently to the Declaration of Independence of the colonies have been obtained principally from the “History of the United States Navy,” by Fenimore Cooper, the authenticity of which is, however, sufficiently borne out on reference to the official correspondence of that period.

The Reprisal was the first American man-of-war that ever showed herself in Europe. She quitted America not long after the Declaration of Independence, and appeared in France in the autumn of 1776, bringing in with her several English prizes, A few privateers had preceded her, and plight difficulties had occurred in relation to some of their prizes† that had gone into Spain; but it is believed that these were the first English captured ships that had entered France since the commencement of the American Revolution. The English ambassador complained of this infraction of the treaty between the two countries, but means were found to dispose of the prizes without detection. The Reprisal having refitted, soon sailed towards the bay of Biscay on another cruise. Here she took several English vessels, and among the rest a king’s packet that plied between Falmouth and Lisbon. When the cruise was terminated, Captain Wickes went into Nantes, taking his prizes with him. This proceeding caused further representations to be made by the British ambassador, which resulted in the prizes being ordered to quit France. The Reprisal, however, was allowed to remain, in consequence of her leaky state. The prizes were taken into the offing, and sold to French purchasers.

In April, 1777, the Lexington arrived, and the old difficulties were renewed. The American commissioners in Paris, who had been authorized by their government to equip vessels, [Page 645] appoint officers, and do other matters to annoy the enemy, now planned a cruise that surpassed anything of the sort that had yet been done in Europe under the American flag. Captain Wickes was directed to proceed to sea with his own vessel (the Reprisal) and the Lexington, and to go directly off Ireland, in order to intercept a convoy of linen ships that was expected to sail about that time. The Dolphin, a cutter which had been purchased and fitted out in France, was also directed to join the squadron.

Captain Wickes quitted Nantes about the commencement of June, 1777, and sailed round the coast of Ireland, capturing and destroying many ships, and afterwards returned to France.

The boldness and success of this cruise produced much sensation in England, and the French government was driven to the necessity of either entirely throwing aside the mask, or of taking some more decided steps in relation to these cruisers. Not being prepared for war, it resorted to the latter expedient. The Reprisal and Lexington were ordered to be seized and held until security was given that they would quit the European seas, while the prizes were ordered to quit France without delay. The latter were accordingly taken outside the port and disposed of to French merchants in the same informal manner as in the previous cases, and the vessels-of-war prepared to return to America.

While the American commissioners (Dr. Franklin and Silas Deane) were directing the movements of Captain Wickes in the manner that has been described, they were not idle in other quarters. A small frigate was building at Nantes on their account, and an agent was sent by them to Dover, where he purchased a fast-sailing, English-built cutter, and had her carried across to Dunkirk. Here she was privately equipped as a cruiser, and named the Surprise, and Captain G. Conyngham was appointed to command her, by filling up a blank commission from John Hancock, the president of the Congress. This commission was dated March, 1777. Having obtained his officers and crew in Dunkirk, Captain Conyngham sailed on a cruise about the 1st May, and on the 7th he captured the Harwich packet Prince of Orange, with which he returned to Dunkirk.

This proceeding of the Surprise called forth the earnest remonstrance of the English ambassador, and Captain Conyngham and his crew were imprisoned, the cutter seized, and the prizes liberated. The commission of Captain Conyngham was taken from him and sent to Versailles.

Notwithstanding these proceedings the American commissioners purchased and fitted out another cutter at Dunkirk, which was called the Revenge, and means were found to liberate Captain Conyngham and his people, to whom a new commission was given, doubtless one of those in blank which had been confided to the commissioners to fill at their discretion.

The Revenge, under the command of Captain Conyngham, sailed from Dunkirk on the 18th July, 1777, and captured many British vessels, some of which were destroyed, but the most valuable were sent to Spain.

Alter a cruise of almost unprecedented success as far as injury to British merchants was concerned, the Revenge went into Ferrol, refitted, and finally sailed for the American seas.

The characters of the Surprise and Revenge, says Fenimore Cooper, appear never to have been properly understood. In all the accounts or the day, these vessels were spoken of as being privateers authorized to act by the commissioners in Paris. That the two vessels commanded by Captain Conyngham were public vessels, however, is proved in a variety of ways. Like the Dolphin, the Surprise and Revenge were bought and equipped by agents of the diplomatic commissioners of the United States.

The sensation produced among British merchants by the different cruises in the European seas was very great; Mr. Deane,* one of the American agents in Paris, stating that it had caused insurance to rise, and even deterred British merchants from shipping goods in English bottoms, so that in a few weeks forty sail of French ships were loading in the Thames on freight.

Insurances in some instances rose as high as twenty five per cent., and for a short period ten per cent, was asked between Dover and Calais.

In 1776 the American commissioners in Paris, with a view to increase the naval force of the country, caused a frigate of extraordinary size and of peculiar armament and construetion for that period to be laid down at Amsterdam. This ship had the keel and sides of a two-decker, though frigate-built, and her main deck armament was intended to consist of 32-pounders. She was named the Indian. In consequence, however, of the apprehension of the Dutch government, and the jealousy of that of England, the American Congress was induced to make an offering of the Indian to Louis XVI, and she was equipped and got ready for sea as a French vessel-of-war.

This vessel subsequently entered the American service under the following circumstances, and was finally captured after having destroyed a large amount of British shipping.

The following are the circumstances related by Cooper:

In 1779 Commodore Gillon was sent to Europe by the State of Carolina, provided with large amounts of colonial produce, for the purpose of raising funds to purchase ships-of-war for the American navy. Commodore Gillon, after many unsuccessful attempts to obtain the class of ships he required, finally went to Amsterdam, where he found the Indian, which vessel, [Page 646] as previously mentioned, had been laid down by the American commissioners, and subsequently presented to France. She had the dimensions of a small seventy-four, but was a frigate in construction, carrying an armament of twenty-eight thirty-sixes on her gun-deck. This ship, though strictly the property of France, had been lent by Louis XVI to the Duke of Luxemburg, who hired her to the State of South Carolina for three years on condition that the State would insure her, sail her at its own expense, and render to her owner one-fourth of the proceeds of her prizes. Under this singular compact the ship, which was named the South Carolina for the occasion, got out of Amsterdam in 1781, and made a successful cruise in the narrow seas, sending her prizes into Spain. She afterwards sailed for America, capturing ten sail, with which she went into the Havana.

Cooper states that most of the vessels of South Carolina were purchased, and its seamen were principally obtained from places out of its limits; Commodore Gillon and Captain Joymer being both natives of Holland.

Having thus given an outline of the proceedings of the American vessels-of-war in Europe., it will be interesting to refer to the diplomatic correspondence, and also to that of the American commissioners in Paris.

On the 18th of August, 1776, Mr. Silas Deane, who, as before stated, had been sent to Paris as the agent of the revolted colonies, and who had arrived in that city about the beginning of July, reported the result of his secret interviews with the French minister for foreign affairs. M. de Vergennes assured Mr. Deane that the importance of American commerce was well known, and that no country could so well supply the colonies and receive their produce as France, for which reason the court had ordered their ports to be kept open and equally free to America as to Britain. With regard to the shipment of arms, M. de Vergennes stated that, considering the good understanding between the two courts of Versailles and London, they could not openly encourage the shipment of warlike stores, but no obstruction of any kind would be given; if there should, as the custom-houses were not fully in their secrets in the matter, such obstructions would be removed on the first application.

So satisfied was Mr. Deane with the result of his intercourse with the French minister, that he stated that he had hopes of obtaining liberty for the armed vessels of the united colonies to dispose of their prizes in the ports of France, and also for the arming and fitting-out of vessels-of-war from thence. He further urged that a few American cruisers should be sent to the French coast, where they would do very well, as they would find protection in the harbors of the kingdom. Coming ostensibly for the purpose of commerce, he stated no questions would be asked, and they might wait until opportunity offered, and then strike something to the purpose.

On the 8th October, 1776, Mr. Deane stated that the French court, as well as other courts in Europe, had expected that the declaration of independence would be formally communicated to them. He also urged the necessity of eight or ten American frigates being collected at Bordeaux, where they might have leisure to rent and procure supplies. The appearance of American cruisers in Europe had, he stated, amazed the British merchants, and that insurance would now be on the war establishment; and as the American vessels-of-war would be protected in the ports of France and Spain, the whole of the British commerce would be exposed. He also prayed that the committee would forward him blank commissions, or a power to grant commissions to ships-of war, as there were many persons wishing for an opportunity for using them in this way. Mr. Deane made frequent applications for blank commissions, which were subsequently forwarded to the American ministers in Paris in December, 1776.

The first country which appears to have publicly acknowledged the vessels of the United States, as being, entitled to belligerent rights, was Spain, under the following circumstances:

In September, 1776, Captain Lee, commanding the American vessel Hawke, who on his passage from America had captured some valuable British vessels, went into Bilbao, not with the prizes, but with the captains and crews of the captured vessels. The British consul at Bilbao and the captains of the vessels protested, and complained against Captain Lee as a pirate, on which his vessel was detained, and his commission, &c., sent to Madrid by the Spanish authorities.

On the 7th of October, 1776, the Spanish government directed the governor of Bilbao to release the Hawke, and declared “that in consequence of the amity subsisting between his Catholic Majesty and the King of Great Britain, he should maintain a perfect neutrality during the war; that he should not give any aid to the colonists; but should not deny their being admitted into any ports of his dominions while they conformed to the laws of the country.”

On the 26th of September, 1776, commissioners were appointed by the American Congress for transacting the business of the United States at the court of France. The persons chosen were Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Thomas Jefferson; the latter was subsequently replaced by Arthur Lee. The three commissioners met in Paris about the middle of December, where they continued to reside, chiefly employed in procuring military supplies and money for the United States, till they signed the treaty of alliance with France on the 6th February, 1778. They were presented to the King as representatives of an independent state on the 20th March, 1778. Dr. Franklin was appointed minister plenipotentiary to the court of France on the 14th September, 1778, at which time the commission was dissolved.

In a letter addressed by the committee to the commissioners on the 21st September, 1776, [Page 647] they were informed that a resolution had been passed by Congress, approving of armed vessels being Jilted out by them on continental account, provided the court of France disliked no the measure; and they were informed that blank commissions for this purpose would be sent to them by the next opportunity.

The commissioners arrived in Paris on the 22d of December, 1776, and on the 28th they were received by M. de Vergennes, the French minister for foreign affairs. They laid before him their commissions, with the articles of a proposed treaty of commerce. In their letter to the committee, reporting their reception, they also stated that the ports of France, Spain, and Florence, (thai is, Leghorn in the Mediterranean,) were open to the American cruisers upon the usual terms of neutrality.

In March, 1777, the commissioners reported that the French court, while treating them privately with all civility, was cautious of giving umbrage to England, and was, therefore, desirous of avoiding an open reception and acknowledgment of them, or entering into any formal negotiation with them as ministers from the Congress. To make them easy, however, they were told that the ports of France were open to their ships as friends. Although it was no secret at the time that 200 field-pieces of brass and 30,000 fusils, with other munitions of war in great abundance, had been taken out of the King’s magazines for exportation to America’, the minister in their presence affected to know nothing of that operation.

During these conferences the commissioners stated that every step was taken to gratify England publicly by attending to the remonstrances of our ambassador, forbidding the departure of ships which had military stores on board;* recalling officers who had leave of ab sence and were going to join the Americans, and giving strict orders that our prizes should not be sold in French ports.

They also reported that Captain Wickes had made a cruise during the winter, (1776-77,) and had returned to France with five prizes, where they were sold, which proceeding caused some trouble and uneasiness to the French court. Money to the amount of 2,000,000 of livres was also supplied to the commissioners through the French government. Captain Wickes was directed by the commissioners to make another cruise previously to his return to America.

In May, 1777, the commissioners were directed to purchase in such port or place in Europe as it could be done with most convenience and despatch, a fine, fast-sailing frigate or larger ship. They were instructed to place Captain Paul Jones in command of the vessel, and to employ him as they thought best. In June, 1777, they reported that the ship building at Amsterdam would be nearly as strong as a seventy-four, and might join the squadron in the months of February or March.

On the 16th July, 1777, M. de Vergennes addressed a letter to the commissioners, complaining of the conduct of the American vessels in carrying on hostilities from the French ports, and at the same time informed them that orders had been sent to the ports for their sequestration and detention until sufficient securities could be obtained that they should return directly to their country, and not expose themselves by new acts of hostility to the necessity of seeking ayslum in French ports. With regard to the prizes, they had orders to go out immediately.

In a letter dated the 30th November, 1777, the commissioners refer to the difficulties arising out of the uncertain policy of the maritime powers, by which the American prizes could not be publicly sold, in consequence of which the purchasers took advantage to beat down the price, and sometimes the admiralty courts were obliged to lay hold of them in consequence of orders from court, obtained by the English ambassador.

On the 8th February, 1778, the commissioners announced the signature of the treaties of commerce and alliance between France and the United States, the announcement of which subsequently led to hostilities between France and Great Britain.

In consequence of the proceedings of the American privateers in the French ports, numerous representations were made by Lord Stormont, the British ambassador at Paris, to the French government, during the years 1776-‘77; in fact, the correspondence with France of that period is principally upon that subject.

In a memorial addressed to M. de Vergennes on the 18th March, 1777, the English ambassador made the following demands on the French government:

“II reclame donc l’accomplissement des assurances formelles qui lui out été données que le vaisseau Américain commandé par le Sieur Wickes sortirait d’abord du port de l’Orient, et qu’il ne lui serait pas permis de croiser sur les côtes de France.

“1. Il demande la restitution immédiate et pionière du paquebot de Falmouth, vaisseau appartenant au Roi son maître.’

“2. Celle des quatre vaisseaux marchands mentionnés dessus appartenant à des sujets de sa Majesté Très Chrétienne. Il demande que cette restitution, avec (a valeur de cette partie des cargaisons qui a été détournée, soit d’abord et bond fide aux propriétaires.”

These demands arose out of the capture of five British vessels by the American ship Reprisal, which had been taken into the port of l’Orient, and there sold, and appear to be the only instance in which the ambassador made any claim for the value of the cargoes.

Notwithstanding these representations, assistance continued to be rendered to the vessels of the colonists in the French ports.

[Page 648]

On the 4th July, 1777, Lord Stormont received instructions from his government, of which the following is an extract:

“The proper representations made by your excellency to the French ministers, with respect to the cutter fitting out at Dunkirk, the artillery and military stores collecting for the use of the rebels, and the several causey of complaint given by their governors in the West Indies, meet with his Majesty’s approbation.

“The enclosed copy of a letter from Whitehaven will show your excellency that fresh proofs have been lately given of the protection held out to the rebels in the French ports where the three privateers, the Reprisal, the Lexington, and the Dolphin, have been supplied with everything that was necessary to them for their cruise, the last of them wholly fitted out at Nantes, and it appears that after their cruise they returned to some of the ports’ of France.

“This account, by his Majesty’s command, has been taken into consideration by tis confidential servants, and their opinion thereon submitted to his Majesty.

“In consequence thereof, I am commanded by his Majesty to signify to your excellency it is his pleasure that you acquaint the French ministers that however desirous his Majesty may be to maintain the present peace, he cannot, from his respect to his honor and his regard to the interest of his trading subjects, submit to such strong and public instances of support and protection shown to the rebels by a nation that at the same time professes in the strongest terms its desire to maintain the present harmony subsisting between the two crowns. The shelter given to the armed vessels of the rebels, the facility they have of disposing of their prizes by the connivance of government, and the conveniences allowed them to refit, are such irrefragable proofs of support, that scarcely more could be done if there was an avowed alliance betwixt France and them, and that we were in a state of war with that kingdom.

“‘The avidity of gain will tempt merchants in all countries to do very irregular things, and that avidity may not be easily controlled;’ but the private views of the traders of France are not concerned in these transactions otherwise than by buying below their value what is supposed to be sold clandestinely in the case of the prizes carried into the French ports. Such a Circumstance cannot weigh with a great state, whose views must be directed by greater considerations. The views of the rebels are evident; they know that the honor of this country and the proper feelings of the people in general will not submit to such open; violation of solemn treaties and established laws acknowledged by all nations. The necessary consequence must be a war, which is the object they have in view; and they are not delicate in the choice of means that may bring about an end so much desired by them.

“These reflections, my lord, your excellency will communicate to the French ministers, expressing at the same time that an explanation is desired, not a menace intended; but on full consideration of the present circumstances they must be satisfied peace, however earnestly wished, cannot be maintained, unless an effectual stop is put to our just causes of complaint.

“Lord Macartney and Governor Shirley have transmitted many depositions on oath to ascertain the complaints, the particular subjects of which have been sent to your excellency; but I do not trouble you with them, as you need no proofs to be convinced that the French governors are acting the most unjustifiable conduct in the West Indies, where there is too much reason to suspect they are concerned in the piracies.”

In consequence of the seizure of the English vessel Experience, the English ambassador addressed the following demand to the French government on the 8th July, 1777:

“Que le vaisseau Anglais nommé l’Expérience, et sa cargaison, soient restitués d’abord aux propriétaires ou à leur ayant-cause, et que les capteurs reparent tout le dommage qu’ils ont fait. Il serait superflu d’insister davantage sur la justice de cette demande, en parlant à un ministère aussi éclairé que celui de France, et c’est à dessein que l’ambassadeur évite d’appuier sur les circonstances de cette prise; il se bornera à dire que ce bâtiment Anglais étoit à l’avère près du port de Cherbourg quand il a été pris par les pirates Américains, qui sont sortis de ce même port pour s’ emparer de ce vaisseau, et qui ont été accompagnés de plusieurs sujets de sa Majesté très Chrétienne, et même de plusieurs soldats François qui ont été complices de cet attentat.”

In reply to those representations M. de Vergennes read a note verbale to Lord Stormont, the following extract of which relates to the conduct of the French government with regard to the privateers which had been admitted into the French ports:

“C’est d’après cette conviction que le Roi me charge de déclarer à votre excellence, que fidèle à Inobservation des traités, que sa Majesté s’attend qui ne seront pas moins exactement observes de la part de Angleterre, elle ne permettra rien qui pourrait y déroger; et que sensible aux plaintes que vous avez eu commission de me porter contre les trois corsaires (Américains) la Représaille, le Lexington, et le Dolphin, lesquels, après avoir en injonction de sortir des ports de France pour n’y plus revenir, y sont cependant rentrés malgré cette défense; sa Majesté, bien éloignée d’approuver cette navette que les traités réprouvent, en est au contraire très-mécontente, et ne peut mieux en témoigner son mécontentement qu’en ordonnant, comme elle le fait, de séquestrer lesdits corsaires dans les ports où ils peuvent être relâchés, pour y être retenus jusqu’à ce qu’on puisse avoir des sûretés suffisantes qu’ils retourneront en droiture dans leur patrie, sans infester de nouveau les mers d’Europe.

“Quant aux prises que ces corsaires ou d’autres peuvent avoir amenées, ou pourront [Page 649] amener pa la suite dans nos ports, les ordres sont renouvelés nonseulement pour qu’on n’en permette pas la vente; mais encore pour qu’on les fasse partir aussitôt que le vent et les-circonstances du temps pourront le permettre, sans se prêter à aucune des exceptions que la cupidité des vendeurs et des acheteurs est ingénieuse à former; et il est enjoint aux officiers préposés à cet effet, d’y tenir sévèrement la main, sauf à en répondre en leur propre et privé nom. Il leur est pareillement recommandé de veiller soigneusement à ce que les facilités de commerce dont les Américains jouissent dans les ports de France n’excèdent pas celles d’un commerce permis.

“Si quelque sujet Anglais se croit fondé à intenter une action personnelle contre quelqu’un des susdits corsaires, la voie des tribunaux leur est ouverte ici comme en Angleterre. La loi décide les affaires contentieuses, et jamais Vautorité,

“Pour ce qui est du ‘Dolphin,’ que votre Excellence prétend être un bâtiment Français armé en France avec l’équipage de la même nation, et n’ayant qu’un seul officier Américain, l’examen le plus impartial en sera fait, et si la chose est effectivement telle qu’elle vous a été représentée, il en sera fait justice.”

On the 15th of March, 1778, the French ambassador in London communicated to the English government the recognition of the independence of the American colonies, and the treaties which had been signed between France and the United States, which led to the withdrawal of the English ambassador from Paris, and to the subsequent hostilities between the two countries without any formal declaration of war.

In 1779 the French government published an Exposé des Motifs of its conduct relative to Great Britain, to which a reply was published by Great Britain, written by the historian Gibbon, and contained in volume iv of his miscellaneous works. In reply to the latter memorial thé French government published a paper entitled “Observations de la cour de Versailles sur le Mémoire justificatif de la cour de Londres.”* In this paper the following extracts occur in justification of the asylum granted to the American privateers in the French ports:

“En donnant asile aux Américains, le Roi n’a fait que remplir un des premiers devoirs de l’humanité, en même temps qu’il a exercé un droit inhérent à la souveraineté; droit qui appartient à toutes les nations indépendantes, qui ne peut être restreint que par des conventions, et dont l’exercice est plus étendu en Angleterre que dans aucun autre Etat de l’Europe. Le Roi n’a eu aucune raison de renoncer à l’exercice de ce droit au préjudice des Américains, parce que cette nation ne l’a jamais offensé; et c’eût de sa part une tyrannie, une cruauté inouïe que de les expulser de ses Etats, parce qu’ils étaient injustement opprimés par la Grande Bretagne. Des Américains ont séjourné dans plus d’un pays de l’Europe. En estil aucun d’où ils n’aient été forcés de sortir; aucun où ils n’avaient joui dû droit de l’hospitalité; aucun où ils n’aient été aussi tranquilles et aussi surs que dans les provinces les plus reculées de l’Amérique ? A quel titre la cour de Londres prétendelle donc faire un crime au Roi de n’avoir chassé les Américains de ses Etats ?

“Non-seulement le Roi a donné un asile aux Américains, mais il a aussi admis leurs corsaires et leurs prises; et c’est là un des principaux griefs de la cour Londres, sur lequel elle s’est appesantie la plus, et qui a fourni la matière la plus ample à ses déclamations et à ses reproches. Mais quelques mots suffiront pour établir les véritables principes ser cette matière, et pour démontrer que le ministère Anglais les a méconnus volontairement.

“Le Roi est le maître d’admettre dans ses ports les navires de toutes les nations de l’univers. Ce droit s’étend sur les bâtiments de guerre comme sur les bâtiments marchands; et il n’admette restriction que celles qui sont établis par des Traités. Celui d’Utrecht en renferme relativement aux bâtiments de guerre: L’Article XV porte en substance, ‘que les parties contractantes (la France et l’Angleterre) ne permettront pas à leurs ennemis respectifs d’armer dans leurs ports, d’y vendre leurs prises, et d’y séjourner au delà du temps requis pour réparer leurs dommages et se pourvoir des choses nécessaires pour être en état de remettre à la mer.’ Le Roi a suivi ponctuellement cette conduite par rapport aux corsaires Américains. Sa volonté à cet égard est constatée par les ordres le plus précis, et surtout par leur exécution. Il est vrai que le ministère Anglais avance que ces ordres étaient illusoires, qu’ils étaient transgressés ouvertement, impunément et même sous l’autorité du gouvernement: mais cette accusation est une calomnie d’autant plus révoltante qu’elle est contraire à la notoriété publique, constatée même par les gazettes ministérielles imprimées en Amérique.

“Si l’on prétend que le Roi aurait dû refuser toute retraite aux corsaires Américains, parce qu’il aurait dû les regarder comme pirates, on demande de quel droit le Roi aurait pu les juger tels? Les Américains ne sont point ses sujets: il n’est ni le juge ni l’arbitre des querelles domestiques de l’Angleterre. Il avait adopté la neutralité, et il l’aurait enfreinte de la manière la plus odieuse, en prononçant sur l’État des Américains. Ces principes sont certains, et c’est une véritable dérision que de les méconnaître, comme ce serait une adulation, une faiblesse inexcusable que de les violer. La cour de Londres seule a eu des pirates en mer; ce sont ses bâtiments marchands qui, en pleine paix, ont enlevé des bâtimens Français; et cette cour ne soutiendra pas sans doubte, que ce procède était contraire à ses ordres ou a ses intentions, puisque les coupables, quoique dénoncés, sont demeurés impunis, et que les navires pris n’ont pas été restitués.”

[Page 650]

It results from the foregoing statements that no such contrast between the conduct of France on the occasion of the revolt of the British provinces in 1774, and that of Great Britain on the occasion of the recent insurrection in the United States, as that which Mr. Adams has sought to draw, can really be drawn. Great Britain by no act of hers conferred upon her revolted colonies any belligerent character, or sought to enforce against neutrals belligerent rights; on the contrary, for a long period she dealt with her colonies as revolted provinces by acts of ordinary legislation, and by restrictions on their trade. On the other hand, the United States, within a few months after the commencement of the insurrection, conferred upon the southern States belligerent rights by the proclamation issued by the President of the United States on the 19th of April, 1861, establishing the blockade of the southern States, “in pursuance of the laws of the United States and of the laws of nations in such cases provided.”

Foreign Office, October 30, 1865.

Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the First Session Thirty-ninth Congress

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward

[Enclosures.]

Earl Russell to Mr. Adams

[Document referred to in Mr. Adams’s despatch No. 1081.]

Memorandum relative to the measures of coercion adopted by Great Britain during her contest with the North American Colonies; and also regarding the policy of foreign powers.