Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward

No. 1059.]

Sir: I transmit to you copies of the London Times of the 26th, of the 27th, of this month, and of this morning.

That of the 26th has a leader on the subject of the continued piracies of the Shenandoah, which sufficiently betrays the uneasiness that is felt on that subject. The other two relate more particularly to the President himself and to his policy. You will not fail to note the remarkable change that has taken place since the time when I forwarded with my despatch No. 936, of the 28th [Page 567] of April, the first notice of himself that appeared after the news of his accession I then ventured to predict the possibility of a conversion in his case like that which happened in that of his predecessor.

I am glad to learn from the tone of those newspapers understood to be most in the way of hints from high sources that the relations between the two countries are thought to have been at no time so perfectly amicable as now.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[Untitled]

There is every reason to hope that peace, abroad as well as at home, will be the leading aim of President Johnson’s policy. Few could have expected that one who denounced rebellion so sternly would display such moderation and humanity in the hour of triumph, or that so eager a partisan would prove capable of rising so far above party influences. Perhaps Mr. Johnson himself, like his predecessor, Mr. Lincoln, hardly foresaw the mellowing effect of responsibility upon his earlier views, and would freely admit that, in the short experience of office, he has both learnt and forgotten much. This power of rapid self-adaptation is an eminently American virtue, and it has infinitely facilitated the work of pacification in the south. The southerners do not pretend to have altered their private convictions, but they look facts in the face, and, finding the question of slavery settled once for all by force of arms, they make the best of it and cheerfully rejoin the Union. The same good sense and readiness to let bygones be bygones have been shown by the northern people, and still more remarkably by the government. What concerns us, however, more nearly is the present attitude of the United States towards foreign powers, and here, again, it is but just to acknowledge that our fears have not been realized. Even Mr. Cobden firmly believed that a declaration of war against the Mexican empire would follow immediately upon the subjugation of the south, but nothing of the kind has yet taken place, or appears to be contemplated. Our own relations with the Washington government have never been more friendly since France and England, in justice to the United States as well as to themselves, recognized the confederates as belligerents. Mr. Seward, indeed, took exception to the terms in which Lord Russell announced the withdrawal of that recognition, but he coupled his remonstrances with assurances of his desire not only to preserve amity, but to establish “a lasting and intimate friendship between the two nations.” The sincerity of this desire is fully appreciated in this country, and the remembrance of any misunderstandings that may have arisen in the course of the war is becoming fainter and fainter every day on this side of the Atlantic. It is, therefore, peculiarly vexatious to hear that one source of irritation, which ought long since to have been closed, is still kept open by the proceedings of the Shenandoah, which continues to rove the seas under a confederate flag.

We have already called the attention of our readers to the depredations of this cruiser— the only relic of a flotilla which once numbered five steamers and four sailing vessels. In spite of positive information that the confederacy was crushed, that President Davis was a prisoner, and that all the southern generals had laid down their arms, Captain Waddell chose to wait for an official notification of it from a government which no longer existed, and to pursue, in the mean time, his buccaneering voyage. Having planned a kind of battue, among the whalers of the northern Pacific, he was engaged, by the last accounts, in burning one after another, and it was believed that he would succeed in destroying the whole fleet. Such ravages had never been committed by the Alabama herself during the height of the war, and they, of course, infuriated the mercantile community at San Francisco, to which port many of these ships belonged. The news has since reached the United States, and our Washington correspondent comments on its effect in keeping alive the old grudge against Great Britain. It is natural that it should do so, and, however little we may deserve them, we must bear patiently with reproaches for which there is too good an excuse. The mischief done in wanton malice by the Shenandoah is enough to justify any degree of resentment, and as there is no one else to be held responsible, except Captain Waddell, who cannot be got at, no wonder that the brunt of it falls upon us. So far as we are blamed for the original launching of the Shenandoah in British waters, we can only reply, as we have so often replied before, that we had no means of preventing the construction of a hulk which should afterwards be converted into a ship-of-war beyond our own territory. On another point, however, there seems to be a misapprehension which it is desirable to remove. The special ground of complaint against us, as reported by our correspondent, is, that we have deviated from the course adopted by other powers, and given confederate cruisers the benefit of twenty-four hours’ shelter in British ports, “so that,” (to quote the words of an American officer, ) “even if our vessels followed the Shenandoah into any of your ports, in any part of the [Page 568] world, we should not be allowed to take her.” Thus stated, the construction put on Lord Russell’s despatch by the American public is erroneous in more than one respect. It is not the fact that her Majesty’s government stood alone in the application of the twenty-four hours’ rule, for precisely the same ground was taken by the French government. Nor is it the fact that Captain Waddell would be able to claim the benefit of that rule under any circumstances whatsoever.

Nothing can be simpler than the principles on which we have granted or refused shelter to these cruisers. On the 31st of January, 1862, Lord Russell communicated to the colonial office certain directions for the guidance of colonial governors. The first part of these directions related exclusively to the Bahamas, and prohibited the admission of any vessel-of-war, federal or confederate, to any harbor in those islands, “except by special leave of the lieutenant governor, or in case of stress of weather.” Any such vessels-of-war, or any vessels-of-war which might be already lying there, were to be required to depart with all possible despatch, but no ship-of-war belonging to one belligerent was to be permitted to sail within twenty-four hours after the departure of any ship belonging to the other belligerent. The rule laid down for the United Kingdom and the colonies differed from this in one particular. Ships-of-war belonging to either belligerent were not directly prohibited from entering or remaining in our ports, but only from making them a place of resort for purposes of war or warlike equipment. They were, therefore, to be sheltered there so long as might be absolutely necessary for provisioning or repairing, but the same twenty-four hours’ rule was to he applied. When the recognition of the Confederate States as belligerents was cancelled on the 2d of June last, all the ports in our empire were closed against vessels-of-war under a confederate flag, and all such vessels were cautioned to depart forthwith, but the twenty-four hours’ rule was to be maintained in their favor “then and for the last time.” A reference to the circular of the French minister of marine, published in the Moniteur of June 13, will show that precisely the same reservation was made by the imperial government: “You will cause to be observed, for the last time in their behalf, the rule laid down in my circular of the 5th of February, 1864, and by the terms of which an interval of at least twenty-four hours must be observed between the departure of any vessel-of-war of one of the belligerents and the subsequent departure of any vessel-of-war of the other belligerent.” The justice of this provision is self-evident, but it has no bearing on the case of the Shenatí-doah, which was not lying in any of our ports when Lord Russell’s letter was received. It is true that in the next paragraph permission was granted to confederate captains to enter our ports and disarm their vessels, at their own risk, within one month after the receipt of that letter by the colonial authorities; but it was expressly added that the twenty-four hours’ rule would there be inapplicable. The worst, therefore, that could happen is that Captain Waddell should have presented himself at Vancouver’s island within a month after the governor has received Lord Russell’s despatch, obtained leave to disarm the Shenandoah, and thereby saved himself from the doom of a pirate. It is highly improbable that he would have bethought himself of doing so while he was in hot pursuit of the whaling fleet. Even if he had, the Shenandoah’s career would be at an end, for she must instantly part with her armament, whereas if he had not, the day of grace would be over, and no British port would be open to him. Whether by his conduct he has not forfeited all claim to avail himself of any such privilege is a further question which may be left to the legal advisers of the Crown, but we do not scruple to express the hope that, in the event of its arising, it may be answered in the affirmative.

[Untitled]

When the people of the northern States elected Mr. Lincoln for the second time they were moved by a happy impulse to choose as the second magistrate of the country Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee. The office of Vice-President is in itself of little importance, and though on two former occasions a Vice-President has succeeded to the government of the republic through the death of his superior, we may presume that the expectation of Mr. Johnson’s accession to the higher office was hardly present to the mind of any one of those two millions of electors. Those who chose him wished to pay a compliment to the most energetic and zealous among the few southern men who had remained faithful to the federal cause, and it may have seemed to them that by electing a Tennesseean they declared emphatically the non-severance of a seceded State from the Union. But the great crime of April last has given supreme power to the politician who otherwise would have filled for the next four years the dignified but powerless office of president of the Senate. All parties were startled at this sudden change of men, and there were probably few but the most extreme who looked on it without alarm. Mr. Johnson must now receive the credit of having disarmed groundless fears and disappointed extravagant hopes. We cannot tell what thoughts have passed through his shrewd and energetic mind during these five months of unexpected rule, how much he may owe to the sobering responsibilities of his high office, how much to the counsels of two or three able men who have been schooled to government amid the difficulties and calamities of the war, how much to his own southern extraction, and to the fellow-feeling [Page 569] which he avows for the seceders in everything but their secession. But, whatever the motives which influence his policy, the Americans have found in Mr. Johnson an able and successful magistrate. Mr. Lincoln is said to have meditated in the last days of his life a large amnesty and the restoration of the south to its due place in the Union. When he fell it was not unnaturally thought in America that a sterner rule was to be instituted, and the zealots of the republican party hastened to accept Mr. Johnson as their leader, with the hope, perhaps, that they might use him as their tool. These expectations have, however, vanished. Within a month after the President’s accession to office his leaning towards a moderate policy began to appear, and though it was received with marked disappointment by a strong party of his own supporters, the effect of it on the conquered south was so favorable and tranquillizing that he has persevered in it, and it may be expected to characterize his whole term of office.

There is no one on this side the Atlantic who will fail to rejoice at the prospects which this policy opens to the newly cemented Union. The Americans, with the suppleness of a young people, are adapting themselves to their altered conditions. The southerner who has fought so fiercely for disunion no sooner finds it impossible than he rises from the ground where the superior might of his enemy has prostrated him, bandages up his wounds, takes off his tattered uniform, burns his confederate colors, and walks to the polling booth to put in his ballot as he would have done before secession. The only true philosophy is to look upon the past as something with which we have no more to do, and to treat the present moment as the first of a new existence. The southerners appear to be anxious to draw a pen through the history of the last five years, and to take up the Union where they left it. This is not entirely possible, since during this time a great revolution—the emancipation of the negroes— has broken the framework of society. But this the southerners accept with a readiness remarkable even in Americans, and ask almost with unanimity that the Union shall be restored on its old footing. They profess loyalty to it, and declare, doubtless with sincerity, that they have no treasonable afterthought in demanding a restitution of their civil rights.

Whether these rights should be restored; how far the southern States should be permitted self-government; what should be the interference of the federal government in the relations between white and black; whether some organic law on negro suffrage should be passed and enforced over the whole Union; when the military force which now maintains order should be withdrawn—are questions on which men widely differ at the north, and they will be for some time to come the chief subjects of party strife. But we think Mr. Johnson, in his liberal treatment of the south in all these matters, shows political wisdom and a true appreciation of the differences which have divided the two sections of the republic. The principles which he enounced in his speech to the southern delegation at Washington the other day are consistent both with his former acts and his present policy. They are* simply that the Union must be maintained at all hazards, by any means, and against any men or party, but that, the Union once secured, the rights and political independence of the States are the best guarantees of national prosperity. Slavery is gone, and the rebellion is over. This being the case, the restoration of all the States to their former relations with each other and with the federal government is desirable. “While I dreaded and feared disintegration of the States,” says the President, “I am equally opposed to consolidation or concentration of power here, under whatever guise or name they bear; and if the issue is forced upon us II hall endeavor to pursue the same efforts to dissuade from this doctrine running to extremes. But I say let the same rules be applied. Let the Constitution be our guide. Let the preservation of that and the Union of States be our principal aim.” This theory undoubtedly tends to give the south an earlier and larger possession of political power than is thought safe even by moderate men of the republican party. But we think that the confidence of the President, and the bold liberality of his policy, are not likely to be in vain. The secession of the southern States was the natural termination of a condition of things which had its origin in the very foundation of the republic. The jealousy between north and south, which deepened at last into hatred on the part of the latter, had several causes, the chief being the existence of slavery in one region and the attacks upon it in another; and, furthermore, the anger with which the southern States found their proportionate importance yearly diminished by the stream of emigration which continually flowed into the more temperate regions of the north. The first of these causes exists no longer; and as to the second, the south must every year become more powerless to give effect to any chagrin it may cause. The chief grounds of quarrel are removed, and those that remain are henceforth innocuous. The worst evil the federal government can fear is that the southerners, in their political intercourse with the north, may become factious and perverse. This, indeed, is not unlikely; but it is an inconvenience which can well be borne, and which is sure to decrease with time. All the better instincts of the people will be against carrying on a war of words or of votes when the war of weapons has failed, and they will surely find their interest in submitting cheerfully to the destiny which has linked them forever to the northern States. After all, it is no grievous doom to form part of the American Union, even though State patriotism may be vexed by the insignificant part which Virginia and South Carolina must play in comparison with the time when they were leading republics in the Union. President Johnson probably sees that both necessity and interest bid the conquered States to be loyal, and for this reason he restores to each of them its institutions, and to its citizens their liberties and property.

[Page 570]

[Untitled]

It cannot be expected that the great civil war in America should be without its sequel of political strife. For some years the steps of American statesmen will be on the still heated ashes thrown up by that great eruption. Disputes will be as loud, party platforms will be a uncompromising, personal animosities will be almost as bitter, as in the days before the war. But there will be this difference, that real danger will have passed away. Three generations of statesmen have always had before them the spectre of their country’s disruption. There is hardly a leading man, from the time of Washington to the present day, who has not contemplated a successful secession as a possible and even probable event, and has not for the most part been of the opinion that when the time should come no resistance should be made to an inevitable calamity. One class of politicians has spoken of the dissolution of the Union in terms of solemn warning; another has used it as a threat to carry out its own purposes. These things now belong to the past. There are many and difficult questions to be settled by the American people. They have a devastated country to restore; they are burdened with a heavy debt; their financial system is far from sound; four millions of men of an inferior race are within their borders, and the social and political relations of these to the community must ever be a troublesome question. But the prospect of a disruption is no longer before them. One side can no longer threaten it; the other side no longer fears it. American parties may retain their combative spirit; the leading politicians may seek to excite their respective followers; Congress and the State legislatures may resound, as of yore, with the noise of intemperate disputations; but the terrible interest of the political campaigns which preceded 1860 will no longer remain. The questions of slavery, of State independence, and of northern preponderance, were questions involving the very existence of the Union. It was this that roused the passions of the disputants, and kept American politics always at fever-heat. If senators and representatives quarrel now, it will rather be from constitutional irritability or a remembrance of the old traditions than for any such legitimate cause.

For these reasons we are not inclined to believe that the political campaign which is now in prospect will absorb the attention of a people who have been so highly excited for five years past. Our Philadelphia correspondent gives an interesting account of the state of parties in the Union, and speaks of the opposition which President Johnson will encounter in carrying out his policy of conciliation. The President, after a period of vacillation or of caution, has at length fully declared his intentions. He is a southern man—by birth a North Carolinian, by settlement a Tennesseean—and he has thrown his protection over the conquered population of the late confederacy. He will preserve the States to their present inhabitants, and forbid any plans of extirpation and confiscation. The scheme of wholesale vengeance which received the sanction of Congress during the heat of war is now virtually abandoned. It is announced that no property will be taken until the owner is duly convicted of treason, and, as no prosecutions are instituted, this amounts to a repeal of the whole act. Pardons are granted to all who apply for them. Civil government being gradually restored, the generals commanding the corps have orders to abstain from interfering with meetings and elections, and the corps themselves are rapidly. diminishing in numbers. The negro troops are being withdrawn, those belonging to the northern States being the first to move. The President, in answer to a deputation of southerners, declares against centralization and the interference with State rights. He will not bring the leading secessionists to trial, and is suspected of a design to pardon even Mr. Davis himself. He has, in fact, pardoned some of the most noted civil and military chiefs of the confederacy. He will not interfere with the churches, and orders that all ministers and congregations shall receive back their edifices whether or not they swear and pray in his favor. In short, Mr. Johnson is, in the American political language of the day, a strong conservative, in opposition to the radical tendencies of the republican party. That this party, or at least the extreme portion of it, is much incensed against him is evident to any one who reads the American papers. The old abolitionists think that nothing is done unless the negro receives equal rights with the white man; and there are other politicians who go even beyond these, and thirst for vengeance on the fallen confederates. President Johnson’s accession was hailed with joy by those who thought that Lincoln was too mild and good-natured for the work he had to do. To them the President is now a backslider of the worst kind. It is not only that he will not punish; he actually in trusts rebels with power, and puts into their hands the means of repeating their rebellion. So a great demonstration is to be made in Congress. Both houses are strongly republican by means of the elections that took place during the war. But still there is a democratic party, and if the southern representatives are admitted the democrats may join them and again become powerful. Hence the republicans see with extreme disgust the rapid organization of civil government in the south, and will be glad of any excuse for keeping out the southern representatives. This question is connected, also, with that of negro suffrage. If the negroes vote all through the south, they may be expected, it is thought, to side against their late masters, and return a large number of republican members. If, on the other hand, they are denied this right, the whole strength of the south will be given to the Democratic Party, which then is not unlikely to govern the republic for years to come. There is, therefore, the prospect of an active session. But its opposition [Page 571] is not likely to influence the President. He has by his office powers equal to those of a despotic sovereign, and the will to use them. As events advance at present in America the reconstruction of the civil government in the south is likely to be almost complete before the meeting of Congress in December; the army will have been too much diminished to carry out any scheme of military occupation, and we have little doubt that the southerners will have shown by their conduct that they are ready to accept in good faith the restoration of federal authority. It cannot be concealed, also, that the President’s policy is popular with the mass of the people. There is always a tendency to side with power. and when power shows itself lenient and generous it is sure to carry with it the sympathies of the multitude. The current of popular feeling is in favor of amity with the south, which has fought well, and now frankly accepts defeat.

We may venture to assume, therefore, that within the next few months the southern States will again send their representatives to Congress, and freely form whatever party combinations they may think proper. The question of negro suffrage is the only one which is likely to be seriously contested. On the one side is the dislike of the southern whites, and, indeed, of all Americans, to admitting black people to equality with themselves; on the other, there is the obvious difficulty of refusing the suffrage to men on no other ground than the color of their skin or their African ancestry. We need not speculate on the solution of these difficulties; but, whatever the decision, the people of the United States are too well satisfied with the result of the war and the presidential policy to encourage any class of men in an acrimonious party warfare.