Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the First Session Thirty-ninth Congress

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward

No. 908.]

Legation of the United States, London, March 24, 1865.

Sir: There was no bag received by the China, so that the legation is without further advices this week.

I have the honor to transmit a copy of the Times of this morning, containing a report of the proceedings in both houses of Parliament last evening. I would call your attention more particularly to the remarks of Lord Russell in the upper house, and to the debate on the estimates for Canada in the Commons. You will be glad to perceive how much the tone toward the United States is changed. The alarmist policy, alluded to in preceding despatches, seems to be at last abandoned, and in lieu of it come earnest professions of a belief that the friendly relations between the two countries are firmly established.

It is not necessary at this time to analyze very closely the elements with which this new faith is compounded. I have reason to believe that the discovery of the indefensible position of Canada had its date so long ago as the happening of the Trent affair, and that it had materially contributed to cool the ardor with which that question was entered into long before it received its solution by the delivery of the captives. At that time, however, all reference to it was carefully suppressed; and so it would have remained but for the reluctance of this government to adopt, in season, the necessary measures to prevent the operations of the rebel emissaries sent to that region for the purpose of perpetrating outrages, like the St. Albans raid. The result has been a necessity to go to Parliament with a disclosure of the truth. The discussion is not, on the whole, of a kind likely to gratify the pride of the British people. The fact stands boldly out, that the continuance of the bond with Canada depends upon the good will of the United States. It would have been wiser to have thought of this before the ill will of the governing class had been permitted to betray itself so indiscreetly in the dark hours of our civil struggle. The result is, that no further apprehension need be felt by us of any aggressive policy on this side of the water. Even the tone of the London Times marks the completeness of this revolution of opinion. The course taken by England is evidently the guide to that adopted by France; and all the other powers of Europe will follow suit. The President may fairly congratulate himself upon the fact that, so far as their action is concerned, he has carried the country through without serious embarrassment from complications with the powers in this hemisphere.

At the same time it should not be overlooked that the prodigious development of physical power during this war is viewed with no inconsiderable share of alarm. To quiet this will call for the exercise of prudence and moderation in tone, not less than in action,, for some time to come—indeed, until the period when our domestic affairs shall have resumed the even tenor of their peaceful way, and the nations shall become convinced that we fight only when we are obliged by others to do so.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[From the London Times of March 24, 1865.]

[Untitled]

HOUSE OF LORDS, Thursday, March 23.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

Earl Russell, in laying on the table the despatches from the minister of the United States, said: I wish to make a statement in regard to the relations between this country and the United States. My lords, one of these papers is a letter from Mr. Adams, in which he states that he is commanded by the President to deliver to the British government a notice, dated March 13, in regard to the termination of the reciprocity treaty between this country and the United States, and stating that this treaty will terminate twelve months from the date of the acknowledgment of that notice. Mr. Adams also encloses the vote of the Congress, which has been approved by the President, declaring that it was no longer for the interest of the United States that that treaty should continue. Coupled with this notice is a notice given with respect to the armament of the lakes. I think it must be admitted that recent occurrences on the lakes—namely, the seizure of vessels by the agents of the confederacy and other acts of hostility—completely justify the United States in giving notice of the termination of the convention. My lords, it was not to be expected that the United States should submit passively to such acts of violence without availing themselves of all the means of repression within their power. With regard to the reciprocity treaty, although I will not say there are sufficient grounds, yet there are grounds with respect to the admission of articles duty free into the United States which may induce the United States government to wish for a renewal of the treaty with modifications that may be more advantageous, and which the United States government may consider more just to the United States. When Mr. Adams informed me of the result of the negotiations which had taken place between the President of the United States and the agents of the so called Confederate States, I expressed to him a hope that when he should present to me the notice of the termination of the reciprocity treaty, I should find that the Congress and government of the United States would be ready to consider propositions, by which a small and limited armament might be kept up on the lakes, for the purposes of police at both sides; and also that a renewal of the reciprocity treaty, upon terms to be agreed upon by both parties, might be negotiated during the twelve months to elapse before the existing treaty ceased its operation. Of course, Mr. Adams was not authorized to give me any assurance upon the subject, but the words used induced me to trust that such an assurance would be given. I am sure your lordships will all be anxious that the relations between this country and the United States should continue as they are now, of a pacific and friendly character, [cheers;] and for my part I should be very sorry that anything should occur, or be done in this country, that would tend to prevent such a satisfactory result. But, my lords, I cannot but think that the expressions which have been used, and the speeches which have been made, may tend to excite in the United States a disposition unfavorable towards the end which we thus desire to see accomplished. I allude to speeches declaring that this country has behaved wrongfully to the United States, has given the United States just cause of complaint, and that an unfriendly spirit has been shown throughout these transactions. My lords, the obvious effect of speeches such as these must be that individuals in the United States who are in favor of hostilities with this country must know that there is in this country a party ready to take up the view that the United States are in the right, and, therefore, that they will be wanting in proper spirit and in proper regard for the national interests and the national honor if they do not complain loudly of the conduct of this country. I ask your lordships to attend for a short time to the statement which I have to make; because I cannot but think that the government of this country and this country itself have been wrongfully accused upon these various points. One of the chief complaints put forward is, that this country in a great hurry and without proper consideration granted belligerent rights to what are called the Confederate States. Now every one who knows anything of the law of nations knows perfectly well that although a country may put down insurgents who rise against its authority, yet that a country has no right or power to interfere with neutral commerce unless it assumes the position of a belligerent. [Hear, hear.] But that is what the United States did. The President of the United States by his proclamation declared that the coasts of particular States were in a state of blockade, and that armed vessel belonging to those States were to be treated as pirates. There came representations on this subject from her Majesty’s minister in the United States, but in the first instance these merely covered despatches from Admiral Sir A. Milne, commanding her Majesty’s squadron in those waters, asking how he was to treat the armed vessels of the two parties. At that time Lord Campbell held the high office of lord chancellor, and of course we consulted him and the law officers of the Crown as to what should be done. Lord Campbell declared, as we all supposed he would do, that there was no course but one to pursue, namely, to regard the blockade on the part of the United States as the exercise of a bellgerent right. And as belligerent rights cannot be confined to one party, but are usually exercised against somebody else, our advisers told us that we were entitled to recognize the existence of belligerent rights on the part of both the combatants, and to declare her Majesty’s neutrality between the two parties. [Cheers.] And this, accordingly, was the course which we recommended. The proclamation in that sense was approved, if not actually drawn up, I believe, by my learned friend the present lord chancellor; and the course of neutrality thus adopted was certainly received with favor, arid, I believe, commended itself to the sentiments of the country as the right course for us to take. It is said now that we ought to have awaited the arrival of Mr. Adams. I know not what Mr. Adams could say on the subject. If I had told my colleagues that we must wait for him and consult him I believe it would only have caused embarrassment in the relations between the two countries. He could scarcely have approved anything which we did short of taking the part of the north against the south. But, then, it is said, if the proclamation of neutrality was not altogether wrong, at any rate it ought to have been delayed, and that unfriendliness was shown in the manner of its promulgation. I conceive that there was nothing unfriendly, nothing uncourteous in the declaration; but, on the contrary, that it was the proper course for this country to declare at the earliest moment that it meant to take part neither with the north nor with the south, but to remain entirely neutral in the contest. [Hear, hear.] Be it observed also that from the issue of that proclamation, on the 13th of May, her Majesty’s subjects were bound to take no part in the contest, and were warned that they would disobey her Majesty’s injunctions if they gave aid to one side or the other. Your lordships all remember the affair of the Trent. It is said with regard to that affair, as with regard to the proclamation of neutrality, that the proceedings of the government were unfriendly and uncourteous, and I am accused, not for the first time certainly, nor probably for the tenth time, but with as little justice now as on any of the former occasions—of having had a despatch put into my hands which ought to have been published, because it contained an assurance on the part of the United States government that they did not intend to resist the delivery of the vessel and the commissioners. My lords, that was very far from being the case; and although Mr. Adams did bring me a despatch on that occasion, it was a despatch relating chiefly to other questions between the two countries, and merely ending with a declaration that if any demand were made upon the subject of the Trent that question would be fairly considered by the United States government. The despatch was not put into my hands, and therefore I could not publish it. Even had it been left with me, and had I published it, it would have given no satisfaction, because I certainly believed, and my noble friend at the head of the government also believed, up to the last moment, that it was entirely a matter of uncertainty whether the United States government would give up these commissioners, or whether they would refuse to do so, and withhold arbitration. And now as to the manner in which these demands were made. In the first place, I wrote to Lord Lyons, and begged him not to make any demands in the first instance, but to acquaint the minister with the nature of the despatches, and request that he would name a day when the despatches could be put into his hand, after consulting the President. That appeared to me the course which it was most courteous to take. And I am bound to say, in mentioning these facts, that there is one circumstance connected with them which does the highest credit to the memory, good taste, and discretion of the late Prince Consort. At the last moment, after her Majesty had approved the despatch, we received a letter from the Prince Consort, in which he said that some of the expressions used in the despatch might be considered too abrupt, and suggested other phrases, which he thought might make it more easy for the government of the United Sates to accept the request which it conveyed. These phrases were adopted by the government and embodied in the despatch, and, doubtless, tended in some degree to render the document more acceptable to the United States government, who were called upon by its terms to perform a duty in conformity with the law of nations and regarded by the people of this country as an act of justice. [Cheers.] But it is said that, while we displayed great haste in acknowledging the south as belligerents, we were guilty of great supinenos in the case of the Alabama, and upon this point I have only to state that the evidence on this subject was furnished to us by Mr. Adams, and that the information which we received was immediately laid before the law officers of the Crown, and that on the very morning of the day on which they reported the Alabama left Birkenhead. On this question, however, I will say no more, because it may form a matter for discussion between the government of the United States and our own. I do not wish in any way to forestal that discussion, but I think I may say that we have done everything which either international law or the laws of this country demanded of us in order to prevent the attacks made on the trade of the United States by that vessel. There was, however, another case which was the subject of much discussion, and in respect to which considerable irritation was created. After the Alabama had sailed from Birkenhead other vessels were built, the construction of which amounted in itself to an armament, and furnished evidence of a hostile purpose. The owners of those vessels were in correspondence with Captain Bullock, the agent of the Confederate States, and we had every reason to believe that those iron rams were intended to break the blockade of the southern ports, which had been established. Now, it seemed to me that if those vessels were allowed to proceed from the port of Liver pool the utmost danger to the friendly relations existing between this country and the United States would have been the result. I could not conceive it possible that the United States would have allowed those armed vessels to break the blockade, which had been acknowledged by the authorities of this country, and not make demands with which we might not have found ourselves able to comply. I therefore took what was a very strong measure on this subject. I ordered those rams to be detained, and afterwards directed that they should be seized for the purpose of preventing them from committing acts of Hostility. We subsequently had placed in our hands the contract by which the agents of the Confederate States had agreed to sell those rams to M. Bravay, who said they were not intended for purposes of hostility against the United States. The question, however, remained to be tried, and we came to the conclusion that, though the moral evidence was complete, and though we believed the legal evidence to be complete, there might still be circumstances which would prevent a conviction from being obtained. I am, however, convinced that it would not only have been unfortunate, but that it would have been an ignoble and ignominious thing if we had been obliged to go to war, not for the honor of England, because that was not engaged; not for the interests of England, because they were not involved, but for the sake of private considerations, where no injustice had been done. I therefore regret very much that the noble earl opposite took the course which he has taken, and that he should have done everything in his power to prevent our stopping those vessels, which might otherwise have gone and broken the blockade. I will now say that there is every reason to hope that, as the ports of the southern States have been captured by the arms of the United States, many questions which have hitherto arisen as to the breaking of the blockade, the imprisonment of the crews of vessels, and several other questions touching the maritime rights of the two countries, will disappear, and that there will be the less reason to apprehend the occurrence of hostilities between us and the United States. I must at the same time observe that the impartial course which her Majesty’s government has pursued has from time to time been impeded and endangered on the one side by those partisans of the north who were constantly stating that we were acting in a manner hostile to the north, and, on the other, by those who were as constantly violating the neutrality which her Majesty had proclaimed in the pursuit of their own private ends. But, be that as it may, I am satisfied that there is not the slightest pretence for saying that the course which the government has pursued has not been strictly neutral. To-morrow a new minister will set out from this country to represent her Majesty at Washington. We greatly lament that Lord Lyons is, owing to the state of his health, unable to return to his post. [Hear, hear.] There is no person to whom the country is more indebted for the wise, calm, and conciliatory line of conduct which he has pursued than that noble lord, who has never failed, at the same time, to maintain the dignity and honor of the country. Sir F. Bruce, who is about to take his place, has distinguished himself greatly by the firmness of his policy. He has acted in such a manner towards the Chinese government as completely to win their confidence, while his conduct towards the representatives of the other European powers has been such as to obtain their concurrence in every step which he has taken. Towards the British interests in China he has so acted that, while willing to listen to their complaints and to obtain redress for their just grievances, he has never shown himself prepared to support their unreasonable demands. That being so, he appears to me to be exactly the man whom it is desirable her Majesty should choose to represent her in the United States, and I hope that under his auspices the friendly relations between the two countries will be maintained. [Cheers.]

[From the London Times of March 24, 1855.]

[Untitled]

HOUSE OF COMMONS, Thursday, March 23.

THE CANADIAN FORTIFICATIONS.

The Marquis of Hartington, in rising to move the vote of £811,400 for superintending establishment of, and expenditure for, works, buildings, and repairs at home and abroad, said: I will not detain the House in replying to a question raised by an honorable member because it bears more upon the general subject of our relations with the United States than upon the details proposed by the government for the defences of Canada. I think it may be convenient to the House if I state, as shortly as I can, what are the views of the government. I trust I may be permitted, in the first place, to express a hope that toe House will to-night discuss this question upon its merits solely, and not again enter into the consideration of the possibility of hostilities with the Hinted States. [Hear, hear.] I do not feel called upon to express any opinion as to the wisdom and prudence of entering on discussions of that sort. It might, perhaps, be better that we should, on both sides of the Atlantic, frankly state what our fears and apprehensions of each other are, and it is possible the very discussion of the differences between us and our suspicions of each other might tend rather to improve our relations; but, on the other hand, I should be inclined to fear that words inadvertently uttered in the heat of debate might tend to excite animosities which might be productive of danger. Whatever may be the opinion of the House upon this point, there is one thing which I feel sure is not necessarily mixed up with this question—that is, our relations with the United States. The real facts of the case are these: Four years ago our North American provinces had upon their borders a very great nation—not then a great military nation, because the United States had the smallest standing army, perhaps, of any nation in the world. The people were the least turned to military matters, and their greatest men devoted themselves to the pursuits of peace and eschewed those of war. The United States, however, have be: come a great military nation, and have command of armies as large as any which can be wielded by the great powers of Europe, and at the head of these armies are generals as able as any we know of. [Hear, hear.] Although our North American colonies cannot compete with the United States in size or commercial prosperity, yet they are, it must be admitted, a great nation, and are on the high road to be a still greater nation. These colonies profess a wish to remain independent and distinct from their great neighbors, the United States, and they also profess, in the most unmistakable language, their desire to maintain their connexion with this country. If such are their wishes, it seems to me that it is not strange they should desire to place themselves in such a position as not to be depending upon the forbearance of their great neighbors, however long they might imagine that forbearance might be extended. It seems to be only worthy the position of our North American colonies, and only worthy our position, so long as they belong to us, that we should do what we can to place their borders in a state of defence. Without the slightest expectation of the government of the United States meditating any attack upon our Canadian provinces, I do not see why we should not do what all continental nations do, namely, erect such works as are necessary to protect their frontier. Now, a good deal has been said about the great length of the Canadian frontier, but upon that point I need hardly say more than that it was never intended to maintain that frontier intact. [Hear, hear.] Not only would an attempt of that kind prove impracticable in the case of Canada, but it must always be impracticable in the case of any continental nation engaged in war with a powerful neighbor. What great nation is there in Europe, for instance, which cannot be invaded at any moment by a powerful neighbor, not at one but at many places? All, then, that can be done is to fortify the most vital points, and to trust for the expulsion of the enemy to such further operations as may from time to time be judged expedient. [Hear, hear.] If Canada be invaded by the United States or any other enemy, the invasion must either be made with the object of permanently annexing the country, or of inflicting upon our arms a humiliating defeat. If the object be the permanent annexation of the country, that can only be accomplished by the conquest of the whole country, and more especially by the reduction of the most important points. It can certainly never be attained by overrunning the country, though operations of that character may be very largely extended. Above all, to insure the annexation of Canada, it is necessary that the enemy should possess himself of the line of the river St. Lawrence, the great artery of the country. He must also possess himself of the points which command the navigation of that river, namely, Montreal and Quebec. If we, therefore, can place the line of the St. Lawrence and these two points which command its navigation in such a state of defence as to enable the Canadians to resist the attack of an enemy, it is reasonable to suppose that, if the object of the enemy be annexation, he will first of all endeavor to ascertain his chances of success at those points. Unless he can see a prospect of succeeding in those directions he will hardly think it worth while to incur the expense and the loss of so large a number of men as must necessarily follow a hopeless attempt. It seems to us, therefore, that by insuring the efficient protection of these places, we are really providing for the protection of the whole of Canada. If, on the other hand, his object be the defeat of our arms, it is obvious that the construction of proper works of defence will enable our troops, assisted by the Canadian militia, to make a successful resistance against very, superior forces, and even if overcome by superior forces, the fortifications, accompanied by the command of the St. Lawrence, will always enable our troops to embark with safety. The plan recommended by the government for the defence of Canada entirely depends upon our naval superiority on the St. Lawrence. I will not now enter into the conditions which are necessary for the preservation of that superiority. That is a question which comes more particularly within the province assigned to my noble friend, the secretary for the admiralty. I think it is hardly reasonable in us in this country to hope that we shall be able to maintain our naval superiority on the St. Lawrence, in case of a war with a nation like the United States, possessed of so powerful a navy. The first point at which we propose to erect fortifications, and the only place for which the House of Commons is now asked to vote any money, is Quebec. As the House is aware, Quebec is already well fortified, and is, I believe, really a place of strength, except that, like a great many other places formerly regarded as being beyond the reach of cannon, it is now exposed to the bombardment of cannon of long range. As was pointed out by the right honorable gentleman, the member for Calne, (Mr. Love,) the other evening, the fortifications of Quebec can be bombarded and the town shelled from Point Levi, on the south side of the river St. Lawrence. It is on that very point that the government propose to spend nearly all the money which the House of Commons is asked to vote. It is proposed to form detached works, which will, however, be connected by a military road, and will form a sort of intrenched camp, partially protected by our gunboats on the river. A small portion of the sum asked for will be expended upon the improvement of the existing works at Quebec, still in a tolerable state of repair. The attack, however from Point Levi is the only attack which it is considered the United States could make, and therefore the only point upon which it is thought necessary to spend any large sum of money. The works will, in a great degree, resemble the land defences which have recently been constructed in this country. At Montreal, too, the defences will be of a somewhat similar character. It is proposed to form a series of works, forming an intrenched camp, on the south side of the river St. Lawrence—works which will prevent the enemy from making an attack upon Montreal by means of the Victoria bridge, and also prevent his approach to any point from which he could command the town with his artillery. It is expected that the Canadian government will undertake the defence of this place, and that, as far as the protection of the river St. Lawrence is concerned, the expense incurred by the imperial government will be confined to the defence of Quebec and to maintaining the necessary naval force upon the river. Now, sir, there are other works in the neighborhood of Montreal, but it will be unnecessary for me to take up the time of the committee by describing them. It is frequently said, in discussions on the subject of fortifications, that our troops would be cooped up behind earthworks. The object of those fortifications is, undoubtedly, to a certain extent, to enable a comparatively small number of our forces to resist the attack of a much larger body; but the main object of their construction is not so much the protection of our troops as the protection of those points which are considered essential to our interests; and I have already said that in my opinion it would not be worth an enemy’s while to attack Canada unless there were a probability of his succeeding at these points. In addition to the purposes which I have enumerated, behind these works can be collected not only our own troops, and the volunteers and militia already enrolled, but the whole levy of the country can find shelter behind the walls, and there be drilled and organized as far as the time at command will permit. I have described the nature of the works which we propose to erect. It is said that no works that we can construct can hold out against a large force, and that our troops, aided by every assistance they can receive from the Canadian militia, will not be able to hold these works against the forces which the United States would be able to bring against them. Now, I believe that works of the nature such as I have described could be made capable of holding out, if not forever, at least for an indefinite period, because it must be recollected that the capability of defending such fortifications depends upon the question whether they be completely invested or not. If we have a naval superiority upon the river it is impossible that these works should be completely invested. Therefore, I maintain that such works as we propose could be held for a long time against a superior force. Further, I believe that it will be impossible for any army to carry on military operations in Canada for more than six months of the year. It is quite true that various opinions have been expressed upon that point, and reference has been made to the campaign of General Montgomery, in which during a rigorous winter he made an attack upon Quebec. Now, the history of that campaign seems to me to be rather an argument in favor of our views than otherwise. It is true that General Montgomery did with a small force march across the country in the winter, and did make a sudden attack upon Quebec; but will the House allow me to quote a passage from Sir J. Carmichael’s Précis of the Wars in Canada? They will find that any attack upon Quebec was not in those days a very formidable operation; and they will also learn what was the result of attempting such an operation in the middle of winter. In the book I have referred to I find this passage:

“The garrison of Quebec consisted of only one company; to these were added the seamen and marines of a sloop-of war and the inhabitants of the town. The latter, both French and English, were armed, formed into companies, and showed great zeal and alacrity at this important crisis. Governor Carleton, in all, had about 1,600 bayonets. The season and the want of heavy artillery prevented the Americans from making any impression upon the defences of Quebec. It was evident that the former would not permit them to remain much longer in their situation. Governor Carleton had refused to receive a flag of truce or to enter into any sort of negotiation with them; it was, therefore, necessary either to retire or to get possession of Quebec by an escalade.”

The House knows the result of the attempt. General Montgomery was killed, and his-troops retired in confusion. That very event, which is used by some persons to prove that siege operations in Canada can be carried on in winter, seems to me to prove the very reverse. Quebec was defended only by a small force, with only one company of regular troops, but General Montgomery, with a superior force, was prevented by the severity of the weather from undertaking any siege operations, and was therefore compelled to make a rash and almost hopeless attempt to take the place by assault, in which he failed. The opinion of the Canadians themselves upon this point is worthy of our consideration. I have lately received a speech delivered in the legislative assembly, of Canada by a gentleman who is well known to many members of this house who have been in Canada. I refer to Mr. Rose, who, although not now a member of the government, has held office in that country. That gentleman is member for the city of Montreal, he knows that country well, and he also has visited the American armies and knows what operations they are capable of. Mr. Rose says:

“Honorable members must remember that it is impossible to have more than a six months’ campaign in this country. And supposing you were to erect works before which an enemy was compelled to sit down in the month of May, it would take him fully three months before he could bring up his supplies and siege train and protect his communications, and by the time he was ready to make a determined attack he would be overtaken by winter, be compelled to raise the siege and to go into winter quarters. In truth, our winters are our safeguard and defence.”

He goes on to say:

“If, therefore, we can only by manning certain salient points in the country prevent the-progress of invasion we are safe.”

While I am quoting from Mr. Rose’s speech I should wish to add one more extract to show what is the opinion of the representative of a most important constituency, and what is the feeling in Canada as to those defences. Mr. Rose says:

“I am sure that no member of this house, no man in this country, would hesitate, if need were, to put his hand into his pocket and give a tenth of his substance for the construction of the works required to protect the country from the ravages of the aggressor, and to secure to ourselves the inestimable blessings derived from living under the British flag.” [Hear, hear.]

That is the opinion of a member whose judgment is well entitled to have weight with this house. Then as to the fact I have mentioned, that military operations on a large scale cannot be carried on in Canada during the winter—that is admitted by the Americans themselves. I do not deny that small bodies of troops may be marched from one point to another. I do not even deny that an enemy might remain in huts in front of works; but I do deny that during a severe Canadian winter an enemy could make any progress against such works as we propose to construct. Another point which has been alluded to is the possibility of our providing a sufficient number of troops to man these works. The calculation which I am about to read is, of course, a rough one, but I believe it to be sufficiently accurate for the purposes of the discussion. It is considered that the number of men that would be required for the defence of works at Quebec and Montreal would be about 12,000. That is the number that would be sufficient for garrisons, but in case the attack was fully developed it would be desirable to have at least 35,000 men. There should, further, be a movable force of 20,000 or 25,000 men to harass the enemy whenever opportunities should arise. The total force that would be required for the defence of the lower St. Lawrence to Montreal would be 60,000 men. That is not a force which we need despair of getting for the defence of these works. We could easily send out from this country 20,000 troops. There are already 20,000 volunteers enrolled and organized in Canada, and preparations are made to raise 80,000 militia. Those men are already designated, and under the law of the country are required to turn out when called upon. As the committee knows, a sum of money has been voted for the organization of the militia; the officers have to a considerable extent been drilled, and the Canadian government has now applied to us to send them officers to assist in organizing the militia. I have now stated what are the works we propose for the defence of the lower St. Lawrence. I admit that it is quite possible that inhabitants of the western provinces of Canada may consider that this scheme does not provide sufficiently for their defence. They may wish very naturally that some measure should be taken to prevent an enemy from occupying and overrunning those western provinces. I admit that it is possible they may hold that view, and I think very fairly, and Colonel Jervois has prepared a scheme for the defence of those western provinces of Canada. I believe the scheme to be perfectly practicable, but, of course, it involves a greater expenditure, and requires a larger force of men. I have stated that we consider that, if once we can put in a proper state of defence the line of the lower St. Lawrence, it will not be worth while for an enemy to invade Canada. That is the view of her Majesty’s government; but, of course, it is a question for the Canadian government to cousider whether they will-take the additional measures of defence which are indicated to them for the other provinces. They have only postponed the consideration of their further plans until the project for a confederation has been accomplished, as it has not been thought right to pledge the future confederation to a larger outlay than might ultimately be found to be necessary. Until the Canadian government have announced their intentions upon the subject of the defence of western Canada, it is not necessary that I should enter into any detailed explanation of the plans proposed to that end. I believe, however, that it is a rational and practicable plan—one that would neither involve any very large amount of money for the construction of the works, nor require any very large force for their defence in time of war. I will only further detain the committee by briefly alluding to other plans that have been suggested for the defence of Canada. I need say nothing of the views of those honorable gentlemen who think that it is impossible to defend Canada, and that therefore it is impolitic to take any steps with that object in view. Those gentlemen adopt a very intelligible line of argument. They say the only source of danger to Canada arises from her connexion with this country. They add that this country is powerless to defend Canada in time of war, and therefore it is better we should say to the Canadians in time of peace, “We cannot undertake your defence, but we will relieve you of the danger which arises from your connexion with us, and we advise you to keep on good terms with the United States, and not to provoke hostilities with that country.” That is an intelligible line of argument, and if the committee think that the allegations upon which it is based are true, then I hope it will at once say so, and will not wait to declare its opinions until we have induced the Canadians to spend a large amount of money, and to raise a large body of men. [Hear, hear.] There are others who do not wish to abandon Canada, [hear, hear,] and who say that the measures we propose for the defence of the country are not such as they approve. [ Hear, hear.] There are, again, others who say that the best mode of defending Canada is not to defend her frontiers or any particular points, but rather to withdraw all our troops from the country and trust to our own powers of aggression upon the enemy’s frontiers to make him loosen his hold upon Canada, to relinquish any attempt at invasion, and to restore any territory which he may already have captured. Well, that would be a very plausible argument if those who use it could show what points in the United States are so vulnerable ás to admit of our attacking them with a fair prospect of success. [Hear, hear.] It is well known to the House that for several years past the Americans have been busily employed in fortifying their most vulnerable points; they have erected fortifications at all their great harbors; and even supposing that our navy could make an attack on those harbors and land 40,000 or 50,000 men, would it not be in the power of the United States, possessing such an army as they do now, to send 100,000 or 150,000 men into Canada, against whom no resistance could be made? [Hear, hear.] And we know that at the conclusion of a war to call upon one of the belligerents to give up a territory which he has completely occupied is a different thing from calling upon him to give up a territory which he has only partly overrun. [Hear, hear.] On the whole, I submit that the advocates of the other system have got to show much more clearly than they have shown yet where those weak points are to be found by an attack upon which, with a smaller expenditure of money and with fewer men, we should be able to defend Canada in case of emergency. [Hear, hear.] I believe that the majority of this House and the majority of the country do not agree with those who wish to give up our connexion with Canada, [hear, hear;] or with those who wish to defend Canada by refusing to fortify the Canadian territory. [Hear, hear.] I hope that the proposition of the government will be fully and calmly considered to-night. If it be so considered, I think the opinion of the House will be that the proposal is a reasonable one, affording every prospect of success, and calculated to meet with the approval both of the Canadians and the people of this country. [Cheers.] The noble marquis concluded by moving the vote of £811,400 for works, buildings, and repairs at home and abroad.

Mr. Bentinck, in moving that the item of £50,000 for the improvement of the defences at Quebec be omitted from the vote, said he should discuss the question in the spirit in which his noble friend the under-secretary for war had asked him to discuss it. He fully admitted what he believed to be the feeling of the country, that Great Britain was bound to maintain at any cost the integrity of the Canadian frontier; and it was in no opposition to that view he was about to make his remarks. He wished to observe, also, that except in one particular, to which he should presently allude, he thought that the report of Colonel Jervois, who bore the highest reputation as a military man, was worthy of the credence of Parliament and the country. He was desirous of saying, likewise, that he had no wish to embarrass her Majesty’s government in the conduct of what must be a most difficult and delicate affair. He could not be held guilty of raising, the question of the probability or the possibility of hostilities between the United States and this country, because the vote before the committee raised it, and he could not discuss that vote without considering the question so raised. His. first ground of objection to the item for the improvement of the defences of Canada was that, in the unfortunate event of a war between this country and the United States, this was not the right mode of defending the Canadian provinces. As he had stated on a former occasion, if we were to defend Canada at all it could only be done by sea; any attempt to defend Canada by land would be only a waste of men and money. He had stated his views on this subject when the navy estimates were before the House, but he had not said that if a war should arise between England and the United States we should put a stop to it by starving those States. What he had stated, and now repeated, was, that a war between two great countries, more especially countries like the United States and Great Britain, never could be brought to a termination by one or two great battles, but must be brought to an end by the financial or commercial exhaustion of one or other of the belligerents. He maintained that history bore him out in this view. As to the particular argument in the report of Colonel Jervois which was adopted by his noble friend, but from which he dissented, he thought he again had history in his favor, and that it was against the view of Colonel Jervois and his noble friend. The gallant colonel said that in the place of which he was writing military operations could only be conducted during six months of the year, and that, if we could erect and maintain such defences as would protect that portion of Canada against invasion for six months, for the other six months our labors were at an end. Now, he begged to deny that the passage which had been quoted, describing the siege of Quebec, afforded any proof whatever that a winter campaign could not be carried on in that country; he went further, and asserted that it afforded indubitable proof that it could be carried on. If his noble friend had read a little further he would have seen that the failure of the attempt was to be attributed to a chance shot which killed the general of the invading army. Whatever facilities might have existed for carrying on a winter campaign in 1775 were vastly increased now by the opening of railways, which were available all the year through. In fact, the difficulties of a winter campaign were, to a great extent, done away with. The noble lord forgot to mention that an invasion now, instead of being by 10,000 or 20,000 men, would be carried on by 100,000 or 200,000 men. That which was possible in 1775 could be done now with the greatest facility, and his noble friend was greatly mistaken, therefore, in assuming that there would be six months’ respite in the war. But not only was Quebec not exempt from attack during six months in the year, but there were six months in the year, on the contrary, when, fighting as we should be, under the enormous difficulty of having to carry our re-enforcements and supplies across the Atlantic, it would be impossible for us to throw re-enforcements and supplies into Quebec. That appeared to him the strongest argument against any attempt to erect defensive works on the Canadian frontier. Such an attempt would only end in a complete waste of money, without affecting the result of the war. But, assuming for the sake of argument that the proposed mode of proceeding was the correct one, were we going to work in the right way to carry out that suggestion? He believed not. His noble friend asked for £30,000 for commencing the defensive works in Canada, and no doubt he would tell them in the course of the discussion that he had asked for all which could be spent in one year. If that were the case, nothing would tend to show the utter hopelessness and absurdity of the proposal more than the fact that, owing to circumstances, they could only lay out £50,000 in the first year, and that it would take two or three years before the plan could be carried out. Certainly, if ever the contingency of a war with the northern States of America did arise, they would hardly be kind enough to wait until our system of fortifications was complete. If ever that unfortunate contingency should arise, it would as likely as not arise long before those fortifications were complete. Was it not, then, absurd to come down to the House and ask for money to commence works which might take three or four years to complete, and which were intended to meet a contingency as likely to occur within four months as four years? The whole scheme was utterly unworthy of the consent of Parliament. He objected, too, to the works, not only because they were inadequate to the defence of the Canadian frontier, but because they were likely to be a source of irritation in the northern States. [Hear, hear.] They were a great deal more likely to precipitate hostilities than to avert them. If the government really thought that it was necessary to take steps for the defence of the Canadian frontier, and if the House agreed in that opinion, he should be the last man to throw obstacles in the way; but he contended that it was most unbusinesslike to come down and ask for money which was to be spent in driblets, and was more likely than anything to create the emergency which was deprecated. Assuming, however, that his noble friend was perfectly correct in his suggestions, and that the plan he proposed was founded on the best information, and ought to be adopted, then after all it was only a portion of the scheme for the defence of the frontier. Fortifications without men were of little use, and it was to be presumed that the government had considered this question of manning these fortifications. It was said that 60,000 men would be required for the defence of the frontier, and that we were to give from 10,000 to 20,000. He should wish, first of all, to be informed by his noble friend where these 10,000 or 20,000 men were to come from. It had been stated in the House, and the government had not contradicted it, that we had not sufficient troops to furnish the requisite reliefs for the colonies, and that the difficulty would be increased greatly in a couple of years, when the regiments sent to India for the mutiny would have to be brought home. Where, then, were these 10,000 or 20,000 men to come from? Then we were told that this was to be a joint scheme of defence between the mother country and the colony. He wanted to know whether, if this scheme were adopted, there was any agreement which would bind the colonists to carry out their portion of it, because, according to the report of Colonel Jervois, a very large sum would be required to do that. Was the colony willing to construct the forts required, and to go to the expense of raising and keeping in an efficient condition the number of men that would be necessary to garrison them, and also a sufficient standing army? [Hear, hear.] These were points which the government ought to clear up. He came now to what, in his opinion, was the most important part of the case. His noble friend had said that this country hoped to maintain her naval superiority. They all hoped that. But in the report with which Colonel Jervois had furnished the government, and which he believed was the foundation of the present scheme, that officer, in summing up his plans of defence, had stated that the most important part was the arming of the rivers and lakes with iron-clad gunboats. [Hear, hear.] That statement of Colonel Jervois had been accepted by the noble lord, and it was admitted on all hands that those iron-clad gunboats, and a number of them sufficient to cover the whole river St. Lawrence upwards to the further part of the lakes, were indispensable. When the House was asked to vote a sum of money for the commencement of a scheme of this character, assuredly they ought to have some information as to how they were to provide for the most essential part of the design. [Hear, hear.] We did net possess, at this moment, such a thing as an iron-clad gunboat. There were old wooden gunboats rotting in the yards since the time of the Crimean war; but the government, acting on the plan of doing everything at the last moment, had neglected to provide iron-clad gunboats. Colonel Jervois, however, had distinctly stated that they must have such gunboats, and of a superior description. Now, the committee hada right to demand an answer from her Majesty’s government as to where these gunboats were to come from, and whether any preparations were being made for their construction. [Hear.] Was his noble friend, the secretary to the admiralty, after the chancellor of the exchequer had slipped his budget through the House with the greatest rapidity, to come down and ask a sum of money for the construction of these gunboats, or was there any other arrangement? Such gunboats as Colonel Jervois referred to were not to be constructed in a week, or a month. He should be glad to hear what length of time would be required to construct a sufficient number for the defence of Canada upon the plan proposed. The committee had a right to call upon her Majesty’s government to give a positive assurance that these gunboats were, or were about to be, put in hand, and that by the time the fortifications were completed they should have enough both of gunboats and of men ready to play their part in the defence of Canada. [Hear, hear.] There was only one point more. He would ask the government to bear in mind that they were about to take no trifling step when they asked for this vote of £50,000, but one the consequences of which no man could venture to calculate, either as regarded ourselves, or the influence it might have upon the defence of Canada. [Hear, hear.] He thought, with all deference to the committee, that they ought to pause before assenting to this vote; that they ought to have better information, in the first place, as to where the men were to be found, and, in the next place, as to the gunboats. He feared they were about to embark without sufficient advice and consideration upon a measure which, if it failed, might ultimately lead to a great disaster both to the honor and interests of this country. [Hear, hear.] He begged to move the omission of the sum of £50,000 for the defences of Quebec from the vote. [Hear, hear.]

General Peel. Although a great deal of the interest and importance attached to this vote has been already forestalled and anticipated by the debates which have taken place upon the subject of Canada, I shall, with the permission of the committee, offer a few remarks on the subject now before us. In the course of previous debates the House has, I think, expressed its opinion, with a degree of temper and moderation which does it the greatest credit, to the effect that, without casting the slightest doubt upon the good intentions or honor of the American government, this country has come to the determination that, if Canada be attacked by anybody, that attack should form a, casus belli, [cheers,] and that she would be defended with the whole strength of our armament, to be employed in such a manner as should be most beneficial to her interests. [Renewed cheers.] This I take to be the opinion of, at all events, the majority of this house, and, I am sure, of the majority of this country. [Cheers.] Entertaining this opinion myself, I shall now come to the consideration of the merits of the scheme proposed by her Majesty’s government. If I were to look at the proposed fortifications of Quebec merely with reference to the report of Colonel Jervois, I should incline to say that they were rendered necessary for the safe retreat of her Majesty’s forces in Canada in case it should be invaded, and I should look upon the position of our troops in those fortifications in much the same way as the minister looked upon that regiment of volunteers whose colonel wrote to say, upon the breaking out of war, that they would not under any circumstances leave the country, and the reply of the minister was that he was quite, satisfied provided they made one exception, and that was in case the country was invaded. [Laughter.] If that be the case with regard to the position of our troops in Canada, why you had better at once secure their safety and save your own money by withdrawing them, and adopting the principle of leaving the inhabitants to their fate, and seeking some other battle-field upon which to avenge their cause. [Hear, hear.] That is no new scheme at all, nor has anybody in the course of these debates had the merit of making this suggestion for the first time. More than two years ago, in 1862, Sir Francis Head, who is some authority upon this subject, after describing, in the first instance, the great extent of the frontier you will have to defend, goes on to say:

“Now, over such an enormous expanse of land and water, instead of our despatching troops, vessels, and ammunition to engage, not in regular warfare, but in an endless, costly, and ignominious game of ‘hide and seek,’ in which we might possibly lose more than we should be permitted to capture, let England proclaim that so long as Canada shall unequivocally evince the loyalty and attachment to Great Britain which have hitherto distinguished her, any unjustifiable invasion of her territory by the army of the adjoining republic shall, in the first instance, be instantly resented, not on her own soil, but by an infinitely cheaper and more efficacious punishment elsewhere. Thus, if the army of the government of the northern States fire Toronto and Hamilton, let England, instead of troubling herself to’ extinguish those distant flames, bombard and burn Boston and New York. If Canadian vessels are attacked on fresh water, let the injury be promptly avenged by the British navy throughout the ‘wide, rude,’ salt, aqueous surface of the globe.”

That might be very good advice merely in a military point of view, but there were other points of view. It would be very bad consolation for the inhabitants of Toronto and Hamilton who had been bombarded and burnt on your account to tell them that you intended to burn and bombard Boston and New York—which you would find it very difficult to do. [Hear, hear.] I think our position with regard to the Canadians, if we abandon them, would be very like that of the absentee landlord to his steward When the latter wrote to say that in consequence of his arbitrary and oppressive treatment his tenants had threatened to murder him, and the reply of the landlord was, “Tell the scoundrels if they think to intimidate me by shooting you they are very, much mistaken.” [Laughter.] I suppose we are to instruct the Canadians to tell any aggressor that if they think to punish England by massacring them they are very much mistaken. Now, I am totally opposed to this policy of abandoning the Canadians. [Hear, hear.] So long as they continue faithful subjects of her Majesty, and are prepared to defend themselves from aggression, I think that by every tie of blood and by every consideration which can actuate a great nation we are bound to protect them. [Cheers.] I attach value to this vote, because I look upon it as a declaration on the part of England that if Canada is attacked she will not be left to defend herself alone; and as that declaration will come from the House of Commons in the name of the English nation, I trust it will be more faithfully kept than other declarations which have been made of late to other countries. [Loud cheers.] Still, sir, the question remains as to the merits or demerits of the plan proposed. Now, nobody can have a higher opinion of the ability of Colonel Jervois than I have. So high is my opinion of him, that I feel perfectly certain that if he had had the least idea that a confidential report to the secretary of state for war would have been laid on the table of this house, he would have accompanied it by those explanations which the, secretary of state would no doubt obtain from him in private. [Hear, hear.] He would not have thought of publishing to the world the bare fact that the British troops are placed in Canada very much like scare-crows, and will be at the mercy of any assailant. [Hear.] As to the merits of the scheme, looking to the great extent of frontier, which it is impossible to defend, it is evidently of the last importance to prevent the enemy from taking possession of vital points in the country. You can only do this by means of fortifications, and I think it would be most unwise not to have recourse to them. In my opinion, Colonel Jervois’s report is much strengthened and supported by the fact that, the Canadians are ready to undertake their proportion of the proposed works.” I look upon them as a very sensible and intelligent people, and they have among them military men quite capable of judging of the sufficiency of these fortifications. If, therefore, they undertake their share, we may rest assured that these are very good and necessary works of defence. There remains, however, a question which has been alluded to, but has not yet been answered, Are the Canadians to carry on the works at Montreal themselves? Are the Montreal works to be carried on simultaneously with those at Quebec? and if the Canadians should find any difficulty in providing the money, will they be assisted by loan or by guarantee? In point of fact, is our undertaking to provide for the defences of Quebec dependent upon the performance by the Canadian’s of their part of the agreement? The government has been, with much justice, complained of for having been two or three years in possession of Colonel Jervois’s views upon this subject, and yet having taken no steps whatever to secure the safety of Quebec; for allowing valuable time to be wasted, and then, when the necessity is pressing, proposing to spend so small a sum as £50,000 in the course of the present year. [Hear, hear.] The answer of the government is, that so long as the Canadians did not show any disposition to defend themselves it was useless for us to do so. But I cannot help thinking that the government are themselves to blame for any backwardness which has heretofore existed on the part of the Canadians in this matter. It is all owing to the great mistake you made in sending out in such a hurry some 10,000 or 12,000 men at the time of the Trent affair. In my opinion this was a mistake, both as regards the Americans and the Canadians. It was a mistake as far as the Americans are concerned, because it was treating the American government with suspicion, as though they would not of their own motion pursue a course which was dictated by justice and by the law of nations. [Hear, hear.] You ought to have waited till they had refused compliance with the proper and the peremptory demand you made upon them for the return of the prisoners taken from under the protection of your flag. [Hear, hear.] This is one of the cases in which I think a minister should carry out in his public policy the same principles which he would act upon privately. If a neighbor’s servant committed against me an improper and wholly unjustifiable act, I should not go to his master for redress with a pistol in one hand and a horsewhip in the other, [hear;] I should express my belief that he would be very happy to have the opportunity of repudiating the act of his servant, and of doing me justice. [Hear.] But you never gave the Americans the opportunity of doing justice to you with credit to themselves. [Hear, hear.] You almost rendered it impossible for them to subdue that feeling of irritation and excitement which prevailed in their country, owing to the manner in which you made the demand upon them. [Hear, hear.] I know it is said by a great many people that it was owing to the spirited conduct of the noble lord that a war was prevented upon that occasion. But depend upon it that if the American government were not actuated by a sense of justice on that occasion—if they gave way merely because it was not convenient for them to go to war with you at that particular moment—you have not prevented war; you have only postponed it till it is convenient for them to make a similarly spirited demonstration. [Hear, hear.] It would have been better to have thrown upon them the responsibility of entering into an unjust war by refusing to act in accordance with the law of nations, and to give up the prisoners improperly taken by them. You would then have had with you the whole of this country to a man, and you would have had, at all events, the acknowledgment of every other nation that you were in the right. It is perfectly evident, therefore, that if the American government, in which you now place such confidence—I hope with good reason—were then ready to have acted justly, it would have been far better not to have sent troops to Canada. On the other hand, if the American government were not prepared to have done this, there was still greater reason why you should not have sent troops to Canada, for, according to Colonel Jervois—

“It is a delusion to suppose that that force,” meaning the regular force now maintained in Canada, “can be of any use for the defence of the country without fortifications to compensate for the comparative smallness of its numbers. Even when aided by the whole of the local militia that could at present be made available, it would, in the event of war, be obliged to retreat before the superior numbers by which it would be attacked; and it would be fortunate if it succeeded in embarking at Quebec, and putting to sea without serious defeat.”

I need not remind the committee that at the time these troops were sent out to Canada no fortifications or defences were available there, and therefore a great mistake was committed as regards the Americans. But the mistake was no less serious as regards the Canadians, because you led them to believe that you were prepared to undertake the entire defence of the country against any attack made upon them on your account. [Hear, hear.] Andit would have been no wonder if this feeling existed. The quarrel was yours, not theirs, and we can’t be surprised if they desired to throw the whole burden of their defence upon your shoulders, thinking it a sufficient hardship if their country were made the battle-field throughout the war. I say it was natural, then, that they should show no great anxiety to be ruined on your behalf. But now the case is different. It is certain that the Canadians are prepared to make every effort in their power for their own defence, and I think you are bound to assist them. [Hear, hear.] I do hope that if ever they should be assailed they will be able, with your assistance, to maintain their independence, and I never will believe that her Majesty holds any portion of her dominions by the forbearance of a neighboring power. [Cheers.] I trust that so great a calamity as war with America may never occur, and I am certain that, whatever causes of dispute may occur between the two nations, no occasion for war will arise if those differences are treated in the spirit which ought to prevail between two great nations. At the same time, while we have no right to complain of any act done by the Americans in order to secure themselves from attack upon their Canadian frontier, neither ought the American government to be in the least annoyed at the fortifications now proposed. By their very nature they are for defence, and not for aggression; and as for this vote, it is rendered absolutely necessary for the reconstruction of the defences of Quebec. The only ground of surprise is that such a work should not have been completed before, without any reference to apprehended attack on Canada. [Hear.] I shall, therefore, give my vote for the sum proposed by the noble marquis, and I take it for granted that if this sum is voted the House of Commons will stand pledged for the completion of the whole work—that is to say, the government will at once be able to enter into contracts for its completion; at all events, to the extent of the sum mentioned in the margin; for no contractors will supply the necessary plans if the sum now voted may be the limit of expenditure, and if there is a possibility that next year the House will refuse to proceed with the works. [Hear, hear.],

Mr. Butler Johnstone thought it would have a bad effect in Canada if, for any reasons, the proposed vote should be rejected, and he confessed that he felt the deepest disappointment at the smallness of the sum which the government proposed to take for the defences of Canada. [Hear, hear.] Still, he believed that by the expenditure of the £50,000 Quebec could be made, through the means of earthworks, more defensible than at present. He conceived that more money ought to be expended by the government in enabling the Canadians to carry out the great works of railways, by which their sparse and scattered population might be gathered together on emergencies. He concurred in thinking that this country, if ever it went to war with America, must trust in a great measure to the enterprise of its seamen, and therefore it was a great mistake that Bermuda and Halifax had not been put in a proper state of defence. It was from the latter place that, by means of a railway joining Quebec, provisions and materials of war might be conveyed to the British troops. The weak point in the American armor was not on the American frontier, or in the Atlantic, but it Was in the Pacific, and he looked in vain for any vote in the estimates for defences on the Pacific side. At present British cruisers in the Pacific went to San Francisco to refit; but if that port were shut they would be obliged to go to Valparaiso, for there was no other point where they could refit; but a capacious harbor in Vancouver Island might be made a safe place for refitting the vessels. He would even go further, and say Hong-Kong and points in Australia should be placed in a state of defence. He admitted that great expenditure would be required for what he suggested, but so long as this country maintained the position of a great empire it must be ready to bear the accompanying liabilities. Nothing had been done of late years to put the British possessions all over the world in a proper state of defence. Parliament had not grudged £9,000,000 for fortifications in this country, and Canada, it should be borne in mind, was part of the British empire. A defeat in the Atlantic or Pacific would wound the honor of, England as much as if it occurred in the British Channel or the Thames. For these reasons he was of opinion, without meaning that a huge vote should be proposed, that something should be done to place the British possessions all over the world in a proper state of defence. He was ready to assent to the proposed vote of £50,000, and though he regretted that it was not larger, still he hoped it would have some good effect in showing that this country was willing with all her resources to defend Canada. [Hear, hear.]

Major Anson said that though this country had had colonies to defend before now, yet England had never been placed in the same position as she was at present with respect to Canada. In case of war with America she would have to carry on operations at a distance of 3,000 miles, with the communications closed for six months of the year, and would have to defend a frontier of 600 miles. [Hear.] It was proposed to defend three points—Quebec, Montreal, and the peninsula of Toronto; and at each, British troops were to be placed. To provide those troops with the necessary supplies the communications with them must be kept up, and the geographical position of Canada was such that the whole frontier must be defended to keep up the communications. A force of 100,000 men would be required between Quebec and Montreal, and another force of 300,000 men between Montreal and Upper Canada. If a war should break out the Americans had hundreds of thousands of veterans ready to fall upon Canada, and even with the force of artillery which this country possessed it could hardly claim to compete with America. He believed that the American army had a larger proportion of artillery to the number of men than any other army in the world, and they had, besides, siege, transport, and commissariat trains. On the other hand, the means of transit to the frontier on the Canadian side were limited, and it was impossible for this country to dream of defending Canada for one moment. Then, again, the cost of a war carried on in that quarter must be calculated. During the last four years of war in America the recklessness of blood and money had been greater than any nation ever exhibited before in the prosecution of a war. He did not see exactly how this country could keep up the supplies of men necessary to carry on the exhausting struggle which it would have to maintain in Canada against the Americans. [Hear, hear.] Were where the men to come from? There was nobody in that house had a higher opinion of the capabilities of the British army than himself; but an army ought to be proportionate in point of numbers to the duties it would have to undertake in time of war. He did not think the British army had that proper proportion; and at the time of the war in the Crimea the real reason of the failures there was the attempt that was made to get the work of 20,000 men out of 10,000 men. In like manner, the real cause of the mutiny in India was the attempt to keep in subjection the native army of 280,000 men by means of 18,000 European troops. A great deal more work was always expected to be got out of the British army than it could possibly do. [Hear, hear.] After the Indian mutiny was over they had a war with China. They sent off a force of some 6,000 troops, and told them to march to Pekin, the capital of an empire with 400,000,000 inhabitants, and they did it. But all that was perfect child’s play compared with what they were about to undertake, in the event of a war with America. [Hear, hear.] There they would not have ten Sepoys or ten Tartars with their bows and arrows or their matchlocks against one Englishman, but they would have to face Anglo-Saxons, men of their own race, with all their own indomitable energy, courage, and perseverance. [Hear, hear.] For every gun that England brought, no matter of what power, the Americans could bring ten; for every gun-boat she put upon the lakes and the St. Lawrence they could put ten, and more too, if they chose to try it. [Hear.] With the small army which England possessed, and with the very great demands made upon it all over her extended empire, they ought not to allow her to drift into a great military war with America, of which they would possibly see no end. Canada herself ought to perceive that it was no part of the duty of England to shed the blood of her soldiers in that colony. If the Canadians wanted a standing army, let them raise it for themselves, and let them rest content with the maritime and other efficient aid which England could render them. England certainly was not called upon by her honor to send troops to fight in Canada, especially when all knew that it was hopeless. With regard to the £50,000 for Quebec, which they were now called upon to vote, he wished to ask the under-secretary for war, if Colonel Jervois had been told to place Quebec in a sufficient state of defence before the next winter set in, whether he would have said he could or could not? That, he thought, was what the government ought to have done. Instead of asking for that £50,000, they should have sent out an engineer, and told him to put Quebec in an adequate state of defence before the winter no matter at what cost. [Hear, hear.] The honorable and gallant member concluded by thanking the committee for according him a patient hearing.

Mr. Adderley said that the honorable and gallant member who had just spoken seemed to make out that Canada was the only country in the world which it was impossible to defend; but, for himself, he could not conceive that she was in a different position from other states in Europe and other parts of the world which had powerful neighbors on their frontier, but which, he maintained, were somehow or other defensible. The question was, how was the frontier of Canada to be defended? If the proposal on the part of the government was that England was to undertake the defence of Canada, then he could understand the honorable and gallant member’s argument that they were undertaking what was impossible. But he did not apprehend that the government were undertaking anything of the kind. The proposition they were discussing was the first vote towards fortifying Quebec, and what did they undertake by that proposition? Certainly not to defend the Canadian frontier, but to provide for the security of the troops they now had there, and also for the security of stores which they now had there of great value. Last session he called the attention of the House, and then not for the first time, to that very point, and he did so with these two objects: first, the security of British troops in the north, whom he felt to be in a most precarious and exposed position; and, secondly, in order that this country might as soon as possible come to a clear understanding with Canada as to how much Canada was to undertake for herself, and how much England was prepared to undertake for her. [Hear.] It was because he conceived that the vote now before the committee tended to accomplish both those objects that he should give it his cordial assent. [Hear, hear.] It was all very well to say it was quite impossible for this country to defend 2,000 miles of frontier in Canada. It was perfectly true that such a thing would be absurd and impossible, but would anybody, would the honorable and gallant member who had just spoken, or the right honorable member for Calne, (Mr. Lowe,) or the honorable member for West Norfolk, (Mr. Bentinck,) ask the committee to come to the conclusion from those premises that they should either leave the troops they now had in Canada exposed as they were, or should withdraw them thence altogether? [Hear, hear.] Was there anybody who would withdraw those troops at this moment? [Mr. Lowe: “Hear, hear.”] The right honorable member for Calne said “hear, hear,” but he stood alone. Nobody else shared his views on that point. And if nobody but the right honorable gentleman would withdraw the troops at that moment, would anybody venture to say that if they were to remain they should remain without fortifications? When Colonel Jervois made his report, it was proposed that this country should undertake to fortify not only Quebec, but Montreal also, and that the Canadians should undertake to raise fortifications at three other points on their frontier, viz: Kingston, Toronto, and Hamilton. When that proposal was made, he, himself, ventured to suggest that it would be wiser if this country only undertook to fortify Quebec, and made it perfectly clear to the Canadians that if works at other points were essential for the defence of their frontier, they themselves must undertake to fortify all those other places. And what was his meaning in that? Why, that Canada should distinctly understand that if we were to fortify Quebec, it was not with a view to defend their whole frontier, but to defend our own troops, and to secure our own stores, which we had there to the value of about a million sterling, and that the defence of their frontier was to be undertaken by the Canadians themselves, the only people who could undertake it. Before that time Canada had been trusting to a broken reed in relying for her defence upon England, while we, on the other hand, talked a vague sort of rhodomontade, saying that as long as Canada was loyal and attached to us we should protect her, when we knew that under the circumstances the thing would be impossible. Moreover, it would be absurd, even if we could, to relieve any part of the empire from the duty of self-defence—a duty which patriotism and self-respect imposed upon men worthy of freedom [Hear.] By our fortifying Quebec alone we should show the Canadians that we meant only to protect our own troops and stores; that all other fortifications which might be needed on their frontier must be provided by themselves; and that the rest of our share in defending them in the event of war would be performed by sea, in attempting to cut off the enemy’s commerce, or in attacking his most vulnerable points. [Hear, hear.] He would ask the right honorable member for Calne, who alone proposed that we should now withdraw our troops, whether he knew what the state of Canada was at this moment—whether he knew that she was only now, for the first time, seriously undertaking her own defence, and that she could not put forth her own strength without the assistance of a certain number of regular troops? If the right honorable gentleman did not wish Canada to go entirely undefended, why did he wish this country to take a step which would absolutely disable the Canadians from defending themselves? Our troops in Canada, now about 9,000 in number, were scattered in half battalions along 2,000 miles of frontier. That was certainly a precarious position for any troops to be in; but it was at present unavoidable, unless we meant to leave the whole of Canada at the mercy of the United States, or any enemy that might attack it. Last year he had proposed that those troops should be concentrated, and the government favored that proposal; but the necessity of providing military schools, as it were, at different places in the colony for the training and discipline of the provisional levies [hear, hear,] now prevented the carrying out of that concentration. That being so, how could we leave 9,000 British troops in the present aspect of affairs in North America without any place of strength on which in case of extremity they could fall back? He fully concurred with the right honorable member for Calne as to the mischief which was done by the presence of those troops; and nothing but an overriding necessity justified our having them there. They were like the red flag held out at a bullfight. [Hear.] They were an incentive to the very attacks which they were put there to ward off. [Hear.] That was a great mischief. Another mischief was that these troops were looked upon as a pledge on the part of England to undertake the defence of Canada, which was far more than was meant by England in sending them there. The third mischief was in diverting the attention of this country from its chief means of defending Canada— namely, by sea—and in leading us to look mainly to its defence by land. He would allow the truth of what had been said by Sir F. B. Head, long before the speech of the right honorable member for Calne, that—putting out of question the conveyance of a sufficient number of troops 3,000 miles across the Atlantic, and the impossibility of bringing the recent inventions of war to the aid of the English forces—the English army would be firing guineas in such a war, while the United States army would be only firing shillings in return. [Hear, hear.] He entertained great hopes that when the English troops in that country had done their work, and had developed the strength of Canada, it might be possible to withdraw them and to make the Canadians a present of the fortress of Quebec, in order that they might defend it for themselves. [Hear, hear.] These considerations did not, however, lead him to consent to the withdrawal of the English troops at the present moment. On the contrary, he would leave them there, in order that they might aid the Canadians in developing their own resources and powers of self-defence. It was said that war with the United States was only a remote possibility, and that the Americans were too sagacious a people to draw upon themselves a powerful enemy at a moment of exhaustion. The sagacity of the Americans was, however, leading them to fortify their seaboards. Not only so, but for some reason or other, known, of course, to themselves, they were not waiting for the completion of their permanent fortifications, but were actually throwing up temporary fortifications in readiness for any emergency. [Hear, hear.] If there was any lesson to be learnt from these events, it was that steps should be taken on our part corresponding to those taken by them in contemplation of the possibility of a rupture with this country. His only regret was that this vote was not passed a year ago. He regretted the delay that had taken place in commencing the proposed fortification of Quebec, but he felt bound to add that he fully acquitted the secretary of state of any blame. It was obviously necessary that this country should not take the initiative in fortifying any part of the American continent. [Hear.] If this country had taken the initiative, we should only have repressed the spirit of the Canadians, and rendered it almost impossible for the Canadian government to obtain any votes for fortifying the frontier. It was necessary for the secretary of state to wait until the Canadians had shown some proof on their part that they were as much in earnest as ourselves in defending their country against aggression. There was now ample proof of the spirit of the Canadian people, and it could only be repressed by uncertain relations with the mother country. Nothing could show the spirit of the Canadians more than the way in which, when the volunteers marched to the frontier the other day, the men, women, and children joined in cheering them upon taking the first step in the defence of the country. He trusted that this feeling would be kept up by such measures as were indicated by the present vote. It had been said that Colonel Jervois’s report showed the necessity of supplying the Canadians with gunboats., He could not agree in this opinion, but we ought to encourage them in the formation of dock-yards upon their lakes, to furnish them with artificers, and thus enable them to build for themselves a sufficient number of gun-boats for the defence of their frontier. He must confess his disappointment in regard to the part taken by New Brunswick in the defence of the Canadian federation. New Branswick appeared to be holding back, as if in the expectation that her defence would be undertaken by the mother country. He did not suppose it was the intention of the government to put any pressure upon New Brunswick. It was not the business of the imperial government to press any of the colonies into the federation against their will, but if it became clear, that any maritime province of North America was holding back from an undue reliance on British protection, it ought to be cautioned against an exclusive reliance upon that protection. [Hear, hear.] He would assure the government that he most cordially supported the vote, and trusted that it was an indication that further measures would be taken on their part to assure the Canadians that England would support them if they would take the proper steps to defend themselves. [Hear, hear.]

Lord Bury said that, having some acquaintance with Canada, he wished to make one or two observations on this vote. The first question in every mind was whether England would defend Canada. He believed that there were not three men within the walls of that House who did not believe that the matter was already settled for us. Every one had concluded that it was inconsistent with the dignity of Great Britain to yield up to the ravages of a foreign army any possession that formed part of the territory of the Crown. [Hear, hear.] That question might be regarded, then, as already settled. During the whole time that Canada had been under the protection of the British Crown, it had been known that any attack on its frontier would be an attack made upon England. [Hear.] If England ever came to a different conclusion, it would be her duty to give the Canadians notice of the termination of. that understandings but until we had done so, and until the period of that notice had expired, no one would think it consistent with the duty of the English government to recommend the discontinuance of that protection. He would not say that at some future time Canada would not be obliged to defend itself, or that the time might not soon come when the Canadians would be in a condition to declare their independence. Many things had, however to come to pass before that event occurred, and it would be necessary to give notice of the intention of this country to withdraw from its protection of Canada, and to give the Canadians time to organize a system of defence for themselves. There was only one possible enemy by whom the Canadas could be attacked, and on all hands we were frightened by the immense forces at the disposal of the United States. He quite admitted that within the last few years the United States had made extraordinary progressive strides, and had risen to be one of the first military nations in the world. They had at their command vast resources, and, as his honorable and gallant friend behind him had said, they had two or three guns, and could put in the field five or six men for every gun and man that we could put forward. Could we help that, and was it by exaggerating the forces of an enemy that we could get out of the difficulty in which we were now placed? All we could do was frankly to recognize the power of an enemy, and to take the best means in our power to render his attacks of no avail. [Hear, hear.] He confessed that to him it did not seem probable that we should be subjected to any attack at all. [Hear, hear.] Looking at the United States we found that they had been waging a great war for a great cause, and at great cost to themselves. They had made immense exertions and expended an enormous amount of blood and treasure; and they had accumulated a debt beside which our own sank into insignificance. [“No, no.”] The debt might not be as large as ours at the present moment, but it had been created in a few years, while ours was the growth of centuries, and before the war was ended, no doubt, they would have accumulated burdens far in excess of any which this country could show. [Hear, hear.] After such a struggle the exhaustion consequent on such tremendous exertions must necessarily be felt, and even supposing the war were to terminate in the entire subjection of the south, enormous garrisons would have to be maintained in order to hold the country which they had conquered. [Hear, hear.] Was it likely that to the south, disaffected and ready to rise in fresh rebellion at any moment when the strong hand keeping them down was removed or weakened, the United States would desire to add a north equally disaffected to their rule and equally consisting of an Anglo-Saxon race, who, moreover, not having yet suffered any sacrifices, would come fresh to the encounter? [Hear, hear.] It did not seem within the bounds of probability that the United States, whatever their aggressive spirit—upon which he offered no opinion—would rash blindly and for no possible reason [hear, hear] from one great war hardly terminated into the jaws of another. It was, therefore, likely that we should have a breathing space to perfect our defences against the enemy—if enemy he proved to be. Still, though we might never be attacked, it was plainly our duty to stand prepared [hear, hear,] and, in his firm opinion, the proposals made by her Majesty’s government were the wisest means of preparation. The right honorable and gallant gentleman opposite had been very satirical in his comments upon the government for making a point d’appui at Quebec, behind which the English soldiers could retire in case of disaster befalling them. But the great master of the art of war formed the lines at Torres Vedras, and did any Englishmen think that in doing so the Duke of Wellington had degraded the honor of England? [Cheers.] The wisest thing that government could possibly do was to put Quebec in such a state of defence that, in case of disaster, not only the English troops, but the Canadians who might be fighting with them, should have a safe place to resort to. [Hear.] Naval superiority on our part had been asserted again and again to be indispensable to the defence of Canada. But, unless our navy had some point of concentration, such as Quebec, how was that naval superiority to be maintained? He knew Quebec well, every inch of it, he might say, having lived there for years; and at the present moment Quebec undoubtedly was on the wrong side of the river for military and strategic purposes, though it was different informer days, when military operations were conducted on a system now exploded. Any gentleman who had visited Quebec would remember that it was built on the slope of a hill, and that from the height opposite almost every part of the citadel would be commanded by long-range cannon. The outworks, therefore, must be transferred to the Point Levi shore; and according to the modern system of fortifications, which trusted a good deal more to earthworks than to masonry, earthworks, casemates, and works of that description must constitute the future defences of Quebec. Second only in importance to the defence of Quebec was the defence of Montreal. At that point the river took a circular sweep round the island of Montreal. Above were the rapids, and on the right towards New York the road by which the enemy advancing from the United States must come into Canada. Strategic reasons existed now, as they had done throughout all history, proving that this was the only road by which an enemy could enter Canada. In the war which began in 1755 there were two campaigns, and the only successful force which ever advanced out of the United States territory came by way of Montreal. The peculiar conformation of the current round Montreal gave great facilities for making a line of defence round the head of the Grand Trunk railway bridge, and would enable our gunboats stationed a little below the town to command almost the whole of the line of works, and thereby materially to assist in the defence of the place. There was no doubt that fortifications such as he had described could be held with ease by a very small English and Canadian force during the six months that operations were possible in Canada. In winter everybody acquainted with that country must know that it was impossible to do more than keep the great roads; and consequently a small defensive force would have great facilities in resisting a large aggressive force which, finding it impossible to deploy, would be unable to make use of its numbers. In case any attempt of this kind were made, a few men on snow-shoes would easily cut the line of communications; and, therefore, during the winter the enemy would be obliged to retire to his base of operations. The defences of Upper Canada remained to be considered. A frontier upwards of 1,400 miles in length it would be impossible to defend without an enormous outlay of money and without sending into Canada more troops than we possessed. It was, therefore, only possible to retain possession of these two strategic points— Montreal, by which the enemy would come, and Quebec, behind which our troops would rally if unfortunately there should be occasion to do so. These were the principal points on which the committee ought to concentrate their attention. No doubt, as the numbers and discipline of the Canadian militia increased and as means became available, it would be necessary and easy to fortify Toronto, Hamilton, and Kingston; but these works must be left over for the present. We were now, as stated on all hands, in presence of a great and immediate danger. [“No.”] He did not believe in the existence of the danger, but he did believe in the necessity of being prepared; and the proposal of the government to fortify Quebec and Montreal on the Principle he had mentioned was, he thought, the best mode in which that very desirable object could be carried into effect. Having some personal knowledge of the country, he only wished to make a few practical remarks. [Hear, hear.] He felt it would be an injustice in any one who had lived among the Canadian population not to say, when such a matter as this was under discussion, that he believed they were in temper, in bone and sinew, in manners, like ourselves, and able and willing to defend themselves. Like ourselves, they had representative government in Canada. Having conceded that to them— having made them free, we could not be surprised if, when under circumstances of great internal difficulty a militia bill was presented to them, they took occasion to turn out an unpopular government. We did not like that proceeding, because we wished them to make provision for their own defence. But, having given them responsible government, we could not blame them for exercising it. Now that difficulty was swept away; the very men who rejected the militia bill were, he believed, ready to do far more than had ever yet been proposed to put Canada in a state of defence. Even those who had been turned out were ready to join with them, seeing the necessity of being prepared. It was not, he believed, the wish of the Canadian people to throw the burden of their defence on this country; they were prepared to take their fair share of it. He believed they would in a very short time see a highly efficient force organized in Canada by the same means which had been adopted in England—by the raising of a volunteer force. There were a large number of sergeants of the regular army all through Canada, and if a large body of men had been raised here and rendered not unworthy to stand by the side of any soldiers, he could not doubt, out of the same materials among the Canadian population, a force equally efficient would in a short time be produced. But they had the disadvantage of living among a sparsely settled population. They had also the additional disadvantage of having to sacrifice enormously high wages to attend drill; but now they knew it was necessary to provide against a danger which could only be averted by being prepared for it, they would no doubt be immediately at their post. [Hear.]

Mr. Watkin did not quite agree with the policy which this vote indicated. It went either too far or not far enough. It did not go far enough to give confidence, but it went far enough to increase the irritation of feeling on the frontier. The government ought to tell the House from the information received by the last mail what were our relations with the United States. Was it true that notice had been given for the termination of the reciprocity treaty, unaccompanied by the expression of any desire on the part of the government at Washington to renew the operation of that excellent treaty? Was it true, on the other hand, that the passport system in Canada had been abolished, and that some intimation had been made to our government that the government of the United States had no intention to put gunboats on the lakes, as had been announced a few months ago? These were important considerations, and should influence the decision of the committee. He should have been disposed to move an amendment in terms somewhat like the following:

That before entering on the consideration of erecting fortifications on the Canadian frontier the House consider it more desirable to address themselves to negotiations at Washington, with the view, if possible, of avoiding the construction of works which would prevent that neutralization of the lakes which had existed so advantageously for the last fifty years. The United States could hardly be prepared to enter on a race of expenditure for fortifications on both sides of the frontier; but if we fortified on one side, we must expect them to fortify on another. And if appealed to, as the Emperor of the French had been appealed to, with reference to the commercial treaty, he could not help thinking the plain common sense of the American people would see the interest they had in putting down this expenditure, and thereby set an example to all states having an illusory frontier line. But the government did not appear disposed to undertake these negotiations. They would spend money first, and then negotiate. They would allow some great evil to happen, and remonstrate afterwards. We had been for some months without an ambassador at Washington, and we had now sent a gentleman there who was certainly not of the first order of diplomatists. Had he gone? or were affairs still to be left in the hands of Mr. Burnley, who everybody knew was utterly unfit to meet on equal terms the able men of whom Mr. Lincoln’s cabinet was composed? [Laughter.] What had taken place since the 17th of December? Had the system of these passports not produced great irritation, and was it not most unfortunate that at this moment we had no minister in Washington? Since he entered the House a letter had been placed in his hands from a gentleman at Portland, in which he stated that some eighteen passengers by the Belgian having arrived without passports, they had been detained by order of General Dix, and they were then guarded by a squadron of American soldiers. That was certainly carrying things with a high hand. He did not mention this to increase the irritation, but it was no use having an embassy at Washington if our embassador was not at his post; and we ought to have the ablest man we could find to negotiate with the Americans, who looked upon it as a slight if we did not send to Washington a man of the first rank as a diplomatist. Our fellow-subjects in Canada ought to be assured that if an unjust war took place we would stand by them, and, on the other hand, we should not do anything that would be likely to prevent the renewal of the reciprocity treaty, or raise up any bitter feelings between the British provinces and the United States, and still further alienate the two peoples. For every interest and for the sake of civilization this ought as far as possible to be avoided. [Hear, hear.]

Mr. Haliburton, who was indistinctly heard, was understood to say he wished to disabuse the minds of honorable gentlemen with reference to the probability of a war with America. He knew something of Canada. Sixty winters passed over his head in that country before he removed to this, and he would venture to say that he knew something of the climate and of the people. [Hear, hear.] He had not the least notion that the Americans wished or intended a war with this country. They were too sagacious a people for that. [A laugh, and “hear.”] They knew their own interest too well, and they also knew their utter inability to annex the British provinces. Those were two very sufficient reasons against the American people entertaining such a foolish project. The noble lord who spoke just now (Lord Bury) alluded to the debt of the United States, and he had not understood its amount. It was a larger debt, taken with its interest, than the debt of this country. When the United States made peace with the secessionists, one of two things would have to take place in their finances. They must repudiate their debt altogether, or the people must submit to be heavily taxed for the interest which would have to be paid. There was no country in the world so impatient of taxation as America, and it had been so from its earliest history. [Hear.] In-deed, so much so had this been the case that every expedient of borrowing and confiscating and every plan of raising money by loans had been adopted in preference to allowing taxes to be levied. There was a great security in this fact. If the American government repudiated the debt, which was principally due to their own people, the people would not trust the government again with the sinews of war; and if they had to pay taxes to raise the interest upon the debt, where was the money to come from for a war with England? An utter exhaustion must take place after the terrible struggle in which they were now engaged. He would, therefore, put aside altogether any probability of a war between this country and America. A good deal of irritation had taken place, and there had been some cause for it. [Hear, hear.] The Alabama unfortunately escaped from this country, and it naturally led the American people to suspect that we had favored her escape. This and other things naturally gave rise to a good deal of irritation, and a good deal of rough language had been used in the American papers, which never were famous for truth or mildness of expression, especially towards this country. But it was all “Buncombe” [Laughter.] It meant nothing. If it meant anything it was but to alarm the people, who were truthful themselves and naturally believed others when they asserted anything solemnly, and to prevent them from recognizing the true feelings of this country towards them. With respect to the reciprocity treaty, of which they had heard so much, the whole loss of it would fall upon the Americans. It was entirely in their favor, as every other treaty was that had been made with them by this country. Their fisheries were protected, and they acquired a right of land in uninhabited parts of the provinces to dry their fish and spread their nets. Their principal articles of “lumber” were obtained from Canada, there being little or none in the back States, and they got them duty free, which was a great advantage. Canada had a population equal to that of the United States at the time of the rebellion. They could see, therefore, what three millions of determined people could do if their rights were invaded. The Americans succeeded in resisting the whole power of this empire, and we could give the Canadians credit for as much pluck as the Americans possessed if an attack were to be made upon them. [Hear, hear.] There was a time in the history of Canada when the people had a good deal of sympathy for the American form of government, but they had grown wiser as they had grown older, and they had seen that a great country, with a cheap government, and no army or navy, had now as heavy burdens as the old country. The Canadians felt now that if amalgamated with America they would be swallowed up by the immensity of that country, and they wished to have nothing to do with it. It had been stated by an honorable gentleman that a winter campaign might take place; but when that honorable gentleman had lived sixty years in Canada he would know more about the winter. None but those who knew the climate could have any idea of it. The horses, with the exception of a few that drew small sledges through the streets for the necessary traffic, were all sent away to winter quarters. They could not be moved about. The severity of the winter in the open country was so great that language could not express it. The thermometer gave no idea of it. A man must feel it in his face, and in his fingers and toes, to obtain a correct notion of it. They were told, that General Montgomery made an attack in the dead of winter, and that General Grant might do the same, if he had the time and opportunity. There was a vast difference between a small body of men travelling through the woods, where they were protected from the cold wind, and an army moving in the open and desolate country. It was utterly impossible for men to carry on a war in Canada during the winter. Provisions could not be conveyed to the army. One honorable gentleman had talked of the facilities offered by railways running into Quebec. There was only one railway, and that was on the other side of the river. Sometimes, for seven or eight days in the winter the railway was not to be seen, and they had to dig it out of the snow. [Laughter.] He wras anxious that no offence should be given in that debate to the colonies. Canada had done, he thought, all that could be reasonably expected of her. With reference to this question of defence she had had the assurance of this country that it was prepared to assist her, and, as it had been said, that to attack Canada was to attack England. While relying upon that assistance, it would be a disgraceful thing if this country should desert her now because an idea was entertained that there was some probability of a war with America. If we thought it was not convenient to have an alliance with Canada, then it would be better to separate at once. The Canadians were a very fine people, and as long as the Americans behaved honestly and acted properly towards them they would be likely to display a reciprocal good feeling. The people of Canada were, moreover, perfectly loyal, and very much attached to this country; indeed, he did not think that in Canada a disloyal man, of any sector creed, or color, was to be found. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, he was sorry to say, did not deserve the same praise in that respect, and he hoped the secretary for the colonies would show that he was aware that such was the case. It was not easy to coerce them, but he trusted the right honorable gentleman would let them understand how matters stood. Those two colonies were equally anxious for British connexion, but when, some years ago, responsible government was granted to them, it was unaccompanied by any definition to preclude the possibility of everybody putting upon it his own meaning. By some, therefore, it was construed in the most extensive and liberal sense, as operating to cut off all British influence, and to make the colonies completely independent; and thus it was that they came to be cursed with demagogues, who made use of all sorts of arguments in support of their views, and who, being possessed of a good deal of talent and very little property, [a laugh,] appealed to the prejudices and passions of the people, and led them astray. But to advert more particularly to the fortresses which were about to be erected, it was contended that when constructed there would not be a sufficient number of soldiers to man them. Colonial history, however, appeared to furnish a very different lesson. General Braddock, for instance, had led a very fine army into the interior of the country, and it was routed by a few militia. General Burgoyne had surrendered his whole army to a common farmer, who had raised the population, and deprived him of supplies, while Lord Cornwallis met with a similar reverse. That being so, it was clear that troops disciplined after the model of European forces were not absolutely necessary for the defence of the colonies. Soldiers extemporized for the occasion, provided they were properly officered, would serve the purpose very well. The colonies themselves, then, possessed all the materials for resistance. They were interspersed with wood and lake, and no battle-field like Waterloo was to be found through out the country. It was, however, desirable that there should be a small force of British troops to give the colonists confidence and steadiness, and he had no doubt they would then be found equal to the occasion. He would only add that he should have great pleasure in voting in favor of the proposed scheme, and that he was glad the debate had not taken such a turn as to render it necessary that he should say a single unpleasant word with regard to the Americans, who were not over-particular as to the way in which they carried on the war in which they were engaged. [Hear.]

Mr. J. S. Lefevre said that in dealing with the question before the committee he was actuated by no feeling of sordid economy, but his belief was that there was no difference between us and the United States which might not be settled by means of amicable arrangement. There were, in his opinion, political reasons which rendered it far better for Canada, as well as ourselves, that we should not commence the proposed fortifications with the intention of stationing in that colony a large force of British troops. There were two grounds on which war might break out between us and the United States, the one of which might originate with Canada and the other with England; and it appeared to him that the one country ought to be in a position to repudiate, if it should deem right, the policy pursued by the other. Let him suppose that the cause of war had its origin with us. Ought not Canada to be able to say, “We have nothing to do with the matter; it arises out of no policy of ours?” as, for instance, in the case of the Trent, to which the right honorable and gallant gentleman opposite had referred. So, also, with reference to the steam rams. The Canadians were never consulted upon the policy which should be pursued in that case; and therefore they ought to have been in a position to have repudiated all responsibility for it, and, if necessary, to have declined to participate in any war with America to which it must have led. In the same way, if a war had arisen out of the St. Albans raid, the people of England ought not to have been necessarily involved in it. The general opinion was, he believed, that up to a certain time the Canadian government were somewhat remiss in taking measures to secure the performance of their obligations as neutrals; but that after they saw the danger of their position nothing could be alleged against them. Supposing, however, that the Canadian legislature had not in time taken steps to prevent the recurrence of such an event, our government would justly have been entitled to refuse to engage in any war with America which might thus have been produced. But our troops being there, if the Americans had attacked Canada, we might have been involved in war before either our government or Parliament had had any opportunity of discussing the question. In both aspects, therefore, it was a matter of extreme importance that Canada should be enabled to occupy a neutral position in the event of a war occurring between this country and America. What had happened during the last three years might happen again; but he did not, however, anticipate the occurrence of difficulties which could not be settled by arbitration, and if difficulties should arise it would, in his opinion, be a great crime on the part of this country if it did not take every means to prevent their leading to hostilities with America. No doubt many things had been done in both countries during the last four years which he might wish undone; but he did not think that anything had occurred on either side which was likely to lead to war. On the contrary, he believed that the observance of neutrality in this country had assumed a noble attitude, for which, at the conclusion of the war, he hoped that she would obtain full credit; and he regretted the commencement of this new system of armaments and forts in Canada, because it would not conduce to the maintenance of friendly feelings between ourselves and the Americans.

Lord R. Montagu said that the honorable member who had spoken from his side of the house (Mr. Haliburton) had laughed at the notion that the United States would go to war with this country. That statement, however, he could not but class with a good many of the American prophecies which had fallen from honorable members in that house. They had heard it confidently stated before now that the Americans were so enamoured of liberty that nothing would compel them to resign their privileges, but their President at this moment was invested with the authority of a guasi-despot. In favor of their Constitution it was urged that their taxes were few, and yet they were at the present moment overburdened with taxation. It was urged, too, that they were a people loving peace and supporting but a small standing army, and now their army exceeded our own in number, and it was the very strength of their army which occasioned our present perplexity and anxiety. The noble lord the member for Wick (Lord Bury) said that the United States would not go to war with us as long as they had another war on their hands, but in that case what would become of the arguments employed by the right honorable gentleman the member for Calne, (Mr. Lowe?) The right honorable gentleman said that the United States was so strong in the neighborhood of Canada that we could not expect to resist them in that country, and that we must therefore create a diversion elsewhere. The right honorable gentleman contended that the defence of Canada could only be carried on by the bombardment of some town upon the American coast. The honorable member for Lichfield (Captain Anson) had said that our colonies ought to be left to take care of themselves. That system was the one pursued by us until the great French war, but during that war it was found necessary to take the defence of the colonies upon our own shoulders, and to guarantee them against the attacks of their enemies. It appeared to him that that was the very thing which the government now proposed to do. We could not leave Canada to defend itself until it had an army and was prepared to receive the attack of an enemy. It had been said that the army of the United States consisted more or less of raw levies, and that they only required good officers. But was it right for us to leave the draughting of officers and sergeants until the time when the Canadians ought to be fully drilled? The plan of the government was to construct fortifications at certain vital points, in order that our troops might be sheltered in case of defeat in the field. He could see nothing in the arguments which had been urged that evening which should induce us to refuse the paltry £50,000 which was asked for. The honorable member for West Norfolk (Mr. lentick) had urged as an alternative that we should defend Canada by means of a maritime war. Now, there were three modes of carrying on a maritime war—by bombardment, by blockade, and by right of search. The noble lord the under secretary of state for war (the Marquis of Hartington) had said, however, that it was quite ridiculous to attempt to bombard the American towns, because they had been so strongly fortified. A bombardment would certainly require the services of iron-clads, and of this description of vessel we only possessed thirteen. The American navy during the bombardment would remain safe in harbor, and would then easily make a prey of our crippled ships. If, on the other hand, their ships did not remain in harbor, what was to prevent them, in the absence of our iron-clads, from ravaging the Clyde or the Severn, or from bombarding Dublin, which was without any defence whatever? for it must be remembered that our wooden ships would not be able to contend with iron-clads. The second mode of carrying on war—by means of blockade—was directed against neutrals, and not against enemies. The object of a blockade was to prevent neutrals from entering the ports of our enemies and conveying to them supplies of any kind. Such a course, however, would bring a Lancashire distress upon every country of Europe having commercial relations with America, and ought not to be resorted to unless found to be absolutely necessary. Then as to the right of search. He did not know what the honorable member for Birmingham would say to the adoption of that mode of carrying on warfare, but the honorable member had lifted up his voice against a course. The object sought to be attained by the right of search was to make an enemy submit by crippling his commerce and seizing his merchantmen wherever they could be found. But by adopting this course they must abjure the treaty of Paris of 1856, because unless they seized the goods of the enemy wherever they could be found they could never hope to crush his commerce and thus reduce him to submission. They had, therefore, only the option of defending the points in the manner proposed by the government, or of resorting to a maritime warfare already denounced by the honorable member for Birmingham and his friends. He should therefore feel himself bound to support the vote.

Mr. C. Fortescue said that he merely rose for the purpose of calling attention to the political theory as to the relations of the mother country to the colonies propounded by the honorable member for Reading, (Mr. Lefevre) On one point he thoroughly agreed with the honorable member. The point to which he referred was often passed over by gentlemen in the course of these discussions, and was in reality much better appreciated in the colonies than it was in the mother country. It was that Canada was likely to be involved in a war over which she had no control, and in which, if there was any blame, she was blameless. She would, in fact, be involved in war simply on account of her connexion with this empire. The honorable gentleman said that in the case of a war he would like to see Canada in the position of a neutral, and that he should be glad if she could escape the horrors of a war. His answer was that such a state of things implied independence, and that Canada herself did not desire to separate from us. It was not enough for us to wish Canada to be neutral in case of a war with the United States. The question was whether the United States would permit her neutrality. He would now call the attention of the committee to the real question at issue. It appeared to him that nearly all the honorable members who had taken part in the debate agreed that it was the duty of this country to contribute more or less aid to Canada with a view of enabling that country to maintain that independent position towards all the world which, as a member of the British empire, she so much appreciated, and which she desired to perpetuate. They were nearly all agreed that the main security of Canada consisted in the good sense and friendly feeling of the two great countries, Great Britain and the United States, upon whose relations the fate of Canada must depend. If, unfortunately, the present peaceful relations should ever cease, they were nearly all agreed that the main defence of Canada would lie in the fact that the power of the British empire would be exerted not only in America, but all over the world. The only question which remained was whether over and above that great security, they should call upon Canada to make preparations to defend herself. He took it for granted that the committee would not say to the Canadians, after urging upon them for years to make exertions to provide for their own defence, that now they had taken steps in that direction this country could not help them, either with money or with men, simply because Canada was utterly defenceless. Of his own personal knowledge he could state that for years past the colonial secretary had been continually urging the Canadians to provide means for their own defence. In proof of that he might refer to a despatch written by the Duke of Newcastle in December, 1862, in which that minister, after admitting the force of an observation made by the executive council of Canada to the effect that the imperial policy was most likely to be the cause of any war in which Canada would be con-cerned, reminded them that their interests were concerned in the maintenance of the power of Great Britain, and that while they relied upon the power of Great Britain to defend them, they must also in return exert themselves to assist the mother country in the struggle. After having addressed such exhortations to the Canadian people and government, and which exhortations at last appeared to have produced practical results, it would not be generous to turn around and say to them, “We cannot give you any aid for the construction of your for-tifications, or for the disciplining of your troops, because you really are defenceless.” What was the meaning of “defenceless?” No one could dream of defending so large a frontier. But a country was not defenceless when it was possible to hold certain important and vital points which would enable the inhabitants to make the task of invasion a difficult and dangerous enterprise to any enemy. If we succeeded in infusing a warlike spirit among the people, and induced them, with our assistance, to put themselves into a respectable state of defence, we should have contributed greatly towards placing them beyond the risk of invasion.” When it was said that the existence of these proposed fortifications and the continued presence in Canada of imperial troops would prove a temptation to an aggressive power, he confessed that he could not understand that argument. He could not comprehend why any fortifications at Montreal should be considered as a defiance to any neighboring power, nor why the presence of the imperial troops should invite aggression. It appeared that the temptation would be exactly in an opposite direction. For those reasons it appeared to him that, upon the ground of common sense, and if we recognized our duty to defend Canada against foreign invasion, we must take steps to assist her, by placing her in a position to render the invader’s task a difficult and dangerous one. The immediate question before the House was not the presence of British troops in Canada, but whether we should aid Canada in providing proper fortifications at certain points. He believed that such fortifications, apart from the continued presence of imperial troops, would be of material assistance for the defence of Canada. Fortifications were intended to give to a smaller number of troops acting on the defensive an opportunity of fighting upon something like an equality with an attacking force of greater numbers. The committee was now invited by the government to give to the Canadians some assistance in the great task of providing for their own defence, and he hoped the committee would not listen to any arguments, however ingenious, which, if carried into practice, would have the effect of leaving Canada completely helpless in the presence of a possible foe. [Hear, hear.]

On Sir F. Smith and Mr. Lowe rising together, there were loud calls for the latter to proceed. The Speaker, however, decided that Sir F. Smith was entitled to precedence.

Sir F. Smith would willingly have given way to the right honorable gentleman, (Mr. Lowe,) whose speeches were always listened to by the House with the greatest pleasure, had he not been called upon by the right honorable gentleman in the chair to proceed. He was glad the honorable member for West Norfolk had raised this debate, as the right issue had thereby been brought fairly before the public. The noble member for Wick had given them, in his exhaustive address, an admirable description of the country proposed to be fortified, and of the objects which those fortifications were to accomplish, from which it was impossible to draw any other conclusion than that the course proposed by the government was the proper one to adopt. It had been contended that we ought not to defend Canada at all, but to leave her to the chances of war; but he did not think that the majority of that house or of this country would be of that opinion, and that night’s vote would show their confidence in the course which had been taken. Having first been told that they ought not to defend Canada, they were afterwards assured that they were unable to do so; but he thought honorable members, after looking at the report of Colonel Jervois, would see there could be no difficulty in the matter. When Quebec and Montreal were fortified upon the principles of modern science, as proposed by Colonel Jervois and the government, it would be impossible to bombard those towns; they would form secure retiring places for the imperial and the colonial troops, and thus a point of great importance would be gained, as so long as our troops could be effectually protected, and we had a good naval force on thè spot, any invasion of that part of Canada would be utterly futile. The proposed forts were so to be constructed as to have a large interior space, while they required but few defenders. It had been remarked that we could spare but few men to defend these forts, but did we not know in how short a space of time our own volunteers had been made into good soldiers, in whom he had such confidence that in case of war he would as soon attach himself to them as to the regular troops. [Hear, hear.] If such an army could be created in this country, why should not a similar force of 60,000 or 70,000 men be raised in Canada, where there were plenty of officers on half-pay to command and of non-commissioned officers to train them? [Hear, hear.] Carrying on war on a large scale in the depth of winter was a perfect impossibility, as roads would have to be made almost daily over the ice and snow, which a few men on snow-shoes could easily destroy. He therefore felt that the system of defence proposed to be adopted by the government was the right one, and he trusted that they would not, in their anxiety to render the St. Lawrence secure, overlook the importance of defending the lakes also. Nothing could be gained by delay, and he hoped the government would use the utmost despatch in carrying out its plans.

Mr. Lowe. I have been so frequently alluded to in the course of this debate, although I have taken no part in it hitherto, that I trust the House will allow me to offer a few remarks in my own justification. I should be very sorry to be obliged to go over, however hastily, the ground I tried to cover the other night, but it is absolutely necessary that I should just restate the points I then took up. I have listened very attentively to the debate to-night, and, with the exception of the last speaker, who boldly affirmed the proposition, not one of the honorable members who have addressed you have expressed their belief that Canada can be defended. We have heard a great deal as to the interest, duty, and expediency, but nothing as to the possibility, of defending Canada; and it was upon the latter point I rested my argument on a former occasion, and it is upon the same point I feel bound to rest it still. The right honorable and gallant member for Huntingdon told us that England was bound to defend Canada; the noble lord the member for Wick said it would not be dignified, and another honorable member that it would not be honorable, to desert her; and the under secretary for the colonies said it was our duty to defend her; but not one said it was possible to defend her. [Hear, hear.] The real question which lies at the bottom of all this talk, which we must look manfully in the face, and which we must answer to our minds and consciences— to God and to man—is, can we defend her? [Hear, hear.] I have heard nothing to-night among the various arguments used by those gentlemen who have addressed you, and who are so competent to speak on the subject, to alter the impression I hold as to the impossibility of defending that country, except the statement of the honorable gentleman who has just sat down, who has given us a most unqualified opinion that it can be defended. The honorable gentleman recalls to my mind a sentence of Lord Bacon, wherein he says, “Authority, a bow, the arrow from which derives strength from the hand that draws it, while argument is like a cross-bow, as powerful in the hands of a child as in those of a giant.” [Hear, hear, and loud laughter.] I will not recapitulate the arguments I made use of the other day. Indeed, a great many members have shown that they recollect them very well, for upon the strength of those arguments the honorable member for North Staffordshire has founded his surmise that I must be mad. [Hear, and laughter.] I think, according to the present state of the law of lunacy, I am bound to show him that I have at least lucid intervals. [Hear, and loud laughter.] The honorable member for Launceston, than whom no greater authority can be quoted, has cited many historical incidents to prove that regular troops are of little value in that part of the world. He has told us that General Braddock was defeated by a few untrained men, and that General Burgoyne was compelled to surrender to a farmer and his men. I always thought a General Gates had something to do with it. [Cheers and laughter.] But, with great submission, I don’t think we can argue from those times to ours. If America were situated somewhere at Cape Horn, or if she had no regular, trained, veteran army, or even if she were in the condition she occupied four years ago, I, for one, would not despair of defending Canada against her. But we must look the matter fairly in the face. We should have to defend her against what is probably the best, and is certainly the largest army in the world, the appointments and training of which are unexceptionable. In fact, we should have to meet with 10,000 him that cometh against us with 20,000. [Hear, hear.] It is no use talking about honor and dignity and that sort of thing; it is a question of possibility, and we must satisfy ourselves, in the first place, whether or not we can carry out our plans. The honorable member for Launceston says there is only one railway to Quebec, but I believe there are four or five different railways touching on the St. Lawrence. There is a railway to Detroit only separated by a narrow strait. There is a railway to Cleveland, and I believe there are two to Niagara; so that the Americans, by means of the railways at their command, have the power of throwing any number of men on a certain bank of the St. Lawrence at any moment they please. That disposes of the difficulty of making marches in winter, and of throwing a force on one point or another with nothing but the St. Lawrence between them and Canada. Then, it is said, there is no precedent for making a campaign in winter, though how General Montgomery’s precedent is got over I don’t see, except that instead of sending his troops by railway he marched them through the woods, and so kept them warm and comfortable. But there is another precedent. In 1837 Canada rose in rebellion, and our troops and the Canadian militia turned out in the dead of that bitter and severe winter and put down the rebellion. Is not that a proof that such a thing as a winter campaign is possible—more especially if you can bring up your troops to the point you wish by railway? [Hear, hear.] However, I will not weary the House by any recapitulation. Suffice to say that nothing I have heard convince me that there cannot be a winter campaign. Then it is said the Americans could not occupy Quebec without also taking Point Levi. But what is to prevent them taking Point Levi, looking at the exploits they have performed and the works they have carried in the course of this war? Is it to be supposed that we are capable of throwing up fortifications which will resist them more effectually? Without going over the matter again, I shall take the liberty of assuming that we cannot defend Canada effectually. Nothing can be more feeble than the arguments which have been used both by the noble marquis and the under-secretary of state for the colonies. The noble marquis says that if the people would only rise and assist us something might be done, and my right honorable friend the under secretary says that Canada is defensible, only she could not be defended for any great period of time. If that be so, the whole basis of my argument rests on that admission; and what becomes of the rest of the argument? The honorable gentleman opposite says it is our duty to do what it may not be possible to do. [Hear, hear,] But it is a sound legal maxim, “Nemo tenetur ad impossibile”—if a man can’t do a thing it is not his duty to do it. [Hear, hear, and a laugh.] Duties are limited by possibilities. [Hear, hear.] Once satisfy your mind that you cannot defend Canada in Canada, and the duty of defending Canada in Canada ceases. [Hear, hear.] You cannot alter it by using fine words, you must go straight to the fact. We have no duty, no honor, no dignity in pretending to do that which we cannot do. [Hear, hear.] Then it is said we ought to encourage Canada. Why should we encourage Canada? If the people think it their duty and their interest to defend Canada, then it may be right in us to encourage them; but if not, why should we encourage them to rush on what would be their own ruin? [Hear.] It is said also that the Canadians are loyal, and that we are bound, therefore, to defend Canada. But that does not prove that because it is our duty to defend Canada, that therefore we are bound to defend it in Canada. It is our duty to defend her wherever she can best be defended. If in Canada, then there; if not, then wherever else she can best be defended. Then an honorable gentleman says. that America has an impregnable front, that there is no point at which we could assault her. That is as much as to say that because we cannot defend Canada at all, therefore we must defend her in Canada.” [ Hear, hear.] I will state to the House frankly what I believe to be our duty. We ought to deal frankly and honorably and truly with Canada, and lay before her the actual state of things. We ought to tell her plainly and straightforwardly that we do not apprehend that we have the means of resisting the present force which the Americans could place on Canadian soil, but that we are willing to do anything we can do. As to giving her officers to train her men, and troops to serve as an example and model, it would be furthest from my wish that anything of that sort should be withdrawn; but when we have got 10,000 certificated schoolmasters to pay, I cannot understand why we should require 10,000 masters in Canada in red coats. I should have thought a much smaller staff would have answered all the purpose. [Hear, hear.] But mark how by arguing this question as it is put before us we loose sight of the better half of the considerations we ought to keep in view. Nobody pretends to say that we are going to defend the valuable part of Canada—the upper province. Upper Canada is a country with a rich and fertile soil, well cultivated, and crowned with all the gifts of nature. The lower province is a rugged and barren region, shut out, inaccessible, poor, and inhabited by a population by no means progressive; and it is upon the lower province that every shilling we are going to spend is to be spent. But is the upper province, which we then abandon, less exposed? Don’t you suppose that it is through Lower Canada that the Americans will march to Upper Canada, and what use, then, will your fortifications be for the defence of the upper province? Upper Canada is accessible to the Americans by Lake Ontario, by the Straits of Detroit, Lake Huron, and Georgean bay; and after all you do, you only restrict your efforts to Lower Canada, because you don’t pretend to affect the upper provinces in any way whatever. All vou risk you risk for the sake of defending the lower province, and, perhaps, for the sake of securing a better retreat for your soldiers when they are driven from the field and cooped up in these fortifications. (Hear, hear.) Now, what is our duty?—for, although I have objected to what honorable gentlemen have defined to be our duty, I freely admit that we have a duty in the matter. Our duty to our troops is not without some far better and nobler end than to expose them to almost certain destruction. [Hear, hear.] It is not our duty in this manner, and upon such shadowy grounds, to sport with the lives of 10,000 brave men. [Hear, hear.] If their country required the sacrifice, they might be willing to do for her all that Marcus Curtius or Decius ever did for Rome; but let us not call lightly on them for such a sacrifice. [Hear, hear.] It is easy for us who sit at home at our ease to read of their struggles and to offer them up, in a spirit of magnanimity, to some phantom of national honor, or to imaginary duty and dignity; but I say that we owe it as a duty to those brave men, who may be willing to give us their best blood, not lightly to put them in peril, and not to sacrifice them in an enterprise which we know beforehand” to be desperate. [Hear, hear.] We have also a duty to perform to the people of this country. The policy which I understand to be inaugurated to-night is what I call a fair-weather policy. Honorable gentlemen have expressed their opinions that, after all, America will not invade Canada. I have no ill feeling to the Americans. I received great kindness and hospitality from them when I was there, and I do not at all wish to put a bad construction on anything they may do or say. I don’t believe that we shall see them invade Canada, but in a matter of this kind—a question of defence—we must act as if it were quite certain that they would. Now, this policy of ours is one which will answer if America does not invade Canada. If she does not invade Canada, nothing can be more glorious to us, or more magnanimous. We shall appear to our colonists as having taken them under our wing, and kept them in safety under the shadow of our protecting aegis; their loyalty to the Crown will not be impaired, and our prestige will not be impaired in any way. On the other hand, we shall have observed a dignified and slightly defiant tone to the Americans, and we shall have held out to all men the spectacle of a small country daring to beard the American giant with his nerves strong and hands all bloody from the fierce contest in which he has been engaged. [Hear.] But suppose that the invasion does actually take place: suppose the Americans enter Canada, what course is left to us? We may leave our men in America to perish or to be captured, or we may withdraw our troops. I know which alternative this country would choose. In one there is a great deal of safety, in the other little honor; but it is our duty beforehand to look at every contingency which may occur, and to be prepared for it. The way in which men run wrong in this world is by refusing to look at both sides of a question, being unprepared to meet reverses when they come upon them. It is not our duty to adopt á policy which may answer in fair whether times, but will not bear the test of the slightest reverse. Our duty is perfectly clear. We ought to represent these things to the Canadians with perfect fairness. We Ought, in my opinion, to tell Canada that we will defend her with all our strength; that we consider her interesta bound up in ours, and that we will fight for her to the last, so long as she belongs to us; but that we see no chance of successfully defending her on her own ground. If she chooses British connexion she must take it subject to this condition, that she will have to defend her own soil in case of invasion; that we will make diversions elsewhere, and defend her in what we think the most efficient way, and that, if our arms are crowned with success, she shall be the first object of our consideration in making peace. We should also represent to her that it is perfectly open to her to establish herself as an independent republic, [hear, hear,] and that if she thinks that will make her position safer and more tenable we do not desire to drag her into any danger. It is our duty, too, to represent to her that if, after well-weighed consideration, she thinks it more ta her interest to join the great American republic itself [cries of “No, no”] it is the duty of Canada to deliberate for her own interests and her own happiness, and it is our duty to put before her the real relation of things, not as seen through the illusion of dignity and glory and things of that sort, but as they really are, and to assure her that whatever course she may take, she shall have in us a friend, a protector, and an ally up to the time of her departure. [Hear, hear.] But I cannot think it is the best attitude for those who, with me, think that we cannot defend Canada in Canada to encourage her to believe that we will resist an invasion which we cannot resist—to stir her up, relying on our support, to incur dangers from which we cannot deliver her. [Hear, hear.] It appears to me that there is mutual deception. We expect Canada to defend herself, and Canada expects us to defend her. [A laugh, and “hear, hear.”] That, I think, is likely to come to very little. In conclusion, I have only to say that as for my vote on this question, I, for one, cannot take the responsibility of resisting the proposal of the government. [A laugh.] I said so the other night, and I repeat it now. If it is thought that it will be an advantage for Canada to have those fortifications, the money is but a trifling sum, and I am willing to vote for it. But I beg that my vote may not be misconstrued. Though I am quite willing to vote this money, and to vote any supplement that may be required to complete those fortifications-, I don’t consider myself pledged to the policy of maintaining any troops in Canada except such as may be wished for by the Canadians themselves to instruct them in the defence of Canada. [Cheers.]

Mr. Disraeli. Though I cannot agree with the right honorable gentleman who has just sat down, I cannot say that I entirely approve the course taken by her Majesty’s government with respect to this question. I highly disapprove the manner in which it has been introduced to us by placing on the table a despatch of a confidential character, the general result of which proceeding has been to import much alarm and complexity into the consideration of the subject. [Hear, hear.] It has also attracted a degree of attention by no means desirable to what, after all, is only the fulfilment of a duty of the government. I know there have been cases in which reports of a confidential character from officers of the government have been placed on the table of the House to prepare the public mind for large measures, and perhaps for some vote of public money; but, generally speaking, I think that course is not one which this house ought to sanction. [Hear, hear.] In all legal questions, in all questions of international law, the government wisely and properly, when asked for the opinion of the law officers of the Crown, al way surge the privilege which enables them to refuse the reasons upon which their professional advisers have given the advice which has regulated the conduct of the government. That is a rule which I think highly salutary, though it is sometimes disappointing to the House. It is one which ought to be followed in respect of the advice of other professional advisers of the Crown, when that advice involves the question of the defence of the empire, and naturally leads to matters of discussion respecting our relations with other powers, because such discussions are invariably of a very delicate character. [Hear, hear.] In this case, if that document drawn up by Colonel Jervois had not been thrown on the table of the House none of these discussions would have taken place. We vote this money on the responsibility of her Majesty’s government, and not on that of Colonel Jervois. [Hear.] When her Majesty’s ministers are satisfied, on the statements of the advisers whom they employ, that a certain course ought to be followed, it is their duty to expound the principle and make the application in their speeches, and not lay on the table a report of a dry and confidential character in order to explain their policy; but, whatever objection may be taken to the mode of the proposition of her Majesty’s government—to the form in which it is put before the House—I have no hesitation as to the course I ought to follow, which is to support her Majesty’s government in this instance, because I myself feel persuaded that if there be any hesitation in this house it will discourage the Canadians in their action at perhaps the most critical period in the history of Canada. [Cheers.] I am perfectly willing to admit that no sentimental feeling about Canada, no motive of mere sentiment, would justify us in entering on a policy which we disapproved and which might ultimately be disastrous to that country. In that I entirely agree with the right honorable gentleman the member for Calne, but I can not agree with the rest of his argument. He says no one has proved that Canada can be defended. Well, even if that be true, neither has any one proved that Canada can be invaded. [Hear, hear.] These things we must judge of by the powers of thought and by the experience which we have before us; and, though I listened to the right honorable gentleman with a great deal of attention, I am not at all inclined to admit that Canada cannot be defended. [Hear, hear.] It is matter of opinion, and with us laymen only matter of theory; but the right honorable gentleman and the few who may sympathize with him proceed on what appears to me to be a great fallacy. He always argues that if, unhappily, we were at war with America—an event which I think improbable, but which the right honorable gentleman seems to think imminent, for that, as I will prove, is the whole basis of his argument—our hostilities must be carried on in Canada or in some one other place; but I submit that if we were at war with America, our war must be carried on in every place we could wage it with advantage. [Hear, hear.] It would be waged not only on one ocean, but on both oceans, and wherever we could strike an effective blow at the enemy. (Cheers) It follows as a strategic corollary from the argument of the right honorable gentleman that we are to allow America to invade Canada with the greatest facility, with the least cost of money and the smallest sacrifice of men. But, as a layman, it appears to me that the more difficult we make an invasion, the greater the demand on the resources, military and financial, of the invader, and by so much the more do we diminish his power at other points of attack and defence. (Cheers.) Therefore it appears to me preposterous of the right honorable gentleman to lay down that if we were at war with America we should permit America to obtain so considerable an advantage, when, even if we were not completely successful in Canada, we might, by resistance there, diminish the power of the enemy in some other place he was assailing or defending. [Hear, hear.] The right honorable gentleman has argued this case in the same spirit as that in which the case of the peninsular war was argued by the whigs some fifty years ago, when they said it was useless to oppose the power of Napoleon, because no one could stand before him. [Hear, hear.] But this assumption pervades the whole argument of the right honorable gentleman, that the power of America is the great power of the age, and that you cannot resist it. He tells us that America has hundreds of thousands of men, an army of veteran troops, commanded, which no one can deny, by some generals of singular ability, and whose operations have been attended with success; and he says, “How can you resist such a power in Canada?” Well, if war were to take place with America to-morrow, there might be some foundation for the views of the right honorable gentleman, but they are utterly inconsistent with the declaration of the right honorable gentleman that war won’t take place, that he does not think it imminent, that he does not think it even probable; for are we to understand from the right honorable gentleman—a man of great acuteness, of great historical knowledge, and of considerable public experience—are we to understand from him that it will be the normal state of America to maintain this army, like the hosts of Xerxes? Does he think that if war breaks out in four or five years America will have an army of several hundred thousand men? If that be the opinion of the right honorable gentleman, I think it is one which he will find it difficult to support, looking at the financial position of America as put by the honorable member for Launceston. There can be no doubt that America has entailed upon herself an immense debt by the present struggle. I don’t want to investigate what may be its real amount; I take it according to the official knowledge of the government; and so taking it, I find that debt—the burden of which is not to be calculated by the mere amount of principal, but in relation to the amount of the interest—is probably not less weighty than our own. I know the question has been asked, “Is it the intention of America to keep faith with the public creditor?” I believe it is. The Americans are naturally a sagacious people, and they know that if they did not keep faith with the public creditor the consequence must be ruinous to their country. [Hear.] If, then, America does keep faith in respect of her national engagements, she will not keep up 700,000 men, because for the maintenance of such an army she has had this year to raise £120,000,000. Therefore, it is not clear that if we went to war with America she would have these innumerable hosts, which are always at the command of the right honorable gentleman in his speeches, and which he tells us are always at hand in the United States. Let us see, then, what would be the position of Canada in respect of defences. An honorable gentleman stated the other night that England had not a general. That was a rather alarming statement; but the debate of this very night shows that there is a very considerable amount of military knowledge in this house, [a laugh,] and I have no doubt that if an emergency arose we should have some very able generals in the field. [Hear.] Now, it has,been pretty generally admitted in this debate, which has been conducted with great ability, and has been highly interesting, that Canada, under ordinary circumstances, could bring into the field 100,000 fighting men. [Hear, hear.] Well, but the population of Canada is a high-spirited population, and under extraordinary circumstances it could do much more. [Hear, hear.] The right honorable gentleman and some others who spoke upon the subject seem to me to have no idea of what the creative inspiration of patriotism can do, and under its influence a brave people like the Canadians are much more likely to have 200,000 fighting men in the field for the future. Well, suppose you had 200,000 fighting men, well qualified to take the field, and supported by a series of strong places—I don’t give it as my own opinion, for that would be absurd, but as the opinion of the highest authorities on these matters—with a series of strong places, of forts skilfully raised, they would be equivalent to a much larger force. You would have what would be equivalent to 300,000 fighting men, [laughter, and hear, hear,] and a force equivalent to that, and acting purely on the defensive, would be equal even to those hosts of which the right honorable gentleman has talked. Sir, the right honorable gentleman has settled the campaigns with the utmost facility. If campaigns could be settled by chopping logic, the right honorable gentleman would be the greatest general that ever existed. [Laughter.] I remember once hearing a distinguished general, whose name has been more than once mentioned in this debate—the Duke of Wellington himself—say that there was no man who could tell what the end of a campaign might be. [Hear, hear.] We know very well from our own knowledge how very doubtful the issue of campaigns has been, owing to the existence of soldiers of an extraordinary character—of some individual who, as you saw at Sebastopol, and as happened at Magdeburg, rose suddenly to do battle with conquering armies, and to throw back the advance of war for a year or two. [Hear, hear.] Such are the events which occur in the progress of war, and looking either to the number or the spirit of the people of Canada—knowing what they can do, and what I think myself in circumstances of excitement they will do—I cannot doubt, with the feeling of affection for England unimpaired, and with the encouraging presence of the trained warriors of our own country, that their resistance would be very considerable, and that its result would be by no means so certain as the right honorable gentleman seems to think. [Hear, hear.] The right honorable gentleman has also held out to us the prospect that the maintenance of our connexion with Canada must in his view be disgraceful in its result and calamitous to England. He has treated the ideas which we entertain of maintaining the connexion as merely sentimental. But I think I have shown that there are considerations which may induce the committee to believe that the right honorable gentleman has been too precipitate in coming to that conclusion. [Hear.] The right honorable gentleman in his argument always maintained that it is impossible to defend the frontier of Canada. But does he mean to say that for the future it is to be laid down as a principle that an extensive frontier is not to be defended? Because if he does, then, in effect, he contradicts all the principles of military science, and he confounds all those rules of policy which have regulated the action of nations with regard to boundaries. But why should the right honorable gentleman as a matter of course conclude that disgrace must befall the English arms in Canada and oppose the present resolution because that is the inevitable consequence of our interference? But what is the present proposition of the government? Does he find fault with the amount of the vote, the manner in which it is introduced, or the mode in which it is intended to dispose of it? The proposition of the government is to take precautions that our troops be not placed in a position in which they must necessarily be defeated or captured. It is to secure them from such a fate that the present propositon is made; and, therefore, if there be any serious conclusion to be drawn from the general views of the right honorable gentleman, it is rather that we should withdraw altogether from the attempt to maintain the independence of Canada, and altogether renounce the duties which, in my opinion, devolve upon us. [Hear, hear.] I cannot agree with the assertion of the right honorable gentleman that to talk of the duty which England has to fulfil in maintaining the independence of Canada ought to be treated as nothing better than a mere idle and sentimental boast. [Hear, hear.] The right honorable gentleman acknowledges Canada already as a republic. I do not grudge Canada her independence. I can anticipate those who are to follow us may view that country as an independent and powerful state; but I do not necessarily see that the form of her government is to be that of a republic. [Hear, hear.] All the traditions of Canada are very much opposed to such a form of government, and her recent experience would not, I think, make her particularly enamoured of republican institutions. [Hear, hear.] What is the moment when the right honorable gentleman refers to the future of Canada and when he calls upon us practically to depart? Why, it is at the very moment when North America is in a state of revolution, when no one can foresee the result of the vast changes and mighty vicissitudes which have occurred within the last four years and are still occurring. [Hear, hear.] I do not confine this remark to the United States or the Confederate States. Change is imminent in British America, and it is also most remarkable in Mexico. [Hear, hear.] We know that the British American provinces have all the elements of a great nation; they have now no inconsiderable population; they have immense resources. [Hear, hear.] The right honorable gentleman has described in his happy and picturesque language the true condition of the northern provinces of British America. These provinces and the lands contiguous to them have the means of sustaining not only millions, but tens of millions of population. And why, then, are we to doom Canada to her future and not very ennobling lot of being absorbed in the United States, or becoming the dependency of some American republic? [Hear, hear.] Canada has, I believe, its own future before it; we have a right to assume it. It has all the elements which make a nation. It has at this moment a strong development of nationality. It is influenced by feelings of attachment to us, of which we ought to be proud. It has appealed to England for support, and it is not for us too narrowly to pry into the proposal of the government in order to see whether it is ample enough, or whether it has been introduced to us in the happiest manner. [Hear.] But what we are to consider is this: whether it is not the duty of the government to appeal to the Parliament of England and ask whether we will not cherish the connexion with the North American provinces which at present exists; whether we do not believe that in point of honor and in duty we are bound to do so, and that aided by us, these provinces have the means of establishing their independence of any foreign foe. [Hear, hear.] And, sir, with the full conviction on our part that these provinces can ultimately become an independent country, we shall find in that circumstance not a source of mortification, but a source of pride. [Cheers.]

Mr. Cardwell. Sir, this debate has happily been characterized by the same spirit which characterized the former debate upon the same subject. It may be referred to without the smallest apprehension of exciting any feeling of hostility between us and that great country on the other side of the Atlantic, with which we are united by such close ties of interest. Sir, I should not have referred at all to this part of the question at the close of the debate if it had not been for remarks which were made and inquiries which were addressed to me by my honorable friend the member for Stockport, (Mr. Watkin.) My honorable friend asked me whether I could repeat the assurance that our relations with the United States were perfectly healthy, and whether I could give any information with respect to the reciprocity treaty, the maintenance of steamers upon the lakes, and also the question of passports. Now, I am happy to say that it is my good fortune to be able to give my honorable friend and the House information which will be agreeable to them upon this subject. [Hear, hear.] Since I came into the House I have received from the noble lord the governor general of Canada (Lord Monck) a despatch which confirms the agreeable reports which had already reached us through the ordinary channels of intelligence. He informs me that he has received a telegraphic despatch from Mr. Burnley, at Washington, to this effect: “The Secretary of State informs me that his government intends to withdraw the notice for the abrogation of the treaty of 1817, [cheers,] and the passport system will cease immediately.” [Renewed cheers.] Sir, I refer to that announcement with feelings of the greatest pleasure; and now I trust we may proceed to discuss the important practical question which is before us in no spirit of panic, but in that just spirit which becomes the consideration of what is due to the honor and interests of our country, and which has characterized the mode in which the proposal has been considered by the House. [Hear, hear.] Because you are on friendly terms with the American government, because you hope that the friendly spirit which animates you is reciprocated by them, and because you are confident that two mighty nations of one blood, one origin, and one language are united by ties which should forever forbid the possibility of bloodshed between them—those considerations do not render it the less necessary that you should temporately consider the nature of your defences, and that you should be dependent for your safety only upon the power of your own country. My right honorable friend (Mr. Lowe) has said that in this debate no one has ventured to assert the contrary of the proposition which he laid down, and to maintain that Canada can be defended. I should have rather said, after listening attentively to every word in this debate, that until my right honorable friend himself rose almost the whole discussion had been upon one side, and there was nothing for those who support the vote to reply to except the argument of my right honorable friend. [Hear, hear.] The right honorable gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) objects to the mode in which this proposal has been made. He says that a document written by a distinguished officer for the information of the government ought not to have been produced to the House. It would be a very convenient doctrine for the government if they were to propose resolutions, as the right honorable gentleman has suggested, merely upon their own authority, without producing the reasons upon which they are founded. But the right honorable gentleman should remember the peculiar circumstances of the case. These proposals are addressed not only to this country, but to Canada. Colonel Jervois was sent out by the British government to make proposals to the Canadian government, and it is due to the House of Commons and the country, as well as to the people of Canada, that there should be some record of the result of that mission, and that the grounds upon which our present proposal rests should be stated. My right honorable friend (Mr. Lowe) has drawn, with his usual ability and power, a distinction between those arguments that rest upon authority and those that rest entirely upon logic. But I think my right honorable friend will find that argument and logic are sometimes deceptive weapons, running into the hand that uses them, and leading great masters of argument to conclusions not warranted by the result; and I think the House feels that, while my right honorable friend has argued his case with great command of logic, he has not carried with him the confidence and support of his audience, and will not convince the community at large. [Hear, hear.] It has always been considered that the defence of Canada rests partly with the mother country, but principally with the colonists themselves. We accordingly addressed to Canada advice which we thought wise and expedient, and now that she has taken the advice we are cordially prepared to do our just part in defending her. [Hear, hear.] My right honorable friend says it is impossible to defend Upper Canada, basing that opinion upon his own view of the campaign of 1776. But if he looks to the historians who describe this campaign, he will find that it was one of unexampled hardship, that the forces commanded by Arnold were reduced by famine to feed upon dogs, and, as the military critic of the campaign says, they were compelled to attempt an escalade of Quebec because the season would not permit them to resort to a regular siege. The result was the destruction of a large portion of the troops and the death of the general in command, and when Arnold succeeded to the command he was compelled to retreat, leaving behind him his artillery, arms, and baggage. My right honorable friend quotes that as a proof that you can successfully carry on a winter campaign, but he does so in defiance of all military authority. Before the American Congress papers have recently been laid referring to the successful defence of Canada in former campaigns, when the French possessed Canada and we were the assailants; and this successful defence is ascribed not to any superiority in the French troops, but to the strength of their fortifications. When, therefore, my right honorable friend says that you cannot defend Upper Canada, I refer him to the opinion of one of the most distinguished officers of the American army, quoted in the papers I am alluding to, who speaks rather contemptuously of the opinions of civilians, and says it may be possible to come down from Upper Canada to Quebec and Montreal, but that the attempt will never be made if a proper military course be pursued by us. [Hear, hear.] He speaks of Quebec and Montreal as the strong places of Canada, and says it is there that the battle will be fought, and the fate of the country determined. In these papers Quebec and Montreal are not spoken of as places which cannot be defended. On the contrary, these American writers think that an attack there will be most arduous and difficult, and especially at Quebec, where, they say, they would have to meet the army and navy of the mother country and all the resources at her disposal. [Hear, hear.] As to the plan now before the House, it was not possible three years ago to ask Parliament for a large grant for the defence of Canada, for Canada then was making no exertions for her own defence. But Canada has now trained a large number of officers to take the command of her militia; she is increasing the number of military schools with a view to train a larger number of officers; her volunteers are now engaged in active service, receiving great praise from the inspecting officer, and acquiring popularity and infusing a military spirit among the colonists. She has a militia, and already 89,000 men have been ballotted for. She has applied for an officer to be the adjutant general of militia, in order to be trained according to the best and most approved sys-tem. Here, therefore, is the beginning of a large local force. In itself the proposal is, I think, a reasonable one; it is brought forward at the proper time; all military authority pronounces that Canada is capable of defence; and as the spirit and energy of her population are shown in providing for her defence, I think she is fairly entitled to the support and assistance of the mother country. [Hear, hear.] Under these circumstances I am sure that I only express the unanimous feeling of the House in saying that every sentiment of honor, and a just regard for the interests and welfare of the whole British empire, call upon us to support this measure; [Hear, hear.]

Mr. Bright. I shall ask the attention of the House for only a few moments. If the honorable member (Mr. Bentinck) divides, I shall go into the same lobby with him. [Cheers and laughter.] I am afraid that in making that announcement I shall excite some little alarm in the mind of the honorable gentleman. [A laugh.] I wish, therefore, to say that I shall not go into the lobby agreeing with him in many of the statements he has made. The right honorable gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) said that he approached the military question with great diffidence, and I was very glad to see any signs of diffidence in that quarter, [Much laughter.] After that explanation he asked the House, with a triumphant air, whether there is any difficulty in defending a frontier of 1,000 or 1,500 miles, and whether the practicability of doing so is a new doctrine in warfare. But 1,000 or 1,500 miles of frontier to defend at the centre of your power, is one thing; but at 3,000 or 4,000 miles from the centre, it is an entirely different thing. [Hear, hear.] I venture to say that there is not a man in this house, or a sensible man out of it, who, apart from the consideration of this vote, or some special circumstances attending it, believes that the people of this country could attempt a successful defence of the frontier of Canada against the whole power of the United States. 1 said the other night that I hoped we should not now talk folly, and hereafter, in the endeavor to be consistent, act folly. We all know perfectly well that we are talking folly when we say that the government of this country would send either ships or men to make an effectual defence of Canada against the power of the United States, supposing war to break out. Understand, I am not in the least a believer in the probability of war, but I will discuss the question for one moment as if war were possible. I suppose some men in this house think it probable. But if it be possible or probable, and if you have to look this difficulty in the face, there is no extrication from it but in the neutrality or independence of Canada. I agree with those members who say that it is the duty of a great empire to defend every portion of it. I admit that as a general proposition, though honorable gentlemen opposite, and some on this side, do not apply that rule to the United States. But, admitting that rule, and supposing that wo are at all points unprepared for such a catastrophe, may we not, as reasonable men, look ahead, and try if it be not possible to escape from it? [An honorable member “Run away?”] No, not by running away, though there are many circumstances in which brave men run away; and you may get into difficulty on this Canadian question which may make you look back and wish that you had run away a good time ago. [Laughter.] I object to this vote on a ground which, I believe, has not been raised by any member in the present discussion. I am not going to say that the expenditure of £50,000 is a matter of great consequence to this country, or that the expenditure of this money, in the proposed way, will be taken as a menace by the United States. I do not think that that can be fairly said, for, whether building fortifications at Quebec be useless or not, that proceeding is not likely to enable the Canadians to overrun the State of New York. [“Hear,” and a laugh.] The United States, I think, will have no right to complain of this expenditure. The utmost it can do will be to show them that some portions, and perhaps the government, of this country have some little distrust of them, and so far it may do injury. I complain of the expenditure and the policy announced by the colonial secretary on a ground which, I thought, ought to have been urged by the noble lord, the member for Wick, who is a sort of half-Canadian. He made a speech which I listened to with great pleasure, and told the House what some of us, perhaps, did not know before, but if I had been connected as he is with Canada, I would have addressed the House from a Canadian point of view. What is it that the member for Oxford says? He states, in reference to the expenditure for the proposed fortifications, that, though a portion of the expenditure is to be borne by us, the main portion is to be borne by Canada; but I venture to tell him that if there shall be any occasion to defend Canada at all it will not arise from anything Canada does, but from what England does, and therefore I protest against the doctrine that the cabinet in London may get into difficulties and ultimately into war with the cabinet at Washington, and because Canada lies adjacent to the United States, and consequently may become the great battle-field, that this United Kingdom has a right to call on Canada for the main portion of that expenditure. [Hear.] Who has asked you to spend £50,000 and the hundreds of thousands which may be supposed to follow, but which, perhaps, Parliament may be indisposed hereafter to grant? What is the proportion which Canada is to bear? If we are to spend £200,000 at Quebec, is Canada to spend £400,000 at Montreal? If Canada is to spend double of whatever we may spend, is it not obvious that every Canadian will ask himself what is the advantage of the connexion between Canada and England? Every Canadian knows perfectly well, and nobody better than the noble lord the member for Wick, that there is no more prospect of a war between Canada and the United States alone than between the empire of France and the Isle of Man. If that is so, why should the Canadians be taxed beyond all reason, as the colonial secretary proposes to tax them, for a policy not Canadian, and for a calamity which, if ever it occurs, must occur from some transactions between England and the United States? There are gentlemen here who know, a good deal of Canada, and I see behind me one who knows perfectly well what is the condition of the Canadian finances. We complain that Canada levies higher duties on British manufactures than the United States did before the present war, and much higher than France does. But when we complain to Canada of this, and say it is very unpleasant usage from a part of our empire, the Canadians reply that their expenditure is so much, and their debt, with the interest on it, so much, and that they are obliged to levy these heavy duties. If the Canadian finances are in the unfortunate position described, if the credit of Canada is not very great in the market of this country, and if you see what are the difficulties of the Canadians during a period of peace, consider what will be their difficulties if the doctrine of the colonial secretary be carried out, and that whatever expenditure is necessary for the defence of Canada, while we bear a portion, the main part must be borne by Canada. We must then come to the inevitable conclusion that every Canadian will say, “We are close alongside of a great nation; our parent state is three thousand miles away; there are litigious, and there may be even warlike people in both nations, and they may occasion the calamity of a great war; we are peaceable people, having no foreign politics, happily; we may be involved in war, and while the great cities of Great Britain are not touched by a single shell, nor one of its fields ravaged, not a city or a village in this Canada in which we live but will be liable to the ravages of war on the part of our powerful neighbor.” Therefore, the Canadians will say, unless they are unlike all other Englishmen—who appear to have more sense the further they go from their own country [laughter]—that it would be better for Canada to be disentangled from the politics of England, and to assume the position of an independent state. I suspect from what has been stated by official gentlemen in the present government, and in previous governments, that there is no objection to the independence of Canada whenever Canada may wish it I have been glad to hear those statements, because I think they mark an extraordinary progress in sound opinions in this country. I recollect the noble lord at the head of the Foreign Office being very angry in this house at the idea of making a great empire less; but a great empire territorially may be lessened without its power and authority in the world being diminished. [Hear, hear.] I believe if Canada now, by a friendly separation from this country, became an independent state, choosing its own form of government—monarchical, if it liked a monarchy, or republican, if it preferred a republic—it would not be less friendly to England, and its tariff would not be more adverse to our manufactures than now. In the case of a war with America, Canada would then be a neutral country, and the population would be in a state of greater security, Not that I think there is any fear of war; but the government admit that it may occur by their attempt to obtain money for these fortifications. I object, therefore, to this vote, not on that account, nor even because it causes some distrust, or may cause it, in the United States, although that might be some reason; but I object to it mainly because I think we are commencing a policy which we shall either have to abandon because Canada will not submit to it, or else which will bring upon Canada a burden in the shape of fortification expenditure that will make her more and more dissatisfied with this country, and that will lead rapidly to her separation from us. I don’t object to that separation in the least. I believe it would be better for us and better for her. But I think that of all the misfortunes which could happen between us and Canada this would be the greatest, that her separation should take place after a period of irritation and estrangement, and that we should have on that continent to meet another element in some degree hostile to this country. I am sorry, sir, that the noble lord at the head of the government and his colleagues have taken this course; but it appears to me to be wonderfully like almost everything which the government does. It is a government apparently of two parts, the one part pulling one way and the other part pulling another, and the result generally is something which does not please anybody, or produce any good effect in any direction. [“Hear, hear,” and a laugh.] They now propose a scheme which has just enough in it to create distrust and irritation—enough to make it in some degree injurious, and they don’t do enough to accomplish any of the objects for which, according to their statements, the proposition is made. [Hear, hear.] Somebody asked the other night whether the administration was to rule or the House of Commons., Well, I suspect from the course of the debate that on this occasion the administration will be allowed to rule. We are accustomed to say that the government suggests a thing on its own responsibility, and therefore we will allow them to do it. But the fact is that the government knows no more of this matter than any other dozen gentlemen in this house. [Hear.] They are not a bit more competent to form an opinion upon it. They throw it down on the table and ask us to discuss and vote it. I should be happy to find the House disregarding all the intimations that war is likely, anxious not to urge Canada into incurring an expenditure which she will not bear, and which, if she will not bear, must end in one of two things—either to throwing of the whole burden upon us, or the breaking up, perhaps suddenly and in anger, of the connexion between us and that colony, making our future relations with her most unsatisfactory. I don’t place much reliance on the speech of the right honorable member for Buckinghamshire; not because he cannot judge of the question just as well as I or any one of us can do, but because I notice that in matters of this kind gentlemen on that (the opposition) bench, whatever may have been their animosities towards the gentlemen on this (the treasury) beach on other questions, shake hands. They may tell you that they have no connexion with the House over the way, [a laugh,] but the fact is, their connexion is most intimate. [Hear, hear.] And if the right honorable member for Buckinghamshire were now sitting on the treasury bench, and the noble viscount were sitting opposite to him, the noble viscount, I have no doubt, would give him the very same support as he now receives from the right honorable gentleman. [Hear, hear.] This seems to me a question so plain, so much on the surface, appealing so much to our common sense, having in it such great issues for the future, that I am persuaded it is the duty of the House of Commons on this occasion to take the matter out of the hands of the executive government, and to determine that with regard to the future policy of Canada we will not ourselves expend the money of the English taxpayers, and not force upon the taxpayers of Canada a burden which I am satisfied they will not long continue to bear. [Hear, hear.]

Lord Palmerston. Sir, I am sorry that we shall not have the vote of the honoraole member for Birmingham; but I thank him for the compliment which he has paid to the government. [“Hear,” and a laugh.] He has said that the present proposal is a specimen of the usual conduct pursued by us—that is to say, we have made a proposal which I think the result will show is supported by the great majority of the House, and therefore I accept the compliment which he pays us—namely, that our usual and general course is so shaped as to receive the usual and general support. [“Hear, hear,” and laughter.] Sir, I should hope that the honorable member for Norfolk, who has moved this amendment, might think, from the course which the debate has taken, that it would be well for him not to ask the House to come to a division upon it. [Hear.] He himself, if I did not misunderstand him, did not maintain that we ought not to defend Canada, or deny that we are bound in honor and in interest to do so. All he wished us to do was to postpone the present vote for further information, or for some other inquiry which he desired should be made. But I think he will see that, with only three exceptions or so, the vote has met with the general approval of all who have participated in the discussion. My right honorable friend behind me, the member for Calne, (Mr. Lowe,) has, indeed, taken that which, if I were not afraid of being accused of a play upon words, I should say was a very low ground. [Laughter and cheers.] He, I think, the honorable and gallant gentleman beside him, (Colonel Anson,) and the honorable member for Birmingham, were the only speakers who seemed inclined to oppose the vote; but I must correct myself even as to that, because my right honorable friend said that, notwithstanding all his objections, he would vote for the motion. [A laugh.] But the general tone and line of argument were so much in favor of the motion that I think it would be very undesirable on this occasion that there should appear to be a difference of opinion in the House. [Hear.] Sir, this is not a Canadian question; it is not a local question; it is an imperial question. It is a question which affects the position and character, the honor, the interests, and the duties of this great country; and I hold it to be of the utmost importance to the character of the nation in a case like this, and when the great majority of the House seem to be of the same opinion, that it should not go forth to the world that there has been a difference of opinion on this motion; but that it should be seen to have been accepted by a unanimous House of Commons. [Hear.] Sir, there are one or two points with regard to which I think it right to express my dissent from some doctrines which have been laid down. Many gentlemen have argued this question as if there was a general impression and belief that war with the United States was imminent, and that this proposal of ours was for the purpose of meeting a sudden danger which we apprehended to be hanging over us. Now, I think there is no danger of war with America. Nothing that has recently passed indicates any hostile disposition on the part of the United States towards us; and, therefore, I do not base this motion on the ground that we expect war to take place between this country and America. But is it necessary that when you propose to put a country in a state of defence, you should show that war with some powerful neighbor is imminent and likely soon to take place? Why, the whole practice of mankind is founded on an entirely different assumption. [Hear] Every country which is able to do so, fortifes its frontier, if its neighbor is a powerful state which might, if it thought fit, attack it. But it is said that you can’t defend Canada. Now, I utterly deny that proposition. [Cheers.] I think that is assuming a conclusion which no man is entitled to assume. Does the example even of the war now going on tend to justify that conclusion? The territory of the confederates is vast and extensive. Have they attempted to defend every portion of that territory? They have fortified certain important points, and those important points, although the rest of the country may have been overrun, have resisted attack—some of them even to this day, and others for three or four years of the contest. [Hear, hear.] Look at Richmond; is Richmond taken? [Hear, hear.] Has not Richmond been attacked for a great length of time? And what are its defences? Why, chiefly earthworks, with a force behind them; and, though that force is inferior in numbers to the force which threatens it, it has hitherto remained in confederate hands. The mere occupation of territory by an army that traverses through it without reducing its fortresses is no conquest. The conquest is limited to the ground that the invading army occupies, and when that army passes to another part of the country its conquest passes away with it. But all countries fortify particular points, and when those points are secure they trust that the general bulk of the territory is safe from any permanent occupation or conquest by any enemy who may attack it. It is urged that Canada has an extended frontier; but are no other States similarly placed in that respect? What country has the largest frontier? What is the extent of our own frontier? Why, the whole coast of the United Kingdom, [hear, hear;] and we might as well say that, it would be necessary for the security of this country that we should line our whole coast with defensive works, because we may be attacked at any point of that great and extensive frontier. [Hear, hear.] I maintain, therefore, that there is nothing that has passed, nothing that is now passing between the government of the United States and our government, which justifies any man in saying that the relations between the two countries are likely, as far as present circumstances go, to assume a character of hostility leading to war. But, then, the honorable member tor Birmingham says that any danger which might threaten Canada and our North American provinces must arise from political disputes between England and the United States. And, therefore, the honorable gentleman says that Canadians will find that their best security is, not in fortifications or in British support, but in separating themselves from Great Britain. Now, in the first place, that happens not to be the wish or inclination of the Canadians. [Cheers.] The Canadians are most anxious to maintain the connexion with this country. They are proud of that connexion; they think it for their interest; they are willing to make every exertion that their population and resources enable them to achieve, and, in conjunction with the efforts of this country, to preserve that connexion and prevent themselves from being absorbed by a neighboring power. Is it not, therefore, alike the duty and interest of this country, for the sake of that reputation which is the power and strength of a nation, when we find the Canadas and our other provinces desirous of maintaining the connexion, to do that which we may have the means of doing, in assisting them to maintain that connexion and remain united with Great Britain? [Hear, hear.] But, sir, is it true that the only danger which a smaller colonial state runs from a more powerful and larger neigh bor arises from quarrels that may exist between the mother country and the foreign state? I say that is a total fallacy. Suppose these provinces separated from this country—suppose them erected into a monarchy, a republic, or any other form of government. Are there not motives that might lead a stronger neighbor to pick a quarrel with that smaller state with a view to its annexation? [Hear, hear.] Is there nothing like territorial ambition pervading the policy of great military states? The example of the world should teach us that as far as the danger of invasion and annexation is concerned, that danger would be increased to Canada by a separation from Great Britain, and when she is deprived of the protection that the military power and resources of this country may afford. [Cheers.] If these American pro-vinces should desire to separate, we should not adopt the maxim that fell unconsciously from the honorable member for Birmingham, who maintained that the north was right in suppressing the rebellion of the south. We won’t adopt his maxim, and think that we have a right to suppress the rebellion of the North American provinces. [A laugh] We should take a different line, no doubt, and if these provinces felt themselves strong enough to stand upon their own ground, and if they should desire no longer to maintain their connexion with us, we should say, “God speed you, and give you the means to maintain yourselves as a nation.” That has not happened; but, on the contrary, they much dislike the notion of annexation to their neighbors, and cling to their connexion with this country. And I say that it will be disgraceful to this country [cheers]; it would lower us in the eyes of the world; it would weaken our power and leave consequences injurious to our position in the world, if, while they desire to maintain their connexion with us, we did not do what we could to assist them in maintaining their position. [Hear, hear.] I think that the government are perfectly right in proposing this vote to the House. We are of opinion that all those examples which my right honorable friend behind me (Mr. Lowe) has adduced are not applicable. We all know that in winter the snow is so deep in Canada that if an army should march, it could only be in one beaten track, and that it would be impossible to carry on siege operations in winter. We know that warlike operations must be limited to the summer months, and we think that we can, by the fortifications now proposed—some to be made by the Canadians and some by this country—put Canada into such a state of defence that, with the exertions of her own population and as sisted by the military force of this country, she will be able to defend herself from attack. [Hear, hear.] My right honorable friend the member for Calne argued in a manner somewhat inconsistent with himself, for what did he say? He says that you cannot defend Canada because the United States can bring a military force into the field much superior to that which you can oppose to them; yet the right honorable gentleman says we ought to defend Canada. You ought not to relinquish the connexion, he says, but you should defend Canada elsewhere. Where? Why, as you are not able to cope with the United States in Canada, where you have a large army and where you can join your forces to those of the Canadians, you should send an expedition and attack the people of the United States in their own homes and in the centre of their own resources, where they can bring a larger force to repel our invasion. If we are unable to defend Canada we shall not have much better prospects of success if we land an army to attack New York or any other important city. I really hope that the honorable gentleman (Mr. Bentinck) will be sufficiently satisfied by proposing this amendment, and that he will not think it necessary to disturb the unanimity of the House by insisting upon our going to a division. [Hear, hear.]

Mr. Bentinck, in reply, said that there was no one more fully impressed than himself with the conviction that the honor and interests of this country were bound up in the defence of her colonies. He differed from the noble lord and the government, not as to the end, but only as to the means. He had been anxious that a full discussion of this important subject should take place, and he thanked the honorable gentleman the member for Birmingham for the perfect fairness with which he had let the cat out of the bag. [A laugh.] It he persisted, after the honorable gentleman’s speech, in going to a division, he should be giving a vote that would be open to great misconstruction, because he should find himself in the same lobby with honorable gentlemen who would be giving the same vote with entirely different views, and he should be gaining their votes under false pretences. [Laughter, and Oh, oh!] He declined to receive their support under false pretences, and he therefore would not ask the House to go to a division. If a division took place, he should take no part in it. [A laugh.]

The Chairman having obtained from the honorable member for West Norfolk the assertion of his willingness to withdraw the amendment, put the question to the committee in the usual form—”Is it your pleasure that the amendment be withdrawn?”

As several voices replied in the negative, a division was called; whereupon Mr. Bentinck rose and left the House, amid ironical cheers and laughter.

The committee then divided: For the amendment, 40; against, 275; majority against the reduction of the vote, 235.