Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the First Session Thirty-ninth Congress

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward

No. 892.

Legation of the United States, London, March 14, 1865.

Sir: I seize the opportunity afforded to me by the despatch agent, who is making up a bag for to-morrow’s steamer, to send you a copy of the Times, of this morning, containing a full report of the great debate in the House of Commons last night on the relations with America.

I think both countries have some occasion for congratulation in the fact, that at last British statesmen begin to open their eyes to the perception of the magnitude of the questions which have been involved in the present contest, and of the importance of recognizing the validity of the policy adopted by our government, This is the best guarantee yet given of the preservation of friendly relations. The tone of this debate, as well as the unequivocal manner in which it was sustained by the sentiment of the assembly, cannot fail to produce a great effect all over Europe as well as in America. I congratulate the President as well as yourself, as being his chief adviser in his foreign policy, upon the testimony incidentally, but not the less decidedly, borne to the firm and dignified manner in which that policy has thus far been directed.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[From the London Times of March 14, 1865.]

[Untitled]

House of Commons, Monday, March 13.

THE DEFENCES OF CANADA.

Mr. S. Fitzgerald said he was not unaware that the course he was about to take in bringing before the House the important question of the defences of Canada was one that might be misapprehended and misrepresented. There were those in this house, and there were some out of doors, who thought that such a discussion might possibly in certain events tend rather to precipitate than to avoid any danger, and to induce rather than retard hostilities between this country and the United States. They might say that by constantly discussing the possibility of hostilities between the two countries the people in both might come to consider such hostilities first as possible, then by degrees as probable, and at last as natural and almost inevitable. Upon this ground, therefore, they might deprecate discussion, and might choose to shut their eyes to existing facts rather than by discussion and argument to put the public in full possession of the present state of affairs. Now, he was not of that opinion. He believed that the truest policy in such a case was that this house and the country should be fully acquainted with the facts. Moreover, if any remonstrance were to fee addressed to any body for provoking discussion, it should be addressed to her Majesty’s government, who had laid before Parliament a paper not only contemplating the possibility and the probability of hostilities, but considering the possible course which these hostilities would take, pointing out what probably—or, as they seemed to think, inevitably—would be the result of these hostilities—namely, the defeat and the disgrace of the British arms. By publishing that paper her Majesty’s government has done as much as in them lay to discourage the friends and to encourage the adversaries of this country. There were some, he knew, by whom either the effect or the object of this motion might be misrepresented. There were those in this house, or out of it, who, from a persistent partiality for the policy of the federal States of America, and from a conscientious sympathy for the objects of that policy, would be likely to attribute to him a desire rather to increase than allay irritation on the part of this country against the federal government, so as rather to increase than to diminish the probability of hostilities between the two countries. If such an imputation were made, nothing could be more unjust or unfounded. He believed that there was no man in that house who would vindicate the utterance of a single word which could by possibility increase the irritation between the two countries. He was one of those who differed widely from the honorable member for Radnorshire, who seemed to consider, when he spoke on a former occasion, that the step taken by the American government in reference to the termination of the con vention limiting the naval forces of the two countries on the lakes, and in reference to the reciprocity treaty, was conceived in a spirit of hostility towards this country. It appeared to him that in regard to the termination of the convention limiting the naval forces on the lakes, the American government was justified in that course of proceeding. What were the circumstances under which the notice of termination was given? An American vessel was seized by a party of sympathizers from Canada in American waters, and it was only by accident that a second vessel was not also seized, and then that which was the avowed object of their enterprise might have been carried out—the liberation of a large number of prisoners confined on Johnson’s island, amounting, he believed, to 2,000 After such an attack on federal property in federal waters, he thought that the United States were justified in having recourse to an increase of force for police purposes on the lakes. That measure was proposed, in the first instance, by the federal government as a temporary increase during the war, and was so intimated to the government of this country, but afterwards notice was given for the permanent and total termination of the convention. As regarded this point, he thought her Majesty’s government greatly to blame. He thought that the moment those events took place, and when the federal government intimated their intention to adopt some measure of a temporary character, the English government ought at once to have met then in a conciliatory manner and said, “The object you have in view is as important to us as to you, and we are ready to enter into an arrangement to have a temporary increase of forces on both sides for the naval police of the lakes.” If such a course had been pursued, it was his conviction that the English government never would have received from America what might be productive of some complication and embarrassment—the regular notice permanently and completely to terminate the convention. Again, in respect to the reciprocity treaty. The notice to terminate that was given in a moment of irritation, and in consequence of the events in Canada; but he thought that the course which her Majesty’s government ought to have, pursued was to say, “Do not precipitately and entirely put an end to that treaty, which has removed from the arena so many causes of difference and quarrel, but point out where it may be amended, and we are willing to meet you and to modify the treaty.” If that had been done he believed that the reciprocity treaty would not have been terminated, and that a number of questions with respect to the fisheries, which had before brought the two countries almost to a state of war, would never have been reopened again. [Hear, hear.] He wished it, therefore, to be understood that in the observations he was about to make he did not desire to attribute to the American government anything like a feeling of hostility towards this country. On the contrary, during the last two months the communications which had passed between the United States and her Majesty’s government had been, generally speaking, marked by a far greater spirit of consideration, temperance, and conciliation than previously. He was happy to acknowledge that this result was in a great measure owing to the wise, discreet, and prudent conduct which had marked the course of the American representative in this country, who had done more than any other man in maintaining peace between the two countries, and who had thereby conferred equal obligations on his own country and on the people of this. [Hear, hear.] He would not attribute to the American people, generally, a desire to go to war with this country. On the contrary, he believed that the great bulk of the educated and intelligent classes in America, who, though they might not take a decided part in public affairs, yet had a great influence in their country, would deprecate as much as anyone on this side of the Atlantic anything like hostilities between this country and the United States. At the same time it appeared to him to be worse than folly to shut the eyes to what what might possibly happen. It was impossible to say what might have been the result of a chance accident in the course of the last year or year and a half. What must have happened if the ill-tempered and hasty declaration of General Dix, which was at once and most honorably disavowed by the American government, had been acted on? Supposing the Canadian frontier had been invaded by American troops, that blood had been shed and life lost, who could say for one moment what would have been the result? Supposing, again, that the two vessels in American waters had been captured, and some 1,800 or 2,000 confederate prisoners set free, would not such an event have agitated the people from one end of the United States to the other? He would point out another reason for taking this matter fairly into consideration. It was not long since they all read in one of Mr. Seward’s despatches an account of what passed in an interview between the federal and confederate authorities, and Mr. Seward stated:

“What the insurgent party seemed chiefly to favor was a postponement of the question of separation, upon which the war is waged, and a mutual direction of the efforts of the government, as well as those of the insurgents, to some extrinsic policy or scheme for a season, during which passions might be expected to subside, and the armies be reduced, and trade and intercourse between the people of both sections be resumed. It was suggested by them that through such postponement we might now have immediate peace, with some not very certain prospect of an ultimate satisfactory adjustment of political relations between the government and the States, section or people, now engaged in conflict with it.”

This proposition certainly was not accepted; but he would point out that when it was communicated to Congress it was unaccompanied by a single word expressing disapprobation or repudiation of it, or denouncing it as a faithless and treacherous proposal against a friendly power. He was aware that the confederate government had represented to the French government, and, no doubt, to her Majesty’s government also, that the proposition did not come first from them. It did not matter one farthing from whom it first came, but he wished to point out this, that though the proposition was not accepted or entertained, yet it was not the first time that two conflicting powers had thought that the best thing to do in order to keep down and soften the feeling of animosity between their own people was to turn upon and join in acts of violence against a weak and defenceless neighbor. [Hear, hear.] It was only last year that they had the spectacle of two great military powers, having each objects of their own to gain, and thinking to establish concord between themselves exactly by that process, turning upon a third and defenceless power, and committing acts of violence and spoliation against it which would ever redound to their shame. [Hear, hear.] What, therefore, he wished to point out was that, although he did not believe for one moment that a proposal of that kind would be accepted by the federal government, yet, at the same time, they had not repudiated it, and it was possible that there might be circumstances of such emergency that such a proposal might be entertained, when the consequences to us might become serious. But what was still more important was the possible disposition of the American people, supposing the federal government to succeed in their conflict with the Confederate States. He would give the American government the fullest credit for desiring to maintain peace; and he would give the intelligent and educated class of the American people credit for doing everything in their power for the same object. He would also give every weight to the consideration that it might be of the greatest possible importance to the federal States to have time to recover their strength and repair the losses they had sustained in their gigantic struggle. But, at the same time, it must be remembered that the Americans were a proud, a high-spirited, and a boastful race; they might be intoxicated with their success, and then in what position would they stand? They would see that they had had it impressed upon them by their own government, and not altogether without reason, that they had causes of complaint against this country [hear, hear]—that they had had their commerce swept off the seas—that they had been told by their own government that the vital strength of the rebellion, as they termed it, had arisen from England having set the example of a precipitate acknowledgment of belligerent rights. Exulting in their triumph they would also have before them the paper, which had been produced by the government of England, telling them that they had a ready and easy prey at their very feet. And were we to think that they would not stretch forth their hands and seize the prize, unless effectual steps had been taken beforehand to protect it? Therefore, while giving every credit to the government and people of the United States, he said it would be the greatest folly of which the House and the country could be capable to shut their eyes to the possibility of hostilities occurring, under certain circumstances, between the two powers. That being so, the point they had to look at was very simply and shortly set before them in the report of Colonel Jervois, which had been laid on the table by her Majesty’s government. Almost the last paragraph in that report was this:

“The question appears to be this—whether the British force now in Canada should be withdrawn in order to avoid the risk of its defeat, or whether the necessary measures shall be taken to enable that force to be of use in defence of the colonies.”

Now, that was the question which he wished to bring under the notice of the House. As to the solution of the two propositions contained in that alternative, he did not believe there were five men in the House who would hesitate. He did not believe there were the men in the House or in the country who would say that they would quietly determine to abandon the Canadas to their own defence, to lend them no assistance, to withdraw our troops for fear they should be defeated or taken prisoners of war. He did not believe there was a single man in the House or out of it who would assent to a course so disastrous and so disgraceful to the British name. [Hear, hear.] If that were so, then they came to the other branch of the alternative, viz: whether the necessary measures should be taken to enable the British force now in the province to be of use in the defence of the colony. It had been urged by members on both sides of that House that the first thing they should make the colonists understand was that they were, if not to be solely responsible for their own defence, to contribute to it in by far the greater degree. (Hear, hear.) He had supported that proposition-himself, and he thought it a sound one. But he wished to point out to the House that the position of Canada was very different from that of our other colonies. He could understand that having given responsible government to New Zealand, and the settlers having engaged in contests with the Maories, it was not fair that we, who had no control over their policy, should be called upon to bear all the burden of a war which that policy had brought about. Again, it was not fair that we should be called upon to engage perpetually in Caffre wars. These were cases in which, having given responsible government to the colonists, it was for them to exert themselves in their own defence. But what was the position of Canada? His belief was, that if Canada were independent to-morrow, she would not run the slightest danger of a contest. [Hear, hear.] There were impediments, financial, industrial, and political, which would interfere with any project on the part of the American government for annexing Canada. His belief was that they would be content to see that colony, if independent, growing up side by side with them. But that was not the position of Canada. She was united to this country, and wished to remain so. They had the authority of Lord Bus-sell, speaking in another place the other night, for saying that as long as the Canadians chose to stand by us we were bound to stand by them, and that it would be a disgrace and dishonor for us to allow them to be oppressed by a neighboring country. More than that, it was not only that if they were independent there would be no cause of quarrel between the United States and the Canadians; but it must be remembered that the only cause of quarrel, now that they were united with us, which could occur between the United States and the Canadians, was their connexion with us. It was only because the Americans thought they could through them strike at us that they could ever have any cause of quarrel with them; and the only ground of offence which could possibly exist between the Canadians and the Americans was, that there might arise questions between the Americans and us in which it would be impossible for the Canadians to do otherwise than adhere to us. Thus, then, the cause of quarrel would not be Canadian, but ours; and the only sources of danger to the Canadians were their connexion with this country, and the belief on the part of the Americans that they could wound us through Canada. It should be remembered that there was no ground of quarrel at the present moment between Canada and the United States* The Canadians had not permitted the Alabama to escape; they had not precipitately acknowledged belligerent rights; they had done everything they could, as far as these raids were concerned, to put them down; they had met the American government half way in all the measures which had been adopted to secure the peace of the frontier; and it was only the other day that a distinguished American said to him, “I only wish that the conduct of the mother country had been half as loyal to America as that of her colony has been.” [Hear] Therefore there could be no cause of quarrel between Canada and the United States, except the fact that she was united to England. Well, then, what were the means and preparations for her defence? He thought it was perfectly clear that if the cause of dispute was an imperial one—if we were bound to stand by the Canadians while they were willing to stand by us, it would be possible for us to do otherwise than exert every means in our power to contribute towards the defence of a country brought into danger wholly by its connexion with us What were the means of defence that had been proposed by her Majesty’s government? They had had commission after commission sent out to Canada. They had a commission in 1862, of which Colonel Gordon was a member; and although its recommendations were very similar to these, they were more extensive, and contemplated an expenditure of money and construction of fortifications so vast that the government sent out another commission in 1883. Another commission also was sent out in 1864, and what had been done? Practically, nothing. He wished to point out to the House what were the propositions made by the government. The report of Colonel Jervois proceeded on this ground—that the defence of Canada must be military, by a union of a certain amount of British force with a large Canadian force, protected and supported by additional fortifications. Colonel Jervois also pointed out what was of still greater importance, viz., that the great, the real means of defence for Canada must be a defence by the Canadians themselves. What was it that was now proposed in regard to fortifications? The only fortification to be undertaken was that of Quebec, and this was to proceed at so slow and prudent a rate that only £50,000 was to be spent this year. [Hear, hear.] The first thing, therefore, he wished to know was, if they were convinced of the necessity of fortifying Quebec, why did they not do it years ago? It had been recommended as imperative and inevitable. Colonel Jervois recommended it a year ago. In the letter which had been laid on the table he referred to his report of 1864. He said “he pointed out in his report, dated February, 1864, as the result of his inspection in Canada, that the construction of certain works of fortification at Montreal and Quebec was essential to enable the British troops and local forces to resist an invasion by the Americans with any prospect of success.” Then, as they acknowledged it to be their bounden duty to assist in the defence of Canada by fortifying Quebec, he asked why did they delay it, why did they not do it long ago? He was aware that to a certain extent government might find a justification for a proposal to spend only £50,000 this year on the permanent works to be erected on the right bank of the St. Lawrence. Probably £50,000 was as much as during this year could well be expended at that point. But what had been the course of the American government where they had fortifications to erect? Had they been content with spending only the sum necessary for permanent works, and so consuming a number of years in the completion of permanent fortifications? No; what they did was this—they expended a certain sum on the permanent fortifications; but, side by side with these, they raised temporary earthworks, which, during the construction of the permanent works, would be sufficient for the defence of the position, and contribute to the safety of their army. It was certainly clear that, if for permanent fortifications the sum of £50,000 was as much as they could expend during the present year at this particular point, it was their bounden duty, promptly and without a day’s delay, to put Quebec in that state of defence by earthworks that would at least secure it against attack during the construction of the permanent fortifications. Then he wished to ask what they had been doing as regarded the armament of Quebec? It had, no doubt, been improved. Guns of considerable calibre, but few in number, had been placed there. But there were other guns there of a very inefficient character-guns which would be utterly useless at a hundred yards; and even these, according to an account given in a late publication, were placed on carriages so rotten that if stumbled against they would break to pieces. Was that a position in which a great imperial fortress should be kept? Government, for the last three years, had notice of the condition of that fortress, and now at last they tardily acknowledged that it was vitally important that it should be put in a perfect state of defence. Then, with regard to the fortifications proposed for Montreal and Kingston. Those for Montreal were estimated at £450,000. He asked whether the Canadian government were to find the money, and who were to construct the works? Did they mean that the Canadian government should do it, or did they intend to do it themselves. They must remember the position of the Canadian government. They were now put to fina suddenly an amount equivalent to very nearly £1,000,000 sterling, at the very time they were carrying out the confederation scheme, and when obviously they could not engage in any financial operation like the raising of a large sum of money by loan; he wanted, therefore, to know from the government what steps they were taking in order to carry out the recommendation of Colonel Jervois; whether they were prepared to carry out these recommendations on the understanding that the Canadian government agreed to repay the amount required by instalments, or whether they were going on shilly-shallying, taking neither one course nor another, but putting on the Canadian government the responsibility, and when they were found unprepared at the last moment, to throw on them the blame, because they did not find the money. What did they do in the case of Sardinia? The government opposite came down and proposed a loan of 1,000,000. That was for a foreign power, engaged in a foreign war. Were they prepared to do less for their own honor and for the security of their own brethren in Canada than they had done for Sardinia? He wanted an answer, in distinct terms, from the right honorable gentleman, the secretary for the colonies, as to the ability of the Canadian government to carry out these works, and whether the British or the Canadian government was to construct them? Another important matter connected with these defences, suggested by Colonel Jervois, had reference to the great works at Kingston; and these, again, were intimately connected with his recommendation that the defence of Canada should not be military only, but by means of a naval force on the St. Lawrence and the lakes. From the sea our most powerful sea-going vessels would have access to Quebec. From Quebec to Montreal the St. Lawrence might be effectively and successfully defended by gunboats, iron-plated and heavily armed, drawing fifteen feet or sixteen feet of water. That was clearly a portion of the defence that must be undertaken by this country, and could not be undertaken by Canada. Higher up, from Kingston to the head of the Upper Rapids, the defence must again be by gunboats. But it was obvious if they were to have an efficient naval defence of the lakes and St. Lawrence there must be some place for depots, where their steamers might coal or refit, and where their stores might be in safety. It was, therefore, proposed, for the safety of the vessels engaged in the naval defence of the lakes and the St. Lawrence, that there should be large depots at Kingston. He now wished to ask some questions with reference to Montreal: what were they doing there? Were the Canadian government to carry out the scheme proposed, or were the British government to do it, the Canadian government finding the money? Or were they prepared to assist them? More than that, he wished to know, as the fortifications proposed were of great extent and importance, formidable in their character, what was doing in the way of temporary arrangements by earthworks, in order, for the present at least, to secure the two positions on which, according to the report of Colonel Jervois, the safety of the British troops entirely depended. Again, what were they doing in reference to gunboats? As regarded vessels of small size, they had, at present, only two or three. What were they doing to prepare others? Without them they could not possibly defend the line of the St. Lawrence from Quebec to Montreal. Again, with reference to gunboats on the lakes, what were they doing with the view of placing an increased force on Lake Ontario? They remembered what the French government did in Italy. They constructed iron-plated vessels at Toulon, and carried them in sections to the Italian lakes, where they were put together, and rendered the most efficient service to the French army. The same thing was being done at present in the naval yards of America, and he wished to know whether her Majesty’s government were taking any steps to place a naval force, when the present convention expired, on the Lake Ontario. They had some vessels of the kind, but not any of the most efficient character; were any steps being taken to increase that naval force? It might be said all this was premature, but he asked the House to listen for one moment to what the American government had done. They had notice of what the American feeling was in regard to this country in the affair of the Trent. The American people felt humiliated at what then occurred; and what did they do? From that very moment they had spared no expense in putting every vulnerable point in a perfect state of defence. They knew, in case of a war with this country, the points we should attack. He was told that at Portland there was a new granite work completed, mounting upwards of eighty guns, and that all the earthworks previously existing had been strengthened, in addition to the construction of other permanent works, and these fortifications were amply armed with the heaviest artillery that the United States could produce. The old forts at Boston had not only been renewed and strengthened, but the most formidable artillery that could be obtained placed in them; and at the entrance to Boston there were new batteries and earthworks thrown up in anticipation of more permanent works, and there were mounted on these and other places at the present time one hundred guns of the most formidable character. With regard to New York, a naval officer who had lately seen it, and who had also seen Cronstadt and Sebastopol, said he believed the fortifications at New York were far more formidable than at those places, and were absolutely invulnerable. He did not believe that the American people desired hostilities with this country; but they were wise enough to know that the most economical and wise plan was at the earliest possi ble moment, and by degrees, to establish the most perfect system of defence that modern science could give. The noble lord at the head of the government and his friends had been spending fabulous sums upon the fortifications of England, but in case of a war with America our vulnerable point would be the frontier of Canada. The government had been warned of the danger three years ago, and yet they had taken no steps whatever to avert it, Evea: the works which they now possessed were not armed with such weapons as the United States possessed, but with the most inefficient antiquated pieces of artillery, utterly insufficient for the purpose of defence. [Hear, hear.] What had the government done with reference to gunnery? While the United States government was busy at New York, the English govern-ment was content to take the chance of the chapter of accidents. He hoped there would be no cause for quarrelling with the American people; but if war should not arise it would not be from any feeling on the part of the Americans that the English had put themselves in a state of effective defence, but it would be from their forbearance in not taking up arms at the moment any particular question arose which could excuse or justify them in declaring war. He had received another letter, stating some facts of which he had every reason to believe her Majesty’s government had been made aware. He read an extract of a letter, dated New York, February 20, 1865, stating that he might not, perhaps, be aware that the federal government were now actively, but quietly, preparing for a conflict with Canada, and to which all were now looking forward with some apprehension! He (Mr. S. Fitzgerald) did not agree in the slightest with the views of the writer. He did not believe the steps the federal government were now taking were in any degree in a spirit of hostility to this country, but they were perfectly justified in taking those steps in their own defence. The letter stated, also, as a fact that was not generally known, that a portion of a fleet of gunboats for the Canadian lakes was actually in the course of construction in London, and that an American firm who had settled in London had received the order from the federal government. These gunboats, which were to be forty in number, were to measure forty-five feet in length and fifteen feet in depth, and were to be constructed on the diagonal principle, and to have great strength and speed. They were to carry one large gun, and it was unnecessary to point out how mischievous they would be in shallow water. Five of these powerful “wasps” as they were called, had already arrived out there, having been shipped in segments on board large packets from one of the docks in London, and were afterwards easily transported on trucks up the country, where they would lie till wanted for active use. He (Mr. S. Fitzgerald) believed that the attention of her Majesty’s government had been drawn to this. He was perfectly aware that, under the existing state of the law, they could not interfere, but he wanted to know—not why they did not interfere, but what they were doing under the circumstances, and whether they were not preparing in the dock-yards of this country something which might compete with these boats on the lakes. Colonel Jervois said the only resource left to the British troops, if no fortifications were to be provided, would be to retire to their ships as quickly as possible, in order to avoid being taken prisoners of war. He had spoken thus long upon the subject from an earnest conviction that it was one of vital, pressing, and paramount importance. [Hear, hear.] During the last few years war might at any moment have broken out between this country and the United States, arising either from a raid on Canada, set on foot perhaps by confederate sympathizers, or through the rashness of some injudicious commander; and if war should at any time commence, who could say where it would end? They had in Canada the Guards, the flower of the army, troops who had not only the prestige of being specially attached to the person of the sovereign, but among their numbers were scions who had won still nobler fame in the fields of battle; and what would have been the position of these regiments if war had unexpectedly broken out? They would have scorned to have fled to their ships “and left Canada to be taken and ruined, and there was nothing left for them but hopeless and certain destruction. No one could say for certain that hostilities would not break out between this country and the United States, but they could say for certain, that if this country did not act promptly and vigorously our best blood might be sacrificed and the honor of the arms of England tarnished. He hoped he had said enough to induce the House and the country to press upon the government the necessity of altering the system which they had adopted for the last two or three years. They were bound at once to put in force the whole means at their command to make Canada what it ought to be—capable of defence. He hoped that the American people, when intoxicated with success, would not make war with this country; but if Canada was put in a proper state of defence this would strengthen the friends of peace both here and in Canada, and remove a great source of temptation from those who would be disposed to make war. If, unfortunately, hostilities should break out between the two countries, he should have the satisfaction of knowing that he had done his duty in pressing upon the government and that House the adoption of those measures which should remove the danger to our arms. [Hear, hear.]

Mr. W. E. Forster did not rise to deprecate a discussion of the question which the honorable gentleman, the member for Horsham, had brought forward, and still less did he object to the tone in which those questions had been submitted to the House. His reason for rising was to express an earnest desire that when a reply to the honorable member should be given from the treasury bench, that reply should be most full, most frank, and meeting all questions that had been raised [hear, hear]—not merely questions relating to any duty that we might owe to Canada, or Canada to us, but questions affecting the relations between the “United States and Canada, and between the United States and ourselves. The honorable member had started two or three distinct questions. One was, how Canada could best be defended against a possible attack on her borders; but, upon that, being an engineering question, he should not trouble the House. He would only observe that if the honorable gentleman wished this country to place the whole length of the border of Canada in a state of perfect defence, he was suggesting one of the most costly undertakings ever thought of, and the honorable member would go down to posterity as an extravagant imitator of the fortification scheme which had immortalized the noble lord. [ “Hear,” and laughter.] Then there was a question raised as to the respective shares of expense to be borne by this country and by Canada for defending the latter. Into that question he was not disposed to enter, because the principle was becoming every day more established that the relations between this country and the colonies of British North America were very much on the basis of an offensive and defensive alliance between two self-governing communities united together by allegiance to one legitimate sovereign. Therefore we had a right to call upon the North American colonies, by organization and union, to assist in their own defence, and to prove their patriotism by a willing contribution of money and of men. There was, however, another question referred to by the honorable gentleman, which had a more immediate interest to all in that house. That question was, whether there was any urgent necessity that those two allies should at once enter into arrangements for the defence of Canada against a possible invasion by her powerful neighbor. No one could object to the tone of the honorable member for Horsham, but was it clear that there was such danger as he seemed to apprehend? Was there reason to fear that peace between the two sections of the North American States, now contending with each other, would mean war by them against this country, with Canada and the ocean for battle-fields? He knew that fear did prevail extensively, but he need hardly say that he did not entertain it, as he believed it to be utterly groundless. Still that fear did prevail; it kept down the funds and affected all the calculations of commerce. A contest between the United States and ourselves would be a disgrace to civilization, and might almost be called one civil war taking the place of another. [Hear, hear.] Still, though he believed the fear to be utterly groundless, yet he was not surprised at its existence, because certainly men in high position and exercising great influence in the country had done their best, honestly, no doubt, to create it. The conciliatory tone of the honorable member for Horsham had not been adopted by members of his party occupying even more distinguished positions before the country. He would only refer to a speech delivered in another place by a noble earl, who was regarded with the greatest respect by honorable gentlemen opposite, and for whom those who sat on his (Mr. Forster’s) side of the House also entertained great respect. That noble earl, on the occasion of despatches being produced, took an opportunity of expressing his fears of a war with the United States, in a manner more urgent and less conciliatory than the honorable member had done. Those remarks of the Earl of Derby—[“order!”]—he begged pardon, the remarks which were made elsewhere on a late occasion, were to the effect that very great danger existed owing to the hostile feeling of the American people towards us. The speaker, on that occasion, dwelt upon what he considered the menacing symptoms of hostility on the part of the United States, and said that he regarded the danger as immediately impending. Of course, when a statesman holding so high a position uttered such words, their effect was felt throughout the country. The temperate tone of the honorable member to-night might to some extent undo the harm which the speech of the noble earl had done. Still, the very fact of such discussions made it imperative upon the government to give the fullest information, and the House ought to know whether the state of our relations with the United States was such as would warrant the language that had been held elsewhere. It was not right, perhaps, to use the word “fear,” because a brave and high-spirited nation like this did not fear any other power. It would be better to say that suspicions were entertained which might be very irritating and unreasonable, but because of their unreason were exceedingly dangerous. Let the House look back for three oar four years, and he thought that all who were afflicted with the French panic of that time now felt ashamed for the fears they then expressed. [“No!”] In the case of America it was still worse, because the very reason which should make a war with the United States a thing to be dreaded, was also a reason why the danger of a fulfilment of our own apprehensions was greater—the similarity of language which caused every expression of suspicion and anger to reach the American people. A few days since there was a leader in the most influential organ of public opinion in this country, The Times, in which, in the strongest language, it was asserted that there could be no question but that the federals would go to war with us whenever a prospect of success presented itself. [Hear, hear.] Some gentlemen in that house seemed to be of the same opinion, [hear, hear,] but would they agree with the concluding paragraph of that article, in which a hope was expressed that the present terrible contest would continue to devastate America and to decimate the population, so that the northern people, to whom were imputed hostile intentions against us, might become exhausted? If there were such hostile feelings entertained towards us, it was important to ascertain the fact. True, there had been articles in American newspapers of a hostile character, but articles of a similar tendency towards America had been published in newspapers here. True, there had been unwise speeches in the American Congress, but had there not been unwise speeches made in the English Parliament? [Hear, hear.] A nation could, however, only be responsible for the acts of its rulers, and he would accordingly refer for a moment or two to what had been done, by the American government. He did not understand that the notice given by Mr. Adams of the discontinuance of the arrangement with regard to the lakes, was final, and he believed that the interpretation which had been given to that notice by his honorable friend was a wrong one. Mr. Adams, in the despatch containing that notice, after mentioning the reasons for adopting such a course—reasons which had been dwelt upon by his honorable friend—proceeded to say:

“I am, therefore, with great regret instructed to give this formal notice to your lordship, that, in conformity with the treaty reservation of the right, at the expiration of six months from the date of this note, the United States will deem themselves at liberty to increase the naval armament upon the lakes, if, in their judgment, the condition of affairs in that quarter shall then require it.”

They all knew, however, that a great deal might happen in six months. It was his belief—and in that belief many persons coincided—that before that time had elapsed it was by no means impossible that the war itself, and with it the very state of things which had led to this notice, might be at an end. Mr. Adams went on to say:

“In taking this step I am desired to assure your lordship that it is resorted to only as an indispensable measure to the national defence, and, so far from being in a spirit of hostility, that it springs from a wish no less earnest than heretofore to preserve the most friendly relations with Great Britain. I take pleasure in adding, that it is the fixed purpose of my government in every case to direct its energies to the prevention of all attempts to invade the British territory, whether by way of retaliation or otherwise.”

If words expressed any meaning at all, that despatch conveyed the impression that that arrangement was not regarded as a bad one by the American government, but that it was simply thought necessary to depart from it on grounds of self-defence, and that as soon as the causes which had led to the departure had ceased, the desire for its termination would no longer remain. His honorable friend evidently labored under a misapprehension with respect to the reciprocity treaty, because as yet no notice had been given for its termination. There was undoubtedly a party in America whose interests were injured by that treaty, but when the causes of irritation at present in existence had ceased, he believed that the great majority of the American people would feel that that treaty, in its main principles at all events, had been of great advantage to both countries, in reality he believed even more advantageous to the Americans than to the Canadians. This feeling would, he believed, prevent that treaty from being repealed, though it might possibly undergo some slight modification. His honorable friend had also severely blamed the American government for the efforts which they had made to fortify their towns. He felt sure, however, that his honorable friend would not for a moment attribute such an obvious act of self-defence to any desire on the part of the American government to commence hostilities against this country. It should not be forgotten that, though our government had preserved the strictest neutrality during this unhappy conflict, attempts had been made for the purpose of procuring a departure from that policy, and, not unnaturally, a fear was excited in America lest those attempts should prove successful. The government of that country, therefore, would have been remiss in their duty if they had taken no steps to provide against the emergency which a war with a foreign power would have created. He would allude, also, to an impression which existed in the minds of many persons, that it was the intention of the American government to enforce a claim on account of the disasters caused by the Alabama and similar ships which had issued from our ports. He trusted the House would allow him to refer to the words in which that claim had been urged. After giving the reasons on which the claim was founded, such as the destruction of property, and accusing us of a want of promptitude in our attempts to hinder the departure of these vessels from our shores, Mr. Adams said:

“Upon these principles of law, and these assumptions of fact resting upon the evidence in the case, I am instructed to say that my government must continue to insist that Great Britain has made itself responsible for the damages which the peaceful, law-abiding citizens of the United States sustained by the depredations of the vessel called the Alabama. In repeating this conclusion, however, it is not to be understood that the United States incline to act dogmatically or in a spirit of litigation. They desire to maintain amity as well as peace. They fully comprehend how unavoidably reciprocal grievances must spring up from the divergence in the policy of the two countries in regard to the present insurrection. They cannot but appreciate the difficulties under which her Majesty’s government is laboring from the pressure of interests and combinations of British subjects apparently bent upon compromising by their unlawful acts the neutrality which her Majesty has proclaimed and desires to preserve, even to the extent of involving the two nations in the horrors of a maritime war. For these reasons I am instructed to say that they frankly confess themselves unwilling to regard the present hour as the most favorable to a calm and candid examination by either party of the facts or the principles involved in cases like the one now in question. Though indulging a firm conviction of the correctness of their position in regard to this and other claims, they declare themselves disposed at all times, hereafter as well as now, to consider in the fullest manner all the evidence and the arguments which her Majesty’s government may incline to proffer in refutation of it; and, in case of an impossibility to arrive at any common condirected, I am directed to say there is no fair and equitable form of conventional arbitrament or reference to which they will not be willing to submit.” [Hear, hear.]

He did not believe that any government, impressed with the conviction that they had a right to make such a claim, could possibly have urged that claim in a more Conciliatory spirit. [Hear, hear.] He perceived by a parliamentary paper of the 31st of March, 1864, that there were 451 claims by British subjects against the American government. Many of those claims were, no doubt, valid, and would not be disputed by the American government; but any American who believed that we should enforce those claims without negotiation would be laboring under a strong delusion. He would, therefore, ask the Treasury Bench to inform the House during the progress of the debate whether any despatch had been received from America altering the principle upon which the claim had been urged by Mr. Adams—whether, in fact, any claim had been made except on account of the destruction of the Sea Bride by the Alabama? No conduct of the Americans would warrant the extraordinary suspicion which many people entertained of the intentions of the inhabitants of that country. It could not reasonably be imagined that a peace so ardently longed for by those upon whom the present disastrous conflict had entailed so much expense and suffering would be inaugurated by the commencement of an unprovoked war upon a nation, at all events, more powerful than the south, a war which, though it might possibly be successful in Canada, would be attended with an expense as great, if not greater, than the one which would be just concluded. He believed that the British public had been misled by confederate agents or sympathizers with the south and by disappointed prophets. [Hear, hear, and laughter.] His honorable friend the member for Horsham had, he was afraid, permitted the too near approach of the first class, and the gunboat story alluded to by his honorable friend might, he believed, be traced to a confederate source. [Mr. S. Fitzgerald. No.] There were many confederate sympathizers—and he did not blame them—who, now that the rebellion appeared to be in its last stage, were straining every nerve to induce us to attempt the rescue from defeat of the cause to which they were devoted. There were men, too, of great literary fame in this country, who must be vexed at the shortcomings of their prophecies, and who, after having foretold from day to day the miserable failure of the federal power, deemed it convenient to hide their fallacies, or, at all events, divert attention from their mistakes, by continually urging upon their countrymen that success in the north would only be the herald of a war with this country. These were the men who said that whatever the American government might say or do, we were not to trust to it, because, however friendly the government might be, the people were unfriendly. That charge against the people was quite as baseless as the charge against the government. It was to be traced to three ideas, each of which was based on a fallacy—-first, that the federal power and the federal people were greedy of empire and dominion; next, that they were vindictive and eager for revenge; and, thirdly, that the government was unable to control the feelings of the people. There was a fallacy under each of those ideas. To take the last first. The member for Horsham himself seemed to suppose that the American government would not be able to contend against a demand for war which might be made by the American people under a feeling of temporary irritation; but there was no government in the world of which such a thing could be said with less foundation. [Hear, hear.] The American government was a government of the people; it had never yet been a government of the mob. He challenged any honorable gentleman to produce a case in which the mob had controlled the government. [Hear, hear.] There might be dangerous mobs in New York and other cities, for which, perhaps, the American government was not so much responsible as England and Ireland, who had sent there the people who constituted them; but they had no influence over the government. [Hear, hear.] There was no one city in the United States which had any power over the American government The real body who had influence over the government was the great body of the country farmers, who cared nothing for any mob in New York or elsewhere. [Hear, hear.] There were checks, too, in the form of the American government which prevented any yielding to temporary irritation much stronger than any we had. If there was a fault in the American government, it was that it was less liable to public feeling, because the Executive was much more independent of the feeling of the country than ours. The President had far more power than our prime minister, and the fact which seemed to us so strange, that the members of the house of legislature sat for months after they were virtually turned out, was a proof that it was thought necessary to provide some check against temporary influences. What had happened during the war showed it. If an English ministry had made the failures which had occurred in the conduct of the American armies and of American policy, the English people would not have shown the same long-forbearing patience, but we should have had change after change of administration. [Hear, hear.] Therefore the fear that the American government was likely to plunge into war through any temporary irritation on the part of the people was totally unreasonable. [Hear, hear.] Then, again, as to their being eager for revenge. No doubt, as the honorable gentleman opposite has admitted, there had been some things done in England at which the American people might feel some bitterness; but they had not been done by the government, nor by the great body of the people. The Americans knew that, and the adherence to the cause of the Lancashire operatives throughout all their sufferings would far outweigh any attack made upon them by any men of great station. [Hear, hear.] They knew well that if there was one man in this country who, deluding himself into the belief that this greatest experiment of modern times was a failure, had hailed the accomplishment of his hope with premature joy, there were a hundred who, like the noble lord who had conducted our foreign affairs, had hoped from the first that the great republic would pass unscathed through its trial, and rejoiced now that it seemed likely that she would emerge purified from that slavery which had been her weakness and shame because it had been her sin. [Hear, hear.] Then, as to the idea that the American people were greedy of dominion and empire, for that the noble lord at the head of the Foreign Office was in some de gree responsible. In one of his speeches the noble lord said that the north were fighting for empire, and the south, for independence, and then said how that if the American people would fight for empire in the south, they would also fight for empire in the north. [Hear.] He would not say whether the north had been fighting for empire or not, but it certainly had not been conscious of it. The northern people believed that they were fighting, to prevent the destruction of their country; and in any attack upon Canada they could not feel that they were fighting in anything but an unprovoked war for empire, and that would be a very different feeling from that which now animated them. [Hear, hear.] This idea, therefore, was as unfounded as the others. Surely, then, we might consider how these fortifications were to be raised with coldness and calmness, and without rushing into any enormous expenditure which might affect the budget for years. Whatever we could do would not be the true defence of Canada. These fortifications would avail little for the defence of Canada; the matter would have to be fought out by the possibility of our inflicting injury on the Americans in other quarters. If Canada was to be defended at all it must be by the continuance of that determination to uphold the principle of neutrality which the Canadians had evinced, and the best thing we could do, either in this country or in islands far away subject to our rule, was to endeavor by every action and every thought to hasten the time when—this great struggle over and America once more in the enjoyment of that prosperity assured to her by her fruitful soil and boundless resources—the great English-speaking people, whether subjects of her Majesty or members of independent communities, or citizens -of the United States, should feel themselves bound together by the tie of a common language, a common blood, faith, and freedom, and should deem a war between each other as horrible and revolt ing as a civil war within their own territories. [Cheers.]

Mr. Cardwell. The honorable member for Horsham concluded his speech by saying that if ever a disaster overtook us from the want of proper energy and foresight on the part of the government, he should feel the utmost satisfaction from the reflection that he had at least given early notice of the danger. But if such a contingency did ever arise it would be a still more natural source of satisfaction, either to a subject of her Majesty or a citizen of the United States, that no syllable had ever fallen from him which could have the remotest tendency to bring about the great calamity of a war between the two countries. [Hear, hear.] My honorable friend, the member for Bradford, in his eloquent speech, has called on the government to answer two questions. He has asked us to state distinctly whether we cannot truly assure the House that our relations with the United States are, as they have been, perfectly friendly. [Hear.] I. can, without reserve, give that assurance to the house. [Hear, hear.] My honorable friend has also asked whether there is not some correspondence unknown to this House, varying the tenor of the demands made on this country for compensation on account of the destruction of American merchantmen. With equal pleasure and confidence I can assure my honorable friend that the answer I have to give is the answer which he desires. [Hear, tear.] There are no papers varying the tenor of the principle on which that question stands between the two governments. The member for Horsham began his speech in a tone of which we can make no complaint. All I will say of it is that it contrasts most advantageously with the tone which has been taken by other persons on the same subject, and I sincerely trust that that tone will always be observed. [Hear, hear] I should feel deeply reprehensible if I allowed a single syllable to drop from me which would tend to exasperate any difference of opinion or to turn that which might be a mattter of passing controversy into a serious subject of dispute. The honorable member for Horsham told us that he did not see any evidence of hostility in the course pursued by the American government with regard to the arrangements as to the number of vessels to be kept on the lakes in times of peace. With regard to the reciprocity treaty, when notice shall have been given by the United States ner Majesty’s government will not lose a moment in endeavoring to renew negotiations on a subject of such importance to both the United States and this country. The honorable gentleman has referred in just terms to the cancelling by President Lincoln of the order issued by General Dix, and to the uniform courtesy manifested towards this country by the United States minister in London. I cordially agree with him in respect of what he has said of the excellent conduct of Mr. Adams, and I must say that in selecting their representatives in this country the government of the United States have always paid us the compliment of choosing from among their first citizens. [Hear, hear.] The honorable gentleman, after speaking in this mode in the early part of his speech, then passed with a rapid transition, through which I was unable to follow him, to a consideration of the dangers which he sees in the future. He thinks that after the present civil war is over there is imminent danger of hostilities between the United States and this country. [“No, no !”] I don’t believe that in using the expressions to which I refer the honorable gentleman meant to give his sanction to the demands made by the United States, and which my honorable friend the member for Bradford and every one else in England disapproves; but I understood him to say that the United States complained, not without reason, that their commerce had been interfered with. [No !] Well, whatever may be the honorable gentleman’s opinion on that point, I will admit with him that whatever may be the prospects—and I hope the prospect of relations between the United States and Great Britain is not one in which we are obliged to see hostilities—it is not on the justice or good will of any other country, nor on the forbearance of any other country, we are to calculate for our self-defence. [Hear, hear.] It is on our own position, on our own means of defence. [Cheers.] The honorable gentleman has a right to call cm us to state what we are doing with a view to the defence of Canada. He knows that for the last three years we have been impressing on Canada the necessity of making greater preparation as regards her defence. We are prepared to do our part in defending that colony; but we have always held that for its own defence a country must mainly rely upon the spirit, energy, and perseverance of its own people. [Cheers.] The honorable gentleman also knows that in England there were serious complaints that Canada had not shown herself disposed to take those measures for her own defence which this country had reason to expect from her. In 1863 a new militia law passed, but the vote which passed in Canada last year was an inconsiderable one. In consequence of that circumstance, a right honorable gentleman opposite was so dissatisfied with the state of Canadian preparation that last session he felt it his duty to come down to this house and call on her Majesty’s government to concentrate all our forces at Quebec. We did not agree in that proposal, for reasons which appeared to us to be sufficient. It is now perfectly well known that when, in the autumn of last year, a proposal was made for the union of the British provinces in North America, a totally different spirit began to be manifested, and the Canadians manifested the greatest desire to prepare for their own defence. Anxious to promote that desire we sent out Colonel Jervois, who held a friendly connexion with Canada, and drew up a report on the Canadian defences, which now lies on the table of the House. The honorable gentleman asks me what we are going to do with reference to this report, and I shall answer all the questions he put to us as far as I think the honorable gentleman is entitled to an answer. The report laid on the table points to the fortifications of Montreal and Quebec, positions of the greatest importance for the defence of Ganada. The defence of Quebec we engaged to undertake; the defence of Montreal we called on the colony to undertake; the armament of both we are willing to undertake; so, that the division of expense will be about two-fifths to the mother country and three-fifths to the colony. The honorable gentleman speaks as if he thought the whole question of defence was mainly, if not entirely, for the mother country. [Mr. S. Fitzgerald intimated his dissent.] The honorable gentleman did not say so in terms, but I drew that inference from his remarks. If, however, that is not his opinion, it only helps my case; if it is not, he agrees with me. We think that is a right division; that the position which is the gate of Canada, through which the military and naval forces of England are to enter to defend Canada, should be fortified by the mother country; and that Montreal, the strategic and commercial capital of Canada, should be fortified at the expense of the Canadians themselves. [Hear.] And now, in answer to the honorable gentleman’s first question, Why did we not proceed sooner? I reply that, as long as Canada made no exertions, and showed no readiness to prepare for her own defence, we felt it would be wrong in us to come to the House and ask for imperial money to defend Canada; but the moment that spirit was shown which was manifested in the autumn of last year, it became our duty to come and ask the House of Commons to enable us to give assistance to Canada. [Cheers.] As to his second question, Why are we only asking £50,000 for the present year? the honorable gentleman himself has relieved me of the largest part of my answer, because he admits that £50,000 is as much as can be advantageously spent during the present year in the preparation of the Canadian defences, and when the estimate comes to be discussed we shall satisfy the House that this sum is as large a one as it would be right and proper to ask for during the first year of the work. It has, I know, been represented that because we ask for only £50,000 the first year—the total amount of the estimate being £200,000—we are going to keep the works in hand for a period of four years; but nobody would make that remark who is acquainted with the subject. In the first financial year you can make but a comparatively small progress with the actual works of such fortifications; only the earthworks are raised in the first year, whereas in the second nearly the entire of the permanent works may be completed. The third question of the honorable gentleman I have already answered. Then, with respect to Kingston, the first step towards the defences of the lakes is the providing of a place of safety for coaling and harboring our vessels. We have called the attention of the Canadian government to that necessity; we regard it as the business of the colony, and not of the imperial government, to furnish that fortification. [Hear, hear.] With regard to the honorable gentleman’s sixth question, which is as to what we intend to do in future, I have to observe, that I feel he is entitled to an account of what we have done and what we are doing, but I must respectfully refuse to furnish him with information as to what we intend to do with regard to the defence of Canada at some future day, and in some future emergency. [Hear.] The considerations connected with such an emergency are two-fold: First, a war with Canada is a war with England. [Hear, hear.] The imperial forces will be brought to the aid of Can ada, and wherever it will be most effective in destroying the power of the enemy there the imperial power will be exercised. [Hear, hear.] Next, the defences of Canada must consist of the forces furnished by the mother country, to be supplemented by the military power of Canada. [Cheers.] I have the satisfaction of stating that in Canada large bodies of officers are being trained to take the command of the militia in time of emergency; that the number of training places has been increased, and is still being augmented; and that other preparations are being made to bring a large number of militia into a state of active effi ciency. This being the spirit in Canada, and the mother country acting in unison with this spirit, I think it may be said very confidently that defences are being provided for Canada. [Hear, hear.] But I hope that nothing will ever occur in our relations with the United States to make it necessary that Canada should be defended against an enemy. [Hear, hear,] I cannot express the feelings of regret with which I should view any controversy between the United States and the subjects of the Queen. I should look upon it as a calamity unequalled by anything that the world has ever seen, and I sincerely trust that, however much we may debate among ourselves these questions of the defences of Canada and of the relations which subsist between that colony and the mother country, we shall be careful so to employ our language as not to irritate temporary differences, not to expand into great disputes questions which might shortly pass away, and to believe that the same kind and just feelings which we know to be prevalent among the educated classes and among the members of the government of this country are equally prevalent in America. [Loud cheers.]

Mr. Disraeli. I do not think the government, after placing the report of Colonel Jervoier upon the table, could have expected that this subject would not be touched upon in this House, and I do not think it could have been brought forward with greater moderation than has been shown to-night. I am sorry that the honorable gentleman opposite should disapprove the opinion which he referred to as having been expressed in another place. I am myself at a loss—acting as I do merely upon my impression of the moment—to recall any such expression of opinion by the individual to whom he has alluded which would justify his remarks. If I recollect aright, on a particular occasion, in recalling to the recollection of those whom he addressed the great irritation which was the result of the affair of the Trent, the individual in question naturally inquired why four years had been allowed to pass away without those preparations being made which it was confessed were necessary for the proper? support of the dignity of the country. That appeared to me then, and appears to me still to be a very difficult question to meet. [Hear, hear.] With regard to the general opinion on American affairs expressed by the eminent statesman to whom reference has been made, and in whom I place the greatest confidence, I may say that I have frequently expressed similar opinions in this house, and that they are in all respects mutually concurred in and shared by Lord Derby and myself. [Pear, hear.] With a full recollection of the facts, I do not believe that it is possible to recall any expression which has fallen from the lips of that noble lord during the last four years that can in any way justify the allusion and the references of the honorable gentleman. I am not here to-night to impute, and I have never imputed, anything against the conduct of the government of the United States throughout this great struggle; but, on the contrary, I am now prepared, after further experience, to repeat what I said two years ago, that, under circumstances of almost unprecedented difficulty, that government has conducted itself with great energy and discretion. [Hear, hear.] I am not of opinion that in the event of the termination of the American war we should be placed in any immediate danger of coming into collision with that government owing to our connexion with Canada. [Hear.] I do not pretend now to express any opinion as to what may be the termination of the present contest, as it appears to me to be quite foreign to the question under discussion; but, even assuming that the result may be such as is anticipated by the honorable member for Bradford, I do not believe that the citizens of the United States of the north, even if entirely and completely victorious, will feel inclined to enter immediately into another struggle with a power not inferior in. determination and in resources to the southern States of America. [Hear, hear.] I form that opinion because I believe that the people of the United States are eminently a sagacious people. [Hear, hear.] I don’t think they are insensible to the glory of great dominion and of extended empire, and I give them equally credit for being influenced by passions which actuate mankind, and particularly nations which enjoy such freedom as they do. [Hear, hear.] But they are a sagacious people, and I don’t think they would seize the moment of exhaustion as being the most favorable for the prosecution of an enterprise which would require great resources and great exertions. [Hear, hear.] There are other reasons which also induce me to dispute, that opinion. I have not been influenced in forming my judgment upon points of such vast importance by that sort of rowdy rhetoric [laughter and “hear, hear”] which has been expressed at public meetings and in certain journals in America, and upon which some people in this country found their conclusions as to the possible character and opinons of the American people. I look upon these expressions of opinion as I should look upon those strange and fantastic drinks of which we hear so much, and which are such favorites on the other side of the Atlantic, [“hear, hear,” and laughter,] and I should as soon suppose this rowdy rhetoric was the expression of the real feelings of the American people as that these potations formed the aliment and nutriment of their bodies. There is another reason why this violent course will not be adopted. The democracy of America must not be confounded with the democracy of the Old World. It is not formed of the scum of turbulent cities, neither is it merely a section of an exhausted middle class, which speculates in stocks and calls that progress. [Loud cheers and laughter.] It is a territorial democracy, if I may use that epithet without offending the right honorable gentleman opposite. [Hear, and laughter.] Aristotle, who has taught us most of the wise things we know, never said a wiser one than this—that the cultivators of the soil are the least inclined to sedition and to violent courses. [Hear.] Now, being a territorial democracy, their character has been formed and influenced in a manner by the property with which they are connected, and by the pursuits they follow, and a sense of responsibility arising from the reality of their possessions may much influence their political conduct. [Hear.] And I believe they are very much more inclined to welcome the returning laborers to their fields, to see around them the products of the earth, and to behold happiness in those households to which they are so much attached, than to plunge into the miseries of a new and terrible war. [Hear, hear.] But, although these are my opinions generally, I cannot conceal from myself that very great changes have taken place in America of late years, and these changes I have reason to believe are not regarded in this House with sufficient seriousness, while, in my opinion, they amount to no less than a revolution. I will ask honorable members to recall to themselves the state of North America when we met in this House four years ago. That portion of the world was then divided among what we may call three great powers: first, the United States of America; secondly, Canada and the settlements and dependencies belonging to our own sovereign; and, thirdly, Mexico, a country which. certainly did not possess much political power, but which in extent, resources, fertility of soil, and mineral wealth was almost unequalled in the world. In every one of these three divisions there have been immense changes. In the United States a civil war has raged for four years, and even if that war should terminate, as the honorable member for Bradford suggests, I cannot believe that we shall see the same society and form of government established, or even, if the form be the same, certainly the spirit will be altered, as existed before the civil war commenced. [Hear.] We must recollect that even if the federal government should be triumphant, it will have to deal with most perplexing questions and with a discontented population. I need not dwell much upon the then state of the southern community, but the slave population will then be no longer slaves; there will be several millions of another race emancipated and invested with all the rights of freemen, and, so far as the letter of the law is concerned, they will be upon an equality with the Saxon race, with whom they can possibly have no sympathy. We know from experience and practice that there is a difference between those who are recently emancipated and that—I will not call it a superior race, because that might offend honorable gentlemen opposite [a laugh;] nor will I call it an inferior race, but a race that is not identical with the other. Nothing tends more to the discontent of a people than that they should be in possession of privileges and rights which practically are not recognized and which they do not enjoy. These are the elements of political discontent, and it is possible that when this war is over the American government may have to deal with great masses of discontented population. To do this successfully you must have a strong government. What does that mean? Why, you must have a centralizing government; and the American government have found it necessary to have recourse to the centralizing principle during these events. The government must have an army at its command in order to maintain the order and unity that it is bound to uphold. These are the elements that cannot fail to produce great difficulties in the United States, even if they come triumphant out of the struggle in which they are engaged. But what is the position of the colonies and dependencies of her Majesty in that country? Four years ago, when this struggle broke out, there was very little in common between them. The tie that bound them to this country was almost one of formality; but what has been the consequence of this great change in North America? You have now a powerful federation, with the element of nationality strongly evinced in it; they count their population by millions, and they are conscious that they have a district more fertile and an extent of territory equal to the unappropriated reserves of the United States. These are the elements and prognostics of new influences, that have changed the character of that country. Nor is it without reason that they do not feel less of the ambition which characterizes new communities than the United States, and that they may become, we will say, the Russia of the New World. Well, what is also the condition of Mexico? Four years ago, when this war broke out, Mexico was a republic, with a weak government. It is now an empire, and it has become so by the interposition of two of the most ancient states of Europe—France and Austria. When we see all these immense changes it is impossible to deny that in North America a great revolution is occurring, and that when this struggle is over, when peace reappears, and tranquillity is re-established, you will find these communities governed by very different influences, and aiming at very different objects. I have often heard statesmen, and distinguished statesmen, mumbling over the balance of power in Europe. It has appeared to me always to be a great mistake when we look to the distribution of power to confine our views to Europe, because we shall find, and, perhaps, speedily find, that there are other influences in other quarters of the globe which will interfere to disturb our calculations. It seems to me that this war in America has rapidly precipitated the change. It shows us that the proper meaning of “balance of power” is security for communities in general against a predominant and particular power, and that you have to take into your consideration states and influences that are not to be counted among the European powers. It is impossible, notwithstanding what honorable gentlemen may say about the character of the United States, to conceal that there is a feeling among those influential land-owners to whom the honorable gentleman the member for Bradford referred, with regard to Europe, of a peculiar character, will not say that they look to old Europe with feelings of jealousy or vindictiveness, because epithets and words of that kind ought not to be unnecessarily used with respect to the relations between nations; but it is undeniable that the United States look to old Europe with a want of sympathy. They have no sympathy with a country that is created and sustained by tradition, and the only country to which they look with sympathy is that part of old Europe which is new. I have always observed this in their conduct. [Hear.] It is quite clear, then, it is impossible to know what relations may exist between the United States, this country, and her Majesty’s dependencies on the other side of the Atlantic. Taking these larger views, then, we ought to consider that, not to-morrow or next, year, but that we are on the eve of events of very great importance. The question we have to ask ourselves is, is this country prepared to renounce her American dependencies and colonies, or are we to retain that tie? Now, if these colonies expressed a wish to separate the connexion, and if they preferred to be absorbed by the United States, we might terminate our connexion with dignity and without disaster. But if, on the other hand, those views are just which are more generally accepted—if there should be on the part of Canada and the other North American colonies a sincere and deep desire to form a considerable state and develop its resources, and to preserve the patronage and aid of England until that mature hour when we shall lose our dependency, but gain a permanent ally and friend—then it would be the greatest political blunder that can be conceived for us to renounce, relinquish and avoid the responsibility of maintaining our interests in Canada at the present moment. [Hear, hear.] If, from considerations of expense, we were to quit the possessions that we now occupy in North America, it would be ultimately, as regards our resources and wealth, as fatal and disastrous a step as could possibly be taken. Our prosperity would not long remain a consolation to us, and we might then prepare for the invasion of our country and the subjugation of our people. I infer that honorable gentlemen opposite do not express these views, which have, however, found utterance in other quarters, but that they take a truly patriotic and English view of this subject— namely, not to force our connexion on any dependency; but if, at a moment of revolution in North America, we find our colonies asserting the principle of their nationality, and if, foreseeing a glorious future, we find them still depending on the faithful and affectionate assistance of England, it would be the most short-sighted and suicidal policy to shrink from the duty that Providence has called upon us to fulfil. [Hear, hear.] What is the course which we ought to take under these circumstances? I cannot doubt that it is our duty to place our North American colonies in a state of proper defence, and when we are told that you cannot defend a frontier of 1,500 miles, I ask, who has ever required you to defenda frontier of 1,500 miles? What we recommend and require—I do not speak of this side of the House, but of those generally who hold these views—is to see that our troops in Canada are not placed in a position in which the utmost bravery and skill are of no avail, but that they should defend that country according to military practice. Austria does not attempt to defend the whole of her frontier; but she provides a good army, and takes care that when her territory is invaded there shall be points round which her troops may rally, and which they may occupy against superior strength. We wish to see Canada placed in such a condition that if she has to be defended by her countrymen, assisted by the troops of her Majesty, they may have the fair-play the troops have a right to expect by having fortifications constructed with sufficient skill to double the number of her army and insure the success of a campaign. [Hear, hear.] That is what we trust her Majesty’s ministers have determined to do. I think that these four years need not have been lost, and that from the first the affairs of North America have not been, considered of the importance to which they have now attained, and which from the first I have felt they must attain. I do not wish to employ taunts, but I form that opinion from judgments which have been expressed by members of her Majesty’s government during the last four years. Those judgments upon the struggle in America and its probable consequences have been for the most part inconsistent. One day we were told by an eminent member of the government that the south might be said to have completed her independence, and speeches have been made which led all England to suppose that a diplomatic recognition of the southern States was to be expected. Very shortly afterwards another great authority, now lost to this House—and no one deplores that loss more deeply than myself; I mean the late Sir G. Lewis—told us that he did not recognize the existence of a single element of political independence in the south. Well, these inconsistent opinions perplexed the country, and have shown that from the first the government have never taken that view of the situation which we had a right to expect. One day we were led to believe from the highest authority in the government that there was on their part the utmost sympathy with those who were struggling in the southern States, while, on the other hand, the minister whose judgment upon such matters has, of course, peculiar weight, and which was particularly watched by foreign countries, expressed opinions of a totally different character. Sir, I do not blame her Majesty’s government because, in a position of extreme difficulty, they have made mistakes and formed opinions inconsistent with each other, but what 1 do regret is the consequence of those discordant opinions on their part—namely, that all this time her Majesty’s colonies have not been defended as we are now all agreed they should be, with the possibility of dangers hanging over them; that we have lost four years, and are now about to make an effort on a very small scale, and necessarily with very limited resources. [Hear, hear.] But, sir, that is, after all, but a very little matter provided we are now following a sound principle. If the Parliament of England is determined to maintain our connexion with the colonies of her Majesty, founded upon an unequivocal expression of opinion on their part that to that connexion they cling with feelings of a character which shows that the national sentiment is perfectly unimpaired; if they prove that the reports and rumors which have been circulated of late years respecting the feelings of the colonies are wholly unfounded, and that they themselves are resolved to maintain it until they emulate us in our great career, and become our rivals as well as our allies and friends, then I shall not regret what has occurred. It appears to me that there are two consequences of public opinion being of late agitated upon this topic—that we are conscious now of what our duty to the colonies is, and that we are prepared to fulfil that duty in a manner which I doubt not will conduce to the strength and independence of the British empire. [Hear, hear.]

Mr. Lowe. I should like to take up this matter just where the right honorable gentleman who has just spoken has set it down. 1 will not enter into any discussion as to the intentions or motives of the American government, because it appears to me both dangerous and unnecessary. In the first place, it is dangerous, because, just as in private life, nothing irritates more than such discussions and examinations, and psychological dissections as it were, just as if they were mere natural curiosities. [Hear, hear.] In the second place, it is unnecessary, because, whether the American government have or have not any designs upon Canada, it is our duty to do what is needful. [Hear, hear.] It seems to me perfectly plain that it is our duty in this extremity, whatever complaints we may have had against Canada— and I think we have had many—to consider any attack upon them as an attack upon ourselves. [Hear, hear.] This is not an occasion for picking quarrels or examining too nicely whether the Canadians have always acted towards ourselves as they should have done. Now is the time to stand by them and to make it known that those who go to war with Canada go to war with us. Rut, having cleared up this preliminary matter, what I want to put to the House, and what it becomes us to consider, is what this country is bound to do for the defence of Canada. And upon that point I think we have had a difference of opinion. There is the honorable member for Horsham (Mr. S. Fitzgerald,) who goes all along the St. Lawrence for 800) miles, and says we are to keep large vessels-of-war in those waters. Then he comes to the rapids of the St. Lawrence, and thence upwards is to be defended—I know not exactly how, but I believe with other vessels-of-war of a smaller kind. My honorable friend finally seems to think that it is the duty of this country to put, at the imperial expense, the frontier of Canada, in a complete state of defence, and to find all the maritime expenses that may be wanted. [ “No.”] Then I take my right honorable friend the secretary of state, and he says, with great force and pithiness, that the real defence of Canada is that she belongs to England. But he does not stop there; he says that something must be done by Canada herself, and that what we do must be regulated by what may be done by her. It is my misfortune to differ from both. Let us look at the question on the supposition that we are actually at war. What does Colonel Jervois say will happen? He says if you have no fortifications besides those which exist your troops will have to retreat to their ships, and they will be happy if they reach them. [ Hear, hear.] Therefore, says Colonel Jervois, make fortifications. But what is to happen if we have them? [Hear.] He says as soon as the Americans invade Canada you will be driven like sheep into the fortifications, and then the hope is that the country will rise around you. You will become a sort of nucleus—for that is the favorite expression on such occasions [a laugh] and this nucleus will gather to itself a sort of vapory mass—the Canadian militia, whose existence has been of that nebulous order, through which you can see a star of the sixteenth magnitude. [A laugh.] But look at this thing from a common sense point of view. Don’t look to the old analogies of 1812 and 1814. The Canadians then made an admirable defence, and the Americans had nothing to boast of as to the result of the engagements on land. But on the hikes we met the Americans, and on Lake Champlain we got right well thrashed, and the figure we cut on Lake Ontario was not a very agreeable one. [Hear, hear.] Well, fifty years have elapsed since then, and have things remained the same? [Hear, hear.] Are we going to embark on the defence of Canada as if the principles which we deemed sound in 1813 and 1814 were still to be relied on? [Hear, hear.] Take the lakes. If America was more than a match for us in 1813 and 1814 on the lakes, what must she be now, when by means of the New York Central and Ere railroads she can transport both men and means to the scene; when she can carry down gunboats, as many as she pleases; when to one man of ours she can put ten; and if ten won’t do, she can put twenty? [Hear, hear] Can anything be more idle, or more unworthy of a great nation, than to think of carrying on war on such a principle as that? [Hear, hear.] Then we are to attempt to fight with America on her own ground. Canada has not a gunboat to put on the lakes, while America has boundless facilities of outnumbering us in any proportion that she thinks proper. Are we really to enter with the money of the people of this country into such a matter as that? Then let us turn to the land. I have no doubt that the few thou-. sand men we may have in Canada will fight. But what support have they from Canada? Colonel Jervois tells us that you have twenty-one thousand seven hundred volunteers, whom he has seen, and who have got through their exercise very well, and that there are some thousands besides whom he has not seen, but who, he doubts not, would do their duty equally well. And then there are four hundred and seventy thousand militia men on paper, which nobody has ever seen at all. [A laugh.] In fact, Canada has no materiel. We are told to-night that we are to find her materiel, for her fortifications are utterly antiquated. And with what forces could America invade? Why, with any number that she thought proper, and these trained, disciplined, veteran troops, ten times the number that we could bring into the field. [Hear, hear.] It would not be as it was with General Montgomery in the war of independence, when he had to struggle through impenetrable woods in the depth of winter. America has railways now to transport to the frontier any number of men she pleases, so that under these circumstances the disparity of forces would be absolutely and entirely overwhelming. [Hear.] You will say, perhaps, that this is a good argument for building fortifications. But it is impossible for me to describe to the House what, probably, many have seen for themselves—the situation of the places that we are asked to fortify, and the difficulties which that situation creates. General Wolfe cannonaded Quebec from Point Levi, about three-quarters of a mile from the town, and was able to do this even with the artillery of that day. If Point Levi were seized now, it is certain that, with modern artillery, Quebec would lie absolutely at the mercy of the enemy. Then what are your mens of preventing them from taking Quebec? You may, perhaps, build a fort on Point Levi, but how are you to hold it against such a force and such artillery as America can bring against it? Setting this aside, however, I have never seen a place which seems to be commanded from more points, and to be more entirely exposed, than Quebec is. The town is so built that you seem able to pitch a shell into every house in it, and it would be hard to find a better mark than the citadel itself. Mind, I don’t grudge the money for these fortifications if they give any satisfaction to the Canadians. No doubt we can strengthen Quebec, because now it is not defensible in any way whatever. Indeed, I doubt whether it ever was defensible, because when Wolfe attacked it and gained the Heights of Abraham, Montcalm judged it prudent to march out into the open field instead of awaiting the assault behind his fortifications. I shall not object to fortifications if they are thought desirable. But it seems to me perfectly impossible that when our troops are once hunted into Quebec and Montreal—for that seems to be what it is thought will happen—they can ever escape again. Colonel Jervois, you must remember, assumes that you can only make war in Canada during the summer. But, in fact, in the rebellion the war was carried on in winter time, and General Montgomery, who besieged Quebec, made his way through Maine, where there were then no roads, in the depth of a severe winter. He assaulted Quebec at that time of year, and if an extraordinary casualty had not happened—if he, with seventeen of his staff, had not been killed by the discharge of a single cannon, he might have taken Quebec, and the destinies of Canada might*have been entirely different from what they are to-day. What, then, is to guarantee your eight thousand troops against a similar catastrophe when the St. Lawrence is closed from November to May, and the besieging army have the means of passing across the natural bridge which the ice then makes for them? [Hear.] It seems to me that to coop up our men behind these fortifications will be like enclosing them in a net for the enemy to take them at their discretion; as Hannibal said at Canse, when the Roman consul desired the cavalry to dismount and engage the enemy on foot, “Had he not better deliver them to me bound hand and foot at once?” [Hear, hear.] I cannot conceive why we should enter into arrangements which seem to imply that in time of war we are to keep these troops in Canada. There is another consideration which appears to me to be a most powerful one. When we once go to war with America—it may be about Canada—will Canada be the best place for us to carry on the war? In such a struggle we must consider not merely local but imperial interests; we must wage war in the mode least likely to injure the forces of the empire, and strike at points. which are vital to the interests of our antagonist. If we allow the Americans to lead us, if we follow them to the points they may choose to attack—points, after all, only of local and subordinate interest—leaving unguarded other places which are of imperial importance, such a policy would end in certain failure and disaster. [Hear, hear.] We should be like the unskilful boxer of whom Demosthenes spoke, and who put his hands to the parts where he feat the blows instead of striking at the vital parts of his adversary in return. [Hear, hear.] If that be so, the defence of Canada sinks into a small matter indeed, because, considered from an imperial point of view, the question is not what is the proper defence of Canada as the sole point of probable attack, but what are the points at which America will be able to attack us with the greatest power, and at which we can best attack her in return. [Hear, hear.] It may be that the most effectual way of defending Canada would be by abandoning her altogether, and concentrating our forces upon a place of such importance to the enemy as would compel them to cease attacking Canada, and run to the vital point at which they were themselves assailed. [Hear, hear.] As far as military considerations go, therefore, my conclusion is that it would be unwise, and indeed impossible, for us to retain any force worth speaking of in Canada in the event of so great and awful struggle as that between this country and America—that we should want all our troops for the defence of these islands, or for other points more essential to us, and partaking more of the arx imperii than Canada. Of course I do not profess to give any authoritative opinion on a military question, but I should think that Bermuda and Halifax were much more important than any points in Canada, since, the whole safety of our fleets in North American waters would depend on those two places. In the same way, it would be necessary to defend certain points in the “West India islands for the protection of our ships. I apprehend, therefore, that we should act very imprudently in case of War in keeping our men in Canada., But if it would not be prudent to keep our troops there in time of war, is it right, or is it wise to keep them there in time of peace, thereby encouraging the Canadians to believe that they will have these troops if war should break out, though we know, at least those who take my view know, that the necessary result of the war which begins with the invasion of Canada must, if we are true to imperial interests, be the speedy withdrawing of these troops? [Hear, hear.] I say that unless you are prepared to maintain that the same force should be kept in Canada in war as in peace, it is wrong to retain our troops there now, because we are thereby urging the Canadians on under false pretences. [Hear, hear.] Better—they should know the truth at once—know that they and not we are to fight the Americans; that, with our small army, we should, as we did in the Crimean campaign, soon feel the wear and tear to be so severe that we should be compelled to withdraw our troops from Canada for our own protection. [Hear, hear.] There is another point of view which I think deserves consideration. I believe that, if war does break out, nothing is so likely to cause it as the presence of British troops in Canada. [Hear, hear.] There are those in America who look upon the presence of British troops in Canada as a standing menace. I believe that a sincere conviction prevailed among those persons that on the 4th of March England was about to recognize Mr. Lincoln as only the President of the northern States, thus recognizing the south by implication. [A laugh] There is nothing which these people do not suspect. Then there is the Monroe doctrine; and the presence of our troops in Canada seems to connect this country with it, and to excite ill will against us. Another point of still greater importance should be born in mind. In my opinion nothing would be so strong an incentive in America to war with this country as the notion that they could catch a small English army and lead it in triumph. [Laughter] Never mind; if they were thirty to one, it would be all the same. [Laughter] The popularity which such a capture would confer upon the successful general or the President of the period would be irresistible. To humble us and exhibit an English army as captives and vanquished would be to Americans a gratification which no words can express. [Laughter] Sir, I grudge them that gratification; [hear, hear;] and therefore I say that we should act wisely in withdrawing these troops which, while too weak to protect Canada, are quite numerous enough to give a powerful motive and incentive to war. That such a war may be averted must be the prayer of all of us. [Hear, hear] It would be one of the greatest calamities that could befall either country, perhaps even the whole human race; and it is because I wish to destroy every excuse for war and every incentive to war, because I am convinced the English troops in Canada, though powerless to defend, are numerous enough to provoke, that I say our wisest course, both in the-interests of peace and for the purpose of carrying on a successful war, if war there must be, would be at once to withdraw our troops from Canada. [Hear, hear]

Sir J. Fergusson gathered from the remarks of the honorable member (Mr. W. E. Forster) that he would regard any measure for the defence of Canada as something partaking of an affront to the United States. The right “honorable gentleman, (Mr. Lowe) in his usually able-and lucid manner, had now put forth the new doctrine that we should leave Canada absolutely undefended for fear of a disaster to our arms. Now, he ventured to think that if the House’ gave any encouragement to such notions a painful chill would be cast on the warm sentiments of loyalty so recently expressed by the nascent British confederation in North America. Such an expression would come bufili after the hearty approval given by the government to the aspirations of these provinces; and what would be thought throughout the world if we. were to declare that in the event of danger to these colonies, through no fault of theirs, but owing merely to their connexion with the mother country, they were tobe left absolutely at the mercy of America? He ventured to think that the suggestion of leaving Canada to take care-of itself, however ingenious, was not likely to find much favor in the House. [Hear.] The right honorable gentleman endeavored to throw ridicule upon the report and recommendations of Colonel Jervois, but surely the right honorable gentleman. did not expect the House to suppose that the fortifications to be erected in Canada would be of obsolete form, exposing.: the troops within them to the mercy of the blockading and bombarding force. Those fortifications, of course, would be constructed in accordance with all the improved appliances known to modern warfare, and with a view to the purpose of all fortifications, that of enabling a small force to compete with a large one. Whether in systems of defence such as were established all over the continent, or in those erected for the defence of valuable points at home, for which the noble lord at the head of the government was, in his opinion, entitled to so much credit, the intention was to keep the bombarding force at such a distance from, the place thought necessary to be defended as would prevent the artillery from reaching it. And. of course those points in the vicinity of Quebec which the right honorable gentleman pointed out as commanding the town would all be protected by suitable works. There was nothing in the remarks of his honorable friend to lead to the construction placed upon them by the right honorable gentleman, that he sought to cover the lakes with ships, and the river St* Lawrence with vessels of light draught. He had merely enforced the opinion expressed in Colonel Jervois’s report, that it was necessary to have a certain number of ships capable of assisting in the defence of the Canadian frontier. It might be a question whether we could multiply ships out there with the same rapidity as the American government, but it was; evident, as he himself had pointed out at the outbreak of this American war, that the main defence of Canada must be conducted upon its lakes and rivers. The right honorable gentleman and likewise—unintentionally, he believed—the honorable member for Bradford had thrown cold water on the notion of providing for the defence of Canada while there was yet time do so. The right honorable gentleman in particular seemed to apprehend that any such steps upon our part would be like flinging a menace in the face of the Americans. But in a time of tumult, when the streets were filled with an armed force, and no one could tell to what excess the passions of the crowd might drive them, it was not considered any menace for a peaceable individual to put up his shutters. And when, unhappily, nations which had anything to apprehend perceived that affairs began to wear a threatening aspect, the invariable practice was to place an army of observation on their frontier, and by unusual measures of precaution to guard against and possibly avert the impending danger. At the time when we admitted and proclaimed that the defence of Canada was bound up with our honor, was it not as incumbent on us to take measures to prevent its being overrun by a coup de main as it was to protect the shores of the British channel from invasion? Unless those measures of precaution were taken which the interests and wealth of England demanded, how was it possible that our diplomacy could have force, or our commerce enjoy safety? Unless England were prepared to disarm and await with patience whatever humiliations the future might have in store, it was the duty of Parliament to guard against possible attacks on our North American possessions. The government had placed before the House a scheme by which, in the cheapest and most moderate manner, the most vulnerable points of Canada might be defended. The complaint of his honorable friend, which he begged to second, was that the government had done so little towards the accomplishment of what they themselves acknowledged to be necessary. What was an expenditure of £50,000 compared with the object to be gained? Did they think the danger to Canada would abstain from presenting itself till those fortifications had been completed at the rate of £50,000 a year? [Hear, hear.] The day had gone by when the honorable member for Birmingham could uphold the American people as models of all that was economic and peaceful. [Hear, hear.] Their appreciation of money was as nothing compared with their love of making a demonstration. The proposal, therefore, to create permanent defences for Canada, at the rate of £50,000 a year, seemed to fall little short of a mockery. If we were really determined to stand by our Canadian fellow-subjects, let us go forward in an earnest spirit and take energetic steps to have these works erected. We might then hope, not un reasonably, that measures more efficient than any yet taken would be adopted for drilling the Canadian militia, and in that event we might look forward to being able to take up such standing points as would give time for the concentration of British forces. At any rate, he hoped the country would never have to submit to the indelible disgrace of seeing troops in British uniform retreating before the enemy, unable to strike one blow for the national honor.[Hear, hear.]

Mr. White felt compelled, by the remarks of the honorable baronet the member for Ayr and his honorable friend the member for Horsham, to ask those gentlemen what they proposed to do for the defence of Canada, and whether they were prepared to sanction an amount of expenditure which would soon double the national debt, obliging them meanwhile to forego all hope of the reduction of the malt duty, [hear, hear, and laughter] and sending up the income tax immediately to 1s. Every one acquainted with the geographical position of Canada, and the extent of frontier to be defended, would know that these things must be looked plainly in the face if England undertook to hold that country against a hostile attempt on the part of the Americans. The right honorable gentleman the member for Calne represented, the opinion of every one whose opinion was worth having when he spoke of the utter impossibility of holding Canada without an expenditure of money and blood on the part of Great Britain which was fearful to contemplate. As to the alarm created by the recent conference between the northern and confederate commissioners, and the correspondence between Mr. Seward and Mr. Adams, it would be sufficient to state that the proposal for joint action on the part of the present belligerents had reference to a suggestion that the French should be expelled from Mexico. Any one conversant with the tone of American politics would see that this was the most tempting bait which the confederates, as they thought, could offer to the north. The right honorable member for Calne had mentioned the Monroe doctrine; he much wished he had explained its nature to the House. Everybody acquainted with English and American history knew that the doctrine in question was essentially of British origin, and had been suggested by Mr. Canning. France, having put down the constitutional principles which prevailed in Spain, entertained the notion of defraying herself for the expenses incurred in so doing by acquiring portions of the Spanish colonies in South America, and England, naturally indignant at conduct so detrimental to her interests, and with the aversion which Mr. Canning had ever shown from the principles of the holy alliance, induced President Monroe to enunciate the doctrine which had since become so famous. Lest an American authority upon this point might be received with some mistrust, he had referred to a work which was in the library of almost every gentleman, and from the last edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica took the following extract:

“James Monroe succeeded Madison in the presidency, and retained it eight years (1817 to 1825.) Towards the close of his administration (1823,) in compliance with the suggestion of his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, he introduced into his message to Congress—adverting to the purpose of the European allies of Spain to assist her in subju gating her revolted colonies in Central and South America—the assertion of ‘a principle, in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent position which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power. * * * With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power,’ continues the message, ‘we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any in terposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.’”

Congress took no action upon this, but the spirit of that body and of the nation was in favor of the Monroe doctrine. Lord Brougham, in referring to the President’s declaration, stated that it had diffused joy over all free men in Europe; and Sir J. Mackintosh spoke of it in the following terms:

“This wise government, in grave but determined language, and with that reasonable but deliberate tone which becomes true courage, proclaims the principles of her policy, and makes known the cases in which the care of her own safety will compel her to take up arms for the defence of other states. I have already observed its coincidence with the declarations of England, which indeed is perfect, if allowance be made for the deeper or at least more immediate interest in the independence of South America which near neighborhood gives to the United States. This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths—for so I delight to call them, and I heartily pray that they may be forever united in the cause of justice and liberty—cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by every enlightened citizen of the earth.”

He trusted that the citation of such high authorities would dissipate the apprehensions which some seemed to entertain of the operation of the Monroe doctrine. With respect to Canada, England had not such vast interests in connexion with that country as with the United States. By the last returns of the Board of Trade he found that the total value of the British exports to the United States last year was £16,704,000, exceeding by £5,000,000 the exports to Australia, and being twice as much as the exports to France, while the 150,000,000 of the Queen’s subjects in India took only £3,000,000 more. The trade which this country * carried on with Canada and the whole of British North America did not amount in magnitude to one-third of the British trade carried on with the United States, under the influence of a high tariff and during the agonies of war. He might mention that the vast immigration pouring into the United States would really, in case of a conflict between England and America, impart to the struggle almost the character of a civil war. During the last seven years 3,152,794 foreigners arrived in the port of New York, and of that number 1,816,566 were natives of England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. He considered that the tone and temper evinced by the honorable member for Horsham was quite satisfactory, as contrasted with the tone and temper evinced in a speech delivered in another place by a noble lord, who, they were taught to believe, was the honorable member’s leader. The only consolation he derived from the speech delivered elsewhere was that the noble lord did not regard his advent to power as very probable, or he would not have ventured on such inflammatory language as would cause his advent to power to be regarded by the Americans as a declaration of war. [“Hear,” and cries of “Oh, oh!”]

Mr. C. Fortescue said it appeared to him that the majority of the House did not agree with the views expressed by the honorable member for Brighton. He understood the honorable member to argue that the retention of British North America depended on a calculation of figures and on a question of profit and loss. Her Majesty’s government, on the other hand, and the great majority of that House, regarded the retention of those colonies as a matter of duty which a great country like this was bound to perform, provided only that those colonies were willing to remain dependent on the Crown of England, and to play a manly part in their own defence. [Hear, hear.] Knowing, then, that the colonies of British North America were desirous to remain attached to the Crown of Great Britain, and that they were willing and able to exert themselves more energetically than previously in their own defence, and in maintenance of the connexion with this country, her Majesty’s government deemed it their duty to make proposals to the House to enable them to perform their part in maintaining that connexion. Therefore, with respect to the end in view, they did not agree with the honorable member for Brighton, though they did agree with the great majority of the House. The right honorable member for Calne expressed in his remarkable speech agreement with the government and the majority of the House as to the end in view, and only differed as to the means. The right honorable gentleman objected to the policy which gave a certain number of British troops to the Canadians in order to assist and encourage them. He did not understand the right honorable gentleman to object to the proposed fortifications. The right honorable gentleman reminded the House of the immense changes which had taken place since the last struggle between Great Britain and the United States, and of the enormous growth of power in the latter country. Well, the proper conclusion to be drawn from those facts was, that fortifications were more than ever necessary to the Canadians in the present day, because it was evident that they would aid them in gaining time for mustering their forces, or serve as a protection while waiting for re-enforcements. What his right honorable friend (Mr. Lowe) really objected to was the presence of a single British soldier in British North America. Now, they all knew that the logic of his right honorable friend ran a straight course of the most unbending and merciless kind; but it sometimes left facts, and important facts, which were evident perhaps, even to inferior minds, to the left and right of its path. Hiere were some points in his argument which he had totally overlooked. His right honor-able friend said they were to withdraw every British soldier from Canada for three reasons: first, because their presence was deceptive towards the Canadian people, and tended to flatter them with hopes of a support wihch we should not be able or willing to give; secondly, because their presence would be useless; and thirdly, because it would offer a temptation to the United States to attack Canada. To what did these three reasons come? As to their deceiving the people of Canada, if that were a case of incurring an unnecessary responsibility, and if, by keeping their troops there, they incurred that responsibility, he should be inclined to agree with his right honorable friend. But could anybody say that what they did in this matter would affect their general responsibility for the defence of Canada if, unfortunately, a state of things arose in which they would be bound to help to fight her battle? Then, with regard to the presence of these troops being useless, he need only ask any honorable gentleman to look at the expressions of opinion on that subject which had ever been received from Canada, down to the present moment, and see whether the Canadians consider the presence even of a very moderate body of British soldiers to be useless. On the contrary, they had the authority of the Canadians themselves, who were the best judges of their own interest in that matter, and the authority also of their own officer, Colonel Jervois, in his report, that the presence” of a moderate body of British soldiers would be of the greatest possible importance as a nucleus— the term was a sensible and appropriate one—for the purpose of encouraging and training the more irregular troops in a country like Canada. So far from agreeing with the right honorable member for Calne, Colonel Jervois recommended these fortifications for the very reason that in case of extremities—and in all these cases, however much hey might deprecate that result, it was quite impossible to suppose they could send troops to Canada or anywhere else without running some risk of disaster—their regular force would be comparatively safe, and would become a nucleus around which the people would rally to repel aggression and preserve that connexion with the mother country which their loyalty, their interests, and their love of freedom alike made them desirous to maintain. [Hear, hear.] There could be no doubt that for the purpose of kindling the military spirit of a country like Canada, of setting an example and giving instructions to the comparatively irregular levies which formed the armies of the New World, those of the United States, he might say, as well as that of Canada—the presence of a moderate body of our regular soldiers, the finest, perhaps, in the whole world, would be of essential service. [Hear hear.] At the present moment a most valuable process of training was going on among the Canadian militia which without the presence of these British troops would be quite impossible. Schools of military instruction at Quebec and Toronto had been in operation for several months, and others were about to be formed elsewhere, assisted by the officers of British regiments; and every week they were turning out young Canadian officers fit to take the coinmand of the militia of their various districts. Indeed, he had not the least doubt that in a space of time which, perhaps, few gentlemen in that House would believe, on any serious alarm of danger, the Canadian militia would be turned into a force capable of giving a good account of any troops that were likely to be brought against them on the American continent. [Hear, hear.] The right honorable gentleman said, in the third place, that the presence of our regular troops would be nothing but a temptation to the Americans to make war in Canada for the sake of the honor and glory to be acquired by their defeat or capture. But was there no temptation on the other side of the account, supposing the right honorable gentleman’s advice to be taken and every red-coat withdrawn from British North America? Were that advice followed to-morrow, would it be possible under those circuinstances to convince the people either of Canada or of the United States that we were in earnest in our professed determination to defend the Canadians as long as they wished to remain part of our empire? It stood to reason that such a policy on the part of this country would be such a declaration of indifference as no fair words used in that House or elsewhere could outweigh; and that it would have its due effect on the minds both of the Americans and the Canadians it was impossible to doubt. On these grounds it seemed to him that, however logical his right honorable friend’s arguments might appear, it would not be wise for this country to act upon his views. He was glad to think that the House, on the whole, agreed with the government in the moderate and reasonable measures of defence which they had decided to take for the purpose of meeting the exertions of the Canadian people. He heartily concurred with many of those who had spoken that night in deprecating exaggerated alarm on the subject of the immediate invasion of Canada by the United States on the conclusion of the civil war. [Hear, hear.] He thought that debate would prove useful if it tended to dissipate panic and check a state of feeling which seemed to be gaining ground in the country. And he would add that it appeared to him that the success of the federal power in reducing the south, if it were a success, was likely in itself, if there should be any danger of aggression from that quarter, to make that danger far less. The north, even if successful, would, he thought, still have enough on its hands in controlling and governing its new subjects as they must be called. [Hear, hear.] And, more than that, their national pride would be naturally so well satisfied, the sources of disappointment, irritation, and passion so far removed, that if under any circumstances there were danger of any such insane conduct—an amount of folly and wickedness in which really one could hardly bring one’s mind to believe—as that of a great country turning without cause, and to its own great loss, upon its neighbors, he believed that the success of the northern cause would make that danger much less. Anyhow her Majesty’s government feltthat they had done their duty in seizing the occasion when it arose of meeting the loyal and manly wishes of the Canadian people to provide for their own defence; and with that view they recommended their proposition to the House. [Hear, hear.]

Sir F. Smith said he thought that the House and the country were under a great obligation to his honorable friend the member for Horsham for the statement which he had made that evening. It would tend to dissipate the doubts of the public at home, and to reassure those Canadians who were anxious that the connexion with England should be maintained. From the speech of the right honorable gentleman, the secretary for the colonies, it would appear that the government had cometo the determination to standby Canada, but he should be glad to know what limit was to be put upon the assistance which we were prepared to afford her. It was that we should fortify Quebec, but that the defence of Montreal and Toronto, &c., was to be left to the Canadians themselves, while we, however, were to find the armament and, he supposed, the ammunition which would be required for all those fortresses. But before a vote for the defences of Canada was passed by that house honorable members ought, he thought, to be informed what the probable cost of those measures would be to the tax-payers of this country. [Hear, hear.] The report of Colonel Jervois said nothing of the force that would be necessary for the protection of the colony. He spoke, indeed, of 28,000 militia, and of a number of 400,000 and upwards, which might be called out, but those 400,000 men were, he apprehended, at the present moment, completely untrained. Were we, then, he would ask, blindly to enter upon the defence of Canada, with only such a programme as that which Colonel Jervois had furnished? Of the ability of that gallant officer he had a high opinion, but it should be borne in mind that the question at issue involved the protection of a large province, and he should under these circumstances have supposed that the government would, before taking any decided step in so grave a matter, have instructed Colonel Jervois to make a report to Sir F. Williams, the commander-in-chief in Canada, that he would have sent home that report with his opinion upon it, and that then it would have been submitted by his royal highness the commander-in-chief to the consideration of those most experienced officers Sir J. Burgoyne and the quartermaster-general. As it was, there were no means of judging what amount of British troops it would be necessary to keep in Canada with a view of aiding the colonists to defend themselves. It had been stated a few nights ago that the largest gun for service would cost £4,000, and if that were so, what, he should like to know, would be the probable cost of armament and ammunition if the assistance proposed were rendered. The army estimates would come on for discussion in a few nights, and he should then call upon the under-secretary for war to give the House some adequate information on the subject. He had no doubt that £150,000 would, according to the right honorable gentleman’s statement, be expended next year.

Mr. Cardwell explained that he did not say that £150,000 would be spent next year, but that the works would be almost completed next year, and that the larger part of the expenditure would take place in that period.

Sir F. Smith said that if there was, as there might be, difficulty in finding labor in Canada, there were honorable members of that House who would send out men enough to complete the works very speedily. Either we must give up the idea of defending Canada, which he was not disposed to recommend, or we must execute the works at once. He fully concurred with those who said that the fortifications of at least Montreal and Quebec ought to be placed upon a respectable footing, but he did not believe that £200,000 would complete the works which were needed at Quebec. He should like to see a detailed estimate showing the nature of the pronosed works. He understood that it was intended to lay out £50,000 upon earthworks.

Mr. Cardwell said that what he had stated was, that the preparations for the permanent works would in themselves constitute a temporary defence.

Sir F. Smith. That could only be the case if they were earthworks intended for the backing of permanent fortifications. What he desired was to see a determined resolution to act according to either one line of policy or the other. It would be derogatory to England to abandon Canada merely for the sake of pounds, shillings, and pence; but the House ought to have an estimate before it, so that honorable members might know what they were called upon to vote. If they were in earnest, money ought to be asked for in the present year for the armament of these forts, and at the same time a report ought to be obtained from the veterans of the army in this country as to the nature of the defence to be made in the field. If the Americans invaded Canada they would do it in earnest, with large numbers of artillery and cavalry, as well as infantry; and if we hoped to resist them with success we must meet them not merely with militia or volunteers, however gallant or well-trained, but with a force which, like their own, should include all arms of the service He did not believe that we should ever use these proposed works as refuges into which we might crowd our own soldiers, leaving the Canadians to their fate; but they were indispensably necessary in order that if severely worsted we might have the means of embarking our troops. He regretted that no money was asked for either for providing for the defence of the lakes or for providing communication, the estahlishment of which was equally essential. The government had gone either too far or not far enough. They ought to come boldly forward and state what sum they were likely to require, and let the House of Commons decide upon it. He did not believe that the war with the south would be brought to an early conclusion, but even if it should, the northern army would have to remain in the southern States for many years, and, therefore, for that among many reasons, he did not entertain any fear of an early invasion of Canada by the federals. A war with England was too serious a matter for the Americans to contemplate without terror and alarm.

Mr. Watkin said that he could not corroborate the description given by the right honorable gentleman, the member for Calne of the defences of Quebec, nor could he admit that its fortifications were in so deplorable a condition as had been represented. He thought that it was a very strong place, and, although no doubt it contained a good deal of old ordnance, many Armstrong guns had recently been imported. The question came to this, Were We prepared to abandon and alienate from the British crown the vast expanse of territory lying between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans? [Hear, hear.] There was no half way house between cutting the painter—as the honorable gentleman near him was fond of suggesting in conversation—with regard to Canada, and cutting it with regard to all our North American colonies. [Hear, hear.] This was a question which affected not only Canada, but also Prince Edward’s Island, New. Brunsick, British Columbia, one, of the most thriving and hopeful of British possessions, and all that vast intermediate district known as the Hudson Bay territory, which included fertile land enough to feed fifty millions of people. [Hear, hear.] If honorable gentlemen looked at the report presented by Mr. Ward to the House of Representatives upon the subject of the reciprocity treaty they would see what was the American idea of the nature and value of the British provinces. Their extent, their wonderful internal navigation, the richness of their minerals, the healthiness of the climate, and the vast extent of fertile soil which they contained were described in that document in terms which irresistibly suggested the idea that the people of the United States were disposed to cast a covetous eye upon these possessions of England. He did not believe that we were in any imminent danger of a war with America, but the way to prevent it was not to talk about severing the connexion with Canada, or withdrawing every British soldier from that country; but to say calmly and boldly that these vast American possessions were parts of the Great British empire, and that come weal or woe they would be defended. [Cheers.] If that was the language held, there would be no war with America. The only danger arose from the impression which was produced by the speeches in that house and elsewhere of gentlemen who, humanitarians as they were, could support a war which, in his opinion, had been a disgrace to civilization, and liberals as they were in ideas, thought that they could afford to separate from this home of liberty some of its most important possessions, because it pleased their economical theories to imagine that they could save a few thousands a year to the exchequer. [Hear, hear.] This was not a question of arithmetic; it was a question of the extent of the British empire. Some gentlemen might like to live in a small country. For his part, he should prefer to live all his life in a great one; and as a business must either continually grow bigger or else dwindle away to nothing, so he believed that a country must either be ever growing greater, or else it would become weaker and weaker until it might safely be despised. The government proposed to spend £50,000 this year on the fortifications of Quebec, but, in the first place, the vulnerable point was not Quebec, but Montreal; and secondly, £50,000 was mere playing with the question. We had gone on since 1817 with the lakes neutralized, so far as armament was concerned, in the internal navigation. The sound of a hostile shot had not been heard there during the fifty years the convention had been in operation. If they must fortify, they should do so efficiently; but was it not just possible they might find Brother Jonathan in a favorable mood, and render it unnecessary to fortify? Was it not possible that, instead of running a race of extravagance, the American government might say, if you don’t choose to fortify on the Canadian we won’t fortify on the American frontier? Let the government try and see if they could not find in that way a solution of this question which would undoubtedly involve a large annual charge on the exchequer of England. Notwithstanding all the expense and difficulty ocsasioned by the present war, the Americans were adding day by day to the strength of Fort Montgomery at the head of Lake Champlain, within forty miles of Montreal, till it now mounted two hundred guns. Montreal was the real key to Canada. That was the point of danger, and government would be warranted in saying to a friendly nation, “ If you choose to have two hundred guns at Montgomery, within forty miles of Montreal, we must have two hundred and fifty guns close to Montreal.” If the matter could be dealt with in that way expenditure might be avoided. He offered this suggestion very humbly to the government. Let them take one of two courses. Deal with the question firmly and effectively, stating, without offence, distinctly to America, as Canada was part of the British empire, we should defend it at all cost; or endeavor to get the United States government to adopt this alternative—to let the American frontier, as regards fortifications, be neutralized by the Canadian frontier. [Hear, hear.]

Sir M. Farquhar was glad this question had been brought forward, and in a speech so moderate and temperate. He would follow the example of his honorable friend and avoid entering into the question between the confederates and the United States. They had now to consider the relations between this country and Canada. He must say he had read the letter of Colonel Jervois in The Times, for he had not seen it as a parliamentary paper, with surprise, and when he put a question regarding it to the right honorable gentleman opposite, the answer he received was that the contents of the report were perfectly well known in New York. But, having a good many friends connected with Canada, he could state that they too were exceedingly surprised at the report, because it placed before the whole world the difficulties of defending Canada. At first the Canadians had not taken that strong and decided line they ought to have done; they felt that while the contest between the Confederate States and the federals lasted there would be no necessity for them to come forward; but they had now shown by acts what their feeling was. Lord Monck, who had borne himself in a most admirable manner, had called the different provinces together to consider what line of conduct they should adopt, and the news which had arrived to-day showed that the confederation resolutions had been adopted by a majority of 45 to 15. The course which England would take depended on the line adopted by the Canadians themselves, and now they had shown that they wished by every means in their power to keep up the connexion this great country could not refuse to assist them without shocking every sense of propriety and every feeling of honor. He had heard it said that this country had really no great interest in Canada. But what were some of the investments in Canada? In railways the Grand Trunk represented a capital of £16,747,000; the Great Western of Canada, £5,262,589; the Northern, of Canada, £1,296,000; the Buffalo and Lake Huron, £1,477,860; the Welland, £345,667—in all £25,129,116. In banks, trust companies, and Canada land companies, £27,843,000. The public debt of Canada was nearly £16,000,000. Inali, about £40,000,000; in which this country was more or less interested. He begged on this subject to quote an extract from the report of the British North American Association:

“Of the whole British colonial empire, British North America occupies a prominent place. It contains 4,000,000 square miles, and occupies one-third of the American continent. It is larger than all Europe or the federal and Confederate States together. Its population is about 4,000,000. The tonnage of its shipping enables it to rank seventh among the nations of the earth, and in the last decade its trade has more than quadrupled. Its exports and imports reach £27,000,000 a year, and the agricultural produce amounts to not less than £30,000,000 per annum. Its total revenues during the past year of 1864 are estimated at £3,000,000, and the expenses at £2,700,000. Its greatest length from the Atlantic frontier of Nova Scotia to the Pacific ocean at Vancouver’s island is 3,000 miles, and its greatest breadth 1,600 miles.”

The Canadians were ready to do everything they ought to do, and they would derive from the speeches made to-night the greatest satisfaction—from none more than from the short statement of the right honorable gentteman, summing up, in a few important words, that war with Canada was war with England. [Hear, hear.] But the right honorable gentleman had at the same time deprecated all irritating discussions, just as his right honorable friend below (Mr. Disraeli) had done, and his honorable friend who had brought forward this motion. Still danger was at hand, and it was the duty of a great nation to be prepared for it. He believed the reciprocity treaty to be of the utmost use to Canada as well as to this country, and referred to reports which confirmed his views, and which advised the American government not to act hastily in this matter, but rather to call a meeting to see if the treaty could not be maintained, and thereby nullify to a great extent that feeling of hostility which had arisen. He was glad that debate had taken place, as it would show the American government that that house was prepared to look with moderation upon all that had been said, however irritating the expressions made use of might have been towards this country, and to take into consideration the circumstances in which the United States were placed. The Canadians wished this country to state distinctly what it intended to do. Canada was proud to be connected with the old country, and so long as England did her duty by the Canadians they would stand by her to the last breath. [Hear, hear.]

Lord Elcho said they had had of late years many important questions discussed in that house—Crimean and other wars; but that which involved the question of war between this country and America put all other subjects into the shade. He thoroughly joined with the members of the House as to the necessity of avoiding any bad feeling between these two great countries. The right honorable gentleman who opened the debate had set a bright example, which had been well followed. He heard the subject discussed in another place, but he did not like what he heard there, nor did he like what had been stated in the report of Colonel Jervois. He knew the intentions of the government, but his first impression was not favorable towards them; and after, listening attentively to what had been said in that house, he thought the speech which had most practical common sense in it, and was most likely to command the attention of practical Englishmen, such as those assembled there, was the speech of the right honorable gentleman, the member for Calne, (Mr. Lowe.) He joined with all that had been said by gentlemen on the treasury bench as to the duties of the mother country towards Canada, and if Canada were anxious to stand, by England it was the duty of England to support that colony. The only question between his right honorable friend and the gentlemen on the treasury bench appeared to be as to the best mode of doing that. They must not allow America to choose her own ground. It would be impossible to defend Canada in the way suggested by government. Supposing these fortifications were erected, unless they had a sufficient number of men to command them and the population of Canada were thoroughly armed, they would be of no avail. This country could only send a small nucleus of men over there. The gallant officer who had been sent over to Canada to report said, “On the other hand, if the works now recommended be constructed, the vital points of the country could be defended, and the regular army would become a nucleus and support round which the people of Canada would rally to resist aggression.” He wanted to know how they were to rally. At the present moment there only existed something like 20,000 trained men in Canada. The difficulty felt in Canada was similar to that felt in this country when endeavoring to raise a volunteer force in the rural districts. The people lived a considerable distance from each other, and were scattered over a large extent of country; it was, therefore, very difficult to get them together for training purposes. If they succeeded in training 50,000, or even 100,000 men, would such an army as that stand against the whole forces which the United States could bring against them? Supposing the army were driven into the fortifications, how was the rest of Canada to act against an overwhelming mass of troops? How were they to get by this nucleus sufficient trained men to repel such an enemy as they would have to cope with? They might say to Canada that they would give her a loan of say £500,000 for fortifications and sufficient men for the purpose of drilling the population, and when this work had been accomplished, and if war were unfortunately threatened, it would be a consideration whether England should not fight America on other as well as Canadian ground. It appeared to him that what the government proposed would be powerful to provoke war, but powerless to defend Canada. [Hear, hear.]

Mr. Ayrton said that the government had adopted what appeared to him to be a most extraordinary course. They might have come to the house, and, as in time of war, asked for a vote for the amount which they considered necessary for the defence of Canada, simply saying that the affairs of the province demanded the outlay, and taking, of course, the responsibility which would naturally attend such a demand. If the government possessed the entire confidence of the house the money might have been voted without any demur, and honorable members opposite would have had another opportunity of exhibiting that willingness to support the government in all kinds of expenditures which they had latterly continually displayed, and of inveighing against a small number of members on his side of the house who had endeavored to check the lavish expenditure of the present administration. [“No, no.”] Such a course would have been intelligible, but it had not been adopted by the government, who might have come before the house in another way. They might have given a complete explanation of all the circumstances in connexion with the proposed expenditure, and thrown the responsibility upon the house. Instead, however, of doing either of those things, the government had thrown upon the table of the House the report of Colonel Jervois, and practically asked for a vote of money upon the faith of that report. That report was most unsatisfactory. It should have been one which would enable—he would not say a civilian, but a military man to form an opinion as to the necessity of the fortifications. Though making great pretensions, the report did not contain one word of real information. - The scheme, in reality, embraced the defence of several hundred miles of frontier, including the fortification of Hamilton, Toronto, Kingston, Montreal, and Quebec, They ought, however, to be informed whether those towns were to be completely surrounded with fortifications, and whether the fortifications would be of such a character as to protect the towns from destruction in case of an attack upon the fortifications themselves. Above all, it was necessary for them to know the number of men that would be required for their defence. [Hear, hear.] It would. be advisable, moreover, that the House should be made acquainted with the intentions of the government in regard to the erection or non-erection of barracks and bomb-proof accommodation within these fortifications for the protection of the garrison. Then, too, they ought to know how long a siege the fortresses were designed to maintain, because they knew that such works could not be regarded as impenetrable, and that their reduction was only a matter of time. It might be said that the matters he had referred to, being of a technical character, came purely within the province ot a military man, but he believed that there was a point where technical art ended, and common sense began. [“Hear, hear,” and a laugh.] A military man was no more competent than a civilian to decide upon the necessity of erecting fortifications, providing always that accurate technical information was placed before the latter. Several suggestions had fallen from honorable, members with regard to the proper mode in which we should treat Canada, and he should not have ventured to touch upon the subject but for the unsatisfactory answer which the right honorable gentleman the secretary for the colonies had returned to the questions which had fallen from the honorable member for Bradford, (Mr. Forster.) The best way of protecting Canada was to preserve proper relations with the United States. [Hear, hear.] If we were prepared to break those relations upon the slightest ground, any speculation on the defence of Canada would be of no avail. The claims made by the American government and referred to by the honorable member for Bradford might, according to the suggestion of Mr. Adams, be submitted to arbitration; at all events, he interpreted the despatch from that gentleman as containing such a suggestion. Having heard a good deal about arbitration being one of the chief principles adopted by her Majesty’s government, he must confess that he felt surprised at the answer sent by Lord Russell to the temperate and legitimate despatch of the United States. [Hear, hear.] It was not for us to consider whether the claims made by the United States were founded on justice and right. It was sufficient for our purpose that we possessed the knowledge that a great power solemnly asserted ics belief in the justice of those claims according to the principles of international law and of justice. It was the bounden duty of our government to enter into the negotiation, and fall in with the proposal as far as practicable. What, however, was the course adopted by Earl Russell? He wrote a despatch which to his (Mr. Ayrton’s) mind was most unsatisfactory, and it could not be denied that the publication of that despatch was the cause of great irritation. He thought that some further explanation was due to the House. The answer of the secretary for the colonies substantially was that the question remained in the same state as when that document was written. But that state was one of irritation and annoyance on the part of the United States. The honorable member for Bradford must have expected some better answer—something to soften down that feeling of irritation. Had any steps been taken to meet the demands of the United States government? Those demands would be repeated, and must be repeated if the United States government had any regard for its own honor, and then what would be the position of this country? We had a demand preferred by the United States when in difficulties, accompanied by a suggestion of a reference to arbitration. The demand we had flung aside, but it would be repeated when the United States were as strong as they hoped to be. What would then be our position? We must do precisely that which we refused to do now. [Hear, hear.] We must do that or go to war; and where was the man who would stand up and say we ought to go to war after such a demand from the United States? Would it not be better for the country to look the question fairly in the face now, that the government should again take the subject into its consideration, and endeavor to put it into a train for adjustment? The government ought to give the House the fullest information; but he would prefer to hear from them that our relations with the United States were such as to induce a reasonable hope that they might be able to neutralize the great lakes and to render unnecessary the further prosecution of hostile discussions. [Hear, hear.]

Lord R. Cecil said that, although no doubt great advantages had arisen in recent times from the publication of their debates, yet it was impossible to listen to the discussion on the present occasion without feeling that that practice had its drawbacks. When one speaker rose after another and protested that he had not the faintest idea of the possibility of any rupture with the United States, he could not but feel that there was a contradiction between the fact oí this debate and the sentiments so ostentatiously put forward, [hear, hear]—a con tradiction not altogether flattering to our confidence in our own strength, and not likely to increase in the minds of the rest of the world a favorable opinion of that strength. We valued Gibraltar, but the House were not always discussing how we should protect it from Spain. We valued Malta, but the House were not always discussing how we could protect it from Italy. They were now discussing how to protect Canada from a nation that had the power to attack her, and it was believed would do so. He had heard from the honorable gentleman who last spoke, an opinion which caused him to feel with still greater force the drawback of having their debates reported to the public out-doors. The honorable gentleman had expressed in the strongest and broadest language that it was of very little use for us to defend Canada unless we could contrive to maintain peace with the United States. Of course, if we maintained peace with the United States it would be unnecessary to defend Canada. [Hear.] But he was sorry to hear the remarks of the honorable gentleman concerning the Alabama—remarks similar to those which had been made elsewhere in the course of the debate, and which might be misinterpreted on the other side of the Atlantic, as conveying the opinion and feeling of that house as to the policy of England. He was certain that England would never consent to extravagant demands which were, as had been repeatedly proved, contrary to international law. He wished also to protest against what appeared to him to be an exaggerated application of the principle of arbitration. When facts were in dispute it was well to call in an arbitrator, but when the dispute was not as to facts, but as to law—when great principles of international law were involved in which our adversary maintained one view and we another, to submit that difference to arbitration would be to hand over to the arbitrator the establishment of the principles of international law to which we should adhere for all future time. He did not think that international law could be framed upon those principles, and he believed that if any attempt were made to do so the parties who had appeared before the arbitrator would not submit to be bound by his decision. There was another ground upon which he regretted the course of this debate. It appeared to him that in discussing this question everything had been thought of but the interests of the people of Canada. Now, the people of Canada had a solid and real danger before them. What pressed most upon them was not the question of the British empire, not whether English honor should be maintained or not, but the question of their own lives, of their own homesteads, of their own prosperity, and they wished to learn from this debate whether England was prepared or not to back them up. [Hear, hear.] What answer had they received The secretary of state made some generous and large spoken promises, destitute, as it seemed, of any very definite value, but arguing most amiable intentions on the part of the right honorable gentleman. From the House at large every possible theory for the defence of Canada had been put forth. The honorable member for Stockport (Mr. Watkin) declared that this country was bound to defend the whole frontier of Canada. Another honorable member had told them that the British government was only bound to defenda few fortified points. The right honorable gentleman the member for Calne, (Mr. Lowe,) said that Canada would be best defended by our abandoning her altogether; [“Hear,” and laughter;] and, if he understood the right honorable gentleman correctly, by defending the English empire somewhere else; so that if we massed a force to defend the Isle of Wight, we should thus be defending Canada. [Laughter.] Then came the honorable member for the Tower hamlets, who gave it as his opnion that the best way to defend Canada was never to quarrel with the United States. [ “Hear,” and a laugh.] But what the people of Canada desired to know was, supposing we did quarrel with the United States, what would happen to them? They knew that the House of Commons was the source of all political power, that it directed the policy of this country, and they would study the records of this debate with an anxious interest as men whose lives and interests were at stake. [Mr. Bright.—” Let us take care of ourselves.”] The honorable member for Birmingham said the best course for this country would be to take care of ourselves. That was a fifth suggestion. What he desired to press upon the House was that ambiguity and uncertainty were in themselves more dangerous to the interests, more * fatal to the honor of England, than any other course that could be adopted. [Hear, hear.] We were bound to let Canada know exactly what assistance she might expect to receive from us. If we told them that we intended to defend them by abandoning them, they might think that the best way to defend themselves would be to abandon us. [Hear, hear.] If we told them that they must pass a law giving the government power to call out a definite amount of force they would know what we required from them, and what they must do in order to get any aid from us. But as the matter now stood, judging from the speech of the secretary of state, we were going to defend Canada, not as we should defend Scotland, not as though it were a matter of vital interest to the empire, but with an admonition to Canada that her defence must rest mainly on herself. That was an indefinite liability contingent upon a perfectly indefinite condition. He feared that if that course were persisted in we should drift into a state of things not dissimilar to that which existed last year. Denmark and Canada were not strictly related, but the unhappy similarity of the policy of the government in regard to them brought them into close relation. Last year there were warnings of an approaching crisis—there was the same ambiguity, the same general professions of encouragement and of assistance, there was vague language leading the weaker power, whom we were encouraging, to risk her whole existence upon the faith of our support; but when the trial came we found it too much for our strength, we withdrew from our vague, ambiguous promises, and allowed the weaker power to rush on to her own destruction. England had suffered sufficiently in reputation from one experiment, and she could not afford to repeat it twice in two years. [Hear, hear.] If Canada trusted to the vague promises of the secretary of state, and allowed herself to be brought into a quarrel with the United States, which he agreed with the honorable member for Horsham would be a quarrel, not with Canada, but with England, the disastrous scenes of last year would be repeated. We should then see an army of 300,000 men on the frontier, and a nucleus, as it was called, of 10,000 men to oppose them, and 21,000 volunteers, and we should probably have given orders to build gunboats, which in course of time might find their way to the lakes. When we were face to face with the emergency we should endeavor to discover the exact amount of the obligations we had to Canada—what we had really promised. The secretary of state should turn to his speeches in Hansard, and would find that they were delightfully vague. We should look back to all our past discussions and despatches, and we should find that there was no definite promise which could be diplomatically enforced; and then we should, perhaps, persuade ourselves first that Canada was best defended by being abandoned, and then, that the best thing we could do for Canada was to leave her to the mild and paternal rule of the United States. [Hear, hear.] The member for Brighton seemed to look upon that as the best consummation, and he trusted that when that happened he would be an emigrant to Canada. [Laughter.] He entreated the House to consider this matter as one seriously affecting the honor of England. [Hear, hear.] We should make up our minds what we would do for Canada, and what we would not do; and, whatever we made up our minds to do, we should determine to do it thoroughly. Whatever we determined to do, let Canada know distinctly the conditions on which we were prepared to aid her, the extent to which we were prepared to go, and how far we regarded her as an integral portion of the empire. When we had made up our minds let it be recorded in some formal document, and then we should be able to look forward without fear to any change that the future might bring, and we should be prepared to do our duty as we had defined it ourselves, and to fulfil the pledges we had made. [Cheers.]

Mr. Bright. I am not sure that I should have addressed the House on this occasion but for the remarks which have been made by the noble lord. I think he has been a little more frank in his declarations, and in pointing out the thing which I suspect is passing in his mind and in the minds of many honorable gentlemen who have made no statement of their opinions during this debate. I hope the debate will be useful, though I am obliged to say, while I admit the importance of the question brought before the House, that I think it is one of some delicacy. Its importance is great, because it refers to the possibility of a war with the United States, and its delicacy arises from this, that it is difficult to discuss the question without saying things which tend rather in the direction of war than of peace. The difficulty now before us is that there is an extensive colony or dependency of this country adjacent to the United States, and if there be a war party in the United States—a party hostile to this country—that circumstance affords it a very strong temptation to enter without much hesitation into a war with England, because it feels that through Canada it can inflict a great humiliation on this country. At the same time, it is perfectly well known to all intelligent men, and especially to all statesmen and public men of the United States—it is as well known to them as it is to us—that there is no power whatever in this United Kingdom to defend successfully the territory of Canada against the United States. [Hear, hear.] We ought to know that in order to put ourselves right upon the question, and that we may not be called upon to talk folly and to act folly. The noble lord at the head of the government—or his government, at least—is responsible for having compelled this discussion; because if a vote is to be asked from the House of Commons—and it will only be the beginning of votes [hear, hear,]—it is clearly the duty of the House to bring the matter under discussion. [Hear, hear.] That is perfectly clear for many reasons, but especially since we have heard from the governor general of Canada that in the North American provinces they are about to call into existence a new nationality; and I, for one, should certainly object to the taxation of this country being expended needlessly on behalf of any nationality but our own. [Hear, hear.] What I should like to ask the House first of all is this: Will Canada attack the States? Certainly not. Next, will the States attack Canada, keeping England out of view altogether? Certainly not. There is not a man in the United States, probably, whose voice or opinion would have the smallest influence, who would recommend desire that an attack should be made by the United States on Canada with the view of its forcible annexation to the Union. [Hear, hear.] There have been dangers, as we know, on the frontier lately. The Canadian people have been no wiser than some members of this House, or a great many men among the richer classes in this country. When the refugees from the south—I am not speaking of the respectable, honorable men from the south, many of whom have left that country during their troubles, and for whom I feel the greatest commiseration; but I mean the ruffians from the south, of whom large numbers have entered Canada, and who have employed themselves there in a course of policy likely to embroil us with the United States— when they entered Canada the Canadians treated them with far too much consideration. They expressed very openly opinions hostile to the United States, whose power lay close to them. I will not go into details with which we are all acquainted—the seizing of American ships on the lakes, the raid into the State of Vermont, the robbery of a bank, the killing of a man in his own shop, the stealing of horses in open day, nor the transaction, of which there is strong proof, that men of this class conspired to set tire to the greatest cities of the Union. All these things have taken place, and the Canadian government made scarcely any sign. I believe an application was made to the noble lord at the head of the Foreign Office a year ago to stimulate the Canadian government to take some steps to avoid the dangers which have since arisen; but with that sort of negligence which has been seen so much here, nothing was done until the American government, roused by these transactions, showed that they were no longer going to put up with them. Then the Canadian government and people took a little notice. I have heard a good many people complain of Lord Monck’s appointment; that he was a follower of the noble lord who had lost his election, and therefore must be sent out to govern a province, (a laugh; ) but I will say of him that from all I have heard from Canada he has conducted himself there in a manner very serviceable to the colony, and with the greatest possible propriety as representing the sovereign. He was all along favorable to the United States; his cabinet, I believe, has always been favorable, and I know that at least the most important newspape there has always been favorable to the north. But still nothing was done until these troubres began, and then everything was done. Volunteers were sent to the frontier, the trial of the raiders was proceeded with, and probably they may be surrendered; and the Canadian chancellor of the exchequer has proposed a vote in the new parliament to restore to the persons at St. Alban’s who were robbed the $50,000 which were taken from them. What is the state of things now? There is the greatest possible calm on the frontier. The United States have not a syllable to say against Canada. The Canadian people found they were wrong; they have now returned to their right minds, and there is not a man in Canada at this moment, I believe, who has any kind of idea that the United, States government has the smallest notion of attacking them, now or at any future time, on account of anything which has transpired between Canada and the United States. If there comes a war in which Canada may be made a. victim, it will be a war got up between the government of Washington and the government in London, and it becomes us to inquire whether, that is at all probable. Is there anybody in the House in favor of such a war? I notice with the greatest delight a change which I said would some day come; and I was not a false prophet, in the line taken here with regard to the American question. [Hear, hear.] Even the noble lord the member for Stamford, spoke to-night without anger, and without any of that ill-feeling which, I am sorry to say, on previous occasions he has manifested in discussing this question. I hope there is no man out of Bedlam, or, at least, who ought to be out [laughter,]—nay, I suspect there are few men in Bedlam, who are in favor of our going to war with the United States. [Hear, hear.] In taking this view I am not arguing that we regard the vast naval and military power and the apparently boundless resources of that country. I will assume that you, my countrymen, have come to the conclusion that it is better for us not to make war with the United States, not because they are strong, but on the higher ground that we are against wars. Our history for the last two hundred years and more has recorded sufficient calamitous and, for the most part, unnecessary wars. We have had enough of whatever a nation can gain from military success and glory. I will not speak of the disasters which might follow to our commerce, and the widespread ruin that might be caused by a war. We are a wiser and better people than we were in this respect, and we should regard a war with the United States as even a greater crime, if needlessly entered into, than a war with almost any other nation in the world. Well, then, as to our government, with a great many blunders, one or two of which I shall comment on by-and-by, they have preserved neutrality during this great struggle. We have had it stated in the House, that there has been in the House a motion that the blockade was ineffectual and ought to be broken. Bad men of various classes, and, perhaps, agents of the Richmond conspiracy, and persons, it is said, of influence from France—all these are stated to have brought pressure to bear on the noble lord and his colleagues with the view of inducing them to take part in this quarrel, but all this has failed to break our neutrality. Therefore, I say, we may very fairly come to the conclusion that England is not for war. If anything arises on any act of aggression out of which Canada might suffer, I believe the fault is not with this country. [Hear, hear.] That is a matter which gives me great satisfaction; and I believe the House will agree with me that I am not misstating the case. But, let me ask, Are the United States for war; because, after all, I know the noble lord the member for Stamford has a lurking idea that there is some danger from that quarter, and I am afraid the same feeling prevails in minds not so acute as that which the noble lord possesses. [A laugh.] Now; if we could have at the bar of the House Earl Russell, as representing her Majesty’s government, and Mr. Adams, as representing the government of President Lincoln, and ask them their opinions I think they would tell us what the secretary of colonies has told us to-night—that the relations between those governments are peaceable; and I know from the communications between the minister of the United States and our minister for foreign affairs that our relations with the United States, are perfectly amicable, and have been growing more and more amicable for many months past. [Hear.] And I will take the liberty of expressing this opinion, that there has never been an administration in the United States since the time of the revolutionary war up to this hour more entirely favorable to peace with all foreign countries, and more especially favorable to peace with this country, than the government of which President Lincoln is the head. [Hear, hear.] I will undertake to say that the most exact investigator of what has taken place will be unable to point to a single word he, President Lincoln, has said, or a single line he has written, or a single act he has done since his first accession to power, that betrays that anger or passion or ill-feeling towards this country which some people here imagine influences the breasts of his cabinet. If, then, Canada is not for war, if England is not for war, if the United States are not for war, whence is the war to come? [Hear, hear.] I should like to ask—I wish the noble lord, the member for Stamford, had been a little more frank—whence comes that anxiety which to some extent prevails? It may even be assumed that the government are not free from it, though they have shown it in the ridiculous form of proposing a vote of £50,000. [A laugh, and ** Hear, hear.”] It is said that the newspapers have got into a sort of panic. Well, they can do that every night between twelve and six, when they write these articles; they can be very courageous or very panic-stricken. [Laughter.] It is said that the “City”—-we know what the “City” means; the right honorable gentleman alluded to it to-night: they are persons who deal in shares, though that does not describe the whole of them—it is said that what they call “the money interests” are alarmed. Well, I never knew the City to be right. [Much laughter.] Men who are deep in great monetary transactions, and steeped to the lips sometimes in perilous speculations, they are not able to take a broad, dispassionate view of questions of this nature; and as to the newspapers, I agree with my honorable friend, the member for Bradford, who, referring to one of them in particular, said the course it took indicated its wishes to cover its own confusion. Surely, after four years of uninterrupted publication of lies with regard to America, it has done much to destroy its influence in foreign questions forever. I must now mention a much higher authority, the authority of the Peers. I don’t know why we should be so much restricted here with regard to the House of Lords I think this House must have observed that the other house is not always so squeamish in what they say about us. [A laugh, and “hear.”] It appeared to me that in this debate the right honorable gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) felt it necessary to get up and endeavor to excuse his chief. Now, if I were to give advice to the honorable gentleman opposite, it would be this—for while stating that during the last four years many noble lords in the other house have said foolish things, I think I should be uncandid if I did not say that you also have said foolish things—learn from the example set you by the right honorable gentleman. He, with a thoughtfulness and statesmanship which you do not all acknowledge, he did not say a word from that bench likely to create difficulty with the United States. [Hear.] I think his chief and his followers might learn something from his example. [Hear.] Not long ago, I think, a panic was raised by what was said in another place about France; and now an attempt is made there to create a panic on this question. In the reform club there is fixed to the wall a paper giving a telegraphic account of what is done in this House every night, and also of what is done in the other house; and I find that the only words required to describe what is done in the other house are the words, “lords adjourned.” (Laughter.) The noble lord at the head of the government is responsible for that. He has brought this House to very nearly the same condition; because we do very little, and they absolutely nothing. (Renewed laughter.) All of us, no doubt, in our young days were taught a verse intended to inculcate virtue and industry a couplet of which runs thus.

“For Satan still some mischief finds

“For idle hands to do.

[Laughter and cheers.] I don’t believe that many here are afflicted with any disease arising from a course of continued idleness; but I should like to ask the House, in a more serious mood, what is the reason that any man in this country has now any more anxiety with regard to the preservation of peace with the United States than he had five years ago? Is there not a consciousness in your heart of hearts that you have not behaved generously towards your neighbor? [Loud cries of “No !” and some cries of “Hear, hear.”] Do we not feel in some way or other a reproving of conscience? [Renewed cries of “Nó!”] And in ourselves are we not sensible of this, that conscience tends to make us cowards at this particular juncture? [“No, no!”] Well, I shall not revive past transactions with anger, but with a feeling of sorrow, for I maintain, and I think history will bear out what I Say, that there is no generous and high-minded Englishman who can look back on the transactions of the last four years without a feeling of sorrow at the course that we have pursued in some particulars; and as I am anxious to speak with the view to a better state of feeling both in this country and the United States, I shall take the liberty, if the House will allow me, for a few minutes to refer to two or three of those transactions, regarding which, though not in the main greatly wrong, in some circumstances we were so unfortunate as to create” the irritation that at this moment we wish did not exist. The honorable member for Horsham referred to the course taken by the government with regard to acknowledging the belligerent rights of the south. Now, I have never been one to condemn the government for acknowledging the south as belligerents then except on this ground. I think it might be logically contended that it might possibly become necessary to take that step, but I think the time and the manner of the act were most unfortunate, and could not but have produced very evil effects. Why, going back four years ago, we recollect what occurred when the news arrived here of the first shot fired at Fort Sumter. I think that was about the 4th of April, and immediately after it was announced that a new minister was coming from the United States to this country. Mr. Dallas had represented, that as he did not represent the new government nor the new President, he would rather not undertake anything of importance. It was announced that his successor had left New York on a certain day; and we know that when we have the date of a departure from New York for this country we can calculate the time of arrival here to within twelve hours. Mr. Adams arrived in London on the 33th of May, and when he opened his newspaper the next morning he found it contained the proclamation of neutrality, and the acknowledgment of the belligerent rights of the south. In my opinion the proper course would have been to have waited until Mr. Adams arrived, and to have discussed the matter with him in a friendly manner, when an explanation might have been given of the grounds upon which the English government felt themselves bound to issue it. But everything was done in an unfriendly manner, and the effect was to afford great comfort at Richmond, and generally to grieve those people of America who were most anxious for the continuance of the friendly and amicable relations between that country and England. To illustrate the point, allow me to suppose that a great revolt having taken place in Ireland,. and we within a fortnight after the outbreak sent over a new minister to the United States, and that on the morning of his arrival he found that government had, without consulting him, taken such a hasty step as to acknowledge the belligerent rights of the Irish. I ask whether, under such circumstances, a feeling of irritation would not have been expressed by every man in Great Britain. [Hear, hear.] I will not argue this question further, as to do so would be simply to depreciate the intellect of the honorable gentlemen listening to me. [Hear, hear.] But seven or eight months after that event another transaction, of a very different and of a very unfortunate nature, took place—namely, that which arose out of the seizure of the two southern envoys on board an English ship called the Trent. I recollect at that time making a speech at Rochdale entirely in favor of the United States government and people, but I did not then, nor do I now, attempt to defend the seizure of those persons. I said that, although precedents for such an action might possibly be found to have occurred in what I may call the evil days of our history, they were totally opposed to the maxims of the United States government, and that it was most undoubtedly a bad act. I do not complain of the demand that the men should be given up. I only complain of the manner in which the demand was made and the menaces by which it was accompanied. I think it was absurd and wrong, and was not statesman-like, when there was not the least foundation for supposing the United States government were aware of the act, or had in the slightest degree sanctioned it, immediately to get ships ready, and to make other offensive preparations, and to allow the press, who are always ready, to inflame the passions of the people to frenzy—to prepare their minds for war. That was not the whole of the transaction, however; for the United States, before they heard a word from this country on the subject, sent a despatch to Mr. Adams, which was shown to our government, stating that the act had not been done by their orders—that it was a pure accident, and that they should regard the matter with the most friendly disposition towards this country. How came it that this despatch was never published for the information of the people of this country? How came it that the flame of war was fanned by the newspapers supposed to be devoted to the government, and that one of them said to be peculiarly devoted to the prime minister had the audacity—I know not whence it obtained its instructions—flatly and emphatically to deny that such a despatch had ever been received? [Hear, hear.] How is it possible to maintain amicable relations with any great country, or even with any small one [hear, and laughter,] unless the government will manage these transactions in what I may call a more courteous and a more honorable manner? [Hear.] I received a letter from a most eminent gentleman resident in the United States, dated only two days before the southern envoys were given up, in which he stated that the real difficulty encountered by the President in the matter was that the menaces of the English government had made it almost impossible for him to concede the point, and he asked whether the English government was intending to seek a cause of quarrel or not. I am sure that the noble lord at the head of the government would himself feel more disposed to yield, and would find it more easy to grant a demand of the kind if made in a courteous and friendly manner than if accompanied by manners such as this government had offered to that of the United States. The House will observe that I am not condemning the government of this country on the main point, but that I am complaining merely because they did not do what they had to do in that manner which was most likely to remove difficulties, and to preserve a friendly feeling between the two nations. The last point to which I shall direct your attention is with respect to the ships which have been sent out to prey upon the commerce of the United States, and in doing so I shall confine myself to the Alabama. This vessel was built in this country, all her munitions of war were obtained from this country, and almost every man on board was a subject of the Queen. She sailed from one of our chief ports, and she was built by a firm in which a member of this House was, and I presume is still, interested. I don’t complain now, neither did I two years ago, when the matter was brought before the House by the honorable member for Bradford,, that the member for Birkenhead struck up a. friendship with Captain Semmes, who, perhaps, in the words applied to another person under somewhat similar circumstances, “was the mildest-mannered man that ever scuttled ship.” [Hear, and laughter.] I don’t complain, and I have never done so, that the member for Birkenhead looks admiringly upon what has been called the greatest example that man has ever seen of the greatest crime that man has ever committed. [Hear, hear, and loud laughter.] And I should not complain even had he entered into that gigantic traffic in flesh and blood which no subject of this realm can enter into without being deemed a felon in the eyes of our law and punished as such; but what I do complain of is that a magistrate of a county, a deputy-lieutenant, whatever that may be, (laughter,) and a representative of a constituency of the country, having sat in this ancient and honorable assembly, did, as J believe he did with regard to this ship, break the laws of this country, drive us into an infraction of international law, and treat with undeserved disrespect the proclamation of neutrality of the Queen. [Hear, hear, and cries of no, no.] But I have another cause of complaint, though not against the honorable gentleman this time, for, he having on a previous occasion declared that he would rather be the builder of a dozen Alabamas than do something which nobody else had done, [cheers and laughter,] his language was received with repeated cheers from the other side of the House. [Hear, hear.] I think that that was a very unfortunate circumstance, and I beg to tell honorable gentlemen that at the end of last session, when there was a great debate on the Denmark question, there were many men on this side of the House who had no objection whatever to see the present government turned out of office, for they had many grounds of complaint against them, but they felt it impossible to take upon themselves the responsibility of bringing into office and power a party who could cheer such sentiments. [ Loud cheers and laughter.] But turning from the honorable member for Birkenhead to the noble lord at the head of the Foreign Office, he who, in the case of the acknowledgment of belligerent rights, had proceeded with such remarkable celerity, amply compensated for it by the slowness which he displayed in the case of the Alabama. [Hear, and laughter.] And another curious thing, which even the noble lord’s colleagues have never been able to explain, is, that although he sent after the Alabama to Cork to stop her, notwithstanding she had gone out of our jurisdiction, still she was permitted subsequently to go into a dozen or a score of ports belonging to this country in various parts of the world. Now, it seems to me that this is rather a special instance of that feebleness of purpose on the part of the noble lord which has done much to mar what would otherwise have been a great political career. [Cheers and laughter.] Well, then, the honorable member for Birkenhead, or his firm, or his family, or whoever it is that does these things [laughter,] after having seen the peril into which the country was drifting on account of the Alabama, proceeded at once to build the two rams, and it was only at the very last moment, when we were on the eve of a war with the United States, that the government had the courage to seize these vessels. There are ship-owners here, and I ask them what would be the feelings of the people of this country if they had suffered as the ship-owners of America have suffered? As a rule, all their ships have been driven from the ocean. Mr. Lowe, an influential ship-owner of New York, has had three very large ships destroyed by the Alabama. The George Griswold, a ship of 2,000 tons, that came to this country with a heavy cargo of provisions of various kinds for the suffering people of Lancashire, that very ship was destroyed on her return passage, and the ship that destroyed her may have been, and, I believe, was built by these patriotic ship-builders of Birkenhead. [Hear, hear.] Well, sir, these are things to rankle in the breast of the country that is subjected to these losses and indignities. To-day you may see by the papers that one vessel has destroyed between twelve and thirteen ship between the Cape of Good Hope and Australia. If I had, as some honorable members have done, thought it necessary to bring American questions before this House three or four times during the session, and I should have asked questions about these ships—but no ! You who were in favor of the disruption of the States do not ask questions of this kind, but refer to other points that may embarrass the government or make their difficulties greater with the United States. But the members of the government itself have not been very wise, and I shall not be thought unnecessarily critical if I say that governments generally are not very wise. [A laugh.] Two years ago in that very debate the noble lord at the head of the government and the attorney general addressed the House. I besought the noble lord—and I do not ask favors from him very often—only to speak for five minutes words of generosity and sympathy for the government and people of the United States. He did not do it, and perhaps it was foolish to expect it. The attorney general made a most able speech, but it was the only time I ever listened to him with pain, for I thought his speech full of bad morals and bad law [a laugh;] and I am quite certain that he gave an account of the facts which was not so ingenuous or fair as the House had a right to expect at his hands. Next session the noble lord and the attorney general turned right round and had a different story to tell, and as the aspect of things changed on the other side they gradually returned to good sense and fairness. They were not the only members of the government who have spoken on this subject. The noble lord the secretary of state for foreign affairs, and the chancellor of the exchequer, have also made speeches. Every one will feel that I would not willingly say a word against either of them, because I do not know among the official statesmen of this country two men for whom I feel greater sympathy or more respect. But I have to complain of them that they should both go to Newcastle, a town in which I feel great interest, and there give forth their words of offense and unwisdom. [A laugh.] The noble lord we all know very well can say very good and very smart things, but I regret to say that what he said was not true, and I, for one, have not much respect for things that are smart but not true. The chancellor of the exchequer appeared from the papers to have spoken in a tone of exultation, and to have made a speech which I undertake to say he wishes he had never made. [Hear, hear.] But the House must bear in mind that these gentlemen are set on a hill. They are not obscure men, making speeches in a public house or in some mechanics’ institute, but they are men whose voices are heard wherever the English language is known; and, knowing what effect their eloquence produced in Lancashire—how they affected prices, and the profits and losses of every one, and changed the course of business, I can form an idea of the irritation that these speeches caused in the United States. Then, I must refer to the unwise abuse of the learned gentleman, the member for Sheffield, and I may add to that the unsleeping ill-will of the noble lord the member for Stamford. [A laugh.] I am not sure that either of them is converted, for I thought I heard something from the honorable and learned member that shows he retains his sentiments. [Mr. Roebuck—”Exactly.”] [A laugh.] I hope that these things are regretted and repented, and that any one who is thus ungenerous to the United States and the people of that country will never fall into trouble of any kind. But if you do you will find your countrymen are more generous to you than you have been to the people of the United States. [Hear, hear.] And now as to the press. [A laugh.] I think it unnecessary to say much about that, because now every night these unfortunate writers are endeavoring to back out of everything they have been saying. [ A laugh.] I only hope that their power for evil in future will be greatly lessened by the stupendous exhibition of ignorance and folly that they have made to the world. [Laughter and “Hear, hear.”] Having made this statement, I must expect that if the noble lord, the member for Stamford could get up again he would say, if all this be true, and if these speeches created all this irritation in the United States, is there no reason to fear that this irritation will provoke a desire for vengeance, and that the chances of war will be increased by it? I say that war from such a course is to the last degree improbable. There has been another side to this expression of opinion. All England is not included in the rather general condemnation I have thought it my duty to express. [A laugh.] What have the millions been saying and doing?—those whom you have been so very much afraid of, especially the noble lord the member for Stamford, who objects to the transfer of power into their hands. [Hear.] I beg leave to tell the House that, taking the counties of Lancaster and York, your two greatest counties, there are millions of men there who, by their industry, not only have created, but sustain the fabric of our national power, who have had no kind of sympathy with the men whom I am condemning. They are more generous and wise. They have shown that magnanimity and love of freedom are not extinct among us. I speak of the county from which I come—a county of many sorrows that have hung like a dark cloud over almost every home during the last three years. In the country all attempts of the agents of the confederacy, by money, by printing, by platform speaking, and by agitation, have utterly failed to elicit any expression of sympathy with the American insurrection [hear hear;] and if the bond of union and friendship between England and the United States remains unbroken, we have not to thank the wealthy and the cultivated, but the laborious millions whom statesmen and historians too frequently make little account of. They know something of the United States that the honorable gentleman opposite, and some on this side of the House do not know—that every man of them would be welcome on the American continent if they chose to go there; that every right and privilege which the greatest and highest in that country enjoy would be theirs, and that every man would have given to him by the United States a free gift of one hundred and sixty acres of the most fertile land in the world. [A laugh] Honorable gentlemen may laugh, but that is a good deal to a man who has no land, and I can assure them that this homestead act has a great effect on the population of the north of England l can tell them, too, that the laboring population of these counties, the artisans, and the mechanics, will give you no encouragement to any policy that is intended to estrange the people of the United States from the people of the United Kingdom. [Hear.] But, sir, we have other securities for peace not less than these, and I find them in the character of the government and people of the American Union. [ Hear, hear.] Now, I think the right honorable gentleman, the member for Bucks, referred to what might reasonably be supposed to happen in case the rebellion was suppressed. He did not think when a nation was exhausted that it would rush rashly into a new struggle. The loss of life has been great, the loss of treasure enormous. Happily for them it was not to keep a Bourbon on the throne of France or to keep the Turks in Europe. [Hear, hear.] It was for an object which every man can comprehend who examines it by the light of his own intelligence and his own conscience; and if men have given their lives and possessions for the attainment of the great end of maintaining the integrity and unity of a great country, the history of the future must be written in a different spirit from the history of the past, if she expresses any condemnation of that temper. [Hear, hear.] But Mr. Lincoln is President of the United States—President now for the second term; he was elected exclusively at first by what was termed the republican party, and he has been elected now by what may be called the great Union party of the nation. But Mr. Lincoln’s party has always been for peace. [Hear, hear.] That party in the north has never carried on any war of aggression, and has never desired one. Now, speaking only of the north—of the free States—let the House remember that landed property, and, indeed, property of all kinds, is more universally diffused there than in any other nation, and that instruction and school education are also more widely diffused. Well, I say they have never hitherto carried on a war for aggression or for vengeance, and I believe that they will not begin one now. Canada, indeed, is a tempting bait. [“Hear,” from Lord R. Cecil.] The noble lord agrees in that—it is a very tempting bait, not for purposes of annexation, but of humiliating this country. [Hear, hear.] I agree with honorable gentlemen who have said that it would be discreditable to England in the light of her past history that she should leave any portion of her empire undefended which she could defend. [Hear, hear.] But still it is admitted—and I think the speech of the right honorable gentleman, the member for Calne, produced a great effect upon those who heard it [hear, hear]—that once at war with the United States for any cause, Canada cannot be defended by any power on land or at sea which this country could raise or spare for that purpose. [Hear, hear.] I am very sorry, not that we cannot defend Canada understand, [a laugh,] but that any portion of the dominions of the British Crown is in such circumstances that it might tempt an evil-disposed people to attack it with a view to humiliate us, because I believe that transactions which humiliate a government and a nation are not only discreditable, but do great national harm. Is there a war party, then, in America? I believe there is, and it is the same party which was a war party eighty years ago. It is the party represented by a number of gentlemen who sit on that bench, and by some who sit here. [A laugh.] They, sir, in the United States who are hostile to this country are those who were recently the malcontent subjects of the right honorable gentleman, the member for Tamworth. [Laughter.] They are those, and such as those, to whom the noble lord at the head of the government offers consolation, only in such a shape as this, when he tells them that the rights of the tenant are the wrongs of the landlord. [Hear, hear.] Sir, that is the only war party in the United States, and it was a war party in the days of Lord North. But the real power of the United States does not reside in that class. You talk of American mobs. Excepting some portion of the population of New York—and I would not apply the word even to them—such things as mobs in the United States for the sake of forcing either Congress or the Executive to a particular course of action are altogether unknown. The real mob, in your sense, is that party of chivalrous gentlemen in the south who have received, I am sorry to say, so much sympathy from some persons in this country and in this house. But the real power is in the hands of another class—the land-owners throughout the country, and there are millions of them. Why, in this last election for the presidency of the United States, I was told by a citizen of New York, who took a most active part in the election, that in that State alone 100,000 Irish votes were given “solidly,” as it is called, for General McClellan, and that not more than 2,000 were given for President Lincoln. You see the preponderance of that party in the city of New York, and its vast influence in the State of New York; but throughout the whole of the United States they form but a very small percentage, which has no sensible effect upon the legislation of Congress or the constitution of the government. My honorable friend, the member for Bradford, referred to a point which, I suppose has really been the cause of this debate, and that was the temper of the United States in making some demands upon our government. Well, I asked a question the other evening, after one that had been put by the noble lord [Lord R. Cecil,] whether we had not claims upon them. I understand the claims made by the United States may amount to £300,000 or £400,000, and probably the sum of our claims may amount to as much as that. But if any man has a right to go to law with another, he is obliged to go into court and the case must be heard before the proper tribunal., And why should it not be so between two great nations and two free governments? If one has claims against the other, the other has claims against it, and nothing can be more fair than that those claims should be courteously and honestly considered. It is quite absurd to suppose that the English government and the government at Washington could have a question about half a million of money which they could not settle. I think the noble lord considers it a question of honor. [Hear.] But all questions of property are questions of law, and you go to a lawyer to settle them. Assuredly, this would be a fit case for the senate of Hamburg, just as much as the case between this country and Brazil. Well, then, I rest in the most perfect security that as the war in America draws to a close, if happily we shall become more generous to them, they will become less irritated against us, and when passions have cooled down, I don’t see why Lord Russell and Mr. Seward, Mr. Adams and, I hope, Sir F. Bruce, should not be able to settle these matters between the two nations. [Hear.] I have only one more observation to make. I apprehend that the root of all the unfortunate circumstances that have arisen is in a feeling of jealousy Which we have cherished with regard to the American Union. It was very much shown at the beginning of this war when an honorable member whom I will not name, for he would not like it now, [a laugh,] spoke of “the bursting of the bubble republic.” Well, I recollect that Lord J. Russell, as he then was, turned round and rebuked him in language worthy of his name, character, and position. [Hear, hear.] I beg to tell that gentleman and any one else that talks about bubble repub lies that I have a great suspicion that a great many bubbles will burst before that bubble bursts. [Hear, hear, and laughter.] Why should we fear a great nation on the American continent? Some fear that a great nation would be arrogant and aggressive. But that does not at all follow. It does not depend altogether upon the size of a nation, but upon its qualities, and upon the intelligence, instruction, and morals of its people. You fancy that the supremacy of the sea will pass away from you, and the noble lord, though wiser than many others, will lament that “Rule Britannia,” that noble old song, should become antiquated at last. Well, but if the supremacy of the sea excites the arrogance of this country the sooner it becomes obsolete the better. I don’t believe it to be for the advantage of this country or of any other that any one nation should pride itself on what it terms the supremacy of the sea, and I hope the time is come—and I believe it is—when we shall find that law and justice shall guide the councils and direct the policy of the Christian nations of the world. [Hear.] Now, nature will not be baffled because we are jealous of the United States. The laws of nature will not be overthrown. At this moment the population of the United States is not less than 35,000,000 souls If the next Parliament live to the age of the present, the population of the United States will be 40,000,000, and you may calculate that the rate of increase will be at rather more than a million per year. Who is to gainsay this; who is to contradict it? Will constant snarling at a great republic alter the state of things, or swell us islanders to 40,000,000 or 50,000,000, and bring them down to 20,000,000 or 30,000,000? Honorable members should consider these facts, and should learn from them that it is the interest of this nation to be one in perfect courtesy and perfect amity with the English nation on the other side of the Atlantic. [Hear, hear.] I am certain that the longer the nation exists the less will our people be disposed to sustain you in any needless hostility against them or in any jealousy of them; and I am the more convinced of this from what I have seen of their conduct in the north of England during the last four years. [Hear, hear.] I believe, on the other hand, that the American people when this excitement is over will be willing, so far as regards any aggressive acts against us, to bury in oblivion transactions which have given them much pain, and they will probably make an allowance which they may fairly make— that the people of this country, even those high in. rank and distinguished in culture, have had a very inadequate knowledge of the transactions which have really taken place in that country since the beginning of the war. Now, it is on record that when the author of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire was about beginning his great work David Hume wrote a letter to him, urging him not to employ the French but the English tongue, because, he said, “our establishments in America promise a superior stability and duration to the English language.” How far the promise has been in part fulfilled we who are living now can tell. But how far it will be more largely and more completely fulfilled in after times we will leave for after times to tell. I believe, however, that in the centuries which are to come it will be the greatest pride and the highest renown of England that from her loins have sprung a hundred—it may be two hundred—millions of men to dwell and to prosper on the continent which the old Genoese gave to Europe. [Cheers.] Now, sir, if the sentiment which I have heard to-night shall become the sentiment of the Parliament and people of the United Kingdom, and if the moderation which I have described shall mark the course of the government and people of the United States, then, notwithstanding some present irritation and some fresh distrust—and I have faith, mind, both in us and in them—I believe that these two great commonwealths may march on abreast, parents and guardians of freedom and justice wheresoever their language shall be spoken and their power shall extend. [Cheers.]

Mr. Walpole rose, but gave way to

Viscount Palmerston, who said. How ever long this discussion may have been, I, for one, cannot regret that it has taken place; for by the majority of members in this house two opinions have been expressed which cannot fail to be useful in the quarters to which they relate. The first opinion is that which has been peculiarly dwelt upon by the honorable member who has just sat down, namely, an earnest desire that the most friendly relations should be maintained between Great Britain and the United States of America; and next, the opinion that we should maintain the connexion which exists between this country and our provinces on the North American continent so long as the people of those provinces are desirous of maintaining their connexion with the mother country. [Hear, hear.”] The honorable member who has just spoken has made what in one respect may appear a paradoxical, but what, I think, as human nature is constituted, was a very conciliatory speech towards the United States. Though he reviewed a long course of events to prove that the United States have been most grievously ill treated by this country—I don’t agree with him in any one of these points—[hear, hear]—it is no doubt a part of human nature that you cannot please any man or any set of men better than by telling them they have been exceedingly ill used. [ “Hear,” and a laugh.] I won’t follow the honorable member when he complains that we admitted the belligerent rights of the south—an admission which was the result of necessity and not of choice; I will not follow him into the discussion of the Trent question, which I thought had been fully disposed of. and into the questions which have arisen between the government, or rather, I should say, the people of some, parts of Canada and the United States, because, as he admitted himself, the conduct of the Canadian government has been such as to be ac knowledged gratefully by the government of the United States as a full and complete fulfilment of the duties of friendly neighborhood. [Hear, hear.] The honorable gentleman says there exists in this country a jealousy of the United States. Sir, I utterly deny that assertion. [Cheers.] We feel no jealousy of the United States. On the contrary, I am sure that every Englishman must feel proud at seeing upon the other side cf the Atlantic a community sprung from the same ancestry as ourselves, rising in the scale of civilization, and attaining every degree of prosperity—aye, and of power, as well as wealth. [Hear, hear.] I therefore entirely deny that there has been in this country any feeling of jealousy as regards the United States. Undoubtedly there are men who, differing from the honorable gentleman in their theory of government, cannot see with the same approbation which he feels the trial on the other side of the Atlantic of a system of government which we do not think is the best or the most conducive to the happiness of those for whom it was established. [Hear.] But that is an entirely different thing from the feeling which the honorable gentleman has sup-posed. [Hear, hear.] No doubt during this contest in America there has been experienced, and probably felt, both in the north and in the south, some irritation against this country. But that irritation was caused by the natural feeling which two parties in a quarrel have, that a third party who does not espouse either side is to a certain degree doing both sides an injury, or giving them some cause of complaint or jealousy. [Hear, hear.] The north wished us to declare on their side; the south wished us to declare on theirs; and as we maintained a perfect neutrality between the two, some slight degree of irritation arose on both sides against us. [Hear, hear.] But I am equally persuaded, with the honorable gentleman, that among the great bulk of the people of the United States there are feelings deeper than that irritation—feelings of good will towards the country with which their ancestors were connected; [hear, hear;] and I am satisfied that when this unfortunate contest shall have ceased, whatever its termination, the natural feeling of good will and relationship which ought to prevail between the two nations will take the place of any temporary irritation which the war may have occasioned. [Hear, hear.] lam quite satisfied also that England will not give to America any just cause of complaint—that war will not proceed from us; and if war does not proceed from our side, and if, as the honorable gentleman thinks, it does not proceed from theirs, then we may have a well-founded expectation that, in spite of adverse appearances for the moment, and in spite of the prognostications of many, the friendly relations between this country and the United States will not incur any real danger of interruption. [Hear, hear.] But that is no reason why we should not use the means in our power to place our fellow-citizens, if I may so call them, in Canada and the northern provinces, in a state of defence should they be attacked. [Hear, hear.] There is no better security for peace than strength to resist attack, if attack should come. [Hear, hear.] That is no provocation. It is an abuse of terms to say that when you employ means to prevent danger you are provoking that danger and irritating the party against whom those precautions may be taken. [Hear, hear.] If no animosity exists these precautions can have no effect except that of inspiring confidence in the party in whose favor they are made. [Hear, hear.] If, on the other hand, there be a disposition to attack, that disposition is sure to be lessened in proportion as the chance of success is diminished. [Hear, hear. J Now, I cannot agree with my right honorable friend (Mr. Lowe) in thinking that whatever are the difficulties—and difficulties undoubtedly there may be—in successfully resisting an attack, if it should be made by America, we should regard the defence of Canada as an undertaking which we could not succeed in accomplishing. I think, on the contrary, that Canada may be defended, and I also feel that the honor of England and the good faith which is due to our loyal fellow-countrymen in these northern provinces require that, at all events, we should make the attempt successfully to defend her. [Hear.] Not concurring, therefore, in the argument of my right honorable friend that Canada cannot be defended—least of all do I concur in his conclusion that, assuming defence to be impossible, we ought forthwith to withdraw our troops—I neither admit the argument nor assent to its conclusion; and I am anxious that there should be no mistake on the subject, and that it may be fully understood that it is not the intention of the government to follow the advice of my right honorable friend and withdraw our troops from Canada. [Cheers. J On the contrary, I feel that the honor of England demands, and that our duty as a government binds us to do everything—moreover, that we shall have the sanction of the British nation in doing everything—that we can to defend our fellow-countrymen in Canada. [Hear, hear.] As I have already said, I am persuaded that the tone of moderation which has prevailed in this debate must be useful both in Canada and in the United States. [Hear, hear.] No doubt there are those who have endeavored to persuade the people of the United States that there exists in this country a spirit of hostility towards them, and that we are looking out for grounds of quarrel. There can, however, be no real and just grounds for quarrel between us. We certainly shall not seek such grounds, nor shall we invent them; and if the speech of the honorable gentleman who has just sat down be a true and faithful exposition of the sentiments of the people of the United States, there can be no well-founded apprehension that the peace happily prevailing between us is in danger of interruption. I can confirm the statement of my right honorable friend, that the present relations between the two governments are perfectly friendly and satisfactory. [Cheers.] We have no complaint to make of the government of the United States; [hear, hear;] they have acted in a fair and honorable manner in all the matters that may have arisen between us. No doubt there are claims which they have put forward, not urging them at present, but laying the ground for their discussion at some future time. No doubt, also, we have claims upon them which we do not put forward at present, but have announced to be claims which at some future time may be discussed. But I should trust that we both feel it to be for the interest—aye, and for the honor of the two countries, that peace should be preserved, and that matters of this sort ought to be capable of a friendly and amicable adjustment. [Cheers.] All I can say is that the government, as long as they continue to be chargeable with the conduct of affairs, will do everything that the honor and interests of the country permit them to do to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries. [Loud cheers.]