Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session Thirty-eighth Congress, Part II
[Extract]
Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I sent you last week, by the ordinary post, a copy of the London Times, containing a report of the debate which took place in the Commons on Friday, the 13th instant, on the motion of Mr. Thomas Baring.
Had the government felt itself competent to the assumption of any positive policy, here would have been an excellent opportunity. The general effect of the discussion, as well as the gradual progress of opinion of the commercial classes, had paved the way for the support of any measure of repression of the proceedings of the rebel agents and their sympathizers, which might have been proposed. The ministry shrunk back from the occasion, partly from its innate dread of anything positive, and partly from a sense of a necessity not to shake the feeble base of resistance it has laid against our claims of indemnity for the consequences of its past errors. The attorney general, in his singularly professional speech, was candid enough to admit that the spectre of the Alabama stood in the way of doing what might, at the present moment, be just in itself as well as effective in the prevention of future abuses.
* * * * * * * * *
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
The Georgia.
Mr. T. Baring, in rising to call attention to the circumstances under which this vessel has been allowed to enter the port of Liverpool and to put a question on the subject, said that as he brought this matter before the house simply as one of English interest, he should not refer to the feelings or prospects of either of the contending parties, nor should he endeavor to provoke an expression of sympathy with either side. He wished to make no charge against the government, and, if he referred at all to the past, it would be to illustrate the position in which the country was placed as to its international engagements. An incident had recently occurred which was of a most extraordinary character A [Page 4] vessel-of-war carrying, as they were told, the flag and commission of the Con federate government, had recently entered the port of Liverpool. She was still there, and when the house heard her history it would be somewhat surprised at the course which had been pursued. This was her history: The Japan, otherwise the Virginia, commonly known as the Georgia, was built at Dumbarton, on the Clyde. She was equipped by a Liverpool firm. Her crew was shipped by the same Liverpool firm for Shanghai, and sent round to Greenock by steamer. She was entered on the 31st of March, 1863, as for Point de Galle and Hong Kong, with a crew of forty-eight men. She cleared on the 1st of April. She left her anchorage on the morning of the 2d of April, ostensibly to try her engines, but did not return. She had no armament on leaving Greenock, but a few days after her departure a small steamer called the Allar, freighted with guns, shot, shell, &c, and having on board a partner of the Liverpool firm who had equipped her and shipped her crew, left Newhaven and met the Georgia off the coast of France, near Ushant. The cargo of the Allar was successfully transferred to the Georgia on the 8th or 9th of April; her crew consisted of British subjects. The Allar put into Plymouth on the 11th of April, bringing the Liverpool merchant who had directed the proceedings throughout, and bringing also fifteen seamen who had refused to proceed in the Georgia on learning her real character. The rest of the crew remained. At the time of her departure the Georgia was registered as the property of a Liverpool merchant, a partner of the firm which shipped the crew. She remained the property of this person until the 23d of June, when the register was cancelled, he notifying the collector of her sale to foreign owners. During this period, viz: from the 1st of April to the 23d of June, the Georgia being still registered in the name of a Liverpool merchant, and thus his property, was carrying on war against the United States with whom we are in alliance. It was while still a British vessel that she captured and burnt the Dictator, and captured and released under bond the Griswold, the same vessel which had brought corn to the Lancashire sufferers. The crew of the Georgia was paid through the same Liverpool firm. A copy of an advance-note used was to be found in the diplomatic correspondence. The same firm continued to act in this capacity throughout the cruise of the Georgia. After cruising in the Atlantic and burning and bonding a number of vessels the Georgia made for Cherbourg, where she arrived on the 28th of October. There was at the time much discontent among the crew. Many deserted, leave of absence was given to others, and their wages were paid all along by the same Liverpool firm. In order to get the Georgia to sea again the Liverpool firm enlisted, in Liverpool, some twenty seamen, and sent them to Brest. The Georgia left Cherbourg on a second cruise, but having no success she returned to that port, and thence to Liverpool, where her crew have been paid off without any concealment, and the vesel is now laid up. Here, then, was the case of a vessel clandestinely built, fraudulently leaving the port of her construction, taking Englishmen on board as her crew, and waging war against the United States, an ally of ours, without having once entered a port of the power the commission of which she bore, but being for some time the property of an English subject. We heard nothing of the steps, which, under those circumstances, were taken by the government, but he felt assured they had done all that lay in their power, and was consistent with their duty under the existing law. It was, therefore, not their conduct in the matter, but the impotency and insufficiency of the foreign enlistment act, which our courts of justic found it impossible to interpret, that he wished to bring under the notice of the house. The vessels to which he alluded were vessels which would undoubtedly have been arrested if time had been given and if their purpose had been known. The question was, in fact, could we be said to be carrying out our obligations as a neutral power towards a belligerent which was an ally, in a manner consistent with international law, though it might be in harmony with our municipal law, while such a state of things was permitted to exist? For [Page 5] his own part, lie had no wish to lose himself in the mazes of a legal discussion on the subject, but common sense as well as international law, he believed, prescribed that a neutral should act towards a belligerent who was an ally as she would like to be done by. (Hear.) It was in order to prevent a war between neutrals and belligerents that the foreign enlistment act was passed, and if vessels were allowed to proceed on a course of devastation, if they were admitted into the ports of our dependencies and colonies, and not only that, but to put into ports in this country, was it not, he would ask, time to consider whether we should not do our duty towards others, and whether the existing law afforded us the means of protecting the interests of our ally as well as our own? The question as to the extent to which those vessels ought to be admitted to the ports of our colonies and dependencies was, he contended, one of serious importance; but it was, at the same time, one as to which he thought there could be no doubt what course the government should adopt. When a vessel left our ports, which would have been arrested here had her objects been ascertained and her construction certified, and proceeded to carry into effect proceedings of hostility against an ally to the endangering of the peace of this country, it seemed to him that it was the duty of the government to avail themselves, in her case, of the powers which they possessed, and to shut our ports against her. (Hear, hear.) If the house would permit him, he would read on the subject a passage from a writer on international law who signed himself “Historicus,” and who said, speaking of the Alabama:
“First of all, the English government must decide on the best information at their disposal whether she was or was not unlawfully equipped in this country in breach of our neutrality. Their decision on this point ought to be final, for they are the sole judges of it, and the federal authorities may impugn their judgment, but cannot question their determination. If the English government determine that the Alabama was not unlawfully equipped within the realm, she will, of course, enjoy the privileges and immunities of any other lawful belligerent cruiser. If, on the other hand, she is decided to have been unlawfully equipped, then she ought to be forbidden access to any port within the jurisdiction of Great Britain. If she comes within our ports with a prize, her prize should be taken from her and restored to the original owner, and she herself compelled to depart.”
There was another extract from the same writer to which he wished also to invite the attention of honorable members. It was as follows :
“Now, it is a sound and salutary rule of international practice, established by the Americans themselves in 1794, that vessels which have been equipped in violation of the laws of a neutral state shall be excluded from that hospitality which is extended to other belligerent cruisers, on whose origin there is no such taint. Accordingly, the cabinet of Washington compelled all the French privateers which had been illegally fitted out in America against England to leave the ports of the United States, and orders were issued to the custom-house officers to prevent their return. This course of proceeding appears equally consonant to the principles of law and the dictates of policy. The question then remains, Was the Alabama unlawfully equipped and manned within the jurisdiction of Great Britain? Now, setting aside the vexed question of equipment, I think there can be very little doubt on that of enlistment. The question is one which, from its very nature, is not and cannot become the subject of judicial determination, because a neutral government cannot exercise a jurisdiction over such a vessel. It is a matter on which the executive of the neutral government must, according to the best information it can obtain, form its own judgment, and that judgment is final and conclusive on all parties. Now, I observe that in a despatch dated March 27, 1863, (parliamentary paper, p. 2,) Lord Russell writes, ‘The British government has done everything in its power to execute the law; but I admitted that the cases of the Alabama and the Oreto were a scandal, and in some degree a reproach to our law.’ Now, with [Page 6] the greatest deference to those persons who may be of an opposite opinion, I submit that vessels of which such a statement can be properly made—and that it was properly made no one acquainted with the circumstances of their outfit and manning can honestly doubt—are not entitled to the hospitality of the country whose laws they have eluded and abused. I think that to deny to the Florida and Alabama access to our ports would be the legitimate and dignified manner of expressing our disapproval of the fraud which has been practiced upon our neutrality. If we abstain from taking such a course, I fear we may justly lie under the imputation of having done less to vindicate our good faith than the American government consented at our instance on former occasions to do.”
Now, these were vessels which avowedly ought to have been stopped if their purpose had been known. They were vessels whose destination was to roam about, never getting home, and which were tainted with the offence of having violated our neutrality. They were vessels, therefore, which on every ground had no claim to the hospitality of the country, and he was bound to say that both our international obligations and a due regard for our own interests ought to have led us to exclude them from our ports. The Georgia had arrived in Liverpool and there discharged her crew, and what guarantee had we that other vessels might not do the same; that our neutrality might not be violated, and that we might not hereafter have to deal with a state of things in which our position would be reversed? [Hear, hear.] While, therefore, he was anxious to express his belief that under the law as it stood we could not carry our international obligations fully into effect, he was likewise desirous of inviting the * attention of the house to the situation in which this country would be if the prepedents now established were acted upon in the event of our being involved in war, while other States were neutral. Under the present construction of our municipal law there was no necessity that a belligerent should have a port, or even a sea-shore. Provided she had money, or that money was supplied to her by a neutral, she might fit out vessels, and those vessels might go about the seas dealing destruction to British shipping and property. Take the case, which I hope we shall avoid, of our being at war with Germany. There would, as things now stand, be nothing to prevent the Diet of Frankfort from having a fleet. A number of the small states of Germany might unite together and become a great naval power. Money was all that was required for the purpose; and Saxony without a sea-shore might have a first lord of the admiralty, without any docks, who might have a large fleet at his disposal. The only answer we could make under those circumstances to France and the United States, who as neutrals might fit out vessels against us on the pretence that they were German cruisers, was that we would go to war with them; so that, by the course of policy which we were pursuing, we rendered ourselves liable to the alternative of having our property completely destroyed, or entering into a contest with every neutral power in the world. (Hear, hear.] We ought, under these circumstances, to ask ourselves what we had at stake. He would not trouble the house with statistics on the point, but we all knew that our commerce was to be found extending itself to every sea, that our vessels floated in the waters of every clime, that even with our cruisers afloat it would not be easy to pick up an Alabama, and that the destruction of our property might go on despite all our power and resources. What would be the result? That we must submit to the destruction of our property, or that our shipping interests must withdraw their ships from the ocean. That was a danger the apprehension of which was not confined to himself, but was shared by many who were far better able to form a judgment than he was, and so strongly was it felt by shipowners that memorials had already been addressed to the government upon the subject. Last year such a memorial was sent to Earl Russell by the shipowners of Hull, and, if he was not misinformed, a similar one had been sent by the shipowners of Belfast to his honorable and learned friend the member for that borough, who had forwarded it to the noble earl. The memorialists stated [Page 7] that they viewed with the greatest apprehension the permission which was now being given for the violation of our neutrality and the clandestine furnishing of ships to a belligerent; and last night the honorable member for Liverpool presented a petition, signed by almost all the great shipowners of that place, enforcing the same view. He was a little surprised at this, because what was happening around us was a source of great profit to our shipowners [hear, hear;] but it was a proof that they were sensible that the future danger would far preponderate over the present benefit and advantages. [Hear, hear.] Merchants and shipowners were generally a quiescent body, attending to their own affairs and leaving the concerns of the country to those in whose abilities, position, and experience they had confidence, and on whom they could rely, on whatever side of the house they may sit, patriotically to unite to avert the evils against which private individuals could not secure themselves. He was surprised that no proposal was made by the government for the modification of the existing law, and he could not imagine that if such an attempt were made honorable members on his own side of the house would refuse to assist them in taking steps to insure this country against the dangers which menaced its commerce. They ought no longer to dally with this question. It was one of immense importance and of a most dangerous character. Neither the government nor any one else could be deterred from proposing or adopting a necessary measure by the fear that they might be taunted with acting at the dictation of the United States. No one could be more indisposed than he should be to sacrifice the rights, the interests, or the honor of the country to the dictation of a foreign power, but no one could be more convinced that they ought to blush for themselves and their country if they were deterred by the fear of some newspaper taunt, some electioneering speech, or some piece of stump oratory, from yielding to the dictation of reason and good sense, and applying a remedy where an evil had been proved to exist, [Hear, hear.] He had heard it said that this was not the time to take such a step; that we ought to wait until the war was over, when we could pass an act without apprehension that its purport or intention might be mistaken. Was any foreign enlistment act ever passed in time of peace? [Hear.] Our own act was passed in 1819, while Spain was at war with her colonies. And let the house remember the act of General Washington, perhaps the boldest act of his life, when he issued his proclamation to prevent the citizens of the United States from taking part in a war against Great Britain. The whole feeling of that country was on the side of France. “France and freedom” was opposed to “Great Britain and tyranny.” All the recollections of the past war with Great Britain were fresh in the memory of the Americans, and their gratitude to France was still alive. Popular feeling was strongly against General Washington, and yet he perilled his power, his influence, and his popularity, and had the courage to propose and carry a measure for which he was afterwards praised and blessed by his countrymen, because they recognized it as being in accordance with wisdom, with their own interests, and with justice. [Hear.] The moral which he drew from that was, that whatever might be their individual sympathies or their wishes and views as to the causes or results of the pending contest, they need not be afraid of being charged with acting under the dictation of a country which was now engaged in the most exhausting conflict that had ever occurred. They ought not to yield to sympathy when the dictate of duty was clear that they should act to others as they would that they should act to them [hear;] they ought not to be prevented from adopting such a measure as might avert the calamity to which he had adverted so imperfectly, but which now loomed in the view of every shipowner [hear;] they ought not to be deterred from passing such an act as would protect this country against the charge of being neutral only when it suited her purposes, and violating it when it suited her interests. He could not help thinking that if there was to be a change of the law this was the moment when those who guided and controlled our destinies were bound to [Page 8] consider what course should be pursued. We could do it now without giving rise to any idea that we had been threatened. If we did it now we might save ourselves, while if it was delayed we could not avoid retribution hereafter. If we missed this opportunity, what we might do at a time of general peace would not be accepted when war occurred. We should be referred back not to what we had done after the war was over, but to the acts which we had sanctioned by our present policy. He was anxious to ask the government whether they did not see that what had occurred at Liverpool might lead to our neutrality being called in question, that it perilled the performance of our national obligations, and might seriously affect our interests and welfare in the future. [Hear, hear.]
The Attorney General. With many things which have been said by my honorable friend in the course of his able and temperate speech I entirely agree. [Hear, hear.] No one who has observed the conduct which the government have endeavored to pursue with regard to this most important political subject during the past two years can doubt that, whether successful or otherwise, they have endeavored to the best of their power to vindicate the laws of this country, and at the same time to fulfil the obligations of a sincere and impartial neutrality. I know that these professions will not meet with the assent of those who, in their own minds, have no sympathy with the neutrality itself, who have given themselves, doubtless under the impulse of generous motives, to entire, unqualified, and enthusiastic sympathy with one or the other of the belligerents. Nevertheless, I have great confidence that the country generally will perceive that the government, in the course which they have pursued in circumstances of some slight difficulty, have really desired to maintain the law and preserve the honor of the country, and at the same time not to deviate from the path of a real and impartial neutrality. [Hear, hear.] Addressing myself first to the last and most generally important of the topics of my honorable friend’s speech, I need hardly say that we are quite sensible of the gravity of the public evil which exists when merchants or any other persons in this country hold themselves at liberty, by all kinds of shifts and evasions, [hear, hear,] to treat with contempt her Majesty’s proclamation of neutrality, to make themselves parties in a war in which her Majesty has proposed to be neutral; to shelter themselves under all those opportunities of escape which the just regard of the law of our country for persons accused of any offence invariably offers; and to do acts which la their immediate effects place in peril the friendly relations of this and another great nation, [hear, hear,] and which in their ultimate consequences may possibly recoil with the most disastrous and destructive effect upon the trade and commerce of their own country. [Hear, hear.] The government had some right to hope that in the circumstances of such a war as this English merchants occupying eminent positions would not spell out the law under the advice of lawyers, saying “I cannot find it in the bond,” [hear, hear,] and, availing themselves of every means of escape which ingenuity can suggest, bring this country into peril, and create a precedent for future mischief and danger, against which the law of this country seeks to provide. [Hear.] I hope the time will soon come-indeed, I think I may infer from the memorial to which my honorable friend has referred that the time has come, when the voice of the mercantile community will be raised, so that those who may be unwilling to hold themselves bound by her Majesty’s proclamation of neutrality shall see that they cannot expect the support of the great body of their fellow-countrymen. [Hear, hear.] I must endeavor to show that the conduct which has been pursued by her Majesty’s government has been that which the country had a right to expect. The house is aware that there are only three vessels which are alleged, and in those cases I do not say the allegations are well founded, as they have never been brought to the test of judicial proceedings, but there are only three vessels which are alleged to have been fitted out in this country in violation of the law, and with the practical effect of placing this country in the situation of ministering in a [Page 9] most important and formidable manner to the warlike requirements of one of two belligerents. [Hear.] The government believe that the law was intended to strike and does strike, at such acts. With regard to these three ships, the house will recollect that the first which left the shores of this country, the Oreto, afterwards the Florida, left before any information upon which the government could act had been imparted to them. That vessel was afterwards arrested at Nassau, was tried there and acquitted, but it was found that there was reasonable cause for the arrest. So far the government was not to blame. As to the next ship, the Alabama, I need not repeat what was said upon a former occasion as to the steps which were taken by the government, after full consideration of the evidence laid before them, with a view to arrest that vessel. It is well known to the house and to the country that orders to that effect were given, but the ship in the mean time made her escape. Then, lastly, there was this vessel, the Georgia, as to which no information whatever reached her Majesty’s government; no evidence upon which we could act until she was actually gone. So successfully disguised were the real designs of those connected with that ship that, as my honorable friend has stated, the crew were actually engaged for a voyage to Shanghai, and all other arrangements were made with a view to concealment and disguise, and it was only off the coast of France that, meeting another vessel, she received her armament and re-enlisted her crew. The government had no opportunity of interfering so as to stop that vessel. If there be those who think that all those proceedings connected with these ships were perfectly lawful, they will, I am sure, join with me in regretting that, being lawful, they were not also open, avowed, and above-board. [Hear.] It does not seem favorable to the conclusions of the persons engaged in these proceedings that, believing in their lawfulness, they should have taken all possible pains to disguise their real character. [Hear.] Afterwards, as the house is aware, her Majesty’s government took action in the case of the Alexandra, and since then with regard to other vessels, concerning which I will say nothing, as they will soon be the subject of judicial trial. I may also mention that in Scot-and the government directed the seizure of the vessel Pampero, under the foreign enlistment act, and the result of that proceeding has been that a verdict has been given by consent for the crown, and that, while great liberality has been shown in the waiving of the forfeiture to the crown, security has been taken against the employment of the vessel for any belligerent service, and the authority of the law has been successfully vindicated. [Hear.] I am happy to be able to say that, whatever may happen in these cases in point of law or evidence, the interference of the government does appear to have been productive of good effect, as it has impeded the progress of the system of fitting out of naval armaments for a belligerent state. We have no reason to believe that the efforts of the government have been unsuccessful in the practical object, nor even so far as regards the elucidation of the law, although it would, perhaps, be premature to express a confident opinion upon a subject concerning which high authorities have differed. But I cannot avoid expressing a sanguine hope that the result of the measures taken by the government will be to clear up much of the difficulty attaching to the construction of the law, and to lead in future to a better observance of it. I am encouraged in that hope by the fact that in the court of exchequer two learned judges adopted the construction of the act upon which the crown had been advised to proceed. Their construction has since received the indorsement of a learned judge in the Queen’s Bench, under circumstances which make it probable that other judges of that court may concur in his opinion, and in the case of the Pampero, in Scotland, the judges of the court of session pronounced opinions tending, to a great extent to confirm the construction of the act contended for by the crown. [Hear, hear.]
The result of all this is to leave the government in a situation in which they have a right to hope that the law, as it is, may be capable of being vindicated, and that steps taken to vindicate it will not fail in their object, and therefore the [Page 10] house will probably think that it will not be improper, in the event of any suggested change of the law, for the government to act upon that view; but if it should prove to be otherwise, and that the present law is not sufficient, then they may look for that support and encouragement from this house and the country which upon a subject so important it is essential to obtain. If, in the absence of such support and encouragement, proposals for a change of the law were effect ually made, it would commit those who ought to have the common interest of the country at heart to a premature expression of opinion which might have disastrous effects upon the future of this country. We think, therefore, that if it should ever, become necessary to consider the subject, it should be considered at a time when no party feelings nor temporary sympathies may exist to induce the house to take a course which it will be difficult afterwards to retract, and which, if persevered with, might be attended with serious consequences to the welfare of the country. Under these circumstances, the house will, no doubt, consider that government are doing right in adhering to their original hope that the law as it is may be found sufficient for its purpose, and, at all events, that they ought not to propose any change in the law until they are convinced that there is absolute necessity for it, and that such proposals will receive the encouragement and support of the house and the country, without which they could not be carried into effect. Having said that, I will address myself to the particular subject of the motion of my honorable friend. I have shown that with regard to the former history of the Georgia the government have omitted nothing which they could do under the circumstances. That ship has now returned as a confederate ship—a public ship-of-war, with a regular commission as such. I must here notice one observation of my honorable friend. He says that from the 1st of April, 1863, until the following 23d of June, this ship—the Georgia—was registered in this country in the name of a British owner, a merchant of Liverpool, and that therefore she was cruising, burning, and destroying vessels at a time when she was a British ship. I must demur altogether to the law of my honorable friend in that respect. The register is nothing but the title of a British owner for a municipal purpose in this country. A ship which has a British register, and which is afterwards transferred to a foreign belligerent power, cannot, by the mere fact of her still remaining registered in England as the property of a British owner, in any way be justly styled a British ship. [Hear, hear.] Nor can it be said that she has not become what this vessel really is—a public vessel-of-war. I regret that my honorable friend should have used an argument that may seem to give countenance to assertions which have repeatedly been made, but which are quite destitute of foundation, that these ships are British pirates. [Hear, hear.] That expression is untrue in fact—dishonorable to this country; and I trust that all those who have the honor of this country at heart, whatever they may see to condemn in the conduct of persons concerned in fitting out and navigating such vessels as those referred to, will not give encouragement to a proposition so extravagant, and so completely without foundation. I now come to the point suggested by the motion of my honorable friend. He points to the fact that the Georgia is now at Liverpool. The ship came in, being at the time a regular commissioned public ship-of-war. There is no doubt she was entitled to come in in that character by license of the crown as long as the rules issued by her Majesty in January, 1862, remain unaltered, because those rules permit ships-of-war belonging to belligerents to come into our ports under certain restrictions. They must not remain more than twenty-four hours, except for repairs; they must not receive repairs in the nature of warlike equipment, and there are strict limits as to leaving as soon as the repairs are completed. This ship being a public ship-of-war, is permitted to come into our ports, and so comes in lawfully as a ship-of-war. The government desired to have information regarding the circumstances under which she had entered our port, and as to the length of time she was likely to remain. They understood she had been brought into dock, it was presumed, for the purpose of repair, and it was afterwards [Page 11] stated that she was likely to be dismantled and sold. If the latter were the case, there would be no harm done to the other belligerent power by relieving her from all fear of opposition on the part of the dismantled vessel. My honorable friend has asked whether the government think the admission of such ships as he describes that ship to be consistent with their international obligations; their profession of neutrality, and the preservation of British interests. The government certainly has not considered the limited and qualified admission of ships of this kind into British ports to be at all inconsistent with their duty in any respect. But for the first element in the case to which the honorable gentleman has called attention, that the vessel was originally manned and equipped from British ports, I think that every one would grant her right to admission into our ports. I must, however, notice that my friend has imported into the case a consideration which has been frequently dwelt upon in the various publications issued upon this subject—namely, that this ship has never been in any of the ports of the belligerent power under whose flag she sails. It is argued from this fact that this is a circumstance which prevents a ship from acquiring the character of a belligerent ship-of-war. It has been said that there is some rule or other, some settled principle of international law, which will bear out this conclusion. It should not be our practice to invent new rules of international law to suit particular cases, and such a rule as this was never heard of. [Hear, hear.] To say that a country whose ports are blockaded is not at liberty to avail herself of the resources which are at her command in other parts of the world, that, she may not buy ships in neutral territory and commission them as ships-of-war without bringing them to her own country first, is a doctrine which is quite preposterous, [hear, hear,] and all the arguments founded upon such a doctrine only tend to throw dust into men’s eyes and to mislead them. We cannot, therefore, upon those grounds make this ship an exception to our ordinary rules. And now I come to the real question. I have not the least doubt that we have a right, if we thought fit, to exclude any particular ship or class of ships, if we consider that they have violated our neutrality, but such power is simply discretionary on the part of the government, and should be exercised with a due regard to all the circumstances of the case. Does the circumstance of a ship happening to have been fitted out in violation of the neutrality of a neutral nation entitle her to be refused recognition as a public ship-of-war? Happily, we find answer to this question in the history of the jurisprudence of the United States, and I do not find that the United States, which have really settled all the doctrines of law applicable to this kind of neutrality by fitting out vessels in their ports for belligerent nations, ever adopted the practice of inquiring into the previous history of public ships-of-war which labored under the suspicion or allegation.of having been fitted out in their ports in violation of their neutrality. In the cases of the Santissima Trinidad and the Cassius, the particulars of which were similar to those of the Georgia, Mr. Justice Story said :
“In genera], the commission of a public ship, signed by the proper authorities of the nation to which she belongs, is complete proof of her national character. A bill of sale is not necessary to be produced, nor will the courts of a foreign country inquire into the means by which the title to property has been acquired. It would be to exert the right of examining into the validity of the acts of the foreign sovereign, and to sit in judgment upon them in cases where he has not concealed the jurisdiction, and where it would be inconsistent with his own supremacy. The commission, therefore, of a public ship, when duly authenticated, so far at least as foreign courts are concerned, imports absolute verity, and the title is not examinable. The property must be taken to be duly acquired, and cannot be controverted. This has been the settled practice between nations, and it is a rule founded in public convenience and policy, and cannot be broken in upon without endangering the peace and repose as well of, neutral as of belligerent sovereigns.. The commission in the present case is not expressed in the most unequivocal terms, but its fair purport and [Page 12] interpretation must be deemed to apply to a publrc ship of the government. If we add to this the corroborative testimony of our own and the British consul at Buenos Ayres, as well as that of private citizens, to the notoriety of her claim of a public character, and her admission into our own ports as a public ship, with the immunities and privileges belonging to such a ship, with the express approbation of our own government, it does not seem too much to assert, whatever may be the private suspicion of a lurking American interest, that she must be judicially held to be a public ship of the country whose commission she bears.’
That decision referred to a case in which the United States foreign enlistment act had been violated over and over again. The other belligerent has no concern whatever in the course which the government may think fit to adopt with reference to this vessel; and if the government refused her admission to the ports of the United Kingdom, it would only be done for the purpose of vindicating our authority. I cannot find, however, that the United States ever followed such a course. The Santissima Trinidad and the Cassius were both received into the ports of the United States, held not to be amenable to courts of law, and never ordered by the government to leave any port. There are, also, a very considerable number of cases reported in which prizes brought into the ports of the United States were either restored or questions raised in courts of law as to their restoration; but I can find no instance of any prohibition or exclusion from any port of any prize after her conversion into a ship-of-war. We are therefore warranted, upon the authority of the United States, in excluding this vessel from our ports. The hon. member for Huntingdon has asked if the government think the admission of such vessels to British harbors consistent with our international obligations. This question renders it necessary to determine the right of the other belligerent in this matter. Now, upon this question I will quote from the judgment of Mr. Justice Story in reference to the case of the Amisted de la Ruez. I hope not to utter a single word in the slightest degree offensive to any one in the United States, and least of all to their government; but I cannot help wishing that the authority I have mentioned had been more recognized when, over and over again, those extraordinary and extravagant demands were made upon our government to pay the value of all the ships taken on the high seas by the Alabama and similar vessels. (Hear, hear.) I need hardly remind the house that in 1793, when the United States did give us compensation for certain prizes not restored, that compensation was strictly limited to ships when brought into their ports fitted out in violation of their laws, and was not extended to any prizes taken upon the high seas. All they did was to name a particular date, and to prohibit the French from bringing in any more of their prizes after that date. Mr. Justice Story thus lays down what is the limit of the obligation which the neutral owes to the belligerent in this matter:
“When called upon by either of the belligerents to act in such cases, all that justice seems to require is that the neutral nation should fairly execute its own laws, and give no asylum to the property unjustly captured. It is bound, therefore, to restore the property if found within its own ports; but, beyond this, it is not obliged to iuterfere between the belligerents.”
So that he distinctly says that we are to execute our laws fairly; we are to give no asylum to prizes captured by ships fitted out in violation of our neutrality, and to property unjustly captured; but he does not say that an asylum may not be given to public ships-of-war, whatever their previous history; and he adds that, beyond the limits which he mentions, we are not obliged to interfere between the belligerents. The authority of Mr. Justice Story, therefore, distinctly excludes the proposition that belligerents have any rights entitling them to require interference by the neutral to the extent of excluding absolutely from her ports ships of this description, if it does not seem to the neutral herself necessary so to do. [Hear, hear.] I say, then, we have done all that authority requires us to do. And now I will ask what reasons there are for the [Page 13] hesitation of the government to take the extreme step of absolutely excluding these particular ships from our ports when, at the same time, all the ships of the United States government were admitted. [Hear.] Some reasons can be given; the house will judge of them. I believe they have had considerable influence upon the determination of the government upon this question, and I think they are such as are consistent with an honest desire to maintain our neutrality and fulfil our international obligations. In the first place, the maintenance of neutrality is plainly consistent with the maintenance of our own rights, and I entirely repudiate the argument, sometimes used, that you are not to enforce your own laws, because the effect of doing so may possibly be to put one of the parties to greater disadvantage than the other. Neutrality does not require that. On the other hand, where you have no law to enforce, then it becomes worthy of consideration whether you may not be weighing down the balance in a manner not entirely consistent with neutrality, if you adopt, voluntarily, a rule which would practically exclude from the asylum you allow in your ports the whole of the navy of one belligerent and no part of the navy of the other belligerent. [Hear, hear.] That is one principle. And then there is another. The whole of the honorable gentleman’s argument assumes that the facts, and the law applicable to the facts, are substantiated; that we are in a position as between ourselves and the Confederate States to treat the matter as beyond controversy, and that the Georgia was, in fact, fitted out in violation of our neutrality. Now, we may have strong reason to suspect this, and may even believe it to be true; but to say that we are to act upon mere suspicion, or belief, against another State, upon certain facts which have never been judicially established, and which it is not easy to bring to the test as between government and government, that is a proposition which is not without grave consideration to be accepted. [Hear, hear.] The difficulty of that view is increased by the fact that we have no diplomatic relations with the Confederate States, and cannot communicate with them in the ordinary Way. We have not recognized them, and, what is more, the government of the United States, by its ships, bar us from the means of communication. [Hear, hear.] Only the other day her Majesty’s government were anxious to communicate and remonstrate with the government of the Confederate States, and actually gave a commission to one of our diplomatic servants, a consul, to do so; and then it was announced that the blockading squadron, under the orders of the United States government, could not permit even a ship-of-war of this country to enter into a blockaded port for the purpose of this communication. [Hear, hear.] These circumstances greatly enhance the difficulty of bringing to a practical test the question whether there has been, in this case, a violation of our neutrality. Upon that allegation the whole thing depends; and here, again, American authority by no means warrants the notion that you ought to act lightly, or without cogent proof. In the case of the Santissima Trinidad, to which I have before referred, Mr. Justice Story says as to the kind of proof which ought to be insisted on in these cases:
“In a case of the description of that before, the court, where the sovereignty and rights of a foreign belligerent nation are in question, and where the exercise of jurisdiction over captures made under its flag can be justified only by clear proof of the violation of our neutrality, there are still stronger reasons for abstaining from interference, if the testimony is clouded with doubt and suspicion. We adhere to the rule which has been already adopted by this court, that restitution ought not to be decreed upon the ground of capture in violation of our neutrality, unless the fact be established beyond all reasonable doubts.”
There, again, is a principle which the confederate government are entitled to have the benefit of, and which makes it matter of serious difficulty to say that because we have very strong moral presumptions and very strong reason to believe that a certain ship-of-war was fitted out in violation of our neutrality, we are, therefore, to act summarily upon the supposition. [Hear, hear.] You have [Page 14] here a mixed question of facts and of law—the facts to be established by evidence, the law to be decided with reference to the facts; and, considering the controversy which has gone on as to the bearing and effect of our law, it is not impossible that in some of these cases the Confederate States may have believed that they were acting within that law. [Hear.] All this increases the difficulty; and now I want to suggest other reasons. Of course, if we act according to the suggestions made to us in this case, we must act on the same principles and deal out the same measure to the other belligerent. And if we are to proceed on grounds of moral belief, and do not stop to ask whether they constitute proper legal grounds of action—-if we are to proceed upon information of the kind which carries conviction to the mind—it is impossible to acquit the agents of the United States, although we may acquit the government, of acts which are inconsistent with our neutrality. The case of the Kearsarge was a case of this character. Beyond all question a considerable amount of recruiting was carried on at Cork for the purposes of that ship, she being employed at the time in our own waters, or very near them, in looking out for her enemy; and she was furnished with a large addition to her crew from Ireland. [Hear, hear.] Upon that being represented to Mr. Adams, he said, as might have been expected, that it was entirely contrary to the wishes of his government, and that there must be some mistake. The men were afterwards relanded, and there can be no doubt that there had been a violation of our neutrality. [Hear, hear.] Nevertheless, we admitted the Kearsarge afterwards into English waters. We have not excluded her from our ports, and if we had I think the United States government would have considered that they had some cause of offence. [Hear, hear.] But it does not rest there. I see from the paper that the honorable member for Horsham wants information respeeting the enlistment of British subjects for the federal army. Now, from all quarters reports reach us, which we cannot doubt to be substantially true, that agents for recruiting for the federal army, with or without the concurrence of the government, are in Ireland, and engage men under the pretext of employing them on railways and public works, but really with the intention of enlisting them, and that many of these men are so enlisted. [Hear, hear.] In Canada and New Brunswick the same practices prevail. Representations have been made to the United States government respecting particular cases of persons who have been kidnapped into the service, and I feel bound to say that those representations have not met with that prompt and satisfactory attention we might have expected. [Hear.] How are we to act in this case 1 Are we to exclude from our ports all the ships of the belligerent whose agents are believed to have engaged in these practices 1 practices which, whatever may be the intention of the United States government, operate to supply their ranks with British subjects in violation of British law. [Hear, hear.] If we are to act in the one case upon suspicion, or upon moral belief going beyond suspicion, it would be difficult to say that we ought not to act so in the other. But in what difficulties we should entangle ourselves were we so to act, not being bound to act by any international obligation! What may fairly be asked is that we should do all we can to enforce our own laws within our own jurisdiction. That is the course which the government have taken; that is the course to which they will adhere; and, in view of the difficulties I have mentioned, I think it is a course which is fully justified. [Hear.] There is one other consideration of importance which I wish to mention; and here again I hope that what I say will not cause offence in the United States, for I state it because it is true, and because it is important that the matter should be understood. The British government are not assisted by the government of the United States in matters of this description. The demands which the United States government make upon us go so far beyond the limits of anything they can be entitled to ask, according to any recognized rules and privileges of international law, that it becomes absolutely necessary that this government should exercise great caution indeed before they do acts which [Page 15] might possibly be misunderstood, and might give foundation to the idea that they do them under the supposed necessity of complying with demands of this kind. [Hear, hear.] The house well knows that I refer to the extraordinary demands arising out of the case of the Alabama. [Hear, hear.] I have no hesitation in saying that the United States government by advancing such demands and by seeking to make our government responsible for pecuniary compensation for prizes taken by the Alabama upon the high seas, and never brought within our ports or in any way whatever under our control, are making demands directly contrary to the principles of international law laid down by their own jurists, and thereby render it infinitely more difficult for us, at their request, to do anything resting on our own discretion, and which we are not bound to do in law. [Hear, hear.] What we may fairly say is this: “We will adhere to the rules laid down by your own authorities. We will execute our own law. We will allow no asylum to prizes or to property unjustly captured. If any such are brought in, any demand for their reclamation shall be investigated. But we will not undertake to recognize claims going beyond these limits. We will not undertake to interfere between belligerents in any other way than that in which, by the rules of international law, we can fairly be called upon to interfere.” [General cheering]
Mr. W. E. Forster said that the strong sympathy which he felt with one of the parties in the American contest might have enabled him to obtain information which otherwise he could not have procured; but he should endeavor to treat this question in an impartial manner. The instructions issued by the admiralty with reference to the ships of either of the belligerents which might enter any of our ports were as follows :
“If any ship-of-war or privateer of either belligerent shall enter any port, roadstead, or waters belonging to her Majesty, such vessel shall be required to depart and to put to sea within twenty-four hours after her entrance into such port, roadstead, or waters, except in case of stress of weather, or of her requiring provisions or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew, or repairs, in either of which cases the authorities of the port, or of the nearest port, (as the case may be,) shall require her to put to sea as soon as possible after the expiration of such period of twenty-four hours, without permitting her to take in supplies beyond what may be necessary for her immediate use; and no such vessel which may have been allowed to remain within British waters for the purpose of repair shall continue in such port, roadstead, or waters for a longer period than twenty-four hours after her necessary repairs shall have been completed.”
Now, he thought there could scarcely be ground for alleging that the Georgia came here for repair, for she had been repaired at Bordeaux, and had only made the voyage from that port to Liverpool. It had been alleged that the Georgia came into an English port to pay off her crew. He asked whether a federal vessel would be allowed to come into one of our ports to pay off her crew. [Hear, hear.] The Georgia was a confederate vessel which, notoriously, had been built in England. She had sailed from a port in Scotland, and the entire of her crew, with two exceptions, one a Swede and the other a Russian, were Englishmen. She had received on the coast of France her equipment from England, and for a month after she began to take her prizes she was owned by an English merchant. That appeared from the custom-house papers, which stated that the vessel was sold to a foreigner, per letter from the owner, dated 23d of June, 1863. In connexion with these circumstances ought to be taken the fact that from the time of the purchase she had not been in a confederate port. [Hear, hear.] Would not the facilities which we had given to this vessel tell against ourselves in future, when, unfortunately, it should happen that we were belligerents? The attorney general had given several reasons why he thought the law should not be altered; but he contended that we had had an opportunity of bringing about an alteration in the law which would be of advantage to ourselves and to the world generally. The two countries which had advocated [Page 16] the claims of neutrals as against belligerents were America and France. They had been the supporters of the neutral rights of commerce against the belligerent pretensions of England. We might, therefore, have pressed upon America to join us in amending the maritime law. On the 19th of December, 1862, Lord Russell wrote to Mr. Adams to the effect that in the opinion of her Majesty’s government certain amendments might be introduced in the foreign enlistment act, and that it was willing to receive from the government of the United States suggestions as to what amendments might with advantage be made in the foreign enlistment act of each country. On the 14th of February Lord Russel wrote to Lord Lyons, stating Mr. Adams had intimated that, while the United States government was ready to listen to any proposition on the subject, they did no.t see how their law could be improved. It was quite true Mr. Adams had said the government of the United States thought their law effective, experience having shown it to be so; but he would read for the house extracts from despatches which had not appeared in our blue-book. On the 16th of September, 1863, Mr. Adams wrote to Lord Russell:
“It will doubtless be remembered that the proposition made by you, and which I had the honor of being the medium of conveying to my government, to agree upon some forms of amendment of the respective statutes of the two countries, in order to make them more effective, was entertained by the latter, not from any want of confidence in the ability to enforce the existing statute, but from-a desire to co-operate with what then appeared to be the wish of her Majesty’s ministers. But upon my communicating his reply to your lordship,, and inviting the discussion of propositions, you then informed me that it had been decided not to proceed any further in this direction, as it was the opinion of the cabinet, sustained by the authority of the lord chancellor, that the law was fully effective in its present state.”
On the 25th of September, 1863, Lord Russell wrote to Mr. Adams:
“I deem it incumbent on me, in behalf of her Majesty’s government, frankly to state to you that her Majesty’s government will not be induced * * * to propose to Parliament any new law which they may not, for reasons of their own, think proper to be adopted.”
He did not complain of Lord Russell telling Mr. Adams that the government would not propose any new law except for good reasons of their own, but he was surprised that they had not discovered that this was an excellent opportunity for putting the law on a more satisfactory footing. We could not suppose that the precedent we were now setting would not be used against us by every neutral power in the future whenever we might be at war. [Hear.] Take the case of a possible war with Germany. Nobody would more deeply deprecate such a war as that than himself; but, to judge from the language of some of the newspapers, and from some speeches, there were persons who looked upon such a war without any particular feeling of horror. Supposing such a war should unfortunately arise, what would be our feelings if when, by our overwhelming naval force, we fancied that we had made every German port safe, one vessel should steal out of Marseilles and another out of Brest, and that, meeting on the coast of Italy, one of them, shipping a crew and armament from the other, should be converted into a cruiser to sail off and destroy British merchantmen wherever she could find them? [Hear.] Should we allow France for a moment to do that? Certainly not, if we dared to prevent her; and with our usual pluck we probably should dare, unless the war were a struggle for our very existence. [Hear, hear.] This precedent, if we allowed it to be established, meant for us a second war whenever we had a war on our hands, unless we were fighting for our existence, and did not dare to undertake another war. “What a wretched navy,” it was said, “the Americans must have not to. put these cruisers down!” [Hear, hear.] But it was a comparatively easy matter to carry on operations of this kind. All that a ship of this character had to do was to attack vessels which could not resist her, and run away from those which [Page 17] could. [Hear, hear.] There was not the slightest occasion for them ever to fight a battle. If they were taken, the officers were only prisoners of war; if they were not taken they made their fortunes. Was it to these risks that they would wish to expose British trade? Our merchants at first were disposed to triumph in the fact that the carrying trade of the United States was being transferred to them, but it was clear now that they had found out that present gain would not be balanced by the future loss. There could not be a stronger illustration of the damage which had been done to the American trade by these cruisers than the fact that, so completely was the American-flag driven from the ocean, the Georgia on her second cruise did not meet a single American vessel in six weeks, though she saw no less than 70 vessels in a very few days. If we did not take care to settle the international law before a war began, our merchants would be obliged to transfer their ships to foreign flags, and he regretted that the government had not discerned how excellent an opportunity this was for that purpose. The question put by the honorable gentleman opposite was whether these particular ships which had eluded our neutrality should be admitted into our ports, but the attorney general had turned that into the question whether the whole navy of the confederates should be excluded from our ports because one of them had broken our neutrality. If federal agents were engaged in enlisting men in Ireland, it was open to the government to express their dis-apprbval of that course, and to endeavor to put a stop to it; but while they did that they might very fairly say also that vessels which left our ports in breach of our neutrality should not be allowed to return to them. Surely the attorney general did not mean to contend that in our representations to other nations we were obliged to be armed with the same proof as we should require in the case of one of our own people who had committed an offence against the law! Were there not sufficient grounds for saying that we ought not to be required to extend to the vessels in question the same degree of hospitality which we would gladly afford to ships which had not broken our neutrality? Then came the point as to what course our interests called upon us to take in the matter, and was it not, he would ask, clearly our interest to prevent the invasion by neutrals of the rights of belligerents, by taking those steps which he understood the honorable and learned gentleman to admit it was in our power to adopt? He wished to add a word with respect to international law. He did not profess to be able to define what that law was according to precedents; but even a layman might be permitted to state his views in reference to it as based upon the principles of common sense; and what he understood its great object to be, as operating between belligerents and neutrals, was that there should be such an arrangement between nations that an individual country should not be allowed by the sovereign power of that country to carry on war with other states without the leave of the government. There was, he maintained, the greatest possible difference between selling munitions of war to either of the parties in a contest and the sending out armed ships from our ports; for in the one case a neutral country was made the basis of hostilities, whereas in the other it was not. [Hear, hear.] He had no wish to enter into the question whether the federals had received from us a larger quantity of the munitions of war than the confederates, though that was a point more open to doubt than some honorable gentlemen opposite seemed to suppose; but he should like to observe that the nature of the question at issue in the present instance was very much qualified by the fact that the confederates had no navy. That was their weakness, it was true, but in war weakness was a fault, and we might very well say to the federals when they complained of our furnishing the south with munitions of war, “Why not stop them, and prevent them from being carried into southern ports ?” When, however, it came to be a question of armed ships leaving our own ports, the matter assumed a different aspect, because the only way in which a belligerent could atop them was not by blockading the ports of [Page 18] another belligerent, but the ports of the neutral power from which they sailed* Let him, however, suppose that the port of Liverpool was blockaded by the United States navy for the purpose of preventing these vessels from leaving it, could any one imagine that we could remain at peace with America? Such then, being the position of the case, it was evident that if the government could succeed in obtaining such concessions as he had indicated, and if neutrals were prevented from allowing their subjects to carry on war, they would not only be promoting our interests, but advancing the interests of civilization. He trusted, therefore, that the discussion raised by the right honorable gentleman opposite, with an authority which scarcely any other member of that house could command, backed as he was by the strongest possible memorial from the shipowners of Liverpool, would impress upon the government the necessity of not allowing, the opinions which had been expressed to pass by without endeavoring to place us in a better position than that in which we seemed to stand in the event of our unfortunately becoming belligerents ourselves. [Hear, hear.]
Mr. Cobden. I will not occupy the attention of the house but for a very few minutes. I wish to say a word or two in reference to what has fallen from the attorney general. Two questions have been brought under our notice by the statement of the honorable gentleman who introduced this subject. The suggestions which he makes are that we should alter our laws, or that we should, in the exercise of the powers which it is conceded we possess, prevent vessels of the description referred to from entering our ports. With respect to* altering our laws, the attorney general has entered into a long argument to show that the law as it stands is effective for the purpose of preventing a breach of our neutrality; but I cannot imagine a more cruel joke than the honorable and learned gentleman’s speech must appear when it comes to be read at Washington. [Hear, hear.] What is the fact? You have been carrying on war from these shores with the United States, and have been inflicting an amount of damage on that country greater than would be produced by many ordinary wars. It is estimated that the loss sustained by the capture and burning of American vessels has been about $15,000,000, or nearly £3,000,000 sterling. But that is a small part of the injury which has been inflicted on the American marine. We have rendered the rest of her vast mercantile property useless. You condemn free trade, by which the world’s affairs are now so largely carried on. If you raise the rate of insurance on the flag of any maritime power, you throw the trade into the hands of its competitors, because it is no longer profitable for merchants or manufacturers to employ ships to carry freights when those vessels become liable to great war risks. I have here one or two facts, which I should like to lay before the honorable and learned gentleman, in order to show the way in which this has been operating. When he has heard them, he will see what a cruel satire it is to say that our laws have been found sufficient to enforce our neutrality. I hold in my hand an account of the foreign trade of New York for the quarter ending June 30, 1860, and also for the quarter ending June 30, 1863, which is the last date up to which a comparison is made. I find that the total amount of the foreign trade of New York for the first mentioned period was $92,000,000, of which $62,000,000 were carried in American bottoms and $30,000,000 in foreign. This state of things rapidly changed as the war continued, for it appears that, for the quarter ending June 30, 1863, the total amount of the foreign trade of New York was $88,000,000, of which amount $23,000,000 were carried in American vessels, and $65,000,000 in foreign—the change brought about being, that while in 1860 two-thirds of the commerce of New York was carried on in American bottoms, in 1863 three-fourths was carried on in foreign bottoms. You see, therefore, what a complete revolution has taken place in the value of property; and what has been the consequence] That a very large transfer has been made of American shipping to English owners, because the proprietors no longer [Page 19] found it profitable to carry on their business. A document has been laid on the table, which gives us some important information on this subject. I refer to an account of the number and tonnage of United States vessels which have been registered in the United Kingdom and in the ports of British North America between the years 1858 and 1863, both inclusive. It shows that the transfer of United States shipping to English capitalists, in each of the years comprised in that period, was as follows: In 1858, 33 vessels, 12,684 tons; 1859, 49 vessels, 21,308 tons; 1860, 41 vessels, 13,638 tons; 1861, 126 vessels, 71,673-tons; 1862, 135 vessels, 64,578 tons; and 1863, 348 vessels, 252,579 tons. [Hear, hear.] I am told that this operation is now going on as fast as ever. Now, I hold this to be the gravest part of the question of our relations with America. Idon’t care what newspapers may write or orators may utter on one side or the other. We may balance off an inflammatory speech from an honorable member here against a similar speech made in the Congress at Washington. We may pair off a leading article published in New York against one published in London; but little consequence, I suspect, would be attached to either. The two countries, I hope, would discount these incendiary articles or these incendiary harangues at their proper value. [A laugh.] But what I do fear in the relations between these two nations of the same race is the heaping up of a gigantic material grievance, such as we are now rearing by the transactions connected with these cruisers; because there is a vast amount of personal suffering, personal wrong, and personal rancor arising out of this matter, and that in a country where popular feeling rules in public affairs. I am not sure that any legislation can meet this question. I candidly confess I don’t think that if you were now to pass a law to alter your foreign enlistment act you would materially change the aspect of this matter. You have already done your worst towards the American mercantile marine. What with the high rate of insurance, what with these captures, and what with the amount of damage you have done to that which is left, you have virtually made valueless that vast property. Why, if you had gone and helped the confederates, by bombarding all the accessible seaport towns of America, a few lives might have been lost, which, as it is, have not been sacrificed, but you could hardly have done more injury, in the way of destroying property, than you have done by these few cruisers. [Hear, hear.]
Well, I turn to another point that has been opportunely raised by the honorable gentleman—I mean as to the practicability of refusing hospitality to these ships. I regard that as a very important question. I alluded to it twelve months ago in this house, and I still think that that is a step which the government might take with advantage to our future relations with America. [Hear, hear.] And when I come to hear what the honorable and learned gentleman says in opposition to that view, I confess I am puzzled beyond measure by his argument. He made a very long and elaborate statement to show that we were not entitled to refuse hospitality to these ships. He admitted, indeed, that we had the right to do it, but he contended against the expediency of our exercising that right. Now, this is a question for the government, and not one for legislation; and therefore I wish to impress its importance on the government. The honorable and learned gentleman wound up by saying he thought they had better wait until they saw whether the House of Commons was quite prepared to support them in any alteration of our law. I will only say it struck me, when I heard that, that we clearly had not a Washington at the head of affairs, [” hear, hear,” and a laugh,] because that certainly was not the way in which Washington earned the tribute of our applause for the course that he took. The government admit, through their legal adviser, that they have the power, if they choose to exercise it, to prevent these vessels from entering our harbors; but the honorable and learned gentleman doubts the expediency of exercising it; and his reason is, that he thinks we have not clear proof of guilt. This brings me to a striking piece of inconsistency on the part of the honorable [Page 20] and learned gentleman. He begins with administering a solemn exportation, and something like a solemn reproof, to English ship-builders for infringing our neutrality laws and disregarding the Queen’s proclamation by building these ships. Well, but if they are violating our neutrality and disregarding the Queen’s proclamation, it must have been because they built these vessels for some belligerent to be employed against some power with which we are at peace. The honorable and learned gentleman assumes that these individuals are guilty of these acts. He knows they have been guilty of these acts. He knows that these three vessels in particular, and the Alabama more especially, have been built for the confederate government, and employed solely for that government, and yet he doubts the expediency of stopping them from entering our ports. He speaks as though we were asking that he should send out ships-of-war to order away these vessels without trial. He says there must be legal proof; but it does not require legal proof to warrant you in telling a government, “You have got these vessels clandestinely; you got them by the infringement of our neutrality code, or, at least, we suspect you, upon fair grounds, of, doing so; and unless you prove that they came legitimately into your hands, we must refuse them the hospitality of our ports.” Why, how do you act in private life? You hear charges and reports compromising the honor of your acquaintance or friend. You may have a moral conviction in your mind that that individual’s honor is compromised, but you may not have legal proof of it, and still you may be quite satisfied in saying to him, “Until you clear up these charges, which on the face of them criminate you, I must refuse you the hospitality of my house.” I hold that you have the right to say the same thing in regard to these cruisers. But what was the course of the government in the case of the Alabama? They told Mr. Adams, the American minister, that they should give orders to stop the Alabama either at Queenstown or at Bermuda. Therefore the principle was recognized in the case of that vessel that you had a right to stop her when she reached your jurisdiction. I say, therefore, in the same way, “Prevent their entering your harbors until they give an account of themselves, to show how they became possessed of that vessel.” This has a most important bearing, and one so apparent that it must be plain to the apprehensions of every honorable gentleman who hears it. If the people of the United States are to be told that not only do individuals here fit out cruisers to destroy their commerce, but that our government will allow these cruisers themselves to enter our harbors, and there to be equipped—civilly equipped I mean—and victualled, see in what a predicament you place yourselves towards that country, in case you are ever again engaged in war. [Hear.] Recollect her geographical position. She has one sea-coast in the Atlantic and another in the Pacific, and her Pacific coast is within about a fortnight’s steaming of your China trade. Let any man take and read the shipping list at Shanghai. It is almost like reading the Liverpool shipping list. Suppose, then, you were at war with any other power, and you had laid down this doctrine for other countries to imitate: Why, let the American government be as true and as loyal to its principles as it has been, can you doubt, if American nature is human nature, if American nature is English nature, that out of their numerous and almost inaccessible creeks and corners there will not be persons to send forth these fleet steamers to prey on your commerce? Why, many Americans will think it an act of absolute patriotism to do this. They will say, “We have lost our mercantile marine through your doing this, and by doing the same towards you we shall recover it again, and you will be placed in the sanle position as we were. You will have a high rate of insurance; you will be obliged to sell your ships; you had the profit before-—now we shall have it, for the game is one that two can play at.” But only look at the disadvantage you will experience under those circumstances. We understood the importance of this at the commencement of the Crimean war. In April, 1854, when war was declared [Page 21] with Russia, the British and French governments sent a joint note to the American government, in which we asked them, as an act of friendly reciprocity towards us, to give orders that no privateers bearing the Russian flag should be allowed to be fitted out, or victualled, or equipped in American ports. [Hear, hear.] Recollect that the words “equipped” and “victualled” were contained in the request which we addressed to the American government. [Hear, hear.] And this leads me to make a remark with reference to a most important point— I mean as to the distinction drawn by the honorable and learned gentleman between a government ship-of-war carrying a commission and a privateer. That is a question of the utmost importance to us. We have been in a fool’s paradise for the last seven or eight years. We have believed that the conference of Paris achieved a great work in the interest of civilization—that it abolished privateering. Now we find that that was nothing but a stupendous hoax. [” Hear,” and a laugh.] For, what is the Florida? What is the Alabama? What is the Georgia? Why, they are not privateers at all. I remember that the honorable member for Liverpool who sits opposite—I wish to distinguish him from his colleague—I remember that he made a speech lately at Liverpool, in which he said that if the Americans had only joined in the declaration of Paris against privateering they would not have been placed in their present predicament; and the honorable gentleman led his hearers, the ship-owners of that port, to believe that if we got into a war we could not be retaliated upon in the same way as the Americans were, because we were under that safeguard which had forever abolished privateering. [Hear.] Well, let us take the case of the Florida as an example, and look at her history for a moment. She was off the coast of Ireland, and went across to Brest. On her way thither she burnt an American merchant ship, and therefore went into Brest red-handed. At Brest she claimed to be allowed to civilly equip and victual. The Opinion Nationale immediately put forth a leading article, denouncing the Florida as being what the French call a corsaire, and what we term a privateer. Therefore the commander of the Florida wrote a letter to the Paris newspapers, declaring that M. le Redacteur was under a great delusion in supposing that his ship was a privateer, and stating that she bore a regular commission of the confederate government, and that he and all his officers were regularly commissioned officers; that, in fact, the Florida was a regular ship-of-war. On the publication of that letter, Mr. Dayton, the American minister at Paris, took the affair in hand, and in the despatches on our table between Mr. Seward and his representatives abroad we have the whole correspondence that took place between Mr. Dayton and the French government. Mr. Dayton called the attention of M. Drouyn de l’Huys to the circular addressed to the American government in 1854, at the breaking out of the Crimean war, and told him in effect, “You and England jointly requested us not to allow any privateer to equip or victual in our ports, but here is a vessel that is either a privateer or nothing; she makes no war on armed vessels; she goes about burning and destroying merchant vessels, and she does not profess to do anything else, because she is neither armed nor manned in a way to act as a regular ship-of-war.” M. Drouyn de l’Huys and the English government appear both to have come to the same conclusion that the Florida, as well as the Alabama and the Georgia, is a regular ship-of-war; but Mr. Dayton, in communicating with his own government, fairly stigmatized the declaration of Paris as “mere moonshine,” and Mr. Seward in his reply indorsed his language. [Hear.] I mention this to show that it will not save us, in case we are engaged in war, from having reprisals practiced upon us, that we have joined in the declaration of Paris, and I am glad that upon this point the honorable member for Liverpool has not succeeded in misleading his constituents, because they appear to take a very sound and far-seeing view of the question. [Hear, hear.] I am only sorry, indeed, that two years ago our ship-owners did not rise en masse and compel the government [Page 22] of this manufacturing and mercantile country to put our laws and regulations in harmony with the present state of our interests and relations; for I hold we are not here to stand up like lawyers and quote pedantically from the reports of 1810 and 1812. We are living in a progressive age, and in a most progressive country, and let me tell the government that we have now five times as much at stake as we had at the beginning of the century. Our exports and imports are five-fold what they were at the time when those authorities spoke whom the attorney general has cited, and I maintain that it is in the power of any country, but especially in the power of great countries, to lay down maxims and establish precedents which themselves become international law. [Hear.] We have, unhappily, lost a precious opportunity of putting ourselves in a better position for the future, if ever we intend to go to war again. Nor is it. merely in time of war that we shall feel the effects of the existing state of things. Do you suppose that foreign governments do not observe what is going on, and do not fully appreciate our altered circumstances? I might apply that observation to other matters, and ask why we scatter our forces all over the world, and then think we are as safe and powerful at home as if we had those forces under our wing. But, confining myself to the question of belligerent rights, I say that foreign governments will take into account the danger we must incur in case of war, and will find in it a motive for our remaining at peace. Look at what happened last autumn. We held out what was supposed to be a threat, that, in conjunction with France, we should go to war with Russia on the subject of Poland. What did Russia do? She sent her fleet immediately to America, and, knowing the astute, long-headed men who rule in St. Petersburgh, does anybody doubt what the motive was? The Russian government reasoned thus: “If England and France are going to attack us again, we will take care to be in a position to carry on reprisals, and particularly we will carry on operations against the commerce of England, in the same way as the confederates are carrying on war against the commerce of the United States.” Therefore they sent their fleet, and, what is still more important, they sent their crews to America, no doubt with the intention of putting those crews into the swiftest vessels that could be obtained both on the Atlantic and on the Pacific side, in order that they might be employed against our commerce. [Hear, hear.] Take the case of Germany, Recently the German newspapers have often pointed to the vulnerability of England, in consequence of the state of the law as established by ourselves in the case of these cruisers. [Hear, hear.] We have, in truth, set a most perilous example, the effects of which, I believe, will be felt in our foreign office in negotiations with Brazil, or the weakest power we could have transactions with. Such has been the result of building three or four swift sailing vessels! Are we to be told that England is so much cleverer than America in mechanics that she can build ships which America cannot? Read the report laid on the table by Mr. Whitworth when he went to America ten years ago to inquire into its mechanical resources. Nobody who knows the aptitude of the American people for mechanical discoveries will lay claim to any superiority on our part. Do you want an Alabama, a ship that was built neither for war nor for trade—a vessel that can run away from anything or catch anything’? America can produce any number of such vessels. When I went first to America, some twenty years ago, they were running steamers on their rivers at the rate of eighteen miles an hour, a thing unheard of elsewhere. The Americans have never done much in the way of ocean steamers; their specialty is on their rivers and lakes, where we find the swiftest vessels in the world. But is it supposed that because we have more ships-of-war, therefore we are sure, in case of war, to find their cruisers? Perhaps nothing is more difficult, not to say impossible, than to find a ship on the ocean after she has once got out of sight. Nelson himself passed many weeks trying to find a fleet of 500 sail going from France to Egypt. You may find a vessel in a harbor, just as [Page 23] Nelson found the French fleet in the Nile; but even if you should find an American cruiser in a harbor, by your own rules you must allow her to escape, because you say she must have a start of twenty-four hours. [Hear, hear.] It appears to me, on the whole, that the only thing remaining that you can do to conciliate the American people under the cruel losses they have undergone at your hands, is to say that henceforth you will deny hospitality to vessels that have been built in your ports, that have clandestinely left your ports, that have been manned and armed from your ports, because you are convinced that to allow such ships to come back here after committing haVoc upon a friendly nation would be to injure yourselves and endanger your own best interests in the future. [Cheers.]
Lord R. Cecil. The present hour and the present state of the house do not invite discussion, but the speech we have just heard contained a fallacy which I cannot allow to pass without notice. The honorable member for Rochdale has drawn a powerful picture of the evils to which England will be exposed in any war in which she may be engaged hereafter. I do not think he has exaggerated those evils, for I am afraid that, in the event of war, we must reckon upon seeing our mercantile marine harassed on the ocean by-swarms of hostile privateers. But the point which the honorable member has overlooked is the impossibility of our avoiding the evils in store for us by any action we could take now. If by sending the Alabama or the Georgia away we could insure ourselves against the risks which the honorable member has so eloquently painted, I should at once admit that there was great cogency in his arguments; but I cannot conceive how anybody can imagine that, by refusing hospitality to a confederate ship, we could add one iota to the safety of our mercantile marine in any future war. [Hear, hear.]. You say that you desire to set the Americans a good example. Do you mean seriously to tell me that when hostile passions are aroused, when men are driven by their feelings, or still more by what they consider an overwhelming interest, towards a particular line of conduct, they will imitate your example? Do you mean to say that the Americans, who have never been very particular as to how they contend with other nations, who certainly were not very particular in their dealings with us in Canada—do you mean to say that they will care two straws whether we did or did not at some previous period act in a manner which they deemed hostile to themselves? But I will remove the question from this American dispute. Look at what has happened between other nations. Are France and Russia any the less likely to unite now because they hated each other bitterly in 1853 and 1854 ? Are England and Denmark, who hated each other bitterly during the great war, on that account less sympathetic or friendly now? Nations in selecting their policy are not affected by events which may have taken place five, ten, or fifteen years before. Gratitude or indignation may last in the breasts of individuals for so long a period, though even that is a rare phenomenon, but I am.quite sure that you can find in the history of the world no instance in which those feelings have endured so long in the breasts of nations. To go from example to precedent. We have heard a great deal about precedent from both the honorable member for Bradford and the honorable member for Rochdale. They say that we ought to set up a precedent which shall change international law. I confess that sounds to me very strange language. We heard from the attorney general, stated with the greatest eloquence and clearness, what international law is. You say to us, “Don’t keep to that; don’t keep international law as it is, but by the process of healing it make it something else, and your reward for so breaking it shall be, that other nations, instead of breaking it, will keep it, and keep it in the way which will be advantageous to you in future wars.” I confess that that is a process which I don’t think that other nations are very likely to go through. At all events, if they follow our example in nothing else, they will follow our example in the convenient plan of amending international [Page 24] law by the process of breaking it. But there is something more to be said.; You profess neutrality, and I presume that you intend that neutrality to be honest. I presume that even the honorable member for Birmingham, strongly, as he feels upon the subject, will not recommend us to depart from strict neutrality. But can there be a greater breach of neutrality than that you should break international law on the one side and not on the other; that,you should alter international law by so breaking it, and that entirely in favor of one belligerent? And what adds to the peculiar baseness of such a proceeding is, that you are asked to take this course, not because you believe that one side is right and the other wrong, but solely that it may give you an advantage in some future war. I confess that such a mode of dealing with international law appears to me more dishonest and more immoral than anything I ever before heard proposed. The honorable member for Rochdale told us a great deal about the bitter feelings of the inhabitants of the federal States at the losses they have endured. He counted up those losses, and asked us to believe, as we well could, that a race come of the same stock as ourselves would be operated upon more strongly by the bitterness of feeling occasioned by these losses than by any other motive. I thoroughly believe it. I dare say that for many years those nations will feel bitterness towards the nation through whose instrumentality they believe that they have been inflicted. But have there been losses only on one side? [Hear, hear.] Has there been suffering only on one side? [Hear, hear.] And has British aid been given only to onesided I have in my hand a paper which tells a different story, and to the tale which it tells I invite the attention of the house. In the course of the year 1862 there were exported to the federal States rifles and muskets of the value of £546,000, besides 11,947,000, or in round numbers 12,000,000, percussion caps. What the Americans have done with all those caps I cannot imagine. I believe that, according to the most recent authority, they have killed 200,000 confederates. That allows sixty shots for each man killed, which undoubtedly is not very good practice. (Lord It. Montague: “Yes it is.”) My noble friend says that it is. I trust that in any war in which we may be engaged he will wield his weapon with more effect. I cannot pass over the fact which has been stated in this house, and is well known, that the mercantile house which has been mainly instrumental in conveying this enormous assistance to the federals, and effecting this fearful injury upon the confederates, is the house of Baring & Co. Now, I want you to consider the feelings with which the confederates regard these enormous re-enforcements, which have been conveyed by the English people through the hands of Messrs. Baring & Co., in violation of her Majesty’s proclamation of neutrality. [Mr. Cobden: “Not in violation.”] The attorney general is not here to inform us as to the law, and I will adhere to my statement until it is contradicted by some more competent authority. Whether contrary to law or not, it is an enormous assistance conveyed through the house of Messrs. Baring & Co. by the English people to the federals. You have been considering the feelings of the federals. Do you suppose the confederates have no feelings? Do you suppose they do not feel for their rich country desolated, for the enormous injury which has been inflicted upon their industry, for their towns bombarded, for their population slaughtered, and for the fearful trials to, which every class of their people have been exposed 1 And do you suppose that when they learn that all this havoc has been committed through the instrumentality of munitions of war conveyed by English merchants, the bitterness on one side will not be as great as that on the other? If our neutrality is honest, we must regard the bitterness of one side as much as that of the other. I am sure, considering what in the future are likely to be the opportunities of greatness offered to the two divisions into which the American republic is. fast dividing, that we shall have as much cause for regret if we permanently alienate from England the inhabitants of that country which lies to the south of [Page 25] the Potomac as we shall have if we alienate those who inhabit the smaller country which lies to the north of that river. [Hear, hear.] We cannot give too much praise to the very learned and moderate speech of the attorney general, [Hear, hear.] It seemed to me to give an exhaustive and complete statement of the law, comprehensible by the least instructed intellect; and I hope that it will be accepted as an official reply to many fallacies upon this subject which have been current in this country. I will only express my regret that after that speech the honorable member for Rochdale should have repeated the statement that it was proved that the Georgia came out in violation of our neutrality. Why, you have not even got a verdict. It will be time enough to talk about the law being broken when you have got any court of law to pronounce in your favor. The only court which pronounces in your favor is that which sits in your own brains. There is not a ghost of a justification for saying that the Georgia has broken our foreign enlistment act. All the facts are against you. [” No, no !”] It is probably well known to the member for Rochdale that it is quite as much within the international law to sell ships-of-war to another nation as it is to sell any munitions of war. [Hear.] There seems, therefore, to be no ground for the statement that the Georgia has invaded our ports in defiance of our neutrality, and we should ourselves be guilty of a clear breach of neutrality if we shaped our policy on an assumption which cannot be proved either in law or in fact. [Hear, hear.]
Mr. Shaw-Lefevre said that he had listened with great regret to the speech of the attorney general, and especially to his statement that he was not prepared to recommend her Majesty’s government to take either of the courses suggested by the honorable member for Huntingdon. Probably, if the honorable and learned gentleman had paid more attention to the history of America and less to law cases, he would have come to a different conclusion. When in 1793 we remonstrated with the American government against the fitting out of privateers in their ports, they did not say that they had no municipal law to meet the case, and were not bound by international law, but at once passed an act to meet our complaints. The act of 1793 was for a time sufficient for the purpose. He could not find that it was evaded by any privateers during the French war. Shortly afterwards, however, a war broke out between Spain and their colonies, and then a flaw was discovered in the act of Congress, which it should be borne in mind was precisely similar to our act of Parliament. In defiance of the law privateers were despatched from American ports. The course adopted was much the same as that taken by those who, in our own day, fitted out the Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. The vessels were chartered as traders, and received ammunition under the disguise of cargoes of merchandise. When they got out to sea they hoisted their guns put of the hold and mounted them on deck, and displayed the flag of the South American republic. The American government, he was bound to say, did all they could to enforce the law against these cruisers. There were numerous cases in which they were seized and condemned, and there were also cases of prosecution for infringement of the foreign enlistment act. Those measures, however, were not sufficient to repress the evil. Spain and Portugal both remonstrated with the United States for allowing cruisers to be fitted out in their ports; and the complaints which were made bore a striking resemblance to some of those which the federal government had lately addressed to us. The Portuguese government pointed out that the fault was entirely in the insufficient state of the existing law, and urged its amendment. Similar representations were made by the Spanish minister; and even this country and Prance joined in the remonstrances. What was the reply of the United States? They did not say that they had a municipal law, and that no international obligation required them to go beyond it. On the contrary, the President immediately sent a message to Congress, stating that it was essential to the interest and honor of the country that the neutrality should [Page 26] be honestly preserved, and that no opportunity should be given for evasions of the law, and proposing that the law should be revised, with a view to its being rendered more effectual. He should like to see her Majesty’s government in the present juncture adopt the same policy as the government of the United States in 1817. In accordance with the President’s message an act of Congress was proposed, containing two clauses not in the original act, and, he might observe, wanting to our statute, giving collectors of customs authority to detain, to exact bonds from vessels suspected of an intention to engage in hostilities against an ally of the States. There was then, it should be remembered, quite as strong a sympathy in the United States for the South American colonies as prevailed among honorable gentlemen opposite for the southern States of North America. Of course there were objections to the proposed act It was said that it had been brought forward under pressure from foreign powers, and that traders had a right to sell ships if they chose. The United States government replied that they had duties to perform, not to one nation, but to all; that they had listened to the representations of foreign powers only because they deemed them reasonable, and that traders must take care that in their mercantile dealings they did not do anything which was incompatible with the higher interests of the country. [Hear, hear.] He did not hesitate to say that such cases as had occurred in this country could not have taken place under the law of the United States; and he held that we ought to adopt the clauses which had been added to the original American act. He had spoken of the proceedings in 1793; but there was an earlier precedent in 1779. When privateers were fitted out in French ports for the service of the American government, the British government strongly protested against it, and offered France the alternative of checking the practice or going to war. France chose peace, and undertook to dismiss all the privateers from her ports at once. Therefore there were two precedents directly in point, showing what ought to be done in regard to these vessels. It was said that there had been no judicial investigation in connexion with the southern cruisers, but that was because they escaped from this country before any trial could be instituted. He did not suppose that any one could doubt that these vessels were built in violation of our neutrality, and he hoped the government would entertain the proposals suggested by the honorable member for Huntingdon. [Hear.]
Lord R. Montague said there could be no doubt either as to the bias of the honorable member’s sympathies or the source of his inspiration. Instead of availing himself of the authentic sources of information in this country, he had gone for facts and arguments to the American papers laid on the table of Congress. The honorable member for Rochdale had proved conclusively that the trade of the northern States had been considerably diminished; but his speech was like a bridge without a keystone. The honorable gentleman had omitted to show how we were responsible for the injury which American commerce had sustained since the war began. Not only had the southern States manufactured a navy, but they had beaten the federal ships which had long ridden the sea so completely that the latter were now fain to avoid the conflict [Hear, hear.] How were we to blame for that? Should we have done anything to prevent the south from sending their ships to sea, or have refused to them that hospitality which our neutrality bound us to concede equally to both sides? [Hear, hear.] The attorney general had pointed out that as yet the southern States were not recognized by us, and that, consequently, we had no legal channel for those communications which might otherwise have been addressed to them. The federal government had themselves prevented us from communicating with the south, and had declined to permit a British man-of-war to proceed to one of the southern ports. The honorable member said the Florida was a privateer. That was not the case, for a privateer was an armed merchant vessel, which, whenever opportunity offered, plundered enemy’s property; but the [Page 27] Florida carried no cargo, and was a commissioned man-of-war. He did not think, as the honorable member seemed to believe, that if England altered her law Russia would not send privateers to sea to plunder English property in case of war with this country.
Mr. Alderman Rose believed that the definition of the law contained in the attorney general’s admirable speech was correct. The honorable member for Rochdale had described the amount of shipping lost by the United States, but the honorable member might also have adverted to the loss of all liberty and credit in that country; and it seemed that the period was not far distant when England would have to recognize the southern States.