Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.
Sir: The publication of the diplomatic papers annexed to the President’s message has elicited much comment in Parliament and in the newspapers, upon your instructions to me, in your No. 651, of the 11th of July last, and particularly that portion of them which declared the intention of the government, under certain contingencies, to enter English ports and seize obnoxious vessels. In my No. 593, of last week, I pointed out to your attention the observations of Lord Derby on that subject, on the opening night in the House of Lords. Remarks of a similar kind have since been made in the Commons. I now transmit a copy of the Times of yesterday, containing a report of the replies made by the ministry in both houses to these questions.
It is, perhaps, unfortunate that, when you decided on publishing these instructions, you did not at the same time insert, at least, so much of my No. 465, of the 31st of July, as would have explained the reason why they were not acted upon at the time by me. For want of that light, it has been generally assumed here that I took the responsibility of suppressing them altogether. The inference is that I assumed to judge them unsuitable, or else was afraid to present them. In point of fact, you may remember that on the very same day of their date I had anticipated them, for the most part, by presenting to Lord Russell a note embracing much of the arguments contained in your despatch. This you did me the honor to notice, in flattering terms, in your later despatch, No. 667, of the 29th of July. The only question then left open was upon the expediency of addressing a new note to Lord Russell for the single purpose of introducing the particular notification which has given rise to the present discussion. For the reasons given in my despatch No. 465, already referred to, I thought it inexpedient at that late moment to reopen the subject. My intention then was to postpone it until the final answer should be made to the remonstrances against the departure of the iron-clads. But when that moment arrived, which was on the reception of Lord Russell’s note of the 1st of September, I felt so fearful that the declaration of that intention would close all further possibility of preserving the peace between the two countries, that I preferred to take the other course indicated in my reply of the 5th, which was, while intimating the strong character of my instructions, to propose to await new ones adapted to the precise emergency rather than to declare them. As matters actually turned, this proceeding seems to have been fortunate; for whilst the general statement in my note left on this government the impression that war might be the alternative in contemplation, the language took no such specific shape as to compel it to resent it as a threat. Even as it was, however, you may recollect that I have expressed to you my regret at the circumstance that [Page 167] my note had passed out of my hands so immediately before I received Lord Russell’s note of the 4th, which was then on its way from the foreign office, and which prefigured a more auspicious termination of the dispute.
I have gone into this, perhaps needless, exposition of the circumstances attending this affair, not because I feel that it does me any particular injury here. On the contrary, the effect is to raise my action in the British estimation rather more than it deserves, or I altogether relish. Nothing is more unsafe to a diplomatic, agent than an approach to a false position between two governments. Had this risk been brought upon me by any proceedings on this side, I should feel anxious to do something at once to restore matters to a proper footing. As it is, the accident has happened by reason of the authorized publication of the facts in America. I trust that there, at least, no unworthy inferences from the language held here may gain currency from the absence of explanations on this side of the water.
One incidental good effect of this outburst in Parliament is, that the ministers, having been attacked upon a point upon which they are able to make a clear and conclusive reply, are, to a great extent, relieved from the necessity of defending themselves on other matters. In comparison these appear trifling. The growing complications in Germany divert attention from them more and more. It is now left scarcely doubtful that the disintegration of Denmark is the cardinal point of the policy of the great powers. Even if successful, it is impossible that this can be gained without a severe shock to the future relations of the governments of Europe. Hence it is that new views may be taken here of the proper conduct towards America.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State.