Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.
Sir: Your despatch of December 31 (No. 564) has been received and submitted to the President.
I thank you for calling my attention to the significant declaration, in a leading British journal, that, as for Great Britain, in regard to the two greatest risks and largest fields of danger, her securities are of a very opposite character—that she depends upon peace in Europe, and war in America: upon war in America, because it is only too probable that a restoration of the national authority here, upon any terms, would be immediately followed by what are described as “most preposterous” demands upon Great Britain.
That the policy which her Majesty’s government have thought proper to pursue in regard to the insurrection existing in this country has resulted in producing many grave claims on behalf of our citizens is a fact which manifestly appears in the diplomatic records of both countries. That these claims are sustained here by a deep and pervading popular conviction of their justice is apparent to all who weigh, however carelessly, the daily utterances of the organs of public opinion. It is, indeed, a question of deep interest to both countries, whether this condition of things will generate, when our domestic peace shall have been restored, a policy of unreasonable and litigious exactions upon the British government. We may safely refer to our correspondence with her Majesty’s government to prove that the government of the United States does not desire such disturbed relations as a consequence of our war, while, if it be not disrespectful, I may add, that we are satisfied that her Majesty’s government sincerely deprecates it. I do not apprehend, therefore, that the British government will take or pursue the policy indicated in the quarter to which I have alluded, with a view to a prolongation of our civil war. That war has its evils and dangers for Great Britain, and for Europe, as well as for the United States, and for the American continent. Whatever errors or misconceptions may have heretofore prevailed in Europe in regard to the causes of the insurrection, and the freedom of this government from responsibility to the country and to man kind for its existence, and even for its duration, those errors and misapprehensions are now speedily clearing away, and it is daily becoming more apparent that the insurrection has derived its main support from European sympathies, and rests all its future hopes upon European and and recognition. I may even go further, and say that the British realm and British provinces already are seen to be the bases of the naval war which the insurgents affect to wage against our country; and that British capital and British seamen are seen to constitute the chief resource and strength of the pretended belligerent. I should not distrust the ultimate judgment of the British nation in our favor, and against its own government, if that government should pursue henceforth a policy calculated to protract the unhappy contest. Nor will I do the government any more [Page 99] than the nation so great a wrong as to believe that it could deliberately lend itself to any system of administration that would be calculated to injure or endanger the safety, peace, and welfare of a kindred and friendly nation.
The President has never failed to forecast the dangers of alienation between Great Britain and the United States, arising out of their civil war and surviving it; hence the earnestness of his increasing remonstrances against the concession of belligerent rights, and the continuance of that concession; hence his willingness to hear, and his promptness in seeking to adjust, the reasonable claims of British subjects, and meet the just; expectations of her Majesty’s government; hence the cheerfulness with which he has hastened to negotiate treaties designed to settle even difficulties which existed before the war, and to change early policies that favored discord between the two countries. It is his purpose to pursue this course to the end of his administration, and so far as it shall be possible, to impress upon the habitual policy of the government a friendly and even fraternal disposition towards Great Britain, so that the two nations may go on harmoniously together, favoring everywhere the development of just principles of free, responsible government, and the progress of a humane civilization, especially in Central and Southern America, and in the portions of the eastern world now being reopened to western commerce.
The pursuit of this policy is not unattended by many embarrassments. Nothing but military disasters, not now apprehended, could induce the American people to believe themselves incompetent to grapple with all the foreign dangers incident to the fullest assertion of their rights, and a full redress of their wrongs, while, like every other nation, they naturally view these rights and wrongs under the influence of self-esteem, perhaps not altogether free from prejudices disparaging to other nations; nevertheless, the policy is practicable, and may be successfully established. They are only superficial observers who assume that the United States are a litigious and contentious nation, and who reason from that assumption that, when they shall have gained the blessings of internal peace, they will be found impatient for aggressive foreign war. I know that we have such interpreters in our public press; but they reason from the excitement of the present hour, not from the normal temperament of the American people. We have a continent to bring forward to a higher state of development and civilization than even Europe and the United States have yet attained We have need to extend throughout the World a foreign commerce, which is an inevitable outgrowth of our internal commerce. We have institutions of self-government to maintain. These are most effectually maintained by commending them to the favorable opinion of mankind, and they can be so commended by showing that, in their practical operation, they do not instigate violence either at home or abroad, but are conservative of law, order, and universal peace.
But it is manifestly needful to the success of the President’s policy that a corresponding spirit shall direct the action of the British government during the period which shall intervene before our domestic peace is restored.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.