No. 1.

Mr. Mason to Earl Russell.—(Received Marck 2.)

My Lord: I have the honor to transmit herewith to your lordship, as her Majesty’s secretary of state for foreign affairs, a copy of a despatch from the secretary of state of the Confederate States of America, bearing date December 10, 1862, which was received by me on the 25th of February ultimo.

I do this, as your lordship will perceive, pursuant to instructions at the close of the despatch, directing me to furnish a copy to your lordship at the earliest moment.

I avail myself of the occasion to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship’s letter of the 19th of February ultimo, in reply to mine of the 16th, respecting the blockade of the ports of Galveston and Charleston; and also of your lordship’s letter of the 27th of February, in reply to mine of the 18th of that month.

The contents of both shall be communicated, as soon as practicable, to the government at Richmond.

I have, &c.,

J. M. MASON.
[Enclosure in No. 1.]

Mr. Benjamin to Mr. Mason.

Sir: The recently published correspondence between the cabinets of France Great Britain, and Russia indicates that the period is fast approaching when the dictates of reason, justice, and humanity will be respected, and our undoubted right to recognition as an independent nation be acknowledged. This recognition must, in the nature of things, be followed by a speedy peace.

The consideration of the effects which will be produced by this event on the commercial relations of the confederacy evokes deep solicitude, and it becomes my duty to commuicate to you the instructions of your government on this important subject.

It is necessary to keep in view the very exceptional condition in which the present war has placed the Confederate States, in order to form a just estimate of the probable results of the renewal of peaceful relations between the belligerents.

The almost total cessation of external commerce for the last two years has produced the complete exhaustion of the supply of all articles of foreign growth and manufacture, and it is but a moderate computation to estimate the imports into the confederacy at $300,000,000 for the first six months which will ensue after the treaty of peace. The articles which will meet with most [Page 774] ready sale, (and in enormous quantities,) as soon as our country is open to commerce, are textile fabrics, whether of wool, cotton, or flax; iron and steel, and articles manufactured therefrom in all their varieties; leather and manufactures of leather, such as shoes, boots, saddlery, harness, &c.; clothing of all kinds; glass; crockery; the products of the vine, whether wines, brandies, or liquors; silk and all fabrics of silk; hats, caps, &c.; the large class of commodities known as “articles de Paris;” the “comestibles” of France, including not only preserved meats, game, and fish, but fruits, vegetables, confectionery, and sweetmeats; salt; drugs; chemicals; stationery; manufactures of brass, lead, pewter, tin; together with an innumerable variety of other articles of less importance.

In exchange for these importations, we have to offer the cotton, tobacco, and naval stores accumulated in the confederacy. They are of much larger value, even at half their present prices, than the amount of importations estimated as above for the first six months; indeed, I feel confident that at one-third the present Europea nprices for our staples, we have exchangeable value for whole $300,000,000 in these three enumerated articles, independently of rice, ship timber, and other productions of the field and forest. It must, however, be admitted as not improbable that a considerable quantity of these accumulated products may be destroyed by us, in order to avoid their seizure by the enemy, in such portions of the country as may become readily accessible to their gunboats, during the approaching season of high water. This necessity is imposed on us, as you are aware, by the fact that the troops of the United States pay no respect to private property, even of neutrals or non-combatants, but appropriate to themselves every article of movable property that they can reach in any part of the country.

Notwithstanding the exasperation of feeling against the United States now prevalent in the confederacy, no statesman can fail to perceive that on the restoration of peace the commercial intercourse between the present belligerents must necessarily be placed on such a basis as to accord to each other the same terms and conditions as are accorded to friendly nations in general. It is scarcely to be supposed that a treaty of peace could be concluded that should leave it optional to either party to wage a war of hostile tariffs, or special restrictions against the other; nor would such a state of things be desirable, if possible, for it would be manifestly incompatible with the maintenance of permanent peaceful relations. It must be conceded, therefore, that the final cessation of hostilities will open to the United States access to the markets of the confederacy, as free as that which may be conceded to European nations in general.

In view of this condition of affairs, it is not difficult to predict the probable results on the commerce of the confederacy, which will immediately be developed unless prevented by some counteracting influence:

1. The first consequence to be anticipated is that our land will be pervaded by agents of the northern merchants, who will monopolize those products of the south from which Europe has been so long debarred, and which are so needful to its prosperity. The cotton, tobacco, and naval stores of the south will be come at once the prize of northern cupidity, and will only reach Europe after having paid heavy profits to these forestallers.

Nor will the amount of the profits exacted be the only loss entailed on Europe. The purchase of the raw material at lower cost would give to the manufacturers of New England an advantage over their European rivals much more important than the mere original excess of outlay to which the latter would be subjected.

2. Such are the necessities of our people, and so eager will be their desire to avail themselves of the first opportunity for procuring commodities which they have cheerfully foregone as long as privation was the price of liberty, that it will be nearly impossible to prevent the enormous demand for necessary supplies [Page 775] from being satisfied almost exclusively by the north, which will avail itself of its close proximity to preoccupy so inviting a field of richly remunerative commerce.

3. The current of trade will thus, at the very outset of our career, continue to flow in its ancient channels, which will ever be deepened; and our commerce with Europe, instead of becoming direct, to mutual advantage, as we have for years desired, will remain tributary to an intermediary. The difficulty of diverting trade from an established channel has become proverbial, and in our case the difficulty would be enhanced by the causes just indicated.

These contingencies cannot be contemplated without deep concern. During the whole period of the existence of the southern States, their pursuits have been almost exclusively agricultural: they possess scarcely the semblance of a commercial marine, nor can they hope to acquire one sufficient for the exchange of their products till after the lapse of a number of years; and a still longer period must intervene before they can expect to provide by their own manufacture, a supply of many articles of necessary consumption. In addition to the difficulties necessarily inherent, under any circumstances, in the task of creating the navigation and the manufactures required for a population of over ten millions of people, there exist in the south obstacles resulting from the education, habits, tastes, and interests of its citizens. For generations they have been educated to prefer agricultural to other pursuits, and this preference owes its origin to the fertility of their soil and the genial influences of their climate, which render those pursuits not only more attractive to their tastes, but more lucrative than those of the manufacturer or the seaman. It is certain, therefore, that for many years the carrying trade of the confederacy, both foreign and coastwise, will be conducted, and its supplies of manufactured articles will be furnished, by foreign countries in exchange for the products of its soil.

It is the most earnest desire of this government and people that a commerce so large and profitable as that which they tender to mankind shall not be monopolized by the United States, and that a direct trade with Europe shall furnish to us all articles the growth or manufacture of that continent. They are all well aware that, from proximity, the northern States possess a natural advantage over any European rival for much of our trade; but the value of their political independence would, in their estimation, be greatly impaired if the result of the war should leave them in commercial dependence, by giving to those States the additional enormous advantages arising out of the present exceptional condition of the south. Unless some preventive measures be adopted, the exchanges of the south for staples accumulated during the two years of the war will be practically effected during the first two months of peace, and will inure to the almost exclusive benefit of that power whose wicked aggressions have already entailed so much misery and distress, not only on ourselves, but on the rest of the civilized world.

It is scarcely possible to refrain from the reflection, that consequences so hostile to the interests of Europe, as well as our own, have been produced by a policy, on the part of certain European powers, in disregard of the plainest dictates of international law, as well as of implied promises to ourselves. If Europe had asserted its unquestioned right to resist a predatory cruise carried on against its commerce on 3,000 miles of our coast by the ships of the United States, under pretext of a blockade of our ports, we should not now be engaged in an effort to avert the disastrous effects to European interests which must be anticipated from the causes above pointed out. Our markets would not now be denuded of all supplies of European commodities, and, on the restoration pf peace, the north would possess, in the competition for our commerce, none .of the abnormal advantages which we now seek to neutralize. It is far from our purpose, in the expression of this view, to indulge in vain recrimination, but the suggestion is made in the hope that neutral nations will be induced, not only by a regard to their own interests, but by the higher obligations of justice and [Page 776] duty, to co-operate in the endeavor to obviate any further ill effects of a policy which experience now justifies us in pronouncing to have been at least unwise.

What are the practical measures which can be devised for this purpose? What can be done to prevent consequences which we frankly avow would be considered by us as a national calamity, as well as a source of deep mortification? The difficulties are great, but not, perhaps, insurmountable, especially if you can succeed in exciting the solicitude of the court to which you are accredited, and awakening it to the magnitude of the interests of neutral nations involved in the subject. It is one which our position has forced upon our attention, and which it is not unnatural to suppose has been considered by us with more care than by those less intimately conversant with the state of our affairs on this side of the Atlantic. Without, therefore, restricting you as to the adoption of any other measures that may be proposed, or may occur to your mind, you are instructed to urge the different points which I now proceed to suggest:

1. In order to prevent the monopoly by the northern States of the accumulated staples now held by our people, no measure seems less objectionable, nor more appropriate, than to encourage the merchants of neutral nations to purchase in advance these products, and to leave them here in depot till the ports are opened. This course would already have been adopted to a very considerable extent, (as I am aware from numerous applications made to this department,) if the staples thus purchased could be guaranteed against destruction by the respective belligerents. The remedy for this seems to be very simple, and entirely within the reach of neutral powers, but they have hitherto, for reasons doubtless satisfactory to themselves, but which we are unable to conjecture, declined to adopt it.

The case stands thus. In the language of Mr. Phillimore, “There is no more unquestionable proposition of international law than the proposition that neutral states are entitled to carry on upon their own account, a trade with a belligerent.” The United States, however, do not concern themselves with unquestionable propositions of international law, nor have they even affected, during the present war, to refrain from any exercise of power against neutrals which seemed to offer the slightest momentary advantage. General Butler still continues to imprison and rob indiscriminately foreign merchants and native citizens of New Orleans; and in no place where the forces of the United States penetrate is there a moment’s hesitation in appropriating any neutral property to their use. This universal robbery by the enemy of all private property forced upon this government the necessity of destroying everything movable, as fast as it became exposed to imminent danger of pillage. In this state of the case the department was addressed by agents of foreign merchants, desirous of purchasing our staples, and storing them until peace should be restored, with the request that special instructions should be given to exempt from such destruction the property thus purchased. This government could have no possible motive for destroying neutral property, but every dictate of policy counselled, on the contrary, that we should protect it. We could not consent, however, that neutral property should be seized by the enemy and converted to its use; for we would thus have been supplying him with the means of continuing hostilities against ourselves. The effect of such action on our part may be readily illustrated. Cotton is worth at least $200 a bale, in specie, in the United States, and not more than one-fifth of that sum in the confederacy. Thus, on the supposition that only 100,000 bales of cotton belonging to neutrals should be seized and appropriated by the United States, they would be provided with $20,000,000 in specie, and if called on to respond in damages by neutral powers, would seek to escape responsibility, and perhaps succeed in so doing, by reimbursing to the neutral owners, after some years of diplomatic correspondence, the fifth of that sum, as being the value of [Page 777] the cotton at the time and place of its seizure. The simplest instincts of self-defence required us to defeat such machinations; and this department therefore made answer to the applications of neutral merchants, that this government would protect their property against destruction upon receiving any satisfactory assurance from their own governments that the property would be effectually protected against seizure and appropriation by the enemy, if it fell into his hands. This answer seems to have been submitted to the government of her Britannic Majesty by different British consuls, and to have elicited a reply, to which extensive publicity was given. This reply, dated the 10th of August, 1862, and signed by her Britannic Majesty’s chargé d’affaires at Washington, is confined to an acknowledgment of the right of this government to act in the manner already mentioned, but omits giving to British subjects any assurance of protection against spoliation by the United States. No action on the subject has been taken by any other neutral power, if we are fully informed, and the whole matter seems res integra, so far as the present inquiry is concerned, for it is impossible to interpret the mere silence of the British cabinet on this point as an abandonment of the right of protecting British subjects against unlawful spoliation.

2. In order to prevent the United States from preoccupying, for their exclusive benefit the market for foreign merchandise which the south will present as soon as peace is declared, several suggestions occur.

It would, in the first place, seem not to be impracticable for the several European governments, pending the negotiations which must necessarily precede the final settlement of the terms of a treaty, to devise some means for communicating in advance, to their merchants, the assured conviction of an early renewal of commerce with the confederacy, and to encourage the formation in their West India colonies of large depots of the supplies known to be needed here ready for immediate introduction into the confederacy. Such measures, accompanied by the necessary arrangements for the speediest transmission to these depots of the news of the opening of commerce, would aid, to some extent, in the accomplishment of the objects desired. A large number of the merchant ships required for the transportation of these supplies would also meet with ready sale in the ports of the confederacy, especially if screw steamers suitable for future direct trade with Europe, or for government transport-ships. And the efficiency of this measure would be greatly increased if accompanied by the prompt operation of one or more lines of steamers between European and southern ports.

But the only effective remedy for preventing northern monopoly, and for neutralizing the unjust advantages which the United States, at the expense of Europe, would seek to secure from their violent infractions of international law, would be to place the confederacy in the same condition relative to foreign supplies as was occupied by it prior to the declaration of the blockade of the entire coast—a declaration which for the first time in history has been respected as legal by neutral powers. To this end, no measure seems better adapted than that proposed by his Imperial Majesty of France to the cabinets of Great Britain and Eussia in the correspondence already adverted to. An armistice for six months, “during which every act of war, direct or indirect, should provisionally cease, on sea as well as on land,” would give to European powers that opportunity which justice demands for placing within the confederacy the supplies, and making the purchases that would long since have been effected but for the unjust interference by the United States with neutral rights, and thus enforce against that aggressive power the rule of universal equity that none shall be allowed to profit by their own misdeeds. Neutral nations would thus be reintegrated in the possession of their “unquestionable” right to “trade for their own account with a belligerent,” and upon the final cessation of hostilities would enter into the competition for our trade, then open to the [Page 778] world, upon conditions approximating equality with the north, a result eminently desirable for the common interests of all, and scarcely attainable in any other manner.

Even if the blockade were continued during an armistice, the object desired could be greatly promoted. The cessation of our foreign commercial intercourse has been caused, not by the blockade of our ports, but by a general cruise on the coast against all neutral commerce, and the seizure of neutral vessels bound to points where not a blockading vessel was stationed. We have now numerous ports where there is not a single blockading vessel, but no neutral trader dares sail for them for fear of capture on the high seas by the federal cruisers. If Europe, even at this late date, would put an effectual stop to this outrage on its rights of trade with a belligerent, we would soon be so well supplied with her manufactures, and she would obtain so large a supply of our staples, as would effectually deprive the north of the profits it hopes to reap by the unprecedentd acquiescence of all nations in its interdict against their trade with us. In the event of an armistice, the cruise against neutral vessels could not, of course be continued, even if the blockade were respected in ports where a blockading force is stationed.

You are instructed to furnish a copy of this despatch to her Britannic Majesty’s secretary of state for foreign affairs at the earliest moment.

I have, &c.,

J. P. BENJAMIN.