I have taken the necessary measures to obtain a conference with Lord
Russell on the subjects referred to in Nos. 759, 760, and 761. On
reflection, I prefer to adopt this course, in the first place, rather
than that by writing, more especially as another subject has arisen,
having an intimate relation to the main question in agitation, and not
unlikely to effect the decision to which the British government will
ultimately come.
It is now more than a fortnight since I received private and confidential
advices from a person at Sheerness, that one of several war steamers,
which had been lately sold by the British government, was remaining at
that place, refitting, under the direction of persons connected with the
royal dockyards, in a manner which created in him a strong suspicion
that she was intended for an illegal purpose. The communication was of a
kind that I could not use in any official way; but I conferred with Mr.
Morse on the subject, and with his aid procured other information,
strongly confirming the idea that the vessel was intended for the
rebels, though nothing of a kind positive enough to base any
representation upon to the British government. It is not improbable that
the parties concerned got wind of the inquiries that were making, for
they suddenly determined upon pushing the vessel out of the harbor, in
spite of the fact that she was by no means prepared for sea, and had no
adequate force to man her;
[Page 4]
indeed,
the workmen engaged in refitting here were actually carried out, and
were found still busy when she was brought to at Calais, on the other
side of the channel. Here the rebel flag was hoisted at once, and the
vessel christened the “Rappahannock,” with the view of obtaining the
recognition of the French government. A number of officers and men were
also then put on board, sufficient to constitute an appearance of a
crew. The trick has succeeded thus far, but the vessel is as yet
entirely unfit for sea, and will need much time and contrivance to
secure an equipment, manning, and armament. Had the government of the
United States a sufficient naval force in European waters she could
scarcely hope to escape capture, together with the tenders and the
Harriet Pinckney, which are evidently relied on to complete the
operation; as it is, the chances are rather in her favor.
Although entirely without any technical evidence upon which to rest a
remonstrance, I considered the case so peculiar as to justify me in
making a representation to the British government, merely on the
strength of a statement of facts presented by Mr. Morse. I have the
honor to transmit copies of my note to Lord Russell of the 28th, and of
Mr. Morse’s letter to me of the same date. A copy of the reply of his
lordship on the 30th accompanies them.
I have confidential information, but which I cannot use, that leads me to
believe that high officers of the navy, attached to the yard at
Sheerness, have been privy to this fraud. If the government is faithful
to its duty of investigation, this cannot fail to appear. From the tone
of the leader in Wednesday’s Times on the subject, a copy of which I
transmit, I infer that some action or other against the rebel agents is
contemplated.
Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &.
[Enclosures.]
1. Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, November 28, 1863.
2. Mr. Morse to Mr. Adams, November 28, 1863.
3. Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, November 30, 1863.
4. Leader from the Times, December 2, 1863.
Mr. Adams to Earl Russell.
Legation of the United
States,
London,
November 28,
1863.
Mr. Adams, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of
the United States, presents his compliments to the Right Hon.
Earl Russell, her Majesty’s principal secretary of state for
foreign affairs, and it is with great regret that he feels
compelled to call his lordship’s attention to another instance
of the violation of the neutrality of her Majesty’s territory by
the agents of the insurgents of the United States. The substance
of the information which Mr. Adams has received will be found in
a letter from the Hon. Freeman H. Morse, consul of the United
States for this port, a copy of which he has the honor to submit
to his lordship’s consideration.
It appears that the vessel which has gone out in an unfinished
state from Sheerness is one which has lately been sold from her
Majesty’s navy. She is not yet in a condition to go to sea,
being neither armed nor manned. Mr. Adams hopes that it is not
true that any of the people in her Majesty’s employ
[Page 5]
have been engaged in the
work of fitting her out. He has the strongest reasons for
believing that two vessels which have just put into Plymouth,
one a steamer called the Harriet Pinckney, the other a sailing
vessel called the bark Agrippina, may be charged with the
materials for the armament, and possibly with a portion of the
crews.
Mr. Adams will probably be able to obtain further and more exact
information in a day or two. In the mean while he has thought it
best to lose no time in making a representation. Not doubting
the disposition of her Majesty’s government to do justice in the
premises, as well in the rectification of any abuses that may
have been committed by persons in her Majesty’s service, as in
the prevention of the ultimate success of this audacious
enterprise, Mr. Adams prays Earl Russell to accept the
assurances of his highest consideration.
Mr. Morse to Mr. Adams.
United States
Consulate,
London,
November 28,
1863.
Sir: The confederate steamer
Rappahannock, reported this morning at Calais, France, was her
Majesty’s steamer Victor, recently sold out of the government
service. She has until recently been at Sheerness, opposite the
government dockyard, and has been prepared for sea, and for
active service, so far as she was prepared, when she left
suddenly at midnight, by laborers many of whom were employed at
the government dockyard at that place. A party of riggers was on
board when she left, at work on her. Her rigging was not then
ratted down. These riggers were from the government yard, and I
am informed that these men were selected and sent off to the
Victor by the master rigger at the dock. Also that the masts of
her Majesty’s ship Cumberland were used as shears to set the
masts of the Victor, then called the Scylla and now the
Rappahannock, and that other petty officers at the government
yard have been employed to engage men and render other service
to this privateer. In fact, that she was being prepared for
service with the greatest secrecy and despatch, as a confederate
privateer, under the cover and protection which her former
ownership, proximity to the yard while being fitted out, and the
employment of hands from the yard, threw around her.
She went off in quite an incomplete state, and would not have
gone for some days but for the fact that the government here, as
is supposed, became suspicious from some cause that materials
from the yard had been used in repairing and fitting her, and
ordered a search to ascertain the truth of the story. In a few
hours after, she left suddenly, near midnight on the morning of
Wednesday, the 25th instant, in tow of the tug-boat Bull Dog.
She came to anchor near the Tongue light, lay there a short
time, and then went to Calais.
The above facts, with many others of equal importance, I expect
to make good by sworn affidavits, from responsible men, and will
do so as soon as possible.
I do not mean to intimate by anything said above that the British
government, or any officer of position connected with it, had
any suspicion that they were selling a government war ship into
the confederate service, and lending one of their dockyards as a
protection to fit her out as a privateer to be used against our
commerce. I think they have been deceived by agents of the
confederates, and will be ready and anxious to act with more
than their usual energy to remedy the evil.
Your obedient servant,
F. H. MORSE, United States
Consul.
Hon. C. F. Adams, &c., &c., &c.
[Page 6]
Earl Russell to Mr. Adams.
Foreign
Office,
November 30,
1863.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge
the receipt of your note, dated the 28th instant, but which was
only delivered at the foreign office a few minutes before 4
o’clock on the following day, Sunday, respecting the case of a
vessel described in the letter from the United States consul in
London, enclosed in your note, as the confederate, steamer
Rappahannock, formerly her Majesty’s ship Victor, recently sold
out of the government service; and calling attention also to two
vessels named the Harriet Pinckney and the Agrippina, which have
put into Plymouth, and which you believe may be charged with the
materials for the armament of the Rappahannock, and possibly
with a portion of the crew.
I have to acquaint you that the attention of the proper
department of her Majesty’s government has been directed without
loss of time to the statements made by you, and by the United
States consul in this matter; and Lord Russell has no doubt that
immediate steps will be taken to verify the truth of these
statements.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your
most obedient, humble servant,
Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c.,
&c
[From Wednesday’s Times.]
In the course of the late argument on the foreign enlistment act
many hypothetical cases were framed, by way of testing various
theories of its construction. It has happened, by a curious and
untoward coincidence, that one of these imaginary problems has
just received a practical illustration. The case supposed was
that of a ship built and equipped for war without any intention
of violating the act, and afterwards passing through the hands
of neutral purchasers into those of a belligerent government. It
was admitted that such a transaction, being purely mercantile in
all its essential features, would be perfectly legitimate,
though it could hardly be denied that, if repeated too
frequently, it might be open to exception, and lead to the very
consequences deprecated by the legislature. While the decision
on the seizure of the Alexandra are still pending, the
combination of circumstances thus suggested has been realized in
fact. A screw gun-vessel, called the Victor, of 859 tons burden
and 350 horse-power, was sold by direction of the admiralty. She
had been constructed, of course, for our own navy, and, besides
being pierced for six guns, was, no doubt, adapted in all
respects for the purposes of warfare. We are told that certain
defects in the engines affecting her rate of steaming were the
principal reasons for parting with her. She was bought
ostensibly for the China trade, and having been named the
Scylla, was allowed to be repaired and fitted with this object
under the superintendence of the dockyard officials at Chatham.
Certain facts, of which the particulars are not given, came to
the knowledge of these authorities, and were reported by them to
the admiralty. Orders were eventually despatched to Sheerness
directing her to be stopped, but she had quitted the harbor and
sailed a few hours before, unfinished, and with a number of
workmen on board. She forthwith hoisted the confederate flag,
changed her name to the Rappahannock, and soon anchored safely
in Calais harbor. There she was detained by the French
custom-house; but it appears that express instructions have
since been received from headquarters permitting her to leave
the port at pleasure.
We must reserve our opinion on the conduct of our own officers at
Chatham
[Page 7]
and Sheerness
until the special report of the case, which has already been
forwarded to the admiralty, shall have been laid before the
public. In the mean time it is much to be lamented that, after
their suspicions had once been aroused, it was possible for the
vessel to slip through their hands. The Alabama escaped by a
similar ruse, executed with the utmost
skill and secrecy, but such mishaps ought not to occur twice,
and very good reasons will have to be given for the delay which
caused the order of embargo to arrive just too late. On the
other hand, it would be folly to doubt for a moment that the
admiralty acted throughout in perfect good faith. Even if our
government had not been engaged, at much risk to their
popularity, in maintaining the forfeiture of the Alexandra, the
notion of their wilfully manufacturing vessels of war for the
confederates would be utterly absurd. No one has ever pretended
that proceedings of that kind are consistent with neutrality, or
that the liberty of commerce which has been claimed for private
ship-builders can be conceded to a state in its public capacity.
Some time ago a case in which the Swedish government was
concerned came under discussion in our columns. Remonstrances
were made at Stockholm by one belligerent against the sale by
Sweden to the other belligerent of some old vessels-of-war, and
the justice of the objection was admitted. To adopt the contrary
principle would be to make the workmen in our dockyards the
mercenaries of a foreign power, and the naval resources of Great
Britain an instrument of aggression against states in amity with
us. For the sake of our own dignity, if better motives were
wanting, we could not tolerate this, and we may be sure that it
is the very last thing which the government would sanction. The
difficulty is to prevent it in an exceptional instance like the
present. Suppose the Victor, being unsuited for her original
purpose, was sold to a respectable English firm, and transferred
by them, at a high profit, to confederate agents. How is it
possible for the admiralty to look beyond the first purchaser
and to control the ultimate destination of the vessel? As it
happened, certain repairs were needed, and the privilege of
using the national dockyards was conceded to the new owners.
This gave the admiralty a power which they would not otherwise
have had, and which they were about to exercise when they found
themselves outwitted. Apart from this incident of the business,
the trick which has been played could not have been anticipated.
There is nothing strange in the proposal to convert a man-of-war
into a merchant vessel. We have only to read the evidence as to
the equipment of the Alexandra to learn how slight are the
differences in structure between the two. Greater solidity, more
or less height in the bulwarks, the addition of ringbolts or
hammock nettings, the being pierced with bow ports—such are the
trifling indications which, interpreted by a sailor’s eye,
distinguish the hull of the frigate from that of the
“frigate-built” merchantman. Yet it is notorious that some
Indiamen possess both hammock nettings and bow ports, and even
carry their bowsprits at that peculiar angle which is, perhaps,
more characteristic of a “Queen’s ship” than the symptoms we
have mentioned. If second-hand men-of-war are not oftener bought
up for the merchant service, it is because the admiralty
generally find what they consider a profitable use for them so
long as their timbers are sound. Moreover, it is only for long
voyages and certain kinds of traffic that vessels of such costly
materials and workmanship are in request among ship-owners.
Aware of this, the parties who negotiated for the Victor took
care to specify the China trade as that for which she was
intended, and might have taken her across to Calais at once, if
they had kindly selected that as their port of departure in the
first instance.
While, therefore, we heartily regret this evasion, we regard it
as one of those which must and will be practiced from time to
time so long as the war last in America and we remain neutral.
It is not to be expected that the confederates will see their
enemies supplied with arms and munitions of war from this
country without trying to compensate themselves in the readiest
way. No doubt we can justify ourselves by conclusive arguments
for prohibiting the
[Page 8]
equipment of ships under penalties, though we leave the export
of contraband articles in general to be checked by the hostile
right of seizure. No doubt we can draw sound as well as subtle
distinctions between building a vessel for sale to the highest
bidder, selling it ready made, and equipping it to order, with a
knowledge of its destination. These are important, if not
essential, safeguards of neutrality; but it is too much to hope
that they will be scrupulously respected by a belligerent whose
coasts are blockaded. The confederates feel, and with some
justice, that the impartial application of international law by
us is injurious in its actual effect upon them, and increases
the inequality of the struggle in which they are engaged. Men in
this state of mind do not stick at trifles, and may be pitied,
though they cannot be excused, when they combat force with
fraud, and sometimes deceive their friends to injure their foes.
Nations are not always jealous of their own honor, but they are
seldom particular about that of their neighbors. The probability
of our becoming involved in a quarrel with the federals about
the Alabama or the Victor is not a consideration which would
deter a confederate agent from defeating our foreign enlistment
act if he could. This is not his affair, but it is ours; and
duty requires us to look at it from our own point of view. Let
the confederates strain our laws to their own advantage and our
inconvenience if they will and can, but the administration of
these laws rests with us; and when they happen to break them,
they can have no decent pretence for expecting immunity.
