Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.

No. 789.]

Sir: I send herewith a copy, which has accidentally attracted my notice, of what purports to be an extract from an annual report of S. R. Mallory, who is pretending to act as Secretary of the Navy for the insurgents at Richmond. So soon as I can lay my hand upon a full copy of that paper I shall transmit it. In the mean time, it is proper to say that I have not the least doubt that the extract now sent is authentic.

It boldly avows the authority and activity of the insurgents at Richmond in the building of the rams in Great Britain and France on their account, and for their use in making war from British and French ports against the United States.

Secondly. It avows with equal boldness and directness the sending of twenty-seven so-called commissioned officers, and forty reliable petty officers from Richmond to the British North American provinces, to organize an expedition from thence to co-operate with the so-called army officers, in making war against the United States on our northern border lakes. And it confesses that this expedition has only been defeated through the watchfulness of the British provincial authorities.

Thirdly. In connexion with these two avowals, the same conspirator says that he has sent another courier with instructions, which will shortly be made apparent to the enemies of the insurgents nearer home, which may possibly mean instructions under which the actors in the piracy and murder lately committed on board the Chesapeake proceeded in that criminal enterprise from and returned to the British provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.

You will lose no time in laying this information before Earl Russell, and you will submit to him, as the opinion of this government, that the proof thus furnished is sufficient to remove all doubt that might yet be lingering over the objects, character, and designs of the builders of the steam-rams which her Majesty’s government has recently detained in the British ports upon your representation.

Secondly. In the opinion of this government, a toleration in Great Britain, or in those provinces, of the practices avowed by the insurgents, after the knowledge of them now communicated to his lordship, would not be neutrality, [Page 47] but would be a permission to the enemies of the United States to make war against them from the British shores.

Thirdly. It is the opinion of this government that to tolerate in the British realm or provinces, without some restraint, these avowed enemies of the United States, while carrying on the hostile practices now avowed, after the knowledge herein communicated, would not be an exercise of the unquestioned right of sheltering political exiles, but would be permitting them to use the British soil and British waters, and British vessels and armaments, to wage war against a country with whom Great Britain is at peace.

Fourthly. That in the opinion of this government it is the design of the confederates in these proceedings to involve Great Britain in a war with the United States, and, at least, that they have a direct tendency to produce that evil, which is mutually to be deprecated by both nations.

Fifthly. This government has borne itself towards that of Great Britain under these annoyances in the spirit and in the manner that have seemed best calculated to defeat the wicked design of the insurgents, without giving cause of offence or irritation to the British people.

Sixthly. That these new difficulties occur most unseasonably, at a time when the Congress of the United States are considering the question of legally terminating the so-called reciprocity convention, which regulates the commercial intercourse between this country and the British North American provinces—a question of deep interest to the whole British empire.

The President wishes that he was able to suggest to her Majesty’s government any adequate remedy for the deplorable state of things to which I have referred, not inconsistent with the policy that Great Britain has adopted in regard to this insurrection. But, in the opinion of this government, that state of things has resulted, although unintentionally and unexpectedly on the part of her Majesty’s government, from that very policy itself. The recognition of the insurgents, without navy, ports, courts, or coasts, as a belligerent naval power was deemed by them, and by ill-disposed British subjects conspiring with the insurgents, as an invitation to them to use British ports, navy, courts, and coasts, to make themselves the naval power they are acknowledged to be, and yet are not.

Indications of popular favor towards this design of the insurgents are not wanting in British communities. If we correctly understand occurrences of the hour, there are not only in the British provinces, but also in the British realm, and in its very Parliament, many persons who are engaged in advancing that design, or who at least are pursuing practices which they must well know necessarily tend to exhaust the patience of the United States, and to provoke our citizens, in self-defence, either to seek their avowed enemies within British jurisdiction, or to adopt some other form of retaliation. It must be manifest that this government can do nothing more to prevent that design than it has already done. If it is to be prevented, it would seem that something further than what has yet been done must now be done by her Majesty’s government.

After making these frank explanations to Earl Russell in the spirit of perfect friendliness, and in the most respectful manner, you will for the present leave the whole subject for his just consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

[Page 48]

Extracts from the report of S. R. Mallory, secretary of the navy of the rebel government.

During the months of July and August I sent twenty-seven commissioned officers and forty trustworthy petty officers to the British provinces, with orders to organize an expedition and co-operate with army officers in an attempt to release the confederate prisoners confined on Johnson’s island, in Lake Erie. From time to time I learned that the arrangements made were such as to insure the most complete success. A large amount of money had been expended, and just as our gallant naval officers were about to set sail on this expedition, the English authorities gave information to the enemy, and thus prevented the execution of one of the best-planned enterprises of the present war.

In accordance with the order of the president, early in the present year I despatched several agents to England and France, with orders to contract for eight iron-clad vessels, suitable for ocean service, and calculated to resist the ordinary armament of the wooden vessels of the enemy. These ships were to be provided with arms, and designed expressly to break the blockade of such of the ports as were not blockaded by the iron-clad monitors of the enemy. Five of these vessels were contracted for in England, and three in France. Due precautions were taken against contravening the laws of England in the construction and equipment of the vessels. They have been completed, but owing to the construction of her neutrality law, the government of England stationed several war vessels at the mouth of the Mersey, and prevented their departure from England. Subsequently they were seized by the British government. Another and larger vessel has since been completed, but it is doubtful if she will be allowed to leave the shores of England, although it is believed the precautions taken are sufficient to exempt her from the fate of her consorts.

The vessels being constructed in France have been subjected to so many official visitations that I have forwarded instructions to cease operations upon them until the result of negotiations, now pending, shall permit our agent to resume work upon them. In this connexion it is proper for me to state that the great revulsion in popular sentiment, both in England and France, towards the confederate government, has rendered our efforts to obtain supplies from those countries almost abortive. In view of all possible contingencies, I have instructed the agents of this department to wait a more favorable opportunity for carrying out the instructions previously forwarded. By the last courier I sent instructions that will shortly be made apparent to our enemies nearer home. I do not deem it advisable to communicate any portion of these plans to your honorable body at the present time, for reasons perfectly satisfactory to the president.

Although the operations of our navy have not been extensive, I cannot overlook the services of Captain Semmes in the Alabama. During the year he has captured upwards of ninety vessels, seventy of which he destroyed, the others being either bonded or released. One of the greatest drawbacks this officer reports having experienced is the difficulty he now has in procuring full supplies of coal. The provincial English authorities have hitherto afforded him every facility, but recently they have interpreted their neutrality laws so stringently that our war vessels and privateers are much embarrassed in obtaining suitable supplies.