Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

116. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 28, 1977, 3–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with the Jordanian Delegation led by Royal Court Chief Abdul Hamid Sharaf of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

• President
• Vice President
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Mr. David Aaron
• Ambassador Thomas Pickering
• Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
• Mr. William B. Quandt
• Mr. Jerrold Schecter
• Mr. Hamilton Jordan
• Mr. Robert Lipshutz
• His Excellency Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Chief of the Royal Jordanian Court
• His Excellency Hassan Ibrahim, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
• His Excellency Abdullah Salah, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

President: It is a pleasure to have you here. I have appreciated the constructive attitude of your government on the Middle East peace negotiations. You understand how complex the situation is with us having to negotiate among the Arabs, with Israel, and with the Soviets. We need all the help that we can get, and your government has been most cooperative and constructive. I’d like to ask how you feel about a call that we might make with the Soviets for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. We still have the details to work out. Some of the parties insist on a unified Arab delegation, while Israel and Egypt prefer separate negotiations. All of the Arabs seem to want the PLO to be represented, but Israel is reluctant. We hope that the Soviets will take a constructive role and so far they have been very helpful and have not obstructed progress.

We are now drafting principles of agreement with the Soviet Union, and this will be useful in formulating an invitation to Geneva. We believe that the Conference at the outset should have a unified Arab delegation which will include Palestinians and PLO. Israel has shown some willingness to accept this, but not if there are well-known PLO members, but non-famous PLO figures might be suitable. You might help us to identify some of these. After the opening of meetings at Geneva, where all of the parties could spell out their views, I understand that your position is that you prefer three committees: withdrawal; peace; and the Palestinian question. In order to accommodate that concept, to which we do not object, and to get negotiations going, we believe that subcommittees should be formed as follows: Egypt and Israel to discuss the Sinai, the security arrangements there, transportation, etc.; Jordan and Israel on the specific bilateral issues between the two countries; the same between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights; and for the Palestinian entity and the arrangements on the West Bank, this should be left for the Israelis, the Jordanians and Palestinians. If there is need for a special study of the refugees, that could be done in a multinational group.

To assure Arab harmony, the Arabs could consult, and we would even use our good offices among them. If the Syrians want to withhold agreement until they are satisfied with the solution of the Palestinian question, they could do so. I hope that this general format will be acceptable. We have no particular interest in which form is adopted, but we want to reach a solution that the parties can accept. We recognize that the negotiations may be long and tedious. We will have to let the technical groups work and then go back to the leaders for decisions. This general approach is acceptable to the Soviets and hopefully will be to the other parties. When the subcommittees reach an impasse, we would want to stick with the process of seeking agreement. The reports of the subcommittees could go back to the plenary sessions, and to their governments, and eventually could lead to agreements and treaties. I have outlined what we hope for. Perhaps you could comment. We think our views are fairly close to yours.

Sharaf: Thank you, Mr. President, for the time you are taking with us and for receiving us. I want to bring you His Majesty King Hussein’s greetings. We have followed with great admiration your efforts on both the international and domestic scenes for the betterment of the United States and of the world. His Majesty and the Jordanian people have been impressed with your sincerity and courage in working against great odds to solve these many problems, and we hope your efforts will be successful in the Middle East and elsewhere. We have had the opportunity to meet with Secretary Vance and to state our views, and we provided some written proposals which also outlined our ideas.² At the risk of repeating, let me emphasize our interest in substance over procedure. There is a danger that procedures can swallow us all up.

President: I wish everyone agreed.

Sharaf: On the substantive points that you have outlined—withdrawal, the end of occupation, the right of Palestinians to their national entity through the process of self-determination, the mutual guarantees for coexistence, and so forth—these are the components of a settlement and we can support them. They are in the interest of Arabs, of Jordan, and Israel as well. To reach these goals, you have proposed convening of the Geneva Conference and we agree. Very early on, several months ago, we suggested the idea of a unified Arab delegation. Even at the time of UN Ambassador Jarring, we proposed that idea. In our view, it helps keep the unity of the Arab position, and it will also be good for Israel, because it will achieve a collective Arab commitment to peace. So this provides a good approach to Geneva, but we would also accept the idea of individual delegations. We would agree to have a Palestinian component in an Arab delegation, and in 1974 we accepted that the PLO represents the Palestinians.³ We still accept this, but we are flexible. If the other Arabs agree to some formula that has Palestinian representation without well-known PLO figures, this would be acceptable to us. If the rights of Palestinians can be defined, the question of representation would only be a minor problem. Not everyone agrees, but US policy is moving in the right direction. You have helped build momentum and you have given priority to the Middle East, and you have outlined fair parameters for a settlement. This has helped create a climate of optimism concerning the framework of a settlement emphasizing the rights of the Palestinians, their homeland, withdrawal, all in exchange for a lasting and total peace. We suggested to Secretary Vance that a unified Arab delegation would be our preference. Palestinian representation in that delegation is useful and necessary. If the Arab partners are ready to find a formula, without familiar Palestinian figures included, we would agree. We are not wedded to any one form.

In splitting into committees, we prefer to keep issues together when discussing principles in the plenary session with the unified delegation. These issues are withdrawal and borders, peace obligations and guarantees, and the Palestinian question. These cut across geographical lines and all countries have a stake. We suggested in the past that the committees into which the conference splits should be functional, not geographic. There should be committees of the whole, based on subject matter. Our reason for this is that it helps to maintain a collective Arab commitment and keeps Arab unity intact and emphasizes the unity of the problems. There may be some technical questions of a strictly bilateral nature. These can be handled in informal, bilateral working groups. The future of the Palestinians should be dealt with in a plenary session or in a committee of the whole.

There are two components of the Palestinian question. After Israeli withdrawal, there will be the question of the political future of the Palestinians. There is also the question of the refugees. The refugee question is governed by UN Resolutions on the repatriation or compensation of refugees. Concerning the political future, we believe that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and those outside, after Israeli withdrawal, should decide for themselves the character of their homeland and should choose their leaders and their relations with their neighbors. Their leadership and their political future should not be imposed upon them.

In our view, a transitional international authority should take over the occupation from Israel of the West Bank and Gaza, with Israeli withdrawal occurring after a few months, perhaps six months. The international authority should prepare the climate for a referendum and should reactivate the structure of the civil service that already exists. The police force can be reactivated. The displaced persons, those who left the areas in 1967, would be readmitted. Within a period of two years, there should be a plebiscite choosing political leaders, establishing constituent assembly, and determining the kind of entity. Palestinians should be able to choose an independent state or federation with Jordan. At the right time, we will present our views on this. The option should be clear and limited. Our view of a settlement is based on these ideas. Concerning security and international guarantees, we can also explore several possibilities. We are also ready to discuss the reduction of military forces. There are various concrete measures that can be taken, short of actual Israeli forces remaining in Arab territory. We have also outlined our views on Jerusalem. East Jerusalem should return to Arab sovereignty, but the city should be unified with free access to holy places. These are the components of a fair settlement. We should agree on as much as possible before a peace conference, or early on in order to open the way to a successful conclusion at Geneva.

Concerning the idea of bilateral committees, we have some reservations. We prefer functional committees, but nothing precludes technical discussions in bilateral channels, so we are not far from your views. Our sensitivity on this issue focuses primarily on the Palestinian question. We want the other Arab countries to support the idea of self-determination. We feel that Israel has territorial designs on the West Bank, and we realize that this is the most difficult problem. We cannot accept the idea of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli occupation, with some special relationship to Jordan. This is a non-starter. Israel is changing the nature of the occupied territories. This is our view. We want to be as helpful as possible. I should explain that we realize how much of an effort you are making and we want to help our common cause.

President: Our position is close to yours, and we continue to support withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-1967 lines, with minor modifications. We support a Palestinian homeland, although we have not talked of its political identity. We have talked of a genuine peace, eventually leading to full diplomatic relations, but the differences among the nations are profound. We see strong differences between Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Jordan and Syria are closer to one another than to Egypt. Israel wants to use every opportunity to keep occupied territory and to prevent the creation of a Palestinian homeland, and they also want peace and acceptance from the Arabs. These are difficult problems to surmount. We hope that all the parties will be flexible in order to get the process started.

If there were a unified Arab delegation, King Hussein and President Assad could claim this as a success. If later, bilateral discussions begin, you could call them technical discussions, while Israel might emphasize the importance of these negotiations. Israel does want to be recognized by each country, and wants to be dealt with equally. The Arabs want to combine in order to avoid that. The Arab countries feel that the PLO should be spokesman for the Palestinians, while Israel sees the PLO as a radical terrorist group committed to the destruction of Israel. We have a profound national interest in the Middle East. We recognize the differences among the parties, but we hope that with the convening of the Geneva Conference, which is not an end in itself, and with the expression of our views, it might be possible to build international opinion behind the Geneva Conference, and a peace settlement. This would make it difficult for any party to withdraw and risk isolation.

There may be a problem that some leaders may have made statements in the past that would limit their flexibility. There has been a history of hatred and a lack of communication. This may be the case with President Assad, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin, although it is less of a problem for His Majesty. But all of them face that problem. It is difficult for them to change policy. They have to take a more aggressive stand for peace than they have in the past, at least in public. It is hard to see a peace agreement unless the parties are willing to be flexible and are prepared to have a modicum of confidence and faith in the United States. We are not trying to impose our terms. We don’t want to show any preference or partisanship, but we are determined to succeed, although sometimes I am tempted to say “the hell with it” and just get out, and let the parties go to war if they want. But we have seen some progress. You and Egypt have been helpful. I want to ask you to take a message to His Majesty and ask him if he will accept the format that I have described.

We have some differences on the utility of bilateral groups for negotiations. I feel that you are wrong and that we are right. It would complicate it to have so many parties involved. There is no reason for Assad to participate in talks on Sinai, or for Sadat to worry about the Golan Heights. If the Jordanians and Egyptians were to be involved in the discussion of the Golan Heights, it would guarantee a failure. I proposed to Foreign Minister Khaddam that Israel should be given this small victory, but that the Arabs can consult with one another and they could agree not to sign anything unless they are satisfied with all of the other agreements, including those dealing with the Palestinian question. President Assad can say that there will be no deal on the Golan Heights unless the Palestinian refugees and Palestinian political future have been fairly dealt with. His ultimate acceptance can be reserved until there has been an overall agreement, but we cannot get a quick agreement, and the Israeli and Arab views are still far apart.

We have some influence over Israel, but we cannot force them to negotiate. They were convinced that we saw their presence in Lebanon as unacceptable, and they got out. This is also true about the settlements. And they have been convinced by us and by world opinion that the Palestinian question must be addressed, and that Palestinian representatives, including the PLO, must be at Geneva. So they are moving in a constructive manner, slowly, and the issues remain complex.

I would be happy to see Israel accept Jordan’s proposal. I don’t care about where the lines are. The most sensitive issue is probably Jerusalem, and the most complex is the Palestinian question. I have expressed my concern. If you reach the point of doubting our intentions or capabilities to keep the process of peace moving forward, Jordan can always withdraw from the negotiations. We need to have some trust, and we need flexibility.

I have asked Secretary Vance after his talks with Dayan, Fahmy, Khaddam, and you, to write down some of the proposals that we have on the format of the Geneva Conference. These are acceptable to us and the Soviet Union. There are differences, and all of the parties will say they don’t like some elements but this is the best that we can get, and then we should go to Geneva and hope for the best.

You know our views on the ultimate settlement. Our views are not incompatible with yours. We have said the same things to all of the parties, and we have made good progress so far. If, at Geneva, all of the parties can express their views and communication can begin, and the subcommittees can be set up, we will try to keep things moving. If we fail, we will have at least done our best, but the first step is procedural, and we have to remove the obstacles. I have said as best I can what our views are. I have other work to do than to concentrate on the Middle East, and I can’t spend all of my time trying to work out these areas of disagreement. We will try to proceed carefully and public statements like those that the Israelis made recently are difficult to accommodate. We have asked them not to do this again. We hope that you will let Secretary Vance know your views on our principles. I think that Israel has come a long way, certainly compared to before, and so have Jordan and Egypt. Syria may be more reluctant, but they are talking in good faith. I don’t want to separate Egypt and Israel. I understand your concerns. I know that Jordan can’t take full responsibility for the Palestinian question, which would risk the possible condemnation of Jordan by the other Arabs. I want to be responsive to your needs.

Secretary Vance: After two hours with Foreign Minister Khad-dam,⁴ he said that if the Palestinian question could be left to the Arabs, this could be solved without creating obstacles to peace. Do you believe that this is true, or do you think that, if the Arabs decide, they will come up with something that would be an obstacle? For example, would they insist on well-known PLO members?

Sharaf: This is difficult. You are asking me my judgment on what Foreign Minister Khaddam said. If the various Arab parties were to realize the seriousness of the American commitment, then we could get a decision on the Palestinian representation question. Then we might be able to agree. I can’t go into specifics, and I hope there have been no problems of communication or gaps with the Syrians. We will try to keep in touch with the Egyptians and Syrians. Egypt has been saying that the PLO must be represented and the Syrians have been too. I don’t see how they are going to back off.

President: We also see the PLO as part of the delegation, and Israel agrees, but there is the problem about the identity of the Palestinian representatives. They should not be well-known PLO. Israel will not go to Geneva with Arafat. There is a problem of how to represent the PLO without having well-known PLO members.

Secretary Vance: Foreign Minister Khaddam said that the Palestinians could only be represented by the PLO, and I said that could be an obstacle. I urged him to be flexible, and at the end, he said that if you are serious about the Palestinian entity or homeland, then it would be easier for us and we would know how to act.

Sharaf: This is what we suggested. If the US is to commit itself to self-determination, then it will be easier for us to choose representatives. The way the President has put it is manageable.

President: It would be easier if the PLO would adopt the formula that we have outlined on Resolution 242 and Israel’s right to exist, and they can add whatever they want beside that. We have signed an agreement with Israel, and I reconfirmed it, and I cannot break my word. We cannot meet with them until they have taken that step. The PLO, with Syrian encouragement, has said that this is a bargaining chip which they will only trade for gaining status as a nation. I am asking them to trust me as I have asked you. If the PLO could communicate with us, maybe we could have a group on refugees, and there could be Palestinians there. Others would be there on the political future of the Palestinians. That delegation should have some Palestinian mayors, some elected officials, and some prominent Palestinians from Jordan, Syria, Egypt, or Gaza, who might want to be involved. Below Arafat there might be acceptable leaders. But we need a good-faith effort, and we need a firm commitment to the concept. The makeup of the Palestinian group is a problem. They should not all have to be active members of the PLO. The mayors may be sympathizers with the PLO, but it is hard for us to inject ourselves in this question. This is mostly an Arab problem.

Sharaf: It may be manageable from what you have heard from the Egyptians and Syrians. The choice of the people would not be so difficult. Concerning our faith in the United States, we have great faith. In Jordan, we have had a very close relationship with you for a long time. Some of our colleagues may need reassurance, but not Jordan. In recent months, we have worked hard to explain issues. We have told our Arab colleagues that the United States is not a monolith, that it has a complex structure, and that the American leaders favor a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Some Arabs still have illusions and misunderstandings, but we have trust in you and we will keep it. More specifically, we will try to work with Secretary Vance and to solve these procedural problems. We want to emphasize that we do not exclude bilateral committees. Our main concern is that the major issues be discussed in plenary. More technical problems can be dealt with in working groups. The Palestinian question should be handled by the full Arab side in plenary. The basic issue should be a collective responsibility. Israel will have to help resolve this. We hope that you will be patient while we work out these details.

Secretary Vance: Do you mean that the issue of withdrawal should be discussed in plenary?

Sharaf: It should be discussed collectively, and there would be advantage in having parallel discussions, so that talks about peace and withdrawal would go on simultaneously. Then, as Israel sees progress on peace, she may be more forthcoming on withdrawal.

President: But if Israel has to negotiate with a combined delegation, there is no way that Egypt could yield anything to Israel in any part of Sinai, even if it wanted to. Syria is already committed to total withdrawal, so I cannot see any progress there. It would prevent the settlement. Syria will not agree to Israel keeping any part of the West Bank, but you and Israel might agree to some form of partition, perhaps involving only a tiny piece of territory. But if the Syrians were there, it would be almost impossible to have even these small adjustments. Both Israel and Egypt see this as an obstacle. Maybe you also do in private. We are not trying to drive a wedge between the Arabs, but if you agree to minor adjustments on the West Bank, and if Egypt accepts a demilitarized zone of a certain size, and if Syria says there can be UN troops in the Golan Heights, these are positions that should be dealt with on a bilateral basis. There would be no chance of agreement with a unified Arab delegation. This would cause me to be completely frustrated and I would not want to spend any more time on the problem.

Sharaf: It should be possible to work out the procedures. Further adjustments can be dealt with in bilateral committees. But the principle should be dealt with on one level, and the principle is that of withdrawal, and then border adjustments could be discussed in the groups.

President: That helps me. I can see a joint approach on the Palestinian political future. It is unfair to put the burden on Jordan to accommodate all of the Palestinians in its delegation. On the question of peace, Egypt might be prepared to move more rapidly, along with Jordan. Since you have already showed some understanding of this, you may go further than Syria right now. You should not be required to move at the Syrian pace. On the definition of peace, and on border delimitations, these subcommittees could do some useful work. On the Palestinian political future, and on the refugees, that could be done on a multilateral basis. Israel wants a separate discussion of the refugees as such. Of course, the refugees are also tied to the question of the Palestinian political future. But there might be refugees in Kuwait and Iraq, whose rights have been violated, and we need to talk about how to deal with the refugee camps. We could have a separate committee just for refugees, but the definition of these areas for discussion might be decided in the plenary with the joint Arab delegation, including Palestinians, mostly PLO. You should be flexible. Give us a chance to get started. I have no specific preferences, but the joint Arab delegation discussing borders makes no sense.

Sharaf: Some issues should be dealt with in functional groups and some technical issues on a bilateral basis.

President: But these should have the same status. Each side can claim some victories.

Sharaf: On the question of peaceful relations, maybe if it came to talking about potash and economic problems, then we could talk bilaterally, but there are problems like the Arab boycott that are collective in nature. The question of normalization of relations in the future is a collective problem. With peace, these issues will fall into place. If there were peace, there would be no need for an embargo, then trade, and transportation, and water rights would be easy to solve. So some questions fall into a bilateral category, and some in a collective category. We want to ask you to be flexible in your approach and to accept some collective and some bilateral discussions. If Geneva can allow this, we believe it can be done.

President: I understand the problem that you have and your ideas. I see some openings. The Israelis are very insistent, and I agree that on some matters they should negotiate with each of the individual countries, such as on the question of boundaries. There may be some where the Arabs want to negotiate as a group, like on the political future of the Palestinians. The boycott also might be in a multilateral group and trade might be in a bilateral one. There are some logical delineations. Some of our views are very close and I hope for flexibility. We will try to be fair.

Sharaf: I would like to make one more point. Israel has said that they would accept a unified Arab delegation, but then they subverted the idea with their conditions by saying that they would only discuss the West Bank with Jordan. They gave you a semantic concession, but they retracted it in reality. The political future of the Palestinians involves responsibility of the Arabs generally, and is not just a question of the West Bank. It involves borders of the political entity, and the political future of the Palestinians. This is the basis of our concern with the need for functional groups, or for discussing the Palestinians in a plenary session. We can accept both of these approaches.

President: I’ll let Secretary Vance work out the details.

Sharaf: But you have become an expert by now.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement 1977: Volume I [II]. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
2. See footnote 4, Document 112.
3. A reference to the 1974 Rabat Conference Declaration. See footnote 8, Document 6.
4. See Document 115.