Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

112. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 24, 1977, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East Talks—Meeting With The Jordanians

PARTICIPANTS

• Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
• Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Minister to the Royal Jordanian Court
• Hassan Al-Ibrahim, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
• Abdallah Salah, Jordanian Ambassador
• United States
• Secretary Vance
• Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary^*
• Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Alfred L. Atherton, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Ambassador Thomas Pickering
• William Quandt, National Security Council
• David A. Korn, Policy Planning Staff

The Secretary welcomed Ministers Sharaf and Ibrahim.

The Secretary proposed first a review of the situation in South Lebanon, which he noted has been a matter of great concern to the United States during the last several days. We have been troubled by the way the situation has developed and have been in constant touch with all the parties to solve it. As of this morning, the Secretary said, he was hopeful that there would be an early cease-fire, perhaps as early as tomorrow morning. It was essential to get a cease-fire and essential that Israeli forces in South Lebanon withdraw. The Secretary repeated that he was hopeful that there would be a cease-fire within 24 hours. He asked Mr. Habib to give further details.

Mr. Habib said that following the Shtaura Agreement the Israeli position was that the Palestinians should withdraw north of the Lithani, which was much further than the 10 kilometers specified in the agreement. The Lebanese could not negotiate that with the PLO; it was too much for them. At this point the Christian militia took advantage of a tactical situation and grabbed a hill overlooking the Palestinian positions. For this they had Israeli support. The Palestinians responded and reenforced their positions, but it was difficult for them to do so because of Israeli artillery fire. Fighting developed and there was a danger that the Shtaura Agreement would collapse. If it did the result would be that there would be no cease-fire and that Lebanese sovereignty in the South would not be restored. Mr. Habib said that at this point we began working to get Israeli withdrawal and agreement on a cease-fire that nobody would take advantage of. Mr. Habib said that in our conversations with the Lebanese we have urged them to put their force into the south as soon as possible. General Khoury, the Lebanese Army Commander, has been in Washington and we have been talking with him about this. He says he hopes to have his forces in the south within 10 days.

The Secretary asked how many men would be in the Lebanese brigade that is to be sent into the south. Mr. Habib said about 1,000. The Secretary noted that originally there had been talk of three battalions, i.e., about 1,500 men. Mr. Habib said General Khoury has more men planned but now the figure is about 1,000. The other problem, Mr. Habib said, is that there has to be restraint on the problem of retribution. The Lebanese Government really is not happy with the leaders of the militia in the south, but the Israelis feel an obligation to them. The Lebanese will have to be cautious in dealing with them.

Minister Sharaf expressed appreciation for the briefing on Lebanon and for the helpful actions that the United States has been taking in Lebanon. He noted that General Khoury has also been to Jordan to seek military assistance. Mr. Habib said General Khoury came to the United States to expedite the shipment of arms, and we have assured him we will do everything we can. The Defense Department will meet Lebanon’s needs in the most rapid ways possible.

The Secretary suggested moving on now to review the talks with Dayan and Fahmy. Minister Sharaf said that before we turn to this he would like to convey a brief message from His Majesty King Hussein. His Majesty very much appreciated the Secretary’s invitation and sent the Secretary and the President his best regards and best wishes for success in their efforts in the foreign and domestic fields. His Majesty very much admires the way the President is handling these problems and is very pleased over the mutual confidence and sincerity that exists in relations between Jordan and the United States.

The Secretary expressed appreciation for the Minister’s kind words and said we are very pleased to have the opportunity to sit down with the Minister and share our thoughts on how to solve these problems of mutual interest. The Secretary said he would convey to the President His Majesty’s good words. The President was looking forward to meeting the Minister next week.

The Secretary said that the meetings so far have been a start. They have been useful. We still have a long way to go but at least the two meetings so far have been of a constructive nature and the parties have indicated some flexibility. The Secretary said that in the meeting with Dayan we went over the various aspects of the settlement issue, both substantive and procedural. Dayan stressed that everything was negotiable. We explored each issue in detail with them, but Dayan repeatedly assured that everything was negotiable. The Secretary said that Israel had prepared a draft of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.² He handed a copy to Sharaf, saying he felt that Jordan should have a copy of it. The Secretary said this is the only treaty the Israelis have prepared. The Minister would see that it goes into great detail and covers navigation, trade, and particularly the nature of peace. It is less precise, however, on the territorial issue. The Secretary said we had probed on this issue in our discussions with the Israelis. Their position basically is that territorial issues are for a negotiation at Geneva. At Geneva they will discuss each territorial issue with each of the parties. They foresee a series of bilateral treaties between themselves and each state, with Egypt on Sinai and with Syria on Golan. The West Bank is more complicated, the Secretary said, but primarily the Israelis expected to negotiate on it with Jordan. They propose to deal with the security issue through buffer zones, limited armament zones, and demilitarized zones.

The Secretary said the Israeli treaty does not cover guarantees. However, the question of guarantees did come up in the discussions with Dayan. The Secretary said that in his judgment the question of guarantees would be a very important aspect of the treaties. The current Israeli position is that they do not believe outside guarantees are necessary; they say they can take care of themselves. However, the Secretary said he believed that in fact their position was different and that the question of U.S. guarantees of a peace treaty would be extremely important. The Secretary added that the Israelis said they would go along with the idea of UN forces in buffer zones, but the UN forces would be observers rather than peace keeping forces in large numbers.

The Secretary said that on the West Bank we made clear that our position is that it is occupied territory to which the withdrawal provisions of 242 apply. Dayan said the Israeli position is that there should be no foreign sovereignty over the West Bank. They do not suggest that they want to annex the West Bank, but they do not want anybody else to have sovereignty there. We probed him on the question of functional partition of the West Bank; how they see the administration working. The Israelis said there are two ways of dealing with the West Bank problem, either by negotiations with Jordan or by negotiations with the West Bank leaders, for example, the mayors. The Israelis have not gone into this problem in detail with us, but they assured us they would do so before Geneva. The Secretary said the Israelis seem to be saying that they believe that day-to-day administration of the West Bank could be turned over to someone other than Israel, for example services could be administered by West Bankers, or by Jordan. The Israelis do not have to play a major role. They could make available medical or other services if the West Bankers wanted, but the West Bankers could also set up their own services if they so desired. On the military question, the Secretary said, the Israelis foresee a limited need for outposts but they stress that these would not affect the daily life of the West Bankers. On the other hand, the Secretary continued, the Israelis say the eastern border should be the Jordan River, so there are some inconsistencies. We will explore this more in depth with the Israelis in the meeting next week in New York, the Secretary said.

The Secretary felt the Israelis do not rule out a solution where there is someone other than Israel sovereign in the West Bank, but they hope that it is far off. Eventually, this has to happen, but their position is let’s not talk about when, but about how the area should be administered in the meantime. The Secretary turned to Mr. Habib and Mr. Atherton and asked for comments. Mr. Atherton pointed out that the Israelis had said that the Jordan should be their security border, not their international border. The Secretary agreed.

The Secretary said that Golan basically poses the same issues between Syria and Israel as Sinai does between Israel and Egypt. However, there is a difference in terrain and the size of the area, and the Israelis maintain that any withdrawal there would have to be small because of the nature of the terrain.

The Secretary said we came down very hard on the Israelis on the issue of settlements in the occupied territories. We restated our position regarding the illegality of settlements and stressed the importance of this issue and the fact that settlements create obstacles to peace. We told the Israelis that this question is of utmost concern to us and the Arab countries.

The Secretary said that on Palestinian representation the position stated by Dayan was that the issue should be dealt with through a Jordanian delegation containing Palestinians. We also discussed with Dayan the possibility of a unified Arab delegation comprising the confrontation states and Palestinians. As we expected, the Israelis were against this, but Dayan said he would raise the question with Prime Minister Begin. The Secretary said he did not know what decision the Israelis have reached on this. He thought we should keep in mind both possibilities, i.e., a unified Arab delegation or separate delegations. The Israelis believe there should be a plenary session in Geneva which should then break up into bilateral working groups. Negotiation of the West Bank issue would depend on how the Palestinian representation question is resolved in the calling of the conference, and whether West Bank mayors are included in the delegation.

The Secretary said he would mention only briefly the talks with Fahmy since Egyptian positions are well-known to the Jordanians. Egypt wants a return to the 1967 borders, a Palestinian entity, and some form of self-determination for the Palestinians. Regarding the nature of peace, their position continues to vary from time to time, but they still see normalization taking place over a long period. They feel very strongly that the peace treaty should take effect only when the last Israeli soldier has withdrawn from occupied territory. On Palestinian representation, the Egyptians would accept a PLO delegation if the problem could be resolved that way. They would still agree to an Arab League delegation to represent the Palestinians. They would also consider a united Arab delegation, but they don’t think that is the best solution.

The Secretary said it is his judgment that if all of the Arab states decided in favor of a united Arab delegation, Egypt would accept that. Egypt would also accept Palestinians in a Jordanian delegation.

The Secretary said Fahmy felt it is important to convene Geneva before the end of the year and told us that Egypt would do all in its power to bring this about. The Secretary then asked Minister Sharaf if he had questions.

Minister Sharaf said that the Israelis speak of a security border on the Jordan. Did they also speak of a political or legal border. The Secretary replied that they had not, and he pointed out that Dayan had said that everything was subject to negotiation, including the West Bank. Sharaf asked if it was correct that the Israelis planned to continue establishing settlements on the West Bank. The Secretary replied affirmatively. The Secretary said we told the Israelis they were wrong in doing this. They have taken note of our deep concern, but have refused to commit themselves to refrain from establishing additional settlements. Sharaf asked if he understood correctly that the Israelis are ready for more withdrawal from Sinai and from Golan and the West Bank. The Secretary said yes. The Secretary asked for Sharaf’s thoughts on the Palestinian representation question. Sharaf said that Jordan’s position all along was that the rights of the Palestinians are more important than the question of their representation at Geneva.

Sharaf said Jordan is for an Arab United Delegation and had been an early supporter of this idea. The Jordanians had tried to convince their Arab partners that this was the best way. The Syrians support the idea of a united Arab delegation but the Egyptians are hesitant, although Sadat seems more flexible on it than Fahmy. Sharaf said that Jordan sees two ways of solving the Palestinian representation problem: either the PLO is invited, or there is a united Arab delegation including the PLO. Sharaf was doubtful that the PLO would accept 242 or the limited role we envisage for it at Geneva unless the Arabs, including the Saudis, make a major effort with it on the basis of a strong U.S. commitment to work at Geneva for Palestinian self-determination and the right to a homeland.

Sharaf said that while in the past the Jordanians had proposed the presence at Geneva of the PLO in any way agreed, he wanted to make a “radical suggestion” for a breakthrough on this issue. This was that the U.S. make a strenuous effort and take a strong stand on Palestinian determination, declaring publicly the right of all Palestinians to self-determination. Sharaf said that if the U.S. were to do this, the question of PLO representation would be of diminished importance and there might be less requirement for Palestinian representation at Geneva.

Sharaf said Jordan is open-minded about the ways of handling the Palestinian representation problem: it would accept a united Arab delegation, an Arab League Delegation, or a Palestinian delegation. But, he emphasized, Jordan cannot agree to the PLO being represented in a Jordanian delegation. The reason, he said, is that legally Jordan does not represent Gaza or all the Palestinians. In an ultimate settlement, Jordan cannot determine the fate of the Palestinians. Sharaf said also that having the PLO in a Jordanian delegation would in fact legalize the PLO presence in Jordan. Mr. Quandt asked if there were a united Arab delegation with some Palestinians in it, would Jordan object to the Jordanian and Palestinian delegations negotiating on the future of the West Bank. The Palestinians would not be members of the Jordanian delegation but they would negotiate together with Jordan regarding the West Bank.

Sharaf said Jordan proposes a functional division for the negotiations. He foresaw three functional groups: (1) a group for withdrawal and borders; (2) a group for peace and guarantees, and (3) a group for the Palestinian problem. All the parties would be represented on all these groups. Sharaf said Jordan felt this would be the best thing to do whether or not there is a united Arab delegation. Sharaf then turned to Mr. Quandt and said that he could answer Mr. Quandt’s question in this way: Jordan would not object to cooperation with PLO representatives in the negotiations, but, as he had said before, the Palestinians could not be part of the Jordanian delegation.

The Secretary said he wanted to ask a question about the Jordanian position on functional division of the negotiations. Was it realistic to expect to be able to make progress in negotiating territorial issues with such large groups? For example, on Sinai, does it make sense to have all the parties discuss Rafah and Sharm el-Sheikh? Sharaf said Jordan’s concern is to maintain Arab unity. A functional division for negotiations may not be the most practical thing in all instances. But, he added, of course there is no need to force all the parties to attend a discussion of the details of a Sinai agreement, for example. However, the Palestinian question would have to be discussed by the overall delegation. Sharaf repeated that on the territorial question there would be no need for everybody to attend the specific negotiations. Ambassador Pickering asked if it would be convenient to have a group to work on Sinai and Golan that could report to the whole delegation. Sharaf said Jordan would be open-minded on this. Mr. Habib said the important thing is whether the Israeli-Egyptian border would be discussed only between Israel and Egypt or with others. The Secretary pointed out that Egyptians do not want others involved in their negotiations. Mr. Habib noted that the Israelis feel very strongly about this. Sharaf repeated that Jordan will be open-minded on this but it does want to maintain the principle of Arab unity. For example, the question of Gaza and other Palestinian questions must be dealt with by all the Arabs at Geneva. Lebanon, for example, will want to have as much a say as Jordan. However, if Egypt and Syria want to handle their territorial issues bilaterally Jordan would be open-minded on this.

Mr. Habib said he thought Minister Sharaf had provided the answer to this problem. For certain issues, the Arab delegation would meet as a whole, and for others, there would be sub-committees. The Secretary pointed out that the Syrians may not be as flexible on this as the Jordanians. Sharaf replied that the Jordanians have always been more flexible than the Syrians. Mr. Habib pointed out that the Israelis have to be taken into consideration too. They will not want to deal with all the Arabs on all issues. Sharaf repeated that it was important to maintain Arab unity on major issues. He added that he thought it would even be preferable from Israel’s point of view for the Arabs to maintain their unity, since it would make it easier for them to make commitments and keep them, particularly commitments on peace.

The Secretary said that our view is that there should be a unified Arab delegation to handle the procedural problem. On the substan-tive issues, we believe there should be a Palestinian entity, self-determination, a transitional period, and a mechanism for administration during the transitional period. The Secretary said he wanted to talk in more detail about this. Our position as he had just described it was known to the Arab states but we have not stated it publicly in a comprehensive manner up to now. So far we have spoken only of a Palestinian entity and self-determination. At an appropriate time, we will be ready to state publicly the other elements of our position, the Secretary said, but that time is not yet at hand. Mr. Habib pointed out that the Secretary had talked about all these elements of our position in background discussions with newspapermen. Sharaf said that it was unfortunate that the Arab public did not know what our full position is.

Sharaf said that on the question of the link between Jordan and the Palestinian entity, Jordan believes in the principle of unity, continuity and very close relations between Palestinians and Jordan. It believes that the Palestinians should make a conscious choice regarding the type of relationship they want with Jordan. If they want their own state, that will be fine with Jordan. If they want unity between the West Bank and Jordan, that will also be fine. But it has to be a conscious act. No outcome should be imposed on the Palestinians. That is our position, Sharaf said.

The Secretary said he thought it would be best if we could agree on a solution for Arab representation at Geneva. His view was that the united Arab delegation is the solution. He asked if Sharaf agreed. Sharaf said yes. The Secretary said the President will want to discuss this with Sharaf. The Secretary said we should now concentrate on getting general agreement on a united Arab delegation. On the delegation’s composition, one way to resolve the Palestinian representation issue would be to have Palestinian mayors and other persons whose credentials would not be examined by the Israelis. They could also be PLO but not so well-known as to make it an issue. The Secretary said he thought the PLO should be able to go along with this. PLO leaders could be present in Geneva (but not at the conference) to give instructions to their people. The Secretary said his point was that the Palestinian delegation should have less well-known PLO members on it but it should be broader than just the PLO. There should be other Palestinians as well.

Sharaf said one difficulty is that there was no flexibility on the part of the PLO. They want some form of recognition and will demand it. They will want to appoint their people for Geneva. Sharaf said he did not see how this problem could be overcome. The Secretary said he realizes there is a problem, but we must find a way to deal with it or a way around it. Mr. Habib said we didn’t have to accept that the entire Palestinian group be PLO. He pointed out that Israel would not accept this. Sharaf said that at some point it would be good if the U.S. could talk with the PLO about this problem. The Secretary agreed but pointed out that so far the PLO had been unwilling to take the necessary steps to make it possible for us to talk to them. Sharaf said he could understand the PLO’s dilemma. What do they get in return for recognizing Israel? Would they get a U.S. guarantee of a homeland? The Secretary replied that we cannot give them a guarantee of a homeland but we can at some point make a statement regarding a homeland and self-determination. The Secretary asked if such a statement would solve the problem. Sharaf said he thought it would be helpful to focus more on the broad question of a Palestinian settlement than on the specific one of the PLO representation problem. The Palestinians support the PLO when they have no option, but when they know they have other options, they will be more reasonable. Sharaf suggested that if the Palestinians know that they can get a reasonable settlement for themselves without the PLO, they will force the PLO to change its position or they will abandon it.

The Secretary said suppose we say publicly that the Palestinian question must be on the agenda at Geneva and that this means the question of establishing a Palestinian entity through self-determination is to be an issue for negotiation at Geneva. Would that reassure the Palestinians and make them more flexible? Sharaf reported that it would certainly generate pressures on the PLO. Ibrahim commented that it would make a big difference over a period of time. Mr. Habib remarked that we do not have years; we are talking about weeks. Sharaf responded that Palestinian opinion cannot be changed overnight, but if there were a U.S. position taking into account the right of the Palestinians, this would force the PLO to become more moderate and help the PLO moderates. Ambassador Salah said that if the Palestinians feel the PLO is standing in the way of a breakthrough which would bring about Israeli withdrawal, the PLO would lose popularity and strength.

Mr. Quandt asked if there were agreement on a united Arab delegation, could Egypt, Jordan and Syria work together to select Palestinians for a united Arab delegation? Ibrahim said no, they would ask the PLO to designate the representatives. Mr. Quandt said that this is what we fear, but was there any possibility of controlling the composition of the Palestinian group. Sharaf indicated that we might be able to get agreement on a Palestinian delegation that would not be entirely PLO. Sharaf repeated that if the U.S. would make public statements reassuring the Palestinians in regard to a homeland and self-determination, this would put pressure on the PLO and encourage Palestinian moderates. Nonetheless, Sharaf said, we shouldn’t minimize the technical problem in this regard. He noted that Jordan does not recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. It believes that there must be self-determination and a vote. It is important, Sharaf said, that the PLO should know that it will not be able to get power automatically, but that the Palestinians are going to be able to determine their own future.

At this point the Secretary suggested the group adjourn for lunch.

The conversation resumed at the luncheon table. Sharaf asked about the Secretary’s talks with the Soviets.³ The Secretary said that on the nature of peace the Soviets agree that there must be normal relations. They believe there must be a Palestinian state and that it should have whatever affiliation it wants with its neighbors. They do not oppose the principle of self-determination. They feel that Geneva must be convened before the end of the year and will work with us for that. The Secretary added that the Soviets agree with us on the question of Israeli settlements in the occupied areas. Sharaf asked about SALT. The Secretary said we made some headway on this and narrowed the differences. We will continue working on it.

The Secretary said he had some questions on the Jordanian paper.⁴ He commented that the paper was very useful and a positive contribution.

Sharaf said he first would like to comment on another point. Dayan had suggested that it was essential that the West Bank be under Israeli sovereignty. Mr. Habib interjected that the Israelis had not used the word sovereignty; they spoke of presence or control. Then under Israeli control, Sharaf continued. Jordan is opposed to this idea because it is clear that the Israelis will never leave the West Bank and Gaza. Jordan does not want to be a party to Dayan’s proposal because it would amount to helping Israel achieve its goal of staying in the West Bank. What they are doing, Sharaf said, is trying to empty the West Bank. People on the West Bank are becoming increasingly restless. If they see there is no solution, they will move away. They will come to Jordan, since they have Jordanian nationality. Sharaf said that when the Israelis say everything is open to negotiations, what they mean, at least in regard to the West Bank, is that they will talk about it but not give in. The Secretary said he agreed that this may be true of some issues but he felt that on many of the issues Dayan would be prepared to negotiate seriously. Whether or not that would be the case for the West Bank is hard to answer. But on many issues, he felt that Dayan would press for flexibility.

Turning again to the Jordanian paper, the Secretary asked if it were realistic for the Jordanians to say that the minor territorial adjustments should each be on the basis of reciprocity. Sharaf said there need not be reciprocity in every instance but there should be an overall balance. The Secretary asked how the refugees would exercise their choice between repatriation and compensation and how Jordan would define who are refugees. Sharaf said the refugees have been defined by the UN. They are people who carry refugee cards and receive a ration. Ambassador Pickering pointed out that in Jordan refugees are defined as people who left Palestine in 1948. People who left in 1967 are displaced persons. Ibrahim commented that the term refugee is a well defined one. Sharaf noted that Ibrahim is well qualified to speak on this subject, since he is Minister of Refugees. Sharaf said refugees are persons defined by the UN as such. He reiterated that the Jordanian proposal would give the refugees of 1948 a choice between repatriation and compensation. If they chose compensation, they would become citizens of the new entity and participate in self-determination and elections.

The Secretary turned to Mr. Atherton and asked him to get for him the UN resolutions defining refugees.

The Secretary asked who would have the responsibility for compensation. Would it be Israel, or would an international fund have to be created? Mr. Habib pointed out that the Israelis will raise counterclaims for Jews displaced from Arab countries and for their property. Sharaf replied that Israel has already agreed to the principle of compensation. He added that the Arabs are ready to offer all Jews the right to return to the countries of their origin. Ambassador Salah stressed the need for foreign assistance to help build up the economy of the West Bank and Gaza, so that returnees can be integrated.

Sharaf stressed that it is important that the Palestinians be given the chance to express their desires. That is why Jordan has proposed a plebiscite and two options: a demilitarized independent state, or a link with Jordan. It is necessary to make these options clear, Sharaf said. The Secretary asked who would determine whether those would be the only two options in the plebiscite. Wouldn’t this be negotiated by the parties at Geneva? Sharaf said these are Jordan’s preferences for the options. There are of course “hundreds of other options.” The Secretary asked if the Syrians would not insist that the people of the Palestinian entity be able to opt for a federation with Syria and Jordan. Sharaf said this is a possibility; Jordan would consider it. Mr. Quandt made the point that the Israelis would not want to withdraw without knowing the nature of the entity that would come into existence on the West Bank. Sharaf said the Arabs would find it very difficult to accept the idea of Israel’s remaining on the West Bank while the plebiscite was going on. Mr. Atherton noted that the Jordanian proposal talks about a package deal. Sharaf confirmed this and said he couldn’t imagine a settlement that did not include all elements, Sinai, Golan and the Palestinians.

The Secretary asked if it is really practical to think of having the UN as the administering authority during the transitional period. Wouldn’t it be more practical to have a state like Jordan administering the West Bank? Or the U.S., Sharaf rejoined. The Secretary said he really couldn’t imagine Israel accepting the UN as an interim administrator. Mr. Habib asked if the Jordanians could contemplate the idea of joint Israeli-Jordanian administration during this period. Sharaf said it would be very difficult to accept this idea or to get agreement on it. After a moment’s reflection, however, he added that everything depends on the atmosphere. If a new atmosphere develops during the talks, the idea might be possible. But at this stage, Sharaf said, it will not pass. Sharaf added that the tendency now among the Arabs would be to call for either the UN or the Arab League to administer the West Bank during the transitional period. The Secretary asked how efficient the Arab League would be. Could they do the job? Ambassador Pickering said he had never heard anyone speak enthusiastically about the Arab League. Sharaf indicated that he did not want to state an opinion on this. During the ensuing discussion it was suggested that there might be a joint Israel-Jordan administration in fact without its being labelled as such.

The Secretary had noted that the Jordanian paper says East Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty. Does this mean that it would be part of the Palestinian entity? Sharaf said yes. The Jordanians used the word Arab sovereignty because they didn’t want to specify what kind of an entity there would be. The Secretary noted that there was still a problem on the Arab side regarding normal relations with Israel. Sharaf responded that, as King Hussein had told President Carter, the main problem is that the Arab countries have not thought about this very much. Mr. Atherton pointed out that the Arabs react against the idea. The Secretary noted that the Jordanian paper had used the words “peace documents,” not peace treaty. The Secretary said we thought the Jordanians were agreed on the term peace treaty. Sharaf replied that words are not important and noted that in translation from Arabic, a peace treaty and peace agreement were often used interchangeably. The important point, Sharaf said, is that the Arabs have agreed to make an agreement directly with Israel. The first time they accepted this idea was in 1971 during the Jarring Mission. Before that, they had thought of making agreement only with the Security Council.

The Secretary said he gathered Jordan has no problems about others guaranteeing the borders agreed upon by the parties. Sharaf said that in principle that is correct. The Secretary said his guess is that when we come down to it Israel may want there to be a separate bilateral agreement between itself and the U.S. guaranteeing the new borders. The Secretary said the Israelis have not suggested this, but he foresees it as a possibility. Sharaf replied that Senator Fulbright had proposed that the U.S. guarantee Israel’s pre-1967 War borders.

The Secretary asked about the local civil service and police on the West Bank. Sharaf said that all these services, i.e., health, administration, public works and education exist on the West Bank. Some are functioning now and others could easily be reactivated. The Secretary said he gathered the Jordanians really didn’t think there would be a major problem in establishing the structure necessary to administer the West Bank following Israeli withdrawal. Ibrahim replied, “None at all.” Mr. Quandt observed that the West Bank can run itself. Mr. Habib remarked that is also Dayan’s point; the West Bank can run itself.

The Secretary said he would have to excuse himself to go to the airport; he was already late. He said he looked forward to seeing the Minister on September 28 during his meeting with the President.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 107, 9/19/77–10/25/77 Vance Meetings with Middle East Foreign Ministers: 9–10/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Korn on September 26. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room and lunch took place in the Madison Room.
2. *Attended the luncheon only.
2. See Document 100.
3. Gromyko was in Washington September 22 and 23 primarily to discuss SALT. He and Vance discussed the Middle East on September 22 and he met with Carter on September 23. The communiqué issued at the end of the visit concludes with the brief statement: “The US and USSR affirmed that they will continue their determined efforts to convene the Geneva Conference by the end of this year at the latest.” (Department of State Bulletin, November 7, 1977, pp. 643–644) Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union.
4. In telegram 6818 from Amman, September 20, Ambassador Pickering reported that on September 20, King Hussein provided him with a paper entitled “Elements of a Peaceful Settlement: Proposed Ideas,” which outlined Jordanian proposals for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840084–1078)